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
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## PREFATORY NOTE

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Wendell Clausen  
*Editor*





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## ASPECTS OF RELIGION IN CLASSICAL GREECE

W. DEN BOER

EARLY in the present century, Gilbert Murray wrote a book entitled *Four Stages of Greek Religion*; in a later edition (1925) another stage was added, and the book became known throughout the world under the title *Five Stages of Greek Religion*. With his view of Greek religion as a progression, toward humane behavior and rationality, both ultimately doomed to succumb to foreign influences, Murray represented the spirit of his time: history not as continuance but as progress, and this process arrested only by a catastrophe too great for the people of the later Classical world. This explains why the last chapter is headed "The Failure of Nerve": people were no longer psychically capable of dealing with the difficulties, both political and spiritual. Murray is but one example among many. His son-in-law, A. J. Toynbee, drew in bold lines a view of the development of the "civilizations" of the world which is essentially the same as the one his father-in-law defined for the Greeks. This is hardly surprising, since Toynbee began his career as a classicist at Oxford as one of Murray's students. But even without this coincidence both may be said to be representatives of the post-Darwinian and optimistic concepts of progress. It was therefore virtually inevitable that many, including Murray, directed their scholarly attention to the Classical period of Greek civilization, roughly from 600 to 300 (or 400) B.C. What came after that was decay and no longer "typically Greek," whatever that might be.

The title of this paper has already made it clear that I do not share this interpretation of the historical development. That is why I speak of aspects, not of (consecutive) phases of this religion. The rich diversity of the religious phenomena cannot be forced into a rigid chronological system. A distinction has been made, for instance, between periods in which objects, animals, and anthropomorphic gods were worshipped. We all know that sacred objects were worshipped in all the periods of the religion of the Greeks; we need think only of the ear of corn, the herald's staff, the umbilicus of the earth, the tree cult without which Dodona would have meant nothing. And it is sufficiently well known

that there was worship of gods in animal form: the Artemis festival in Brauron, in which the goddess was taken as a bear and the maidens in her service were called "she-bears"; Poseidon as the horse, the bull; the he-goat, the snake as animal symbols of virility, male fertility, and therefore worshipped to insure the continuance of the community. It is almost impossible to imagine the intensity with which grain was worshipped in an infertile country; how important the procreation and fertilization could be in a community accustomed to a high mortality of its domestic animals; and the extent to which the images of a primarily agricultural life could dominate human lives: the phallos as the plough, the womb as the earth. And these were in no sense remnants of primeval images which no longer had any meaning in later times. We know that in the forties of the fifth century B.C. an Athenian cleruchy, Brea in Thrace, annually sent a wooden phallos to Athens as an offering, as a fertility stimulus or symbol; and we all know how violent a storm of religious outrage was unleashed by the mutilation of the Hermae in 415 B.C. The ithyphallic Hermes placed at crossroads or elsewhere was a sign and guarantee of the fertility, that was repeatedly threatened and always vulnerable, of the community's precarious chance of survival. Only by realizing how great child mortality was, how many women died in childbirth, can we understand why large families were always desired — albeit with limitations arising from economic circumstances.

Homer is our first major source for the lives of the Greeks, and he tells little of all this. This is understandable, because his personages and public belonged to a social stratum that kept to itself, and the description of their deeds and fates in a notorious war could offer little opportunity to include the ordinary life of ordinary days, the toiling farmer's struggle for a bare existence. I say "little" opportunity rather than "no" opportunity, because Achilles' lament in the underworld, Eumaios' account of his life, and several similes in the epic reveal that this other world existed and was familiar.

Other elements outside the conventional description of the Homeric hero could be mentioned: the miracle in the epic — for which I need only refer to the talking horses of Achilles and the "unsportsmanly" behavior of the gods, who in a secretive and supernatural way restore lost or damaged weapons to their favorites — to put it more generally, the divine supernatural intervention — re-affirms the fact that the epic did not remain as aloof from what we call the irrational as has sometimes been claimed. The conventional doctrine of the older historians of religion and philologists said: "Concerning the pre-Grecian religion we know nothing." In the most ancient stage, according to them,



religion is that of Homeric times, and this was superseded after the disappearance of the dominion of the aristocracy. After that, a folk religion dominated; it was only thanks to the educative value of the epic and the lyric poetry it gave rise to that the gods of the heroic poem continued to be held in high honor, but then mainly in the state cult.

In my opinion, all this is based much too one-sidedly on the epic.<sup>1</sup> It is hardly remarkable that another extreme — but one also saturated with the conventional doctrine — found supporters among scholars. They argued that the folk religion existed before Homer as well and that, for example, the earth, the mother goddess and her consort, the bird as a form of the epiphany of the gods, and the tree cult, were all to be found in pre-epic remnants, not in literary but in archeological survivals. They were, furthermore, anti-rationalistic and saw epic poetry as the cause of the decline of the old religion of the Earth Mother, who was supposed to have revived after the epic period had ended. This made it possible to regard the epic (and, with these poems, the state religion, which worshipped mainly the epic deities) as the murderer of the true "folk" religion, even though the murder was not entirely successful.

In this approach, too, the stages are maintained — successive stages which remain separate as in the conventional doctrine itself. I must admit that I find the second approach more congenial, because it at least takes account of the earth-religion before as well as during the time of Homer.<sup>2</sup> But I have two objections to it: first, the use of periodization, and second, the injustice done to Homer: because this view of Homer, the rationalist and creator of the intellectual, anthropomorphic gods, does not do justice to him; and, in addition, no attention is given to the completely individual nature of the religion of the epic. This is a serious error, especially since Walter F. Otto, in his *Götter Griechenlands* (1934), opened our eyes to this religion and the authentic forms in which it was manifested. He discussed this as *Die Religion der*

<sup>1</sup> One of the first to formulate the theory about the three chronologically connected phases of Greek religion was L. R. Farnell. In one of his best shorter surveys of the subject, however, he remarks: "We may regard these beliefs and practices as the deposit of an age, not indeed of pure theriomorphism — *for it is very doubtful if such ever existed in the history of religion* — but of one when the anthropomorphic imagination was unstable and the divinity might be conceived as embodied now in human now in animal form" (italics mine). (*The Higher Aspects of Greek Religion*, Hibbert Lectures 1911, London 1912, p. 3.)

<sup>2</sup> Incidentally, it may be recalled that the name "Dionysos" occurs in the Linear-B texts, which know of an Earth Goddess as well.

*Gestalt*, which was properly adopted by Van der Leeuw in his *Phaenomenologie der Religion* as indication of a highly distinct and individual manifestation of religion.

The only conclusion the historian can draw from the two forms — i.e. the religion of powers of the earth, dominating rural life, on the one hand, and on the other the religion of the gods of epic poetry, which, as it were, reflect the aristocratic society magnified to divine proportions — is that they existed together at one time and were seen as equally important by people in later times for which we have more sources at our disposal; it is even true that a duality, not to speak of an antithesis, in these two forms of religious experience and in their ritual was never (to the best of my knowledge) felt and put into words. The philosophers criticized both. They said, on the one hand, that adultery was taught to man by the gods and, on the other hand, they considered the blood-sacrifice for the redemption of sins — a typical feature of the religion of the Earth — as using mire to clean up mire. This criticism, directed at *both* forms, was expressed sometimes with affective, sometimes with rational, even rationalistic, arguments. What must be stressed once again is that this criticism held for both the Olympian religion of the epic and the folk religion.

It is useful to distinguish these aspects — not in time but in value, for particular social groups — as long as no separation is made between them. And even in making this distinction great care must be exercised, because the aristocrat was often just as attached to the religion of the Earth as the poor farmer, and, conversely, the religion worshipping the Olympians did not leave the small people untouched. What one would like very much to be able to evaluate is the intensity and sincerity of their belief in their gods. This is always difficult to determine, even when it concerns our contemporaries, our friends, even the members of our own families. It is so now, it was so in earlier eras. In essence, the inclinations of the heart remain unknown to us.

But this does nothing to weaken the conclusion that seems to follow from the foregoing: *The* religion of the Greeks — if one wishes to and may use the definite article and uses the word “religion” in the singular — remains a subject with many aspects, even if the question of the time factor is not raised. Anyone who finds this strange should remember that this same diversity of aspect is also operative in our time. For instance, Roman Catholicism offers a rich diversity. For purposes of comparison with the Greek religion, we must not think of differences in dogma and ritual, or the function of priests and their manner of living, of the priestly function of laymen and the apostolic succession;

we must concentrate solely on the ecclesiastical architecture, the church itself, and its ornamentation. Suppose that three thousand years from now, in a Europe destroyed by catastrophes many centuries earlier, remains should be found of the Cathedral of Chartres and of the church of the Dominican Sisters in Vence, which the paintings of Matisse have turned into a twentieth-century work of art. Who would think that both buildings had served as places of worship for one and the same form of religion? This is why it cannot be sufficiently stressed that — for example — the distinction made between Pre-Hellenic (sometimes called Mediterranean) and Hellenic, at least with respect to religion, is dependent on an inadequate basis and would probably not be found valid if our knowledge of Minoan-Mycenaean culture were suddenly augmented by new discoveries, such as that of the Pylos tablets in 1939 (which made Ventris's decipherment possible).

Another approach to aspects of religion concerns the community and the individual. An absolute distinction between the two is not really possible. Nevertheless, the Greek religion had elements which affected the community as a whole — the state religion in all its official expressions. And then there was the personal religion of the individual, where differentiation can also have a clarifying effect. One of the areas in which the two meet is the religion of the family. If the father presents and carries around his child during the ceremony of the Amphidromia, this is a matter of the brotherhood (*phratry*) to which he belongs, but it is also a family event; it is also a proud personal event: the recognition of his legitimate child. And the mother? Fortunately, we cannot forget her, even though tradition conveys more about fatherhood than about motherhood. Alcestis' prayer in Euripides' play is certainly drawn from life: "Goddess, now that I am to go down to the grave, I pray to you for the last time: foster my orphan children and give my son a loving wife and my daughter a noble husband" (Alc. 163).

Queen, for I pass beneath the earth, I fall  
Before thee now, and nevermore, and pray: —  
Be mother to my orphans: mate with him  
A loving wife, with her a noble husband.

The goddess to whom she prays is Hestia, the hearth; with a capital letter or not? The commentators hesitate, and I with them. Anthropomorphism had its limits: the hearth is the center of family life, and marriage thrives under the warmth emanating from it.



Alcestis' wish is for the continuance of the family; her prayer is not meant primarily to insure a happy marriage for her children, although she certainly wished that for them too. To speak of marriage is to think at the same time of children. The procreative function demanded by the community and accepted by the individual does not debase marriage. The distinction we make here is perhaps not permissible with respect to the Greeks, even though a notorious speech delivered in court (Dem. *Contr. Neair.*) says that the wife is for the bearing of children and that love is sought elsewhere. A lawyer's plea is always to be regarded with caution, no matter what the time or place! Whatever may have been the case in the fourth century B.C., in the oldest data the procreative aspect is always represented in the sacred character of marriage. Pherekydes of Syros speaks of the marriage of Zeus and Chthonië: Zeus gave his bride a gown and pronounced a sacramental formula: "Because I wish you to be my wife, I honor you with this: 'Hail to thee, and be my wife'" (σὺ δέ μοι χαίρῃ τε καὶ σύνησθι). The author follows this with the statement: "That was the celebration of the unveiling," followed in turn by what is for us the important conclusion: "... as a result of this, this custom arose among gods and men." The "sacred marriage" of the highest god and goddess was celebrated in many parts of Greece, and a much later author states that ordinary human marriage was an imitation of this divine marriage.<sup>3</sup> By their union the god and the goddess make the earth and mankind fertile. In their marriage, men and women fulfill a divine command. This is why it cannot be said that here all that is involved is a lawyer's plea in which the legitimate wife is assigned the function of bearing legitimate children and nothing more. This procreative function was the proud privilege of the married woman in primitive society. Without her no society could continue to exist. Her function of bearing children was not seen as a slight but rather a divine command. Isaeus,<sup>4</sup> the specialist in inheritance law, conveys the great importance of the continuance of the family and reports the custom by which a man who has no children adopts one and brings him to the "house chapel" of the family and presents him to his relatives.

Marriage is a social institution, and nuptial customs, including the

<sup>3</sup> Pherek. fr. 2 (Diels-Kranz<sup>6</sup>, 1952): ἐκ τούτου δὲ ὁ νόμος ἐγένετο καὶ θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι. Cf. Farnell (above, n. 1) 31, 151.

<sup>4</sup> Isaeus VII.1 and 27 (Bekker 66): "All who are going to die take forethought for themselves, that they may not leave their houses desolate but that there may be someone to make offerings at the family tombs."

religious ones, show a mixture of personal involvement and the interests of the community. But do we also detect — and it is a legitimate question — a purely personal religion, a surrender to a personal conviction, a commitment to something religious? We can certainly find such examples. We remember first of all those cases in which personal conviction conflicted with the general rules of the community. Antigone, who was convinced that the religious duty to bury her brother superseded the laws of the community issued by the king, is one instance of this. It could also be less violent, however. No conflict arose for the young Ion, who was a servant of the temple and experienced complete religious fulfillment in his function — an example of pure devotion. A third example is offered by Hippolytus, the son of Theseus, who refused his stepmother Phaedra when she fell in love with him. Festugière has given a moving analysis of this personality in his *Personal Religion among the Greeks* (1954).<sup>5</sup> Each year the maidens of Troizen who had reached a marriageable age — before they had lost their virginity — brought a lock of hair as offering to Hippolytus, god or hero, in his sanctuary. They thus gave something of themselves as sign and evidence that they were living in the virginal state in which he himself had lived. His “purity” was not sexual continence, and as such morally meritorious, because any young man could have a mistress or keep a slave or hetaera without parental or communal censure. He could have another boy or adult man as lover, although his partner had to come from the same social group as himself and not be “bought.” Thus there was a difference between heterosexuality and homosexuality, but there was no “prohibition” concerning either of the two forms of love, and therefore Hippolytus’ rejection of Aphrodite was not a sign of *moral* purity. The central fact is that he belonged to another goddess. This conflict between Artemis, the goddess of the hunt, whom he served, and Aphrodite, who was the ally of Phaedra, formed a new expression and continuation of the eternal quarrel between the two goddesses. A deep attachment, even (if we may believe Festugière) a mystical bond with the goddess, had taken possession of the young man, the personal servant of Artemis: he wished to devote himself solely to her.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> I have nothing to add to his revealing description, summarized thankfully in the text of this paper.

<sup>6</sup> A. J. Festugière, *Personal Religion among the Greeks* (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1954) 15. It must be stressed that Festugière — in my opinion rightly — contradicts the two well-known interpretations of the character of Hippolytus in Euripides’ play. Wilamowitz depicted him as the passionate hunter, indifferent to the soft seduction of human love, ἀνεπαφρόδιτος. Linforth made him the cham-



I do not know whether this interpretation does not tend too far in the direction stressed in Festugière's book: for him personal religion is almost exclusively the mysticism of the believers, whose ultimate objective is union with the deity. Whether this was the case for the Hippolytus of Euripides I dare to doubt, and it is irrelevant for our subject. The main thing is that the young son of Theseus refuses to give his father's wife what she wants because he is possessed by another service, another bond — that of the pure goddess of the hunt, the virginal and formidable deity. What arouses the fury of Aphrodite is that, like his goddess, he scorns physical love.

There was an extremely close relationship between personal religion and the veneration of relics. Here we have an aspect of religion that can be followed from pagan Antiquity into Christendom from its beginning to the present day. And in this too there is an element of public religion side by side with personal religion. When it was told that the remains of Theseus were transported from the Island of Skyros to Athens in 476 B.C. by the statesman and admiral Cimon, this was an act having importance for the community, for it concerned Theseus, the founder hero of the city because he had brought about the *synoikismos* of Attica. This belief found response in Athens: the bones transported by Cimon were part of Theseus. Very often the belief of the individual and the religion of the state were linked together by hero worship. Often the original hero was the beloved deceased whose memory was cherished in the family, but whose influence on the community increased in the course of time. We can no longer separate these two aspects. An elegant example is found in a fragment from Euripides' *Antiope* in which Hermes speaks: "If you pay your dead wife the last honors, you must burn her earthly remains and collect the ashes and strew them in Ares' spring, so that the spring-water

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pion of sexual continence. Both are wrong, I think. The word ἀνεπαφρόδιτος literally means he (or she) who misses the charms of Aphrodite, not he who does not give in to Aphrodite. On the other hand, it seems to me a thoroughly modern anachronism to suppose that young Hippolytus refused sexual intercourse because he wished to control his passions. I agree with Festugière when he says, "All considered, I would prefer to put Hippolytus in the category of the blushing boys than admit that, being inclined toward physical intercourse with the other sex, he still represses himself. This is something I believe a Greek could not have understood" (ibid., 145). For Wilamowitz's views, see his edition of Euripides' *Hippolytus* (Berlin 1891), especially p. 47, and for Linforth's, his article, "Hippolytus and Humanism," *TAPA* 45 (1914) 5-16.

acquires the name of Dirke and flows through the city and thus continues to moisten the fields of Thebes with its water.”<sup>7</sup>

Here we see a personal command whose purpose serves the community. It would be difficult to think of a better example of the tie between individual and community. The Christian veneration of saints very often had the same personal origin, after which the personally beloved deceased only later became a benefactor of the community. An additional factor was that during his life the saint already possessed a miraculous power. The Holy Scriptures had already set an example in the *Acta Apostolorum*, according to which the clothing of the Apostle Paul worked miracles of healing.<sup>8</sup> This *χάρις*, this magical power, later became an element of popular religion as well as an element of political religion. Thus did the medieval kings heal the sick as soon as they had been crowned — as, for instance, the French king at Reims.<sup>9</sup> Before we leave this aspect with its dual content, one thing should be stressed — that the miracle performed once or more than once by the beloved dead man who becomes a hero or saint, had conclusive force. For us, who are usually skeptics, what we are pleased to call a miracle kindles distrust. But in the Classical world, to the contrary, the miracle was seen as evidence of the power of gods, heroes, of deceased men and saints. Luther must teach us once again what we moderns are often in danger of forgetting: “*Das Wunder ist des Glaubens liebstes Kind.*”

Is there, we might ask, besides the religion of the individual and the community, also a religion of the upper social level and the lower social level? The answer to this question will prove to be affirmative, although here too a differentiation must be made; a deep separation between the

<sup>7</sup> The most important contribution to the subject is found in F. Pfister, *Der Reliquienkult im Altertum*, 2 vols. (Giessen 1909–1912), especially the conclusion on p. 622. Of the many books on the Greek hero cult, H. J. Rose, *Gods and Heroes of the Greeks* (London 1957), deserves to be mentioned as a clear and charming introduction to the subject. It is to be regretted that no special study has ever been devoted, as far as I know, to the public and personal aspects of the modes of veneration of relics and their relation to each other. Pfister does not explicitly deal with the problem, although he offers a considerable amount of material, see *Der Reliquienkult* 428, the fragment of Euripides’ *Antiope* mentioned above; cf. M. Untersteiner, *I frammenti dei tragici greci* (Milan 1925) 95.

<sup>8</sup> Acts of the Apostles 19.12; cf. Pfister (above, n. 7) 611.

<sup>9</sup> M. Bloch, *Les Rois thaumaturges* (Paris 1924; re-edited 1961). See also O. Weinreich, “Antike Heilungswunder,” *RVV* VIII.1 (1909).

social strata did not exist. There are several reasons for this. First of all, the differences between rich and poor were not great;<sup>10</sup> the landed farmer and the crofter shared in essence the same fears for their harvest, took part in the same sowing ceremonies and harvest festivals. In the sphere of Eleusis, the festivals of Demeter, the mysteries (which still baffle us), social differences played no part. Nevertheless, social conclusions have been drawn by modern scholars, and some of these deserve our attention. The first of these is that the consultation of an oracle, in Delphi, for example, was considered a "primitive" custom practiced by superstitious people and exploited by leaders of state, themselves enlightened in spirit and superior to belief in oracles, to mislead the masses. The oracles were, it was held, the work of politically trained priests, sometimes included in the literature as an aesthetic component, sometimes to create order in the material the author wished to treat, but always absolutely unhistorical and invented solely to gull the people. I have attempted elsewhere to demonstrate the untenability of this thesis in relation to the historical literature and especially for Herodotus.<sup>11</sup>

But a few words must be said concerning this classification according to a socially higher — if you prefer, richer, wealthier — group and a socially lower — if you prefer, poorer — group. Here we see the consequences of our nineteenth-century inheritance, the influence of which still persists. During that period, in the universities of continental Europe, an orthodox Catholic or Protestant was often a *rara avis*, and this is one of the reasons why denominational universities were founded. Religion, especially when it was not a "rational" religion, was considered an incomprehensible atavism. One of Charles Darwin's granddaughters tells, in a charming account of her girlhood in Cambridge, how alien the irrational forms of religion were to her father and his brothers. These were men of high principles, who were also completely convinced of the rightness of Christian morality — but the mystery, the intimacy of religion, sin, and mercy, all this was strange to them. And if there was still a religious sympathy (what remnants of Christian confession continued to exist we need not go into; they were there, but with individual or social differences), this was a purely private matter. Huizinga, who certainly had a keen eye for almost all forms of religious experience, subscribed to what the Darwin brothers, a generation

<sup>10</sup> Excellent treatments of this subject are found in the dissertations prepared under H. Bolkestein in the Utrecht School of Ancient History. See especially J. Hemelrijk, "Poros and Penia" (1925).

<sup>11</sup> *Tijdschrift v. Geschiedenis* 83 (1970) 504, 506ff.



before him, also found to be self-evident: "In refined company one does not speak of religion." This mentality was completely strange to the Greeks — of whatever social level — but it was smuggled unconsciously into the history of religion. If the Greeks remained silent concerning certain religious matters, they did so because silence was prescribed — for instance, about the *ἄρρητα* of the mysteries, and not because of embarrassment or lack of comprehension. It is true that older forms of religion were sometimes referred to with distaste, as was the case with respect to the myths of the gods, which offended enlightened Greeks. Aeschylus rejects vicarious punishment, Plato the "boorish wisdom" of the allegorical explanation. But these are not social prejudices, not condemnation of a group. The gods of Olympus were gods of all men; the gods of the earth were venerated everywhere and by everyone. The demons and nymphs, the satyrs and tree spirits, were believed in by people in proportion to their exposure to these forces of nature. There is no single source that says, "these gods were especially for the wealthy, these gods were venerated by the poor." The most that could be said is that farmers and seamen had other major gods whom they worshipped, but even this holds only partially. Poseidon was a sea god but also god of the land.

Nonetheless, regarded in this way, there was, after all, one exceptional religious current on the periphery of Greek society, namely Orphism. If we first formulate what Orphism was, we may call it a system belonging to theological thinkers who embodied their ideas in poems, knew an (authoritarian) religion from sacred books, and had Orpheus as their patron. This singer, originally the servant of Apollo, is said to have adopted the ecstatic cult of Dionysus. He was, according to some (who were here following Nietzsche's well-known distinction) responsible for the union of Apollo and Dionysus into one concept. The Orphic theologians, so it is alleged, had characterized their old singer Orpheus in this way, and this is not what could be expected of a man belonging to the lower classes.

Is this picture of the historical development plausible? The union of Apollo and Dionysus is certainly neither indicated nor implied by the fragments. We may begin with this point, and that frees us from Nietzsche's dichotomy. There are certainly elements in the Greek religion — and not only there — which to the outsider seem to be contradictory — for example, calm wisdom and wild madness, both occurring in the experience of a single individual. William James has taught us that the varieties of religious experience, particularly in one individual, can be many and also contradictory in the eyes of the

rational beholder. But what has the religious man to do with the rational onlooker, who always remains an outsider? Nothing whatever. It seems wiser to leave out of consideration the contradictions that Orpheus, as servant of two gods, is supposed to have reconciled. His person, rising wraithlike from a mythical past, cannot clarify anything for us in this context.

Let us return to the phenomena of Orphism and its adherents. They know a theogony that seems to us bizarre, perhaps because of the source, which is comic in nature: Aristophanes in his *Birds*. We know something about Dionysus as the god of Orphism: that the Titans killed him, tore him to bits and devoured the pieces; and that mankind, the descendents of the Titans, must expiate this sin — in other words, a concept of original sin. We know of the vegetarian habits of the Orphics, which are supposed to be based on the idea of metempsychosis; it was even forbidden to wear woolen clothing, to bring the clothing to sacred places, or to use it to wrap the dead for burial. The grave is not the final end for the human soul, which, by passing through a series of rebirths, can acquire eternal salvation.

Now, the question is: are we concerned here with folk religion or an invention of a higher level of society? Or, to apply the comparison drawn by one of our leading modern scholars: Salvation Army or theosophy? William Booth or Annie Besant? The arguments are not very solid on either side. I may mention one that inclines me to accept a folk religion, and that is the possession of sacred books. All other aspects of Orphism can be found everywhere, among all ranks and stations. But the sacred book implies an attitude that in the Greek world would be very hard to conceive of as belonging to a socially higher group, although I willingly admit that it remains possible. What follows here is therefore in no sense meant as a certainty but only as a hypothesis.

In the first place, a sacred book implies a magic of the word. The believer takes the book or the scroll and eats it, and in his mouth it tastes sweet as honey; but when he swallows it his stomach turns sour (*Apoc.* 10.10). This is not an arbitrary image but a religious experience with respect to Holy Scripture. "Nothing may be added to it, nothing may be taken away from it."<sup>12</sup> This sanctity of the written word is perceptible in the first legal codes of the Greeks. The period of these earliest laws lies in the seventh century, just when the written word had begun to spread on a wider scale. This is the background required

<sup>12</sup> W. C. van Unnik, "De la règle μήτε προσθεῖναι μήτε ἀφελεῖν dans l'histoire du canon," *Vig. Chr.* 3 (1949) 1-36.



for a sacred book. A second condition is a public that can read; a universal ability is not necessary, but the written text must be accessible to a certain portion of the community. The respect for the written word of the deity is transferred to others via the Scribe or Commentator who can write down, read, and explain the word. It might seem at first sight that a sacred book could originate only among intellectuals, because we accept books as natural among this social group. But the true veneration of the book, or rather the belief in the sacredness of the book, is a religious experience belonging to a pre-literate class.

It is argued that Orphism was something belonging to the little man, who would share in the blessings of the hereafter at the end of an earthly existence full of cares; and that in Attica, in the time of Pisis-tratus, this solace in the hereafter was offered to the poor countryman, and the punishment of the rich oppressor would be the sweet satisfaction to be enjoyed in anticipation by the souls of the poor. I think that this conclusion goes too far and is not confirmed by the sources, but I do believe that the poor Greek, at least if he were susceptible, could find solace in the eschatology of Orphism. I am inclined to see it as a sect of the lower class. If this raises the objection that the man who thought this out (the theogony as well as the eschatology, the regimen as well as the Orpheus mythology) must have been someone belonging to a higher stratum, then I should answer that it is not obligatory that the founder (or foundress) of a religious movement belong socially to the group to which he (or she) addresses himself (or herself). The poor devils who went to the Orpheotelest, like the superstitious man in Theophrastus' *Character of the Bigot*, did not think out this movement,<sup>13</sup> but the entire complex of explanations, rules for living, and expectations after death attracted them. By what means? We do not know, because we do not know the propagandists, not to mention the power of their words and the persuasiveness of their conviction. One thing

<sup>13</sup> Therefore, I cannot agree with W. K. C. Guthrie when he says: "The Greek genius was not dogmatic. The Orphics were dogmatists." Both assertions are biased. Guthrie unconsciously takes the view that a book-religion is, as such, "dogmatic," which is not always so. On the contrary, some of the Christian heretics, for instance, who adhere to the letter of Holy Writ, are exceptionally undogmatic. I suppose that nineteenth-century "dogma" influenced Guthrie and others who wrote in the same vein. This dogma finds its basis in the belief that the Greeks were enlightened by philosophy and reason, and practiced their ritual according to their reasonable and personal views on cult and rite without a strictly prescribed pattern that they had to follow. This, however, tends to make the believer an individual interpreter of sacred tradition, which he very rarely was. Sacred acts in rite and cult were often circumstantially prescribed, and were based on rules of custom that the believer had to obey.

is certain — it was not only in isolated cases that religious (and I would add, political) leaders came from a higher social level and revealed ideas that were accepted by the poor. The strength with which these ideas impressed their fascination on much wider circles in the fourth century is shown to us by the philosophy of Plato, which, in its eschatology, for instance, is related to Orphism. This development is hardly surprising. Christianity, too, penetrated from a lower level of the population to a higher one.

A last objection to the view that the Orphics originally found their following among the needy is that their conception of the "wheel of births," the continually renewed existence, did not abolish the distress of the poor; it is argued that the poor would want an immediate improvement of their lot and would therefore have had no need of a religion that required, even in the hereafter, a repeated return to earthly misery. What a thoroughly materialistic argument this is, and how extraneous to Orphism as a religious movement! For, after all, if it is true that man lives under "original sin" because he descends from the Titans who killed Dionysus, his fate is predetermined by this. The believer in original sin knows that he is guilty at all times and on both sides of the grave. Just what religious guilt is will never be understood by anyone who does not profess a religion recognizing this guilt. That the man living under the weight of original sin has in any case one hope, and that he can indeed be redeemed, is a religious and not a social solace. In Orphism the condemnability of man was preached, and sometimes this struck a responsive chord, but usually it did not, as can be judged from the relatively scarce data, which are especially scarce as compared with those concerning other aspects of Greek religiosity.<sup>14</sup> Much concerning Orphism remains uncertain, but I would tentatively maintain that it was one of the forms of personal religion among the Greeks.

The man who lives in the world of nature, the farmer, the shepherd, the woodcutter, these have their personal religion. Satyrs and nymphs, Demeter and Eleusis, the goat and the sheep — everything has its meaning. This kind of man also lives within the community of the state, and there the personal element, it seems to us, is entirely or

<sup>14</sup> The fragments have been collected by O. Kern in *Orphicorum fragmenta* (1920). Later studies were discussed by Guthrie in the second edition of his *Orpheus and Greek Religion* (London 1952). See also M. P. Nilsson, *Opuscula selecta* III 628ff; and also for a totally different view, I. M. Linforth, *The Arts of Orpheus* (1941). A lucid summary of the debated questions is to be found in M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der Griechischen Religion*, I<sup>a</sup> 678ff.

almost entirely suppressed. But whether this is really so remains a question — I must in any case set it aside. Between the personal religion of the natural man and the farmer on the one hand and the state religion on the other, lies the wide domain of the family religion, to which brief reference has already been made. Is there more to be noted in the borderline area between the individual and the state?

Magic, the influencing of the gods for ends injurious to a fellow man, the curse, the *defixio*, belongs here too. We know the *katadesmos*, the binding of the personal enemy by the magic spell.<sup>15</sup> The frequent occurrence of these curses on lead tablets and shards — sometimes in the fourth century carrying the well-known names of politicians — has led to the opinion that these maledictions resulted from the radical democratization of Athens. The abundance of fourth-century material may be purely a matter of chance; as compared to later times, the number of tablets is not strikingly high. It seems more likely that we are concerned here with a general occurrence of magic spells and not with a phenomenon characteristic of a given time.

There is a little more still to be said about the phenomenon of magical practices. An English scholar speaks, not without irony, about "the comfortable belief in evolution" in talking of magic. He quite rightly sees the phenomenon as human effort. The magician attempts to force the supernatural powers to carry out his desires and to avert what he fears. I have as little desire as this scholar to broach a discussion of the differences between magic and religion, and wish only to conclude that my research, like his, has convinced me that the religious man submits to the deity; although he reveals his needs to his god in his prayer, he always ends with "Thy will be done." Magic, to the contrary, is a manipulation of the deity, a *theurgia*, to obtain fulfillment of a mortal's wish. It is certainly true that cult and rite, liturgy and the wording of prayers, contain elements pointing in the direction of magic. But, like my English colleague, I prefer to reverse the evolutionary principle that magic precedes religion and maintain that magic is a deterioration, a later degeneration of religion.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> R. Wuensch in *IG* III, appendix; M. P. Nilsson, *Greek Popular Religion* (1940) 114; *id.*, *GGR* I 757ff (with bibliography); W. K. C. Guthrie, *The Greeks and Their Gods* (1950) 274.

<sup>16</sup> A. A. Barb, "The Survival of Magic Arts," in *Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century*, ed. A. Momigliano (Oxford 1963) 100–125, expressed misgivings as regards modern simplifications on "Progress" (p. 124). As far as *theurgia* is concerned, I cannot follow Barb when he circumscribes this as "working things divine"; instead, I would say "compelling or forcing the Gods." Cf. Th. Hopfner in *RE* s.v. *Theurgie*.



For the Greeks, the adoration of the image also forms an aspect of religion with which magic is sometimes (but not always) related. Hippolytus, standing before the image of his goddess, perceives her presence, experiences an intense union with her.<sup>17</sup> To go into the essence of image worship would take us beyond the scope of this paper. Two remarks must suffice. In the state religion the image has a central function which may not be dismissed by calling it superficial idolatry. Franz Overbeck has rightly collected the signs of warm veneration for Athena Parthenos as she was sculptured by Phidias. It may certainly not be said that feelings of veneration for this image were less fervent than those for the old wooden figure, made less impressively and of a less valuable material.

In the second place, the image in itself often fills a religious need. Dio Chrysostomos plumbed the deepest meaning of the human desire to worship an image when he wrote:

Through their longing for the divine all people have a powerful urge to worship and serve the deity from nearby. Like children that have been taken away from their father and mother, they are filled with a strange longing and often in their dreams reach out their hands to their parents who are not there, so too do people in their love for the gods seek — and properly so because of their benefits and affinity — in all possible ways to be with them and in their company.

That images had a power which resided in them often became in later times the only motive, however. Even the philosopher Plotinus, who explicitly rejected images, finally became resigned to this common experience.<sup>18</sup>

There is a misconception, inadequately disputed, that philosophy and religion are inimical to each other. This may have become so in later periods, but before that and from the very beginning, this was certainly not the case. Greek religion can, if necessary, be studied without considering philosophy, but there are parts of philosophy that cannot be understood without considering religion. Empedocles, Epimenides, the miracle-workers, shamans, and traveling "medicine men" — they are often taken as limited to the seventh and sixth centuries and then allowed to reappear in the Hellenistic period. This is in my opinion not justified; once again scholars of the last hundred years have been

<sup>17</sup> A. J. Festugière (above, n. 6) 15, 145.

<sup>18</sup> Dio Chrys. XII 60; Plotinus, *Enn.* IV 3, 11; cf. Nilsson *GGR* II (1950) 382, 503f; *id.* *Greek Piety* (1948) 168–69.



misled by their evolutionary dogma and once again they have simply attributed to Classical Antiquity what has happened in Western Europe since the Renaissance. The Simon Magus of the New Testament had a series of predecessors and successors respected and feared in their time. But this man, if he deserved to be called a philosopher, will certainly never acquire the distinction and fame that has fallen to Pythagoras' share through the centuries. It is difficult for us to localize in time the philosophical and political activity,<sup>19</sup> the religious tradition of his ἀκούσματα, his preaching. The precepts are usually considered as popular superstition (*volkstümlicher Aberglaube*)<sup>20</sup> — I shall not go into this deprecatory judgment, a modern and perhaps rather too facile condemnation. What is important when we speak of aspects of Greek religion is that the wise man — that is, the true philosopher longing for wisdom — gave rules for living that had a religious sanction.

And this brings us to another — and our last — field: law or rule and religion. We must keep clearly in mind here that it is completely irrelevant whether a rule is rationally acceptable or not. The prohibition against eating the flesh of certain animals, the sacredness of such fruits of the fields as beans, and purification rites — all have a meaning for believers; even if they seem strange to an outsider, he may not add his own coloring to the things which regulated life in the Greek world. And he certainly may not — as was done by almost all the contributors to a collective work which appeared a few years ago — set the Greek prescriptions for purification aside as older taboos of primitivism, as remnants of Oriental influences, or as barbaric customs originating from the North. All the adherents of the evolutionary dogma who see the Greek as the discoverers of the (rational) mind, progressing *vom Mythos zum Logos*, have shut at least the religious door that can lead to an understanding of the Greek domain (or part of it).<sup>21</sup>

The same bias can be discerned where not religious prescriptions for cult, rite, or food are concerned, but rather rules of conduct in general — in other words, the laws of the community, of the state. Most scholars make a strict distinction between morality and religion; at most, they leave room for religion as the source of sanction for the morality. Bolkenstein has even regarded this as a criterion for the distinction between Greek and Oriental: Greek law derives from man,

<sup>19</sup> See K. von Fritz, *Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy*, (New York 1940).

<sup>20</sup> So Nilsson *GGR* I 662ff, esp. 667.

<sup>21</sup> *La notion du divin: entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* I. See my review in *Museum* 61 (1956) 91–94.

Jewish law from God.<sup>22</sup> And late in his life, Schwartz stated it frankly, as follows: "Anyone who wishes to approach Greek ethics, must first of all discard one universal error, according to which that which we call "morals" derives from a religious belief. In reality, at least for the ancient peoples, ethics is independent of religion and its impact is on both gods and men."<sup>23</sup>

This idea is simplistic and, still worse, wrong. A better and more subtle evaluation was arrived at by K. Latte, who pointed out that the religious movements in Greece — for instance, that of Delphi — contributed to the formation of a persisting state of law and order. But, according to Latte, the oracles only formulated what was already recognized universally as a practical line of conduct. From this point of view, religion and law are two *different* (the emphasis here is mine) forms of expression of the same force that is operative in mankind. The influence of religion on the ideology of legislation extends only to the external form, as, for example, in a series of sacred features of the administration of justice and of contracts; but this process and these contracts are not affected by the religion itself. Moral problems are barely involved (in contrast to the situation for the oracles). It may even be said that the importance of these problems decreased to the same degree that the conviction became stronger among the Greeks themselves that the gods look down in wrath on violation of the law, but their intervention was not obtainable by any religious acts of any nature whatever. This is, so it is alleged, in sharp contrast to the religion of the oldest time, when the gods were more mighty powers whom man did better not to arouse, but were not yet moral powers punishing crime and wickedness without further ado.<sup>24</sup> There is, indeed, more than enough evidence that, in the oldest Greek criminal law, the deity is the most powerful and man is "punished" even when he has no moral guilt. In fact, the difference of opinion is not on this point.<sup>25</sup> But that the gods were first simply powers and only later became moral beings is an evolutionary view that we have already had to stigmatize several times as modern heresy. The "super-ethical" in religion is not bound to any time or place: it is Jewish and it is Greek.

<sup>22</sup> H. Bolkestein, *De godsdienst in het leven der Grieken* (Haarlem 1947); cf. my reservations on these views in *De godsdienst van de Grieken*<sup>2</sup> (1965) 56.

<sup>23</sup> E. Schwartz, *Ethik der Griechen* (Stuttgart 1951) 13.

<sup>24</sup> K. Latte, *Heiliges Recht, Unters. zur Geschichte der sakralen Rechtsformen in Griechenland* (Tübingen 1920) 1ff (also in Nilsson, *GGR* I 607).

<sup>25</sup> A searching analysis was given by K. Latte in *Der Rechtsgedanke im frühen Griechentum, Antike und Abendland* 2 (1946) 63–76 (later republished in *Kleine Schriften*, Munich 1968, 233–51).

And the question of whether morality is linked to the powerful or the *just* god simply does not exist for the believer. For might is right and right is might as far as the deity, the creator, the immortal, is concerned. Man is neither creator nor immortal. This defines the "total difference" of the deity.<sup>26</sup>

In the early fortunes of man the god of Delphi did far more than just sanction existing laws; the god also points out the roads, sometimes obscure, that man must travel.<sup>27</sup> To explain his initiative always as effect and never as cause is in my opinion prompted by a dogmatism having its roots in a certain aversion to the religious element in law-giving. It is, I think, entirely erroneous to speak of Law and Religion as parallel forms of expression of the human spirit, as Latte does.

In my view, we must read the testimony as indicating that the law rested on the base formed by religion and was sanctified by it.<sup>28</sup> What Dodds says is certainly true: "Divine law, like early human law, takes no account of motive and makes no allowance for human weakness."<sup>29</sup> But this extremely perceptive author also sees in the humanization of the law a kind of progress, and in the agreement between the old heavenly and the old earthly laws only a similarity, not a derivation of the latter from the former.

It is not my task to combat the highly esteemed scholars I have mentioned. But I should like to point explicitly to some phenomena that cannot be argued away. The founding of cities is guided by Apollo, the leader (*exegètès*); the new city receives its laws from Apollo (not only their ratification, as Bolkenstein claims). The law is "word," *rhetra*, and comes from the god; the word *manteion*, says Plutarch, means the same. Anyone who doubts that Plutarch was right bears the burden of proof. Such laws can be hard, like all divine words; they can even offend our sense of justice like the sense of justice of the Greeks themselves. But man must obey them nonetheless. Where ancient law prevailed, there was obedience, submission; power and discipline are the counterparts of law and rule. Even in the world of the gods, when it is projected anthropomorphically, as in the epic,

<sup>26</sup> W. B. Kristensen, *Het boven-ethische in de godsdienst* (The "Supra-ethical" in Religion), in the collection of his essays *Symbol en Werkelijkheid* (Symbol and Reality), Arnhem 1954, 36-48. Cf. my paper "Op zoek naar de Grieken en hun goden" (Seeking the Greeks and their Gods), *Forum der Letteren* 2 (1961) 161-70, esp. 168.

<sup>27</sup> E.g., Herodotus 6. 86.

<sup>28</sup> Nilsson, *GGR* I 607. Cf. R. Hirzel, *Dike, Themis und Verwandtes* (Leipzig 1907).

<sup>29</sup> E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and Their Gods* (Paperback ed. 1957) 35.



that which must happen, the way of *Moirā*, fortune, is sometimes an enigma. The gods submit, like men, either willingly or unwillingly. Anyone who associates law with reason, and morality with a precise regulation of what is and what is not permissible, assumes a well-regulated constitutional state in which secularization is so far advanced that there is no longer any question of Law; instead, the individual circumstances of a guilty man standing before the law determine the judge's decision. Whether this is good or bad we need not examine. And, indeed, who could decide one way or the other, again dogmatically? One thing is certain, the law-giver and the judge who knows himself bound to the divine origin of the law cannot take personal circumstances into account. If, therefore, Dodds quite rightly says that the ancient law, divine or human, does not take human weakness into account, he in my opinion also indicates by these words that the origin of law must be sought in the divine inexorable pronouncement.<sup>30</sup>

There is, lastly, a reverse side to this medal. Not only is religion the basis of communal life, but, conversely, communal life is also the basis of religion. Aristotle says somewhere, ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεούς: (only) by citizens is it proper for the gods to be worshipped.<sup>31</sup> And in a dialogue, allegedly by Plato, the *Axiochos*, there is an expression, usually held to be Orphic, man is γεννητὴς τῶν θεῶν, that is to say, a member of the clan of the gods. It is the clan that gives rise to the ideas of blood-guilt, of blood-revenge, of retaliation, but also of redemption and atonement.

There is nothing remarkable about all this, the sphere of religion and the sphere of the family are inseparable. How strongly this bond functions can be judged from philosophy. Just as Kant's ethics bear the stamp of Protestantism and of the Old Testament, so does Greek thought, in which social virtues are related to civil ideals, reflect the atmosphere of the religion of the *polis*, which was a unit of families and relatives.<sup>32</sup>

Above everything and everyone reigns the self-revealing deity who often leads man where he does not wish to go. But the deity also reveals himself as protector, as friend, as beloved. Wilamowitz once wished to characterize the difference between Christendom and Greek religion in the following way. The Greek religion says: Love is God; Christen-

<sup>30</sup> The question of the extent to which "merit" and "responsibility" influenced law and the practices of the law courts, goes beyond the scope of this paper. See on this point, e.g. A. H. W. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford 1960).

<sup>31</sup> *Politica* 7, 9 (1329).

<sup>32</sup> Cf. L. R. Farnell (above, n. 1) 73, esp. 79-80.



dom says: God is Love. In this reversal of subject and predicate a deep difference between the two worlds is expressed.

I do not know whether this is so. It is unquestionably true that in Christendom "Love is God" would certainly not be said of Eros. On the other hand, for Hippolytus, for example, *his* Artemis is indeed Love, and he will not have been an exception in the Greek world. It therefore requires courage — a courage I do not possess — to deny for the Greeks just this variety of the religious experience embodied in "God is Love." The self-revealing gods could be everything — justice, hate, wrath, punishment, retribution — but they could also reveal themselves in loveliness, so it can be said: God is Love.

There is a Christian hymn which begins with the line, "*Ich bete an die Macht der Liebe, die sich in Christus offenbart.*" Substitute for "Christ" the name of a Greek god, and you will by doing so have put into words an experience that I believe was not denied to the Greeks.

UNIVERSITY OF LEIDEN



# MANI AND THE BABYLONIAN BAPTISTS:

## A HISTORICAL CONFRONTATION

ALBERT HENRICHs

### I

ONCE upon a time, when Mani visited Ctesiphon, the Sassanian capital, during one of his missionary journeys, he had to leave the congregation of his faithful because the King of Kings, Shapur I, had sent for him. He was called before the king two more times within short intervals. When Mani returned to his flock after the third audience, one of his disciples approached him with the following request:

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The following abbreviations have been used throughout:

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|-------------------|---|
| <i>CMC</i>        | The Cologne Mani Codex, a miniature parchment codex of the 5th century A.D. which provides new information on Mani's life in a baptist sect in southern Babylonia. Major portions of the Greek text are accessible in "Mani-Codex" (see below); the rest is unpublished. The references following <i>CMC</i> are to the pages and lines of the codex. |
| <i>Hom.</i>       | <i>Manichäische Homilien</i> , herausgegeben von H. J. Polotsky. Manichäische Handschriften der Sammlung A. Chester Beatty, Band I (Stuttgart 1934).  |
| <i>JBL</i>        | <i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i> .   |
| <i>Keph.</i>      | <i>Kephalaia</i> . Manichäische Handschriften der Staatlichen Museen Berlin, Band I 1. Hälfte, ed. H. J. Polotsky und A. Böhlig (Stuttgart 1940); 2. Hälfte, ed. A. Böhlig (Stuttgart 1966).  |
| "Mani-Codex"      | A. Henrichs and L. Koenen, "Ein griechischer Mani-Codex (P. Colon. inv. nr. 4780)," <i>ZPE</i> 5 (1970) 97-216.   |
| <i>Psalm-Book</i> | <i>A Manichaean Psalm-Book (Part II)</i> , edited by C. R. C. Allberry. Manichaean Manuscripts in the Chester Beatty Collection, vol. II (Stuttgart 1938).  |
| <i>SPAW</i>       | <i>Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften</i> , Philologisch-historische Klasse, Berlin.   |
| <i>ZNW</i>        | <i>Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft</i> .   |
| <i>ZPE</i>        | <i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i> .   |

"Pray, Lord Mani, let us have two Manis after your likeness who come down as you did, one Mani to stay with us and another to go to Shapur."<sup>1</sup>

The passage is taken from the *Kephalaia*, a semicanonical collection of didactic sermons which as a genre has its immediate though less complex predecessors in Jewish, Gnostic, and Hermetic examples of wisdom literature.<sup>2</sup> Mani is portrayed as the wise religious teacher, always ready to give illuminating answers to the unpretentious questions of his disciples. No doubt the request for two Manis was put forward in all innocence and was prompted by the disciple's love for his spiritual father. But the very nature of this request marks the disciple as a green novice who had no clear understanding of the subtle theological issues that surrounded the mystery of Mani's incarnation. In terms of Manichaean soteriology, the notion of a duplicate Mani was, in fact, not at all unheard of, but was a well-established doctrine, propagated time and again by Mani himself.<sup>3</sup> Mani's double, though his steady companion on earth, his counselor and helper in times of hardship, and his consoler in moments of despair, was not a creature of flesh and blood, but an incorporeal and celestial being, not subject to the terrestrial limitations of time and space. As the pre-existent and eternal Twin of Light, he is the mirror-like reflection of Mani's inner self, the heavenly embodiment of his spiritual essence, his true identity, from whom he was separated when his soul put on the garment of a mortal body and with whom he was reunited at his death.<sup>4</sup> Up to this point, the underlying concept, far from being original, is well known as the classical Gnostic expression of *Selbstfindung*, which is the dominant theme in the Hymn of the Pearl, a composition of the early third century that

<sup>1</sup> *Keph.* 183,13–188,29. Cf. O. Klíma, *Manis Zeit und Leben*. Monographien des Orientinstituts der Tschechoslowakischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 18 (Prag 1962) 335f; L. J. R. Ort, *Mani. A religio-historical description of his personality*. Supplementa ad Numen, Altera Series, I (Leiden 1967) 165–168 (Prospective readers of Ort's book should consult M. Boyce, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1968, 82–84).

<sup>2</sup> We lack a comprehensive study of the literary form of the *Kephalaia*. A valuable beginning has been made in several contributions by A. Böhlig, now conveniently assembled in *Mysterion und Wahrheit*. Arbeiten zur Geschichte d. späteren Judentums u. d. Urchristentums, 6 (Leiden 1968) 228–266; cf. K. Rudolph, "Der gnostische 'Dialog' als literarisches Genus," *Probleme der koptischen Literatur*. Wissenschaftliche Beiträge d. Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg 1968, 85ff, esp. 92, 94, 102.

<sup>3</sup> The evidence is collected and discussed in "Mani-Codex" 161–189.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. "Mani-Codex" 162 n. 164, 164, 168f, 185; for *ἐνδυμα*, see below nn. 121, 128, 133.



was exploited by Mani.<sup>5</sup> What is genuinely Manichaean is the way in which the concept of the Twin-Companion who brings personal salvation is, in the hierarchy of divine emanations, closely associated with the Apostle of Light. The latter is the god-sent messenger to the world and the herald of the redemption of mankind, who made his appearance in the Patriarchs of the Old Testament, in the religious leaders of the East, in Jesus and Paul, in Marcion and Bardaisan, and finally in Mani.<sup>6</sup> But Mani is unique in that he was sent to the last generation in the consummation of time, thereby concluding the successive incarnations of the Apostle of Light.

In the eyes of the initiate, therefore, the mere suggestion of having two Manis descend from heaven and live in coexistence on earth, thus duplicating what was in reality an irreproducible compound in the divine plan of salvation,<sup>7</sup> must have been sheer heresy. For a complete outsider, on the other hand, the idea of two Manis would have inevitably focused attention on Mani the human individual and would have implicitly questioned his claim to be a prophet by vocation.<sup>8</sup> On both

<sup>5</sup> H. Jones, *The Gnostic Religion* (2nd ed., Boston 1963) 112ff; "Mani-Codex" 171ff.

<sup>6</sup> The key passages are *Keph.* 12,9ff and *Hom.* 68,15ff; M 299 a in W. B. Henning, "Ein manichäisches Henochbuch," *SPAW* 1934, V, 27f. See below, nn. 29, 111, 118.

<sup>7</sup> In Manichaean theology, salvation, both individual and universal, follows the mythical pattern of the salvation of the First Man; cf. H.-Ch. Puech, "Der Begriff der Erlösung im Manichäismus," *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 4 (1936) 183-286 (= J. Campbell [ed.], *The Mystic Vision*, Bollingen Series 30.6 [Princeton, N.J., 1968] 247-314).

<sup>8</sup> That Mani's revelations (see below, nn. 34-35) were a major stumbling-block for the opponents of his religion is shown by a long apologetic digression in homiletic form, probably by the hand of Baraies (on the latter see "Mani-Codex" 110), which covers some thirty pages of the *CMC* (pp. 45-72; cf. "Mani-Codex" 106ff). In the course of this digression, "historical" evidence from apocalyptic literature of heterodox Judaism (below, n. 29) and from St. Paul is produced in support of Mani's own visionary experiences. The author of this section is particularly concerned to find in his apocalyptic sources a pattern of dissemination which is identical with the transmission of Mani's revelations: The "forefathers" (*CMC* 47,4f οἱ προγενέστεροι πατέρες. Cf. *Keph.* 7,6f; M 7 in F. C. Andreas and W. B. Henning, *SPAW* 1934, XXVII, 872) who received such revelations communicated them to their disciples, who, in turn, handed them down to posterity. The importance which is thus attached to the mediation of the disciples is confirmed in *Keph.* 6,16ff and 8,28ff. (W. B. Henning's rather negative conclusions regarding the value of the Manichaean "Tradition," in *Asia Major* 3 [1953] 211, will have to be revised.) Here again, the parallelism between Mani and St. Paul is noteworthy (below, nn. 36-37): Paul's visions were derided by his Jewish-Christian detractors (below, nn. 105 and 109; cf. H. J. Schoeps, *Urgemeinde, Judentum, Gnosis* [Tübingen 1956]

accounts, esoteric and profane, the request for two Manis was indeed a touchy subject, because it struck at the very roots of Mani's existence, either as the Apostle of God who had a unique mission that was not transferable, or as a figure with a definite, historical background. To duplicate the one or the other would have meant to do away with him.<sup>9</sup>

For all its simple-mindedness, the question hit home with Mani, though not quite in the manner in which the disciple might have expected. Mani realized the implications and immediately shook his head in dissent, a rare reaction and indicative of his concern. "Lo," he said, "I am the only Mani and came into the world in order to preach the word of God and to carry out his good will that was entrusted to me."<sup>10</sup> The remainder of Mani's reply consists of a long and impassioned enumeration of the tribulations and hardships of his missionary life, much in the spirit of St. Paul in II Corinthians, but less stylized and with less regard for circumstantial detail.<sup>11</sup> Mani emphasizes the large geographical area which he covered during his journeys; he mentions India, Persia, and Mesene, the land of Babylon and the country of the Medes and Parthians — a catalogue which is familiar to us from his other writings.<sup>12</sup> He also relates the opposition and the hostility he encountered from the mighty of this world, from the many dynasts and the many religious leaders who were unable to tolerate him, the only Mani. Both Mani's singularity and his aloneness as opposed to the plurality of the world are stressed repeatedly in the Coptic text by the emphatic use of the phrase  $\alpha\lambda\alpha\kappa\ \omicron\upsilon\mu\alpha\eta\text{-}\eta\iota\chi\alpha\iota\omicron\varsigma\ \bar{\eta}\nu\omicron\gamma\omega\tau$  "I am the *only* Mani."<sup>13</sup> The world loves the Darkness and hates the Light, Mani asserts, because its deeds are evil. This is the reason why there was much confusion and turmoil over the one Mani. "What then," Mani concludes, "if two Manis had

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14ff on *Hom. Clem.* 17.14-19), but were extolled by his Gnostic admirers (Marcion ap. Iren. *Haer.* 3.13.1 *solum Paulum veritatem cognovisse, cui per revelationem manifestatum est mysterium*; cf. H.-Fr. Weiss, "Paulus und die Häretiker," in W. Eltester (ed.), *Christentum und Gnosis*. Beiheft z. ZNW 37 [Berlin 1969] 116-128).

<sup>9</sup> According to an Arabic source, Mani had claimed in his *Gospel* to be "the seal of the prophets" ("Mani-Codex" 109 n. 25). Hence in Mani's own conception his uniqueness was that he had put the final stamp on all previous revelation. The cyclic incarnations of god-sent messengers (below, nn. 29 and 118) had come to a definite end in Mani.

<sup>10</sup> *Keph.* 184,2-5.

<sup>11</sup> 2 Cor. 11.16-33.

<sup>12</sup> *Keph.* 185,4-187,25; cf. *ibid.* 15,29-16,2; *Hom.* 44,10ff and 76,27ff.

<sup>13</sup> *Keph.* 184,3, 6, 17; 187,27; 188,2, 6, 13; cf. *ibid.* 255,22-257,7 (see A. Böhlig [above, n. 2] 262).

come into this world? Which place could bear them and which country would admit them?"<sup>14</sup>

Mani's answer is more sympathetic than doctrinal. Theology is touched upon only at the very beginning, where he defines and justifies his existence on earth in terms of his apostleship. Apparently, he did not want to encumber the simple mind of the disciple with the weighty metaphysics of his vocation. As elsewhere in the *Kephalaia*, Mani's deep knowledge of the human soul enabled him to adapt himself to the psychic pattern and the intellectual level of his interlocutor.<sup>15</sup> We can assume, therefore, that Mani purposefully designed his answer to be as plain and unpretentious as his disciple's request. Its simplicity is transparent and can best be described as combining Johannine symbolism with the Gnostic and Neoplatonic concept of the One versus the Many. This contrast between the single Mani and the plurality of the world must have been more to Mani than merely numerical and quantitative. Otherwise, his answer to the disciple would have been something like this: "Yes, my son, you are perfectly right: Two Manis would be much more able to cope with the boundless unbelief of the world and of its numerous dynasts." Mani, however, did not say that the world was too much for him to cope with, but that he was too much for the world to bear, a world not prepared to listen to his gospel. The antithesis is one of quality, therefore, reducing the world and everything in it to the basic dualistic structure which underlies all Gnostic systems: The One versus the Many, Light versus Darkness, Gnosis versus Ignorance.<sup>16</sup> This kind of language was easy to understand for any religious person in the third century A.D., even for the poor in spirit, because it was current coinage and almost self-explanatory. The Prologue of the Gospel of John provides early and significant illustration: "The Light shines in the Darkness and the Darkness comprehended it not," or: "He came into His own, and His own received Him not." It should here be recalled that Mani had identified himself with the Paraclete of the Fourth Gospel.<sup>17</sup> For the antithesis of the One versus the Many, on the other hand, we may turn to the Gospel of Thomas, which refers in unambiguous terms to the primitive oneness of the noetic realm and to the subsequent separation which resulted in the multiplicity that characterizes the universe and this world: "On

<sup>14</sup> *Keph.* 188,4-6; cf. *ibid.* 100,23-101,8.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Keph.* ch. LVII (esp. 146,26f), LXXXIII, LXXXVIII, LXXXIX.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *CMC* 84,12ff ("Mani-Codex" 137 n. 103).

<sup>17</sup> "Mani-Codex" 108 n. 22, 163 n. 165. For Mani's adaptation of John 1.11 at *Keph.* 259,13-15 see A. Böhlig (above, n. 2) 265. Cf. below, n. 57.



the day when you were one, you became two. But when you have become two, what will you do?"<sup>18</sup>

## II

There remains the important question of authenticity. To what extent do the *Kephalaia* in general and the passage under discussion in particular reproduce the true doctrine and perhaps the *ipsissima verba* of Mani? Most of Mani's theological lectures collected in the *Kephalaia* are introduced by phrases such as: "Again Mani said to his disciples."<sup>19</sup> No one would attach much credit to such a formula as being a mark of authenticity in the gospel tradition, especially in its Gnostic ramifications like the Gospel of Thomas, where this label, with minor variations, is used as a conventional incipit for the Sayings of Jesus.<sup>20</sup> It would be uncritical, however, to apply to the early Manichaean literature the same analytic criteria which are used when dealing with the scanty remains of the Christian pre-literature of the apostolic period to be traced in the Gospels.<sup>21</sup> The two centuries that had intervened had brought about a tremendous change in historical perspective. True, Mani had a large Christian literature at his disposal, including Tatian's *Diatessaron*, St. Paul's Epistles, and some of the apocryphal Acts, and he and his followers availed themselves freely of these writings and of the literary forms which they represent.<sup>22</sup> But Mani as a man of letters and a man of books had a keen sense of authenticity with regard to his own person and his own preaching. Thus, he found fault with Jesus and with earlier religious teachers of mankind, who in his eyes had failed to commit their message to writing and had left it to their disciples to be transmitted to posterity, thus exposing it to

<sup>18</sup> *The Gospel According to Thomas*, ed. A. Guillaumont, H.-Ch. Puech, *et alii* (Leiden and New York 1959) Logion 11 (II, 34,22-25). Cf. H. Jonas (above, n. 5) 59ff.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. the list of introductory formulae in A. Böhlig (above, n. 2) 234.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. H.-Ch. Puech in *Annuaire du Collège de France* 57 (1957) 233-237, *ibid.* 58 (1958) 235; J. M. Robinson, "Logoi Sophon," in J. M. Robinson and H. Koester, *Trajectories through Early Christianity* (Philadelphia 1971) 71-113, esp. 91.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. H. Koester, "One Jesus and four primitive gospels," *HThR* 61 (1968) 203-247 (= Robinson-Koester [preceding note] 158-204).

<sup>22</sup> P. Alfarc, *Les Écritures manichéennes* II (Paris 1919) 169ff; F. W. K. Müller, "Eine Hermas-Stelle in manichäische Version," *SPAW* 1905, LI, 1077-1083 (cf. F. C. Burkitt, *Rel. Man.* [below, n. 33] 96); A. Böhlig (above, n. 2) 202ff, esp. 212ff; H.-Ch. Puech in E. Hennecke und W. Schneemelcher, *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen* I (3rd ed., Tübingen 1959) 261-265; F. Decret, *Aspects du manichéisme dans l'Afrique romaine* (Paris 1970) 151-182. See below, nn. 29, 37, 102.



the hazards of an indirect tradition that lacked the control provided by authentic texts.<sup>23</sup> Mani was not willing to allow himself or his disciples to make the same mistake. Instead, he created his own canon of sacred books, all of which were written during his lifetime and, what is more, by himself. In addition, he encouraged his disciples to write down and collect his speeches and sermons and his occasional words of wisdom. This was not extraordinary in a time when shorthand was easily available and when Manichaean scribes were the constant companions of the Manichaean missionaries.<sup>24</sup> The tradition that resulted from the literary activity of Mani's most intimate disciples is neither oral nor apocryphal, but essentially authentic, and it forms the nucleus of later works on Mani's life and the early history of the Manichaean church.

The Cologne Mani-Codex, a new and precious Greek biographical source, consists of I-narratives of Mani, prefaced by formulae like "Furthermore he said" (πάλιν ἔλεγεν) or "My Lord said" (ἔφη ὁ κύριός μου), which are more or less identical with the introductory phrases used in the Coptic *Kephalaia*.<sup>25</sup> But — and this is the extraordinary feature — the name of a Manichaean authority is attached to each of the groups of quotations to indicate the high degree of authenticity in the reports that follow. These names are by no means mere shadows; with one exception, all of the authorities that are named were already known to us either from other Manichaean sources or from later Christian abjurations, where they are mentioned as close associates of Mani and as leading figures in the Manichaean church of the generation after Mani's death.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, the new material of the Cologne codex

<sup>23</sup> *Keph.* 7,6ff (see above, n. 8); cf. M 5794 I RV in Andreas-Henning, "Mitteliranische Manichaica II," *SPAW* 1933, VII, 295f (repr. in A. Adam, *Texte zum Manichäismus*. Kleine Texte für Vorlesungen u. Übungen, 175 [2nd ed., Berlin 1969] 6f).

<sup>24</sup> On the general availability of Greek shorthand in Egypt, Bostra, and Syrian Antioch during the 3rd century A.D. and its use in the recording of theological disputations, see C. Andresen, *Die Kirchen der alten Christenheit*. Die Religionen der Menschheit, 29 (Stuttgart 1971) 177f. (Later practice is vividly illustrated in Marc. Diac. *V. Porph.* 88.) Nothing seems to be known about Syriac shorthand in the same century. But the theological and literary activities in Syriac-speaking centers of learning during this period can hardly be accounted for without the existence and extensive use of shorthand systems. On the Manichaean scribes see M 2 and M 216 in Andreas-Henning (preceding note) 301ff.

<sup>25</sup> *CMC* 69,9 (πάλιν ἔλεγεν), 79,14 (ἔφη ὁ κύριός μου), 74,9 (ἔφη ὁ κύριος), 14,4 (ἔλεγεν ὁ κύριός μου), 19,7f (καὶ πάλιν εἶπεν οὕτως), 68,5f (ἔφη δ' αὖ πάλιν); see above, n. 19.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. "Mani-Codex" 110ff.

is not derived from anonymous oral tradition but from memoir-like literary sources.<sup>27</sup> These sources were written by the authorities whose names appear as titles in the codex. They consist of Mani's own words, either as recorded by these authorities or as excerpted by them from Mani's canonical works — for instance, from his Gospel and his Letter to Edessa.<sup>28</sup> In one case, quotations from St. Paul and from Gnostic revelations were added for the apologetic purpose of providing parallels for the similar visions experienced and recorded by Mani.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> A detailed study of the formal structure of the Cologne Codex, which provides additional evidence for the authenticity of the new material, will be published elsewhere by L. Koenen.

<sup>28</sup> CMC 64,3–7 καθὼς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ π(α)ῖρ ἡμῶν (i.e. Mani) φησιν ἐν τοῖς συγγραμμασιν οἷς ἀπέστειλεν εἰς Ἑδεσσαν (quotations from the letter follow). Ibid. 65,23–66,3 ἔγραψεν [δὲ πάλιν καὶ] εἶπεν ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ τῆς ἀγνωστῆς αὐτοῦ ἐλπίδος (cf. *Evangelium Veritatis* 17,2f: “This name of the Gospel is the revelation of Hope,” on which see H. Jonas, *Gnomon* 32 [1960] 328f). Quotations follow, in which Mani refers to his Gospel as τὸδε τὸ ἀθάνατον εὐαγγέλιον (CMC 67,13f), thus confirming the traditional title “Living Gospel” (cf. “Mani-Codex” 108f and 190ff). It should be noted that in the various titles which refer to Mani's Gospel, the term εὐαγγέλιον must be taken in the literal sense of *Frohbotschaft* (as in the Gnostic tradition) and not form-critically as denoting an established literary genre (cf. J. M. Robinson in Robinson–Koester [above, n. 20] 74ff; A. Böhlig in *Christentum u. Gnosis* [above, n. 8] 5f, E. Haenchen, “Neutestamentliche und gnostische Evangelien,” *ibid.* 19–45). In terms of form, however, Mani's Gospel begins with the Pauline formula used elsewhere by Mani to introduce his letters. (In his Gospel, this formula probably serves as a mark of authenticity.) The Gospel continues first with a doxology (CMC 66,7–23) immediately followed by a protreptic summary of Mani's spiritual *res gestae* (*ibid.* 66,23–68,5), and later with a homily (*ibid.* 68,6–69,8). The new fragments from Mani's Gospel confirm Puech's tentative conclusion that we are dealing with “einem Werk lehrhaften und dogmatischen Charakters” (in Hennecke–Schneemelcher I [above, n. 22] 267).

<sup>29</sup> CMC 48,16–60,12 quotes extensively from five Revelations (ἀποκαλύψεις, a term apparently used as a book-title, cf. A. D. Nock, *HThR* 57 [1964] 260 n. 11; H.-Ch. Puech in *Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique* 5 [1957, publ. 1960] 161–190), no doubt borrowed or adapted from semi-gnostic Judaism, which are ascribed to Adam (cf. K. Rudolph, “Gnosis und Manichäismus nach d. koptischen Quellen,” *Koptologische Studien in der DDR. Wissenschaftliche Zeitschr. d. Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Sonderheft* 1965, 169f), Sethel (e.g. *Keph.* 12,10, 42,26, 145,27; M 22 R in W. B. Henning, “Henochbuch” [above, n. 6] 28; cf. G. Flügel, *Mani. Seine Lehre u. seine Schriften* [Leipzig 1862] 269, K. Rudolph, *Die Mandäer* I [Göttingen 1960] 184), Enos, Shem, and Enoch respectively and which are not identical with extant apocalyptic literature (“Mani-Codex” 107). Similar series of names occur elsewhere in Manichaean literature in enumerations of Mani's predecessors (above, n. 6; for the doctrine of the cyclic incarnation of the True Prophet see below, nn. 118–120). The new material in the Cologne Codex provides a fresh

Justin's definition, perhaps influenced by Papias, of the synoptic tradition as "apostolic memoirs" (ἀπομνημονεύματα),<sup>30</sup> though hardly adequate to the Gospels, would well describe the character of part of the material on which the biographic coverage of Mani's life is based. Certain Greek-speaking Manichees must have felt the same way; for a Manichaean work with the title *Ἀπομνημονευμάτων βιβλος* is attested. This is obviously an unofficial name given to a Life of Mani similar to that of the Cologne Codex, i.e., based on autobiographical data in Mani's own writings and on recollections of his disciples.<sup>31</sup> This new insight into the Manichaean practice of authentication gives us more confidence than we used to have in the literary form and the content of the *Kephalaia*.

### III

There are, of course, other and more direct ways of vindicating the general truth of the traditions about Mani that are collected in the *Kephalaia*. Attention has been drawn to the peculiar setting of several chapters, which sketch situations and locations far too unusual to be mere inventions.<sup>32</sup> In our case, for example, the triple sequence of audiences with Shapur I is more than plausible, for there is convincing evidence of a casual contact between Mani and the monarch, although the Cologne Codex has discredited as a late fabrication the story which synchronized Mani's first public appearance, Shapur's coronation and Mani's first meeting with the king.<sup>33</sup>

The authenticity of the *Kephalaia* is particularly in evidence when the doctrinal substance of individual chapters and the religious terminol-

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basis for the study of the interrelation of apocalyptic and Gnostic revelation; cf. H. Koester in Robinson-Koester (above, n. 20) 193ff. For the references to Paul in CMC see "Mani-Codex" 114f, and below, n. 36.

<sup>30</sup> Papias ap. Eus. *H.E.* 3.39.15; Just. I *Apol.* 66.3 (cf. 33.5), *Dial.* 103ff. *passim*. Cf. R. M. Grant, *The Earliest Lives of Jesus* (New York 1961) 15-20, 119-121; W. G. Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament* (English trans., London 1966) 32, 341.

<sup>31</sup> PG I, 1468 A. Cf. "Mani-Codex" 113 n. 36; H.-Ch. Puech, *Le Manichéisme. Son fondateur, sa doctrine* (Paris 1949) 112f n. 97.

<sup>32</sup> A. Böhlig (above, n. 2) 234f.

<sup>33</sup> Much has been made of this synchronism in modern scholarship. The supposed event was ceremoniously labeled "Pentecost of the Manichaean Religion" (F. C. Burkitt, *The Religion of the Manichees* [Cambridge 1925] 3). Cf. "Mani-Codex" 126ff, and, for a timely word of caution, P. Brown, "The diffusion of Manichaeism in the Roman Empire," *JRS* 59 (1969) 92ff (reprinted, with expanded footnotes, in *Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine* [London 1972] 94ff).



ogy in which it is phrased can be paralleled from other early Manichaean sources. Such parallels are frequent, because Mani's theology and Mani's language follow a consistent pattern in all the extant documents. According to Mani's own statement, his theological system in all its essential parts took shape, with divine inspiration constantly at work, during the twelve years that preceded his first public appearance as preacher of the new gospel of hope in 240 A.D.<sup>34</sup> Mani was twenty-four years old at that time, and it was at the age of twelve that he claims to have experienced his first major revelation in which the Twin of Light was instrumental.<sup>35</sup> Although the example of the twelve-year-old Jesus displaying his prodigious wisdom in the Temple may have influenced Mani's choice of that particular age, it would be unreasonable to doubt such an early development. Whatever we think of divine revelations and the part they play in the shaping of a new religion, we have to admit that prophetic gifts and religious genius usually show themselves at an early age, and that this visionary experience must have been as real and overwhelming for the young Mani as it had been for St. Paul, whom Tertullian called "Apostle of the heretics."<sup>36</sup> Mani's admiration for, and imitation of, St. Paul as the Christian prototype of the itinerant missionary is well documented.<sup>37</sup> But to account for the development of as powerful a personality as that of Mani in terms of a

<sup>34</sup> The capital texts for Mani's two major revelations (see following note) are for the first revelation, *Keph.* 14,31-15,24 and *CMC* 19,8-24,16 (cf. "Mani-Codex" nn. 171, 176, 207), for the second revelation *CMC* 104,12-105,8 (ibid. n. 175), and for both revelations *Fihrist* I p. 328 ed. Flügel (cf. K. Kessler, *Mani. Forschungen über die manich. Religion* [Berlin 1889] 384f; A. Adam [above, n. 23] 25 and 118). According to Mani's own testimony in both *Keph.* and *CMC* the content of his first revelation was theological in that it provided Mani with the basis for his doctrine; his second revelation was ecclesiastical in that Mani was directed to begin his missionary work. Mani's extant accounts of his two major revelations, though divergent in detail, are identical in substance. The reference in the *Fihrist* to Mani's first revelation, which has no parallel in either *CMC* or *Keph.*, seems to be a paraphrase by an-Nadim rather than a verbatim quotation from Mani's own works.

<sup>35</sup> "Mani-Codex" 119ff (to be modified in the light of R. Köbert, "Orientalistische Bemerkungen zum Kölner Mani-Codex," *ZPE* 8 [1971] 243-247, and L. Koenen, "Das Datum der Offenbarung und Geburt Manis," ibid. 247ff).

<sup>36</sup> *Adv. Marc.* 3.5 (*CSEL* 47 p. 382,26f). The Manichees were well aware of the affinity between Mani's revelations (above, nn. 34-35) and those of Paul; see *CMC* 60,13-62,9 (above, n. 29) and *Keph.* 19,11.

<sup>37</sup> H.-Ch. Puech, "Saint Paul chez les manichéens d'Asie Centrale," *Proceedings of the IXth International Congress for the History of Religions* (Tokyo 1960) 176-187; P. Brown, "The diffusion of Manichaeism" (above, n. 33) 94 (= *Religion and Society* [ibid.] 98f). Cf. "Mani-Codex" 114f, 138f, 198f.



deliberately cultivated *imitatio Pauli* would be to see in Mani nothing but an impostor and to misunderstand the very nature of religious prophecy as practiced in Jewish and Christian apocalyptic circles, which regarded the experience of revelation as a discipline that could be handed down from teacher to disciple through the grace of God. It was in this spirit that Mani was brought up.<sup>38</sup> We may conclude, then, that Mani's theology, once conceived, admitted of little, if any, substantial change, and that the several books he produced are a monument of systematization rather than landmarks of a continuous intellectual evolution. Mani's theological vocabulary, originally Syriac, was equally uniform and survived translation into several languages. It is this consistency in diction and subject matter that makes source analysis on a comparative basis such a useful tool in Manichaean studies.

With this in mind, let us return for a moment to the chapter of the *Kephalaia* in which Mani points out the impossibility of having two Manis. It is hardly surprising to find in the Cologne Codex several passages in which similar emphasis is placed on the confrontation between the single Mani and the many powers of this world. These parallels will add a new dimension to our previous interpretation. In a sudden fit of despair and discouragement, apparently not long after his first revelation, Mani seeks comfort in a soliloquy in which he pictures his hopeless position in the hostile environment of the baptist sect from which he had alienated himself: "They are many," he complains, "but I am alone; they are rich, but I am poor. How shall I be able, therefore, the one against all of them, to reveal this mystery amidst the crowd that is entangled in error?"<sup>39</sup> Immediately, the celestial Twin appeared and dispelled Mani's doubts. At a later instance, Mani compares himself to a stranger and a solitary (*ὀθνείος καὶ μονήρης*) in the midst of these baptists.<sup>40</sup> In both cases the clash was not yet between the world of the Sassanian Empire on the one side and the fervent warrior for a new creed on the other, who would fight his way from the Persian Gulf in the south to the Caspian Sea in the north

<sup>38</sup> The baptist community, in which Mani spent twenty years early in his life, believed in divine revelation and inspiration as proofs of prophetic vocation; see "Mani-Codex" 139, and below, n. 119.

<sup>39</sup> CMC 31,1-9 ("Mani-Codex" 178 n. 202).

<sup>40</sup> CMC 44,2-12 τότε παραχρῆμα διεῖλον ἑμαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν τάξεων ἐκείνου τοῦ δόγματος (the more common term in CMC is νόμος, see below, n. 89) καθ' ὃ ἀνετράφην καὶ γέγονα παραπλήσιος ὀθνείῳ καὶ μονήρει ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν μέχρι φθάσαι τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ ἀποβῆναι με ἀπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ δόγμα[τος καθ' ὃ ἀνετράφην. Cf. CMC 102,9-11 ("Mani-Codex" 177 n. 201). On the spiritual and monastic connotations of the Syriac term *nūkrāyē* (*ὀθνείος*) see A. Adam, *Sprache u. Dogma* (below, n. 49) 87.

and the Indus valley in the east. Mani's dimensions were still provincial, and his activities confined to some scattered villages in the swampy marshes of the Sassanid province of Mesene. His spirit was not yet one of defiance and superiority, but of anguish and depression. After all, he was a youth in his teens, already aware of his estrangement and his singularity, but still lacking the kind of self-assurance that was the hallmark of his future success. Some twelve years later, at the age of twenty-four, after the final and painful confrontation with, and separation from, the baptists with whom he had lived for twenty years, he was even more depressed than before. He turned to God in prayer, and encouragement came in the form of the second major revelation, transmitted by the Twin of Light, whom Mani addressed as follows:

"I was reared and brought up in this sect of the baptists, and to its leaders and presbyters I was related through the upbringing of my body. If they, then, did not give me room for the acceptance of the truth, how will the world or its mighty or its doctrines accept me, in order to listen to these secrets and to accept these commandments which are heavy? How shall I perform in front of the kings and dynasts of the world and the founders of the sects? For behold, they are mighty and powerful in their wealth and their licence and their riches, whereas I am alone [*μονογενής*] and poor in these things?"<sup>41</sup>

Mani's language indicates a growing horizon and foreshadows his advancement from local heretic, of whom the world would have taken little notice, to a religious leader who left his mark upon history. We are thus prepared for the reply of the Twin of Light in which he commissions Mani to go out into the world.<sup>42</sup>

There is no way of deciding whether the notion of human frailty and divine succor that pervades Mani's early self-analysis and that is so reminiscent of St. Paul's self-denial in submission to God's grace was a genuine attribute of the young Mani, or whether it is merely a

<sup>41</sup> CMC 103,1-104,10 (cf. "Mani-Codex" 177 n. 201). There can be little doubt that Mani's *ἐγὼ δὲ μονογενής τε καὶ πένης τούτων* (CMC 104,8-10) is derived from Ps. 24.16 (trans. LXX) *ὅτι μονογενής καὶ πτωχός* (cf. Ps. 34.10 *πτωχὸν καὶ πένητα*) *εἰμι ἐγώ* (trans. Aquila: *μοναχὸς* [see below, n. 52] *καὶ πτωχός*); on the Manichees' indebtedness to the Old Testament Psalter see A. Böhlig (above, n. 2) 215 (*pace* F. Decret [above, n. 22] 145 n. 1). Cf. the allegorical interpretation of Ps. 24.16 by Didymus of Alexandria, *CPss.* 87,7f ed. M. Gronewald (*Didymus der Blinde. Psalmenkommentar (Tura-Papyrus)*, Teil II. Papyrologische Texte u. Abhandlungen 4 [Bonn 1968]): "*μονογενής*" οὖν "*εἰμι καὶ πτωχός*," καίτοι ὁ οὕτω *μονογενής* (*πτωχός coniec.* Gronewald) *πλούσιός ἐστιν* "*πλουτεῖ*" γὰρ "*παντὶ λόγῳ καὶ πάσῃ γνώσει*" (cf. 1 Cor. 1.5).

<sup>42</sup> CMC 104,12-105,8 (cf. "Mani-Codex" 167 n. 175).

*façon de parler* of the mature man who in retrospect envisaged his early life in seclusion and inactivity as a period of pusillanimity and weakness. Be that as it may, Mani's self-confidence was fully developed by the time he wrote his Gospel, which is most probably his first book and may well antedate his first missionary journey.<sup>43</sup> Among the several quotations from Mani's Gospel which are preserved in the Cologne Codex is the following passage: "The gift that was given to me by my [heavenly] father is very great and very rich. If the world and all of mankind were to listen to me, I would be able to make them rich by virtue of this very possession and gain which my father has given me, and to let wisdom suffice for all the world."<sup>44</sup> Within a very short period of time, the previous confession of poverty had turned into a promise of wealth to the whole world, an unmistakable allusion to the parable of the imperishable and spiritual treasures on which Mani elaborates elsewhere.<sup>45</sup>

#### IV

It might seem that the downward road which leads from the theological and psychological aspects of Mani's self-conception to their philological root is neither short nor worth pursuing. And yet in this case it is both. We have seen how Mani emphasizes that he is "the only Mani," an expression which is capable of conveying the notions of aloneness and uniqueness. This ambiguity was meaningful to Mani, because it reflects the essential polarity which characterizes the Gnostic's existence in the world of matter: Mani is forlorn and menaced in that he dwells temporarily in the midst of a multitude given to ignorance; he is delivered and superior in that he, the elect, transcends the world. The invariable Coptic term to denote this "oneness" is **ΟΥΩΤ**, whereas the three Greek synonyms that are interchangeably used are *μόνος*, *μονήρης*, and *μονογενής*. The Cologne Codex was translated from a Syriac original. This is an inference which rests on several linguistic observations. One of them, for instance, is the use of *αἱ πόλεις*,

<sup>43</sup> The only attempt to establish a relative chronology of Mani's writings was made by W. B. Henning in *Asia Minor* 3 (1953) 208f.

<sup>44</sup> CMC 68,17-69,8 (cf. "Mani-Codex" 98 n. 2); see above, n. 28.

<sup>45</sup> CMC 74,21-76,9 ("Mani-Codex" 155 n. 147). For the notion that the possession of Gnosis is spiritual wealth and that its absence is poverty, see *Gospel according to Thomas* (above, n. 18) Logion 3 (II, 33,2-5); cf. H.-Ch. Puech in *Annuaire du Collège de France* 59 (1959) 258f, 62 (1962) 201, 64 (1964/65) 214ff, 65 (1965/66) 250.



“the Cities,” for the twin cities of Seleucia-Ctesiphon, which is a literal rendering of the corresponding Syriac *m<sup>e</sup>dīnāṭā*.<sup>46</sup> Another is the misleading phrase *ἡμέρα τῆς σελήνης*, literally “the day of the moon,” in the only exact date which the Cologne Codex provides; this, in turn, is an awkward translation of a stereotyped Syriac formula, *baḏ<sup>e</sup>sahrā*, which specifies a date based on the Babylonian lunar calendar.<sup>47</sup> The Coptic Manichaica, on the other hand, are separated from the lost Syriac originals by the interposition of Greek translations from the Syriac, equally lost, with the exception of the Cologne Codex, which is the first witness for the existence of this intermediate Greek stage of Manichaean literature in Egypt. What used to be a scholarly theory has thus become an established fact. Since we are working with translation literature, any interpretation of Manichaean terminology that starts from Greek or Coptic translations of the underlying Syriac terms runs a certain risk. This risk, however, is reduced by the fact that the Manichaean translators were not only imbued with the modes of expression peculiar to their own religion, but must also have been familiar with Christian and, as we shall see, Neoplatonic language and literature.<sup>48</sup> Consequently, the translators had a large technical vocabulary at their command, and although they may occasionally struggle with the syntax of the language into which they translate, especially if it is from Syriac into Greek, their translations usually do full justice to the various syncretistic elements in Mani’s language.

Even so, it is imperative to ask ourselves whether the essential ambiguity which is inherent in the Greek terms *μόνος*, *μονήρης*, and *μονογενής*, applies equally to the underlying Syriac word or words, provided the latter can be ascertained. If not, Mani could hardly have

<sup>46</sup> “Mani-Codex” 105; cf. A. Christensen, *L’Iran sous les Sassanides* (2nd ed., Copenhagen 1944) 383f.

<sup>47</sup> R. Köbert (above, n. 35) 244ff.

<sup>48</sup> Below, n. 134. An interesting example of a common Greek word being given a new Manichaean connotation is the use of *εὐσέβεια(ι)* “alms” as a translation of the Syriac *zedq<sup>e</sup>ṭā* (*ṣ<sup>e</sup>dāqā* in Mishnaic and Talmudic Hebrew, *zidqā* in Mandaic; see K. Rudolph, *Die Mandäer* I 85, unduly criticized by E. M. Yamauchi [below, n. 80] 56, who did not take into account the decisive philological evidence), which is attested in Hegemon. *Arch.* 10 (p. 16,11f ed. Beeson) and in *CMC* 9,8f, 9,12 and 35,8 (“Mani-Codex” nn. 129, 140, 144. The Manichaean translators into Coptic, however, in default of a literary equivalent, had to use **MNTNΔΕ** which corresponds to the standard Greek term *ἐλεημοσύνη*; cf. A. Böhlig [above, n. 2] 258). The phrase *καὶ εὐσεβείας παρέχων τοῖς πένησι* in *Acta Thomae* 19 p. 128,6 (cf. 128,14f) ed. Bonnet could well go back to a *Manichaean* translator.



been aware of this ambiguity, and we would then be forced to give up an interpretation which is otherwise in perfect keeping with Mani's thinking. How, then, did Mani, in his native Syriac tongue, express the two aspects of his *μονότης*? The Greek *μονογενής*, a term of great significance in Christian literature, and a passage in the Syriac text of the Hymn of the Pearl provide the clues to the answer.

The Johannine *μονογενής* in the sense of "only-begotten" is consistently rendered into Syriac as *ihīdāyā* or *ihīdā*;<sup>49</sup> both formations are ultimately derived from *ḥad* "one." Outside a specifically Johannine or christological context, however, *ihīdāyā* was as ambiguous as the Greek *μόνος* and *μονήρης*. In addition, it was used as a key-word in its own right in the terminology of Syrian asceticism to denote the encratitic "solitaries," originally not in the sense of hermits but of celibates who led a single life by renouncing marriage and by severing all ties that connected them with the world.<sup>50</sup> This conception of *ihīdāyē* was free of any Johannine connotations at the time it originated in the encratitic movements of eastern Syria, which — under the influence of Palestinian asceticism, Marcionism, and, later, Manichaeism — determined the course of Syrian Christianity in the late second and third centuries and left a lasting impress on the Syrian Church. The following passage from a Syriac baptismal liturgy which was quoted by Aphraṭ in 337, but has been shown to reflect the spirit of the previous century is vivid proof of how the concept of renunciation of the world and of selection influenced even the dispensation of the Christian sacraments, much as in Manichaeism: "The struggle is suitable for solitaries (*ihīdāyē*), because their faces are set for that which is before them, and they do not remember something that lies behind them, for their treasures are before them."<sup>51</sup> The allusions to Gnostic imagery need no comment. Stripped of most of its Christian disguise, the same Gnostic concept of the elect, who is a stranger in this world, was given a purer expression in the Gospel of Thomas: "Jesus said: Blessed are the solitary (*μοναχός*) and elect, for you shall find the Kingdom; because you come from it, you shall go there

<sup>49</sup> A. Vööbus, *History of Asceticism in the Syrian Orient: I, The Origin of Asceticism; Early Monasticism in Persia*. CSCO, vol. 184, Subsidia 14 (Louvain 1958) 106ff; A. Adam, "Grundbegriffe des Mönchtums in sprachlicher Sicht," *Zeitschr. f. Kirchengesch.* 65 (1953/54) 209ff = *Sprache und Dogma* (Gütersloh 1969) 71ff, esp. 79ff.

<sup>50</sup> A. Vööbus (preceding note) 108.

<sup>51</sup> Trans. Vööbus (above, n. 49) 93f. Cf. F. C. Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity* (London 1904) 126ff; A. Guillaumont, "Monachisme et éthique judéo-chrétienne," *RechScRel* 60 (1972) 199-218, esp. 204.

again."<sup>52</sup> Mani could well have used both these texts for his purposes without changing a word. But it would be rash to assume that the Gospel of Thomas was known to Mani, let alone the baptismal liturgy, or to agree with those scholars who believe in an Aramaic or, more specifically, a Syriac original of the Gospel of Thomas.<sup>53</sup> Both assumptions, though attractive, take too much for granted.

There is a shortcut, however, which leads from the Hymn of the Pearl directly to Mani. It is generally agreed that Mani was acquainted with the original Syriac version of the Hymn of the Pearl, and a hymnic passage in the Cologne Codex which is full of reminiscences of this composition corroborates such a conclusion.<sup>54</sup> The Hymn of the Pearl centers around the Prince who, in the Manichaean interpretation, was the counterpart of Mani, and, like Mani, is described as a solitary and stranger in a couplet which reads: "Since I was one and all alone, I was a stranger to my fellow-dwellers in the inn."<sup>55</sup> This is as close to Mani's *ὁθνείος καὶ μονήρης* as it can be, and even the image of the world as a travelers' inn recalls the following passage from Mani's Gospel: "The truth I have shown to my fellow-travelers (*τοῖς ἐμοῖς ξυνεμπόροις*)."<sup>56</sup> The remaining linguistic data are equally conclusive. The two Syriac words which are used in the Hymn of the Pearl to

<sup>52</sup> *Gospel according to Thomas* (above, n. 18) Logion 49 (II, 41,27-30); cf. Logion 75 (II, 46,11-13). On the Gnostic use of *μοναχός* see M. Harl, *Rev. Ét. Gr.* 73 (1960) 464-474; H.-Ch. Puech in *Annuaire du Collège de France* 61 (1961/62) 179f, 62 (1962) 202; A. F. J. Klijn, *JBL* 81 (1962) 271-278; G. Quispel, *Vigiliae Christianae* 18 (1964) 233 and 235.

<sup>53</sup> On the controversy surrounding the *Gospel of Thomas* see H. Koester in Robinson-Koester (above, n. 20) 128ff; B. Ehlers, "Kann das Thomasevangelium aus Edessa stammen?," *Novum Testamentum* 12 (1970) 284-317. H.-Ch. Puech has shown that four of the Logia in the *Gospel of Thomas* (to which should be added August. *C. ep. fund.* 11 [CSEL 25 p. 206,18-24] = *C. Fel.* 1 [ibid. p. 801,17-24]) are also quoted in the Manichaean tradition (in Hennecke-Schneemelcher I [above, n. 22] 216f and 263; *Annuaire du Collège de France* 58 [1958] 234f, 59 [1959] 263). It is obvious that there is more than one possible explanation for this coincidence.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. *Hymn of the Pearl* 76-78 in *Acta Thomae* 112 p. 223,9-13 ed. Bonnet (for a recent translation of the Syriac version, see R. Köbert, *Orientalia* 38 [1969] 447-456, esp. 454); *CMC* 17,11-15 and 24,4-15 ("Mani-Codex" 168ff and 174f).

<sup>55</sup> *Hymn of the Pearl* 23 in *Acta Thomae* 109 p. 220,19f ed. Bonnet. The above translation, however, is based on the Syriac text (P. Bedjan, *Acta Martyrum et Sanctorum Syriace* 3 [Paris-Leipzig 1892] p. 111; cf. R. Köbert [preceding note] 450).

<sup>56</sup> *CMC* 66,23-67,2 ("Mani-Codex" 200); for *ὁθνείος καὶ μονήρης* see above, n. 40.

express the idea of the Prince's oneness and aloneness are the adjective *ḥaḍ* and, from the same root, the participle *m<sup>e</sup>šāwḥaḍ*, both of which are closely related to *ihīdāyā* which we have recognized as the Syriac equivalent underlying the Greek *μονογενής*. Let us summarize: the triple series *μόνος*, *μονήρης*, and *μονογενής* quite possibly corresponds to the similar Syriac formations *ḥaḍ*, *m<sup>e</sup>šāwḥaḍ*, and *ihīdāyā*, and both sets of terms could be used to emphasize the singularity of the one Mani in all its aspects.

It remains to ask whether Mani added another dimension to his singularity by claiming to be the "only-begotten" of the Father of Greatness, who occupies the very apex of the Manichaean hierarchy of emanations, or, in other words, whether Mani understood the term *ihīdāyā*, in addition to its usual connotations, in the Johannine sense of *μονογενής*. I think a strong case can be made for such an interpretation. Mani's Gospel begins with a doxology which is extant in the Cologne Codex. It is sufficient to quote the first sentence, the substance of which is repeated later: "I Mani, the apostle of Jesus Christ by the will of God, the father of truth, from whom I originate (*ἐξ οὗ καὶ γέγονα*)."<sup>57</sup> Mani does not say expressly that he is the *only*-begotten but in stressing the notion of his divine sonship, he must mean precisely this, because in his own system he had no rival.

## V

Mani's awareness of, and insistence on, his own singularity is the basis of his self-conception, and any attempt to penetrate into Mani's complex personality has to start from that point.<sup>58</sup> But, as we have seen, Mani's self-understanding has little to do with the awareness of one's own individuality or terrestrial historicity, notions which would have been much less meaningful and important to Mani than they are to

<sup>57</sup> CMC 66,7; cf. *ibid.* 66,15-18 *ἐξ αὐτοῦ γὰρ τούτου πέφυκα, εἰμὶ δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ* (Mani's language is inspired by John 1.13); see "Mani-Codex" 198ff. *Μονογενής* is applied to the Father of Greatness at *Keph.* 34,23, to Jesus throughout the *Psalm-Book* (59,2, 60,8, 91,24; cf. J. Ries, "Jésus-Christ dans la religion de Mani," *Augustiniana* 14 [1964] 437ff esp. 451f), and to Mani in a Middle-Persian invocation (M 83 V 6-8) which reads: "Amen, to thee, first-born (*nūhzād*) Apostle, Divine Lord, Mani, our Saviour" (F. W. K. Müller, *Abh. Preuss. Akad. Wiss.*, 1904 [Anhang] 70n.; trans. F. C. Burkitt [above, n. 33] 92). The Middle-Persian *nūhzād* corresponds to the Greek *πρωτότοκος*; on the juxtaposition of *μονογενής* and *πρωτότοκος* in *Acta Thomae* 48 and 60 see H.-Ch. Puech in *Annuaire du Collège de France* 71 (1971) 267f.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. L. J. R. Ort (above, n. 1) 127ff.



us. The fact that Mani possessed an alter-ego in the form of the Twin of Light makes him a split personality<sup>59</sup> in the literal sense of that term rather than an individual: his human existence was nothing but a briefly reflected image of its true and eternal counterpart.<sup>60</sup> In like manner, Mani's conception of history was as different from any other ancient theory of, or approach to, history as it is from modern concepts, because he envisaged the history of mankind neither as a succession of political powers nor as an interplay of human actors, but as the mingling and separation of two opposed principles in which man had an auxiliary function only.<sup>61</sup> This is the reason why the autobiographical passages in Mani's own writings and the biography which Mani's disciples composed are not always what a historian of religion would probably like them to be, namely, an uninterrupted and systematic series of vital facts and dates concerning Mani's life. One has to realize that Mani's biography is a history of salvation (*Heilsgeschichte*). It was written *sub specie ecclesiae et aeternitatis*, in that it was the first chapter of a more comprehensive history of the Manichaean Church, which in turn was interpreted as the final act in the cosmic battle between Light and Darkness.<sup>62</sup> Theological considerations like these determined the title of Mani's biography as it is attested in the Cologne Codex. The title is "On the genesis of his body," where "body" must be comprehended in the ecclesiological sense of St. Paul's *σῶμα Χριστοῦ*, i.e., as Mani's Church.<sup>63</sup> One of several reasons against a literal interpretation of *Περὶ τῆς γέννης τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ* is that Mani's attitude toward physical reproduction was totally negative and that his disciples

<sup>59</sup> G. Haloun and W. B. Henning, *Asia Major* 3 (1953) 208.

<sup>60</sup> CMC 17,11-15 ("Mani-Codex" 169); *Hymn of the Pearl* 76 ("Mani-Codex" 174f).

<sup>61</sup> The dualistic doctrine of the Two Principles is closely associated with Mani's soteriological interpretation of Time as a sequence of Three Epochs. Cf. e.g. P. Alfaric, *Écrit. manich.* II (above, n. 22) 66f; H. Jonas, *Gnosis und spätantiker Geist* I (3rd ed., Göttingen 1964) 286 and 304; H.-Ch. Puech, "La Gnose et le temps," *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 20 (1951) 57-113, esp. 99ff and 106ff (repr. in J. Campbell [ed.], *Man and Time*. Bollingen Series, 30.3 [New York 1957] 38-84); L. J. R. Ort (above, n. 1) 133.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. "Mani-Codex" 113f on the lost Coptic continuation of the Cologne Life of Mani. The aim of the redactor of Mani's biography is thus comparable to the intentions of the author of Luke-Acts.

<sup>63</sup> L. Koenen, *ZPE* 8 (1971) 250. See *Keph.* 14,24ff and 36,3-5 (cf. *ibid.* 10,8-11,16 and 156,11; for the Elect as Mani's "members" [μέλη; cf. St. Paul's usage] see *ibid.* 34,6f and 41,26); C. Colpe, "Zur Leib-Christi-Vorstellung im Epheserbrief," *Festschrift f. Jeremias*. Beiheft 2. ZNW 26 (Berlin 1960) 172-187; C. Andresen (above, n. 24) 31.



would hardly have dared to refer to it openly in the title of his biography.<sup>64</sup>

It follows from Mani's metaphysical concept of history and from the soteriological interpretation he gave to his own life that the scope and content of Mani's biography are governed by selective principles which are neither genuinely biographical nor always historical, but theological and, more specifically, ecclesiastical. In order to qualify for inclusion in this biographical tradition, an event in Mani's life had to be essential for the origin or the expansion of the Manichaean Church. Consequently, instances of divine intervention such as visions, revelations, and miracles were regarded as essential and treated like historical facts, in some exceptional cases with good reason. Mani's two major revelations, for instance, whatever their factual background, are of prime importance historically, because they determined the future course of Mani's life. This explains why they are, apart from Mani's birth, the only events in his life which Mani thought it necessary to date accurately within the framework of contemporary Sassanian history.<sup>65</sup> The accounts of Mani's first missionary journeys as extant in the Cologne Codex, on the other hand, bear little resemblance to a travel journal.<sup>66</sup> In their

<sup>64</sup> The title *Περὶ τῆς γέννης του σώματος αὐτοῦ* seems to be borrowed from *CMC* 46,8f (in a passage on Mani's visions which can be attributed to Baraies; see above, n. 8), where it occurs in a fragmentary context, but apparently without reference to Mani's physical birth. The metaphor of a mother rejoicing instantly after childbirth (*Keph.* 205,26ff) is a rare exception in Manichaean texts and should be contrasted with "the demon who delivers the stink of birth" in *Keph.* 108,6.

<sup>65</sup> "Mani-Codex" 119ff.

<sup>66</sup> *CMC* pp. 116–192. (The last extant quire [pp. 169–192] is too fragmentary to allow identification of its content.) Even if this part of the Cologne Codex were more complete, the epitome-like arrangement of the material and the resulting discontinuity would make it difficult to reconstruct an itinerary which is chronologically and topographically coherent. Some of the peoples, places, and provinces which Mani visited are mentioned by name. On p. 121 we find the Medes (*Μῆδοι*) and the city of Ganzak (spelled both *Γουνζακ* and *Γαναζακ*; contrast *Γάνζακα* in Procop. *Bell. Pers.* 2.24), i.e. Shiz in Media Athropatene [Azerbaijan] (cf. G. Hoffman, "Auszüge aus syrischen Akten persischer Märtyrer," *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 7,3 [Leipzig 1880] 250–253); both references show that Mani's first missionary journey was not to India (W. Sundermann, "Zur frühen missionarischen Wirksamkeit Manis," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 24 [1971] 79–125, 371–379) but in a northeastern direction to one of the major Iranian sanctuaries which was the religious and ideological center of the Sassanian monarchy (A. Christensen [above, n. 46] 166f). Forat (Bašra) is mentioned next (*CMC* 140,3–6 *εἰς Φαρατ τήν [πύ]λιν πηλσίον τῆς [γῆς]ου τῶν Μαῖσα[νῶν]*). Cf. Dio Cass. 68.28.4; *PW* 15.1 s.v.

neglect of geographical and chronological detail and their almost exclusive concentration on the miraculous element, they will prove to contain even less useful evidence for a complete reconstruction of Mani's actual routes than the Pauline Epistles and Acts provide for St. Paul's. But it would be pretentious to look at Mani's biography only as a historical source. To put it bluntly, which is to exaggerate: hagiography is not historiography. Judged by its own standard, however, the material contained in the new codex must be given a high rating. There are two or three stories of doubtful historicity, which are markedly different from all the rest and which must have been included for the sole purpose of pious edification and religious instruction.<sup>67</sup> But even they are so powerful in their imagery and so persuasive in their vivid illustration of Manichaean doctrine that one would not hesitate to credit Mani with them.

The extant accounts of the twenty years of Mani's life that were spent in the community of the baptists are characterized by a marked emphasis on divine revelation; likewise, in the accounts of his subsequent missionary activities the miraculous element prevails. Both sets of excerpts, therefore, suffer from a considerable amount of repetition, because each revelation and each miracle follows a common narrative pattern, although the content varies.<sup>68</sup> This repetition is particularly striking in the early sections of the Cologne Codex, where independent accounts of Mani's first revelation have been collected and purposefully conflated with different accounts referring to his second revelation.<sup>69</sup> In both cases, revelations and miracles, it is left to the modern critic to remove the aretalogical varnish from the underlying factual background.

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Mesene 1082ff). Another mention of Forat follows on p. 144, in connection with merchants and ships which travel [? The verb is lost] to the Persians and Indians (*Ἰνδοί*). Finally, Armenia and Persia (*Περσίς*) occur on p. 146.

<sup>67</sup> CMC 10,4-15 ("Mani-Codex" 147 n. 130); CMC 74,21-76,9 (ibid. 155 n. 147); CMC 77,14-79,8 (cf. ibid. 156 n. 149).

<sup>68</sup> Part of this pattern consists of the stereotyped formulae which introduce Mani's accounts of his revelations in CMC 18,10ff ("Mani-Codex" 120 n. 52), 64,15ff (ibid. 113 n. 35), 69,9ff (ibid. 165 n. 169).

<sup>69</sup> CMC 18,1-19,7 ("Mani-Codex" 120 n. 52, 165 n. 170, 167 n. 177) introduces a revelation which is dated to Mani's *εἰκοστόν καὶ πέμπτον ἔτος* (CMC 73,5-6) and which is therefore his *second* major revelation (above, nn. 34-35). The immediately following quotation (CMC 19,7-24,16; "Mani-Codex" 166 and 168) is so similar to Mani's account of his *first* revelation in *Keph.* 14,31ff (above, n. 34; "Mani-Codex" 163) that both passages must refer to the same event.

## VI

But sandwiched between the stereotyped accounts of Mani's quiet life in the baptist sect and those of his first contact with the world is an intermediate group of continuous texts which cover more than twenty pages of the Cologne Codex and are derived from two Manichaean authorities, Baraies and Timotheos.<sup>70</sup> These two narratives provide us with detailed documentation on the period of transition, presumably of very short duration, in which the latent differences between Mani and the baptists erupted in a series of heated theological disputations. This confrontation signals the open breach between Mani and the religious environment in which he had been raised. The actual birth hour of Manichaeism arrived when, after the futile exchange of many arguments, Mani's physical existence was threatened by the hostility of the baptists, who launched an assault against him which turned out to be the very cutting of the umbilical cord. The Cologne Codex describes vividly Mani's violent expulsion from the baptist community, thus confirming a brief reference to the same effect in Theodore bar Kōnai.<sup>71</sup> Mani survived this ordeal as an independent personality, ready to lead his own life; the baptists survived it too, but at the price of a schism that must have disrupted their ranks more seriously than the passing allusions in the Cologne Codex suggest.<sup>72</sup> The defection of three baptists to Manichaeism, including Mani's father Pattikios, who was highly regarded in the baptist sect, was presumably the beginning of a continuing process.<sup>73</sup> Two passages in the *Kephalaia* suggest that the open conflict between the baptists and Mani continued to be an obstacle for both parties.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>70</sup> CMC 79,13-99,9 (Baraies), 99,11-114,5 (Timotheos); cf. "Mani-Codex" 133-160.

<sup>71</sup> Theodore bar Kōnai, *Liber Scholiorum* XI p. 311,16ff (CSCO 66; trans. A. Adam [above, n. 23] 75f): "Und weil ihn die Reinigungsanhänger nicht ertragen konnten, schlossen sie ihn aus ihrer Gemeinschaft aus" (italics mine). CMC 100,1-101,3 narrates how Mani's recalcitrant opposition infuriated the baptists so that they beat and maltreated him, seized him by his hair, shouted at him as if he were possessed by a demon, and would even have strangled him (CMC 100,17-20 καὶ βουλό[με]νοι διὰ τοῦ προσόν[τος αὐ]τοῖς φθόνου ἀπ[ά]γξαι[μεν], if Mani's father Pattikios had not intervened and saved his life.

<sup>72</sup> CMC 87,6-12 ("Mani-Codex" 157 n. 152) ἄλλοι δὲ ἔλεγον· 'μὴ ἄρα Πλάνη (on the personification of Error, see A. D. Nock, *HThR* 57 [1964] 275) ἐστὶν ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ φθεγγομένη καὶ βούλεται τὸ ἔθνος ἡμῶν ἀποπλανῆσαι καὶ διχάσαι τὸ δόγμα (Matth. 10,35 ἦλθον γὰρ διχάσαι ἄνθρωπον κτλ. Cf. J. Jeremias in Hennecke-Schneemelcher I [above, n. 22] 54; C. Andresen [above, n. 24] 255ff).

<sup>73</sup> CMC 106,5-22 (cf. "Mani-Codex" 130f).

<sup>74</sup> *Keph.* 33,29-32 and 44,24ff. In the former passage, the undefined adherents



The new and unparalleled information on the organization, the ritual practices, and, in a few instances, the theology of this baptist sect is perhaps the most substantial contribution to the history of religion in the new codex. It is here, and only here, that the inherent tension of the situation and the excitement of Mani's two speeches and of the connecting narrative are breathtaking even for the modern reader. It is here, more than in any other section of the codex, that one is convinced that he is witnessing the shaping of history. However, even here we have to be on our guard. Speeches are known to be an important instrument used by ancient writers of history, whether religious or secular, in presenting their own evaluations of historical figures or important events. This is why speeches are a notoriously unreliable source of information. In our case, the circumstances that led to the survival, or revival, of what was actually said in that particular situation are less complex than usual, because Mani is both the main actor and the final authority who must have remembered this confrontation throughout his life. It is understandable that Mani devotes more space to the exposition of his own arguments than to that of his opponents, who are allowed brief exclamations and interjections only and whose opinions are usually summarized in narrative passages.

For the modern critic, this technique has a negative implication in that it produces the tendency of seeing the institutions of the baptists through Manichaean spectacles instead of describing them for their own sake. It is especially the doctrines put into the mouth of Elchasai that are thoroughly Manichaean. Elchasai, who lived in the early second century A.D., presumably in northern Mesopotamia, was the founder of a baptist sect with predominantly Jewish-Christian, rather than Gnostic, basis.<sup>75</sup> A reliable Arabic source mentions him also as the founder of the Babylonian baptists, whom Mani's father had joined

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of the "baptism by water" (ΠΒΑΠΤΙΣΜΑ ΝΗΜΜΟΥΙΕΥΕ) invite speculation (cf. A. Vööbus [above, n. 49] 122 n. 61). The phrase, which is reminiscent of *CMC* 82,23-83,3 καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ὁ καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν βαπτίζεσθε ἐν ὕδασι οὐδὲν τυγχάνει ("Mani-Codex" 141 n. 116), is more likely to be aimed at the practices of the Babylonian baptists than at orthodox Christian baptism. The plural "sects of error" (ΝΔΟΓΜΑ ΝΤΕ ΤΠΛΑΝΗ, cf. above, n. 72), if to be taken literally, would indicate that Mani had several such groups in mind, and not only the baptist sect in which he was brought up. *Keph.* 44,24ff is a clear reference to the δόγμα (below, n. 89) τῶν βαπτιστῶν, who are distinguished from the so-called Καθάριοι (cf. K. Rudolph, *Die Mandäer* I, 43f).

<sup>75</sup> On Elchasai, see e.g. W. Brandt, *Elchasai. Ein Religionsstifter und sein Werk* (Leipzig 1912); G. Strecker, *RAC* 4 (1959) 1171ff; D. Flusser, *Numen* 16 (1969) 147ff.



when Mani was four years old, and among whom Mani grew up.<sup>76</sup> Their connection with Elchasai, though disregarded or distrusted by almost all scholars, is now confirmed by the Cologne Codex.<sup>77</sup> This confirmation means that the various attempts to identify Mani's baptists with the anti-Jewish and anti-Christian Mandaean who make their first *recorded* appearance some two centuries later can no longer stand;<sup>78</sup> for the Elchasaites of the Cologne Codex were not only rooted in traditions of definite Jewish origin, including the Sabbath, but also recognized as binding for their communal life the message of Jesus and an unknown version of the Christian Gospels. The Christian element is consistently referred to as αἱ ἐντολαὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος.<sup>79</sup> We come to realize that the relation of Manichaeism and Mandaeanism was less direct and more complicated than is generally believed. There remains the remote possibility that Mani himself, or parts of the Manichaean literature such as the Psalms of Thomas, came under the influence of still another baptist sect, to be located somewhere in Babylonia or Mesopotamia and related to, or identical with, the later Mandaeans.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>76</sup> The source is an-Nadim's *Fihrist* (p. 340 ed. Flügel); cf. G. Flügel (above, n. 29) 133f, W. Brandt [preceding note] 134f.

<sup>77</sup> CMC 94,9-11 (Mani is addressing the baptists) δέικνυσι γὰρ Ἀλχασαῖος ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τοῦ νόμου ὑμῶν ("Mani-Codex" 135 n. 97). The Greek form of the name in CMC is consistently spelled Ἀλχασαῖος, a spelling which contributes substantially to the clarification of the etymology of the name. The absence of an initial spirant in combination with the specific vocalization of the first syllable (Αλ-), which was hitherto unattested in this form, support the derivation from Syriac ʿalāhā kasyā ("Hidden God") rather than from ḥaylā kasyā ("Hidden Power"; δύναμις κεκαλυμμένη in Epiph. *Haer.* 19.2.2); cf. W. Brandt, *Die jüdischen Baptisten*. Beihefte zur Zeitschr. für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 18 (Giessen 1910) 109, W. Brandt, *Elchasai* (above, n. 75) 8, K. Rudolph, *Die Mandäer* I, 233 n. 4, G. Strecker (above, n. 75) 1171f.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. "Mani-Codex" 133ff.

<sup>79</sup> CMC 79,20f, 80,11f, 84,8f, 84,20f, 91,10f, and 91,20f ("Mani-Codex" 136). Cf. the similar clash between παράδοσις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων and ἐντολή τοῦ θεοῦ in Matth. 15.1ff and Mark 7.1ff.

<sup>80</sup> For a recent and largely novel reassessment of the *Mandäerfrage* see E. M. Yamauchi, *Gnostic Ethics and Mandaean Origins*. Harvard Theological Studies 24 (Cambridge 1970). Certain aspects of Yamauchi's approach, though stimulating, provoke disagreement, especially when he attempts to minimize direct Jewish or Jewish-Christian influence on primitive Mandaeanism. The Cologne Codex seems to provide some of the very links which Yamauchi complained were missing, for instance with regard to almsgiving (above, n. 48) and the Mandaean Sunday (below, n. 97). Mani grew up in a Jewish-Christian baptist community which observed the Sabbath (below, p. 48), but he adopted the Christian Sunday and an anti-Jewish attitude. Is it so unlikely, then, to find in Mandaeanism, which after all has an even more complex genealogy than

It is much easier, however, to regard the analogies between the Manichaean and Mandaean religions, which consist in parallels in the extant literatures rather than similarities in cult practices, as an independent heritage from common ancestors, namely, the Palestinian and Babylonian baptist movements which influenced Mani and which helped to produce the Mandaeans (or proto-Mandaeans) as their last offshoot. The problem presented by the fact that Mandaean ritual provides the only parallel for two of the ritual practices with which the baptists are credited by Mani finds its easiest solution if explained on the same lines.<sup>81</sup> The two rites which Mani's baptists share with the Mandaeans of the extant Mandaic documents are the purification of their food by ablutions with water and the ritual preparation and baking of their bread, most likely unleavened bread. In the Cologne Codex, this bread is distinguished from the wheat bread of the "Greeks," a term we shall discuss later.<sup>82</sup> The first practice is comparable to the ritual cleaning of the Mandaean Tābūtā, the second survived in the Mandaean Pihtā and Faṭirē, two different kinds of unleavened bread prepared for sacramental use.<sup>83</sup>

It is regrettable, though characteristic, that the few pages in the Cologne Codex which are devoted to the doctrines of Elchasai himself are nothing but a collection of legendary stories which add nothing substantial to the reports of the Christian heresiologists. These stories relate how water, earth, and bread address themselves to Elchasai, the righteous one (δίκαιος), and implore him not to do what his Babylonian followers were precisely doing when they used the water for baptism, tilled the soil and baked the bread.<sup>84</sup> What Mani does here is to conjure up the ghost of Elchasai and have him confute the ritual

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Manichaeism, "such a devolution of this Jewish characteristic [i.e. the Sabbath] into anti-Jewish polemic" (Yamauchi, 64)?

<sup>81</sup> Those scholars who did not plead for a direct identification of Mani's baptists with the Mandaeans but regarded both as descending, *qua* baptists, from common ancestors, must be very close to the truth (e.g. O. G. von Wesendonk, *Die Lehre des Mani* [Leipzig 1922] 16f n. 3).

<sup>82</sup> "Mani-Codex" 139 n. 108 and 145 n. 126; see below, nn. 107-109.

<sup>83</sup> K. Rudolph, *Die Mandäer* II, 124, 132, 133.

<sup>84</sup> CMC 94,9-97,17 (cf. "Mani-Codex" 135, 143, 146f) esp. 95.8ff σὺ ὁ δίκαιος λάτρης εἶναι καὶ δίκαιος. "Righteous" (δίκαιος), the name of honor given to James, "the Lord's brother" (Hegesippus ap. Eus. *H.E.* 2.23.4ff; Clement of Alexandria ap. Eus. *H.E.* 2.1.4), was a genuinely Jewish-Christian term which was adopted by Mani and reserved for the Manichaean Elect (e.g. *Keph.* 36,25, 93,7, 166,3, 189,30, 192,25, 209,13; cf. A. Vööbus [above, n. 49] 112, F. C. Burkitt [above, n. 33] 46, 105f); for its Jewish background see R. Mach, *Der Zaddik in Talmud und Midrasch* (Leiden 1957).

practices of the Babylonian Elchasaites on the basis of Manichaean pan-psychism, a clever trick which infuriated the baptists. As one would expect, the factual background of these stories is almost nil. The facts are that Elchasai was indeed called ἀνὴρ δίκαιος and that he had mentioned the “voice of the water” (φωνή τοῦ ὕδατος) in his sacred book.<sup>85</sup> The rest is Mani’s invention.

The new data on the customs of the southern Babylonian baptists, on the other hand, never openly contradict and often confirm the ancient reports on the Elchasaites and on related baptist sects of Jewish-Christian origin.<sup>86</sup> There are eight points of agreement which can be summarized as follows:

(1) *The ritualistic conception of piety.* All baptist sects which descended from heretic Judaism adhered to ritual practices consisting of repeated acts of external purification as the only means to attain remission of sins and as the main road to justification and salvation. Observance of the ritual laws was mandatory. These ritual laws, though different from the Mosaic law, renewed its spirit. Therefore, the baptist sects could claim to “live according to the Law” (κατὰ νόμον ζῆν).<sup>87</sup> This explains why the baptists of the Cologne Codex refer to their religion as “our law and that of the fathers in which we have been living since olden times” (ὁ νόμος ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν πατέρων ἐν ᾧ ἀναστρεφόμεθα ἐκ πάλαι).<sup>88</sup> To emphasize the traditions of the “fathers,” here certainly to be taken in the sense of forefathers and religious teachers rather than Old Testament Patriarchs, is as Jewish a heritage as the insistence on the law. The Syriac term underlying νόμος in the Cologne Codex is most

<sup>85</sup> Hipp. *Haer.* 9.13.1–2 ταύτην (sc. τὴν βίβλον) ἀπὸ Σηρῶν τῆς Παρθίας παρειληφέναι τινὰ ἄνδρα δίκαιον Ἑλχασαῖ. Epiph. *Haer.* 19.3.7 (in a quotation from Elchasai’s book of revelation) μὴ πορεύεσθε πρὸς τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ πυρός), πορεύεσθε δὲ μάλλον ἐπὶ τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ ὕδατος.

<sup>86</sup> The classical treatment is J. Thomas, *Le Mouvement baptiste en Palestine et Syrie* (150 av. J. C.–300 ap. J. C.). Diss. Univ. Cath. Lovan., Series II, Tom. 28 (Gembloux 1935). Several of Thomas’s arguments in support of an unconditional identification of Muḡtasila (i.e. the Babylonian baptists as described in an-Nadim’s *Fihrist*) and Mandaeans (205ff, 244) and, secondly, of a derivation of the Mandaeans from “une communauté baptiste elchasaïsée” (252, cf. 245ff) have to undergo substantial revision in the light of the Cologne Codex.

<sup>87</sup> Hipp. *Haer.* 9.14.1 οὗτος (sc. Alcibiades who disseminated Elchasai’s doctrines in Rome) νόμου πολιτείαν προβάλλεται δελεάσματος δίκην, φάσκων δεῖν περιτέμνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ νόμον ζῆν τοὺς πεπιστευκότας. Ibid. 7.34 Ἑβριωναῖοι . . . κατὰ νόμον φάσκοντες δικαιοῦσθαι. Cf. below, n. 105.

<sup>88</sup> CMC 91,6–9 τὸ βάπτισμα τοῦ νόμου ἡμῶν κτλ. (“Mani-Codex” 136 n. 99).



probably *nāmōsā*, a Greek loan-word. Mani adopted this term from the baptists and applied it throughout his writings primarily to the Jewish-Christian baptist sect in which he was brought up.<sup>89</sup>

(2) *The keeping of the Sabbath.* The followers of Elchasai were required to observe the Jewish Sabbath.<sup>90</sup> It is almost certain that Mani's baptists did the same. The evidence, however, hinges on the interpretation one gives to a passage in the Cologne Codex where Mani describes the religion of the baptists as "the doctrines of those who are used to reading about purity, castigation of the flesh and the keeping of the resting of the hands" (τὸ δόγμα τῶν ἀνεγνωκότων περὶ ἀγνείας καὶ σαρκοδε[σμί]ας καὶ κατοχῆς ἀνα[πα]ύσεως τῶν χειρῶν).<sup>91</sup> The reference to the reading habits of the Elchasaïtes remains obscure. Mani probably had in mind the reading of Holy Scriptures, which preached sanctification through acts of purification and abstinence and through the "resting of the hands." This latter term is used in the Coptic *Kephalaia* to describe the elect's abstention from any kind of manual labor which was supposed to damage the "Cross of Light," i.e. the "Living Soul" or light particles which were dispersed in the world and imprisoned in each organic substance.<sup>92</sup> This specifically Manichaean doctrine was, of course, unknown to the baptists. Their "resting of the hands" must have been something quite different, namely the Sabbath rest to which both the Greek ἀνάπαυσις and the underlying Syriac *nʿyāh*

<sup>89</sup> CMC, passim; cf. *Keph.* 44,23ff esp. 45,5, and *Hom.* 87,13-14 (in both Coptic passages νόμος occurs with reference to Mani's baptists, but in fragmentary context). Likewise, the Mosaic Law could be called νόμος (*Hom.* 11,4, 11,10; *Psalm-Book* 57,11, 192,20). The Manichaean Tradition (above, n. 8), perhaps influenced by Mani's own practice (above, n. 40), used νόμος also in the much broader sense of δόγμα to denote a non-Manichaean religion (*Keph.* 21,21; 29,35f; *Hom.* 2,27, 36,27), or *sensu eminentissimo* for the Manichaean religion itself (cf. the testimonia in F. C. Burkitt [above, n. 33] 53ff).

<sup>90</sup> Hipp. *Haer.* 9.16.3 (cf. Eus. *H.E.* 3.27 on the Ebionites). We do not know whether the baptists of the Cologne Codex shared Elchasai's preoccupation with astrology, which influenced several of his doctrines, including rest on the Sabbath.

<sup>91</sup> CMC 102,12-16. Σαρκοδε[σμί]ας as restored by Henrichs-Koenen seems to be a *hapax legomenon*; but there is no reasonable alternative, and the word makes perfect sense as it stands (cf. *Keph.* 212,28). For κατοχή "observance, keeping" see G. W. H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford 1961) 731 s.v. κατέχω A 1, and CMC 5,6f καὶ κατέχων τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν (said of the young Mani who claims to have observed the Manichaean "resting of the hands" while still living with the baptists).

<sup>92</sup> *Keph.* 192,9f. ΠΜΤΑΝ ΝΝΟΙΧ is a literal translation of ἡ ἀνάπαυσις τῶν χειρῶν.



or *n<sup>e</sup>yāhtā* could occasionally refer.<sup>93</sup> Such an interpretation is confirmed by Mandaic texts and throws fresh light on the origin of the Mandaean Sunday at the same time. In one passage<sup>94</sup> the “resting of the hands” on Sundays is criticized, clearly in an anti-Christian context, whereas elsewhere,<sup>95</sup> precisely in a polemic against the Jewish Sabbath, the “resting of the hands” occurs with reference to the Mandaean holiday period of Saturday night and Sunday, during which the doing of work was discouraged.<sup>96</sup> This inconsistency reflects the unharmonious evolution of the Mandaean religion which, though opposed to Judaism and Christianity, borrowed from both. It has long been recognized that the Mandaean Sunday combined elements of the Jewish Sabbath and the Christian Sunday in such a way that at an earlier, perhaps pre-Mandaean, stage of this evolution, the keeping of the Sabbath will have preceded the Sunday celebration, probably under the influence of a Jewish-Christian baptist sect.<sup>97</sup> The “keeping of the

<sup>93</sup> Cf. Lampe (above, n. 91) 115 s.v. B 4; R. Payne Smith, *Thesaurus Syriacus* II (Oxford 1901) 2315ff s.vv. The universal observance of the Sabbath in Jewish-Christian circles and the relatively late (post-Constantinian) recognition of the Christian Sunday as a day of rest (W. Rordorf, *Sunday. The history of the day of rest and worship in the earliest centuries of the Christian Church* [English trans., London 1968] 68, 128, 136, 154ff) rule out any connection of ἀνάπαυσις τῶν χειρῶν in *CMC* (above, n. 91) with the Christian Sunday. See Rordorf, *Sunday* 161: “The Syriac *Didascalia* [written about 250 for Gentile Christians] did not require any rest from work on Sunday.” The proposed interpretation of ἀνάπαυσις τῶν χειρῶν in *CMC* as distinct from the use of the same phrase in *Keph.* (see preceding note) finds support in Aug. C. *Faust.* 6.4 (*CSEL* 25 p. 288,22–290,24), a passage on the Manichaean rejection of the Jewish *cessatio* [= ἀνάπαυσις] *Sabbatorum* in which the Sabbath rest is compared to the daily abstention from physical activities as practised by the Manichaean Elect.

<sup>94</sup> *Ġinza R.* 56,12f (p. 50,25 ed. M. Lidzbarski): “On Sunday they keep their hands still.”

<sup>95</sup> *Mand. Lit.* (Oxford Collection) p. 211,5 ed. Lidzbarski: “On the Sabbath she [i.e. Mirjai, a symbolic personification of the Mandaean religion] undertakes work, on Sunday she keeps her hands still.” Nṯr “guard, watch, keep” corresponds to κατοχή in *CMC* 102,15 (above, n. 91) rather than to ἀνάπαυσις in *CMC* 102,15f. The Coptic parallel (above, n. 92) forbids employing one of the panaceas of textual criticism by interpreting κατοχῆς ἀνα[πα]ύσεως τῶν χειρῶν as a conflation of the original text (κατοχῆς τῶν χειρῶν) with a gloss (ἀναπαύσεως).

<sup>96</sup> K. Rudolph, *Die Mandäer* II 326ff.

<sup>97</sup> K. Rudolph, *Die Mandäer* II 327 and 330f; cf. W. Rordorf (above, n. 93) 190ff. The objection raised by Yamauchi (above, n. 80) 64, lacks a supporting argument. [After the above was written, Professor Rudolph kindly informed me that his theory of a Mandaean observance of the Sabbath-eve was in part based on the philologically untenable interpretation of the Mandaean *anpia juma* as “Vorabend des Tages” instead of the correct “Anbruch des (Sonn-)Tages” (cf. R. Macuch, *Theol. Literaturzeitung* 87 [1962] 744f; K. Rudolph in H. Gese,

resting of the hands" by the southern Babylonian baptists supports such a hypothesis.

(3) *The baptisms or repeated ritual ablutions of the whole body in running water.* Their frequency and significance varied from sect to sect. Elchasai distinguished between an initiatory sacramental baptism for the remission of sins on the one hand, and repeated baths for purificatory and remedial purposes on the other.<sup>98</sup> The Elchasaites of the Cologne Codex are attacked by Mani because of their *daily* baths, a practice which they shared with the Ebionites and Hemerobaptists.<sup>99</sup> One of Mani's arguments seems to credit the Babylonian Elchasaites also with the institution of sacramental baptism for initiation as admitted by Elchasai and the Ebionites.<sup>100</sup>

(4) *Celebration of the Eucharist with unleavened bread and mere water.* This practice, though not expressly attested for Elchasai, was adopted by the Ebionites and almost certainly also by Mani's baptists.<sup>101</sup> Otherwise, their regulations regarding the preparation of bread would make no sense. Mani himself interpreted the ritual use of this bread clearly as sacramental and eucharistic. In refuting the bread-baking practices of his baptists, he quotes from the New Testament. Characteristically enough, he starts with the institution of the Lord's supper, which he quotes in a peculiar mixture of Matthew and Mark or Luke, another proof of Mani's use of Tatian's *Diatessaron*.<sup>102</sup> After further quotations, Mani ends with the observation that when Jesus commis-

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M. Höfner, K. Rudolph, *Die Religionen Altsyriens, Altarabiens und der Mandäer*. Die Religionen der Menschheit 10,2 [Stuttgart 1970] 444 n. 186). Nevertheless the whole issue of Mandaean adaptation of, and reaction to, Jewish customs remains as open as ever; see E. Segelberg, "The Mandaean Week," *RechScRel* 60 (1972) 273-286, esp. 274, 282, and 286.]

<sup>98</sup> G. Strecker (above, n. 75) 118of; K. Rudolph, *Die Mandäer* I 234f.

<sup>99</sup> CMC 82,23-83,13 ("Mani-Codex" 141 n. 116). Cf. Epiph. *Haer.* 30.2.4, 30.15.3, 30.21.1 (Ebionites), 17.1.2f (Hemerobaptists).

<sup>100</sup> CMC 83,3-7 ἀπαξ γὰρ βαπτισθέντες καὶ ἀπα[ξ] καθαρθέντες εἵνεκε[ν] τίνος πάλιν καθ' ἑκάστη[ν] ἡμέραν βαπτίζεσθε; ("Mani-Codex" 141 n. 116).

<sup>101</sup> Epiph. *Haer.* 30.16; cf. J. Daniélou, *Théologie du Judéo-Christianisme* (Paris 1958) 69.

<sup>102</sup> CMC 92,3-9 ("Mani-Codex" 136 n. 100). New evidence on Mani's use of the *Diatessaron* is forthcoming in contributions by G. Quispel (in a paper entitled "Mani et la tradition évangélique des Judéo-Chrétiens," which through the kindness of the author I was able to read in typescript) and by L. Koenen. [Professor Quispel's paper is now available in print: *RechScRel* 60 (1972) 143-150.]

sioned the Twelve, he did not order them to carry baking equipment with them, neither millstone nor oven.<sup>103</sup> This is an elaboration of the *μήτε πῆραν μήτε ἄρτον* in Luke and Mark.<sup>104</sup> The baptists must have been hard put to challenge this argument, unless they had followed the Jewish-Christian habit of deleting scriptural passages which run contrary to their own beliefs.

(5) *The rejection of certain parts of the Old and New Testaments, including all of St. Paul.*<sup>105</sup> The baptists of the Cologne Codex argue with Mani on the basis of the New Testament. This is the only explicit reference to their use of the Scriptures. Speculation as to which of the gospels they had adopted would, therefore, be in vain. It might have been anything from Tatian's Harmony to one of the several specifically Jewish-Christian gospels.<sup>106</sup> In this connection, we have to consider briefly the fact that in the Cologne Codex, the baptists suspect Mani of "going to the Greeks" (*εἰς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας πορεύεσθαι*) or "to the Gentiles" (*ἔθνη*).<sup>107</sup> One is reminded of the same words in John 7.35

<sup>103</sup> CMC 93,14-23 (cf. "Mani-Codex" 138 n. 104) *ὁμοίως δὲ ὀπηνίκα ἀ[πέ]στειλεν αὐτοῦ τρεῖς μα]θητάς ὁ σω(τῆ)ρ καθ' ἑκ[αστον] τόπον κηρύξαι [οὔτε] μύλον οὔτε κλ[ιβανον] (cf. Matth. 6.30; Luke 12.28) συνεπεφέρο[ντο μεθ' ἐ]αυτῶν ἀ[λλ'] [ῆπει]γοντο πα[ρα]σκευὴν οὐδε[μίαν ἐκ τοῦ οἴκου προσ]λαμβάν[οντες].*

<sup>104</sup> Luke 9.3; Mark 6.8. These scriptural passages must have inspired Mani when he specified which personal belongings his monks (i.e. the Elect) were allowed to possess (see A. Vööbus [above, n. 49] 116ff).

<sup>105</sup> Eus. *H.E.* 3.27.4 οὗτοι (sc. οἱ Ἑβριωνᾶιοι) δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἀποστόλου πάμπαν τὰς ἐπιστολὰς ἀρνητέας ἡγοῦντο εἶναι δεῖν, ἀποστάτην ἀποκαλοῦντες αὐτὸν τοῦ νόμου (similarly Iren. *Haer.* 1.26.2 *Paulum recusant apostatam eum legis dicentes*); cf. "Mani-Codex" 139 n. 107. One is reminded of CMC 89,11-14, where the baptists complain to Mani's father Pattikios: *ὁ υἱός σου ἐξετράπη τοῦ νόμου ἡμῶν καὶ εἰς τὸν κόσμον βούλεται πορευθῆναι[ε].*

<sup>106</sup> P. Vielhauer, "Judenchristliche Evangelien," in Hennecke-Schneemelcher I (above, n. 22) 75-108. A new fragment of the *Gospel according to the Hebrews* is found in Didymus of Alexandria, *CPss.* 184,9f ed. A. Gesché and M. Gronewald (*Didymos der Blinde. Psalmenkommentar (Tura Papyrus)*, Teil III. Papyrologische Texte u. Abhandlungen 8 [Bonn 1969] 198). This attestation adds credibility to the opinion of W. Bauer and others (e.g. H. Koester in Robinson-Koester [above, n. 20] 130) that the *Gospel according to the Hebrews* originated in Egypt and was written in Greek (for a different view, see G. Quispel, *Vigiliae Christianae* 11 [1957] 189-207, *New Testament Studies* 12 [1965/66] 371-382), because Didymus did not know Aramaic. (If he had used a translation into Greek, he would very likely have said so.) If so, this gospel cannot have been the one used by Mani's Syriac-speaking baptists.

<sup>107</sup> CMC 80,16-18 and 87,19-21 (texts quoted in "Mani-Codex" 139). It is obvious that *τὰ ἔθνη* as used by the baptists "has the connotation of religious and moral inferiority which was taken for granted by the Jews" (W. Bauer,



where the Jews suspect that Jesus might intend "to go to the dispersion of the Greeks and teach the Greeks."<sup>108</sup> This is precisely what St. Paul did when he brought the Gospel to the Gentiles. The common Jewish-Christian term of abuse for St. Paul was "Greek."<sup>109</sup> This coincidence is hardly accidental. It is more than likely that Mani had come into contact, personal and literal, with the Marcionite and Bardesanite types of Christianity when he was still living with the baptists.<sup>110</sup> Both Marcion and Bardaisan, for all their differences, represented a Pauline or Greek Christianity and had nothing in common with Judaism or Jewish Chris-

W. F. Arndt, and F. W. Gingrich, *A Greek English Lexicon of the New Testament* [Chicago 1957] 217 s.v. *ἔθνος* 2).

<sup>108</sup> εἶπον οὖν οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι πρὸς ἑαυτούς· Ποῦ οὗτος μέλλει πορεύεσθαι ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὐχ εὐρήσομεν αὐτόν; μὴ εἰς τὴν διασπορὰν τῶν Ἑλλήνων μέλλει πορεύεσθαι καὶ διδάσκειν τοὺς Ἕλληνας; (The relevance of this New Testament passage was first pointed out to us by E. de Strycker). In contrast to Ἑλληνισταί (on which see H. J. Schoeps [above, n. 8] 5), Ἕλληνες as used in the terminology of the LXX and the New Testament (and, by implication, in *CMC*) does not classify people according to their language, but denotes ethnic (i.e. non-Jewish) origin. Slightly different is Socrates' definition of Manichaeism as ἐλληνίζων Χριστιανισμός (*H.E.* 1.22), which he goes on to explain as αἱ τῶν βιβλίων τοίνυν ὑποθέσεις χριστιανίζουσι μὲν τῇ φωνῇ, τοῖς δὲ δόγμασι ἐλληνίζουσιν (Socrates refers explicitly to Pythagoras and Empedocles as sources for the Manichaean doctrine of μεταγγισμός); for Socrates ἐλληνίζειν doubtlessly meant the study of pagan authors who wrote in Greek.

<sup>109</sup> Epiph. *Haer.* 30.16.8f (cf. 30.25.1ff).

<sup>110</sup> On the details of Marcion's and Bardaisan's influence on Mani see F. C. Burkitt in C. W. Mitchell, *S. Ephraim's Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion and Bardaisan* II (London and Oxford 1921) cxliif, and Burkitt (above, n. 33) 14, 74-85 (esp. 74: "Greek influence . . . will have come to Mani through a Syriac channel" [italics mine]); H. H. Schaeder, "Urform und Fortbildungen des manichäischen Systems," *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg* 1924-25 (Leipzig-Berlin 1927) 73ff (= *Studien zur orientalischen Religionsgeschichte* [Darmstadt 1968] 23ff); O. G. von Wesendonk, "Bardesan und Mani," *Acta Orientalia* 10 (1932) 336-363; H.-Ch. Puech in *Annuaire du Collège de France* 56 (1956) 204ff; A. Böhlig (above, n. 2) 208ff and 243; O. Klíma (above, n. 1) 127ff; H. J. W. Drijvers, *Bardaisan of Edessa* (Assen 1966) 225ff; P. Brown, "The diffusion of Manichaeism" (above, n. 33) 93 (= *Religion and Society* [ibid.] 97). The intriguing question whether or not Bardaisan was a "Gnostic" who turned "Christian," which is answered in the affirmative by Christian heresiologists, need not concern us here. Attention should be drawn, however, to a note in a recent text of Didymus the Blind (*CPss.* 181,8ff [above, n. 106]), where Bardaisan is said to have converted from Valentinianism to orthodox Christianity (cf. Eus. *H.E.* 4.30.3) and to have become a presbyter later. (This latter detail anticipates a remark to the same effect in Theodore bar Kōnai; cf. S. P. Brock, *JEGArch* 57 [1971] 241, and *JTheolStud* n.s. 22 [1971] 530f.) The attempt by J. Pedersen, rightly rejected by H. J. W. Drijvers (*Bardaisan* 42), to establish artificial links between the Bardesanites and an-Nadim's Muḡtasila is implicitly proved wrong by the evidence of the Cologne Codex.



tianity. Marcion was emphatically anti-Jewish in his rejection of the Old Testament and its god; Bardaisan was passionately pro-Greek in his successful attempt to imbue Christian theology with Greek philosophy. Mani was indebted to both of them,<sup>111</sup> and it is hardly wrong to imagine a Mani who, when still with the baptists, tried hard to get hold of their forbidden books. If the baptists had an index of prohibited books, Marcion and Bardaisan must have been given pride of place. It is understandable, therefore, that the Jewish-Christian Elchasaites of southern Babylonia associated Mani's more spiritual religiosity with the Greeks whom they hated.

(6) *Encratism*. Abstinence from meat is attested for the Ebionites but not for the Elchasaites.<sup>112</sup> The baptists of the Cologne Codex were confirmed vegetarians.<sup>113</sup> The asceticism which they profess was apparently far more rigid than that of any known Jewish-Christian sect. This brings us to the question of continence. The Cologne Codex does not speak of women in connection with these baptists. Shortly before he joined them, Mani's father was admonished by a mysterious voice to eat no meat, drink no wine, and abstain from women.<sup>114</sup> It is likely, therefore, that

<sup>111</sup> The conclusion is inescapable that the fragmentary passage *Keph.* 13,30f ("At this particular time, in the last Church [sc. before the coming of Mani], a righteous [δικαίος] and honest [ΡΜΜΗΕ = ἀληθινός] man who belonged to the Kingdom made his appearance. He met with . . ." [or "agreed with . . ."]), which is part of a chronological catalogue of Mani's predecessors (above, n. 6), is an anonymous reference to both Marcion and Bardaisan, as was first suggested by H. J. Polotsky; cf. H.-Ch. Puech in *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 4 (1936) 271 (= *The Mystic Vision* [above, n. 7] 304). It is attested in the *Fihrist* (cf. Kessler [above, n. 34] 192; Adam [above, n. 23] 8f) that three chapters in Mani's *Book of the Mysteries* dealt with Bardesanite theology. For a conjectural instance of Mani's dependence on Bardaisan see below, n. 135.

<sup>112</sup> W. Brandt, *Elchasai* (above, n. 75) 111-115; G. Strecker, *RAC* 4 (1959) 1182 (cf. "Mani-Codex" 149 n. 137). Add the vegetarian tendencies found in the *Gospel of the Ebionites* (P. Vielhauer in Hennecke-Schneemelcher I [above, n. 22] 102, 104).

<sup>113</sup> Cf. "Mani-Codex" 145ff.

<sup>114</sup> *Fihrist* p. 328 ed. Flügel (cf. Kessler [above, n. 34] 384; Adam [above, n. 23] 24). The close Manichaean parallel in M 2 V I 8-10 (in Andreas-Henning [above, n. 23] 304, with Henning's n. 5) does not permit us to dismiss this admonition as a later Manichaean fabrication; rather it confirms Mani's indebtedness to the encratic ethical code of the Muḡtasila (rightly emphasized by G. Flügel [above, n. 29] 136, 140, 142; O. Klíma [above, n. 1] 218f; J. Thomas [above, n. 86] 207 "Les Moughtasilas d'An-Nadim sont des continents parfaits."). G. Widengren, who tried to identify Mani's baptists with the Mandaean (above, p. 45), found it difficult to reconcile this command to lead

Mani grew up in an exclusively male community, an assumption which would account for his total opposition toward sexuality. If so, their continuous continence was an ideal which was as foreign to all the other baptist sects as it was to Judaism or, for that matter, Mandaeism. Elchasai even encouraged marriage.<sup>115</sup> But if we can trust Josephus, some Essenes lived without women and adopted little children to raise them in their religion, a fate similar to that of Mani.<sup>116</sup> The references to marriage in the Qumran texts, however, are controversial.<sup>117</sup>

(7) *The doctrine of the "True Prophet."* The Pseudo-Clementines and Elchasai coincide in that they propagate the cyclic incarnation of the True Prophet.<sup>118</sup> For Elchasai, however, the series of incarnations did not culminate in Christ, but included Elchasai and continued even beyond him. The Cologne Codex has a clear reference to this doctrine. Some of the baptists were so impressed by Mani's performance as a

an ascetic life with the nonascetic habits of the Mandaeans (*Mani and Manichaeism* [English trans., New York 1965] 25).

<sup>115</sup> Epiph. *Haer.* 19.1.7 ἀπεχθάνεται δὲ τῇ παρθενίᾳ, μισεῖ δὲ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν, ἀναγκάζει δὲ γάμον. Cf. H. Lietzmann, *Geschichte der alten Kirche* I (4th ed., Berlin 1961) 195.

<sup>116</sup> Joseph. *Bʿ* 2.8.2 [120] (cf. *ibid.* 2.8.13 [160f], and *Aʿ* 18.21) καὶ γάμον μὲν παρ' αὐτοῖς ὑπεροψία, τοὺς δ' ἄλλοτρίους παῖδας ἐκλαμβάνοντες ἀπαλοὺς ἔτι πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα συγγενεῖς ἡγοῦνται καὶ τοῖς ἡθεσιν αὐτῶν ἐντυποῦσαι (cf. *CMC* 90, 11–18, where the synod of the baptists reminds Mani of what they believe was his former observance of the baptist faith: ἐκ νεότητος πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὑπάρχων καλῶς διῆγες ἐν τε ταῖς τάξε[σιν] καὶ ἀναστροφαῖς [τ]οῦ νόμου ἡμῶν. ὡς [νύ]μφη κατεσταλμέ[νη] ὑπῆρχες ἐμ μέσῳ [ἡμ]ῶν). H. R. Moehring, "Josephus on the marriage customs of the Essenes," in A. Wikgren (ed.), *Early Christian Origins* (Chicago 1961) 120–127 is a poor example of applied form-criticism.

<sup>117</sup> F. M. Cross, *The Ancient Library of Qumran and Modern Biblical Studies* (Garden City N.Y., 1958) 71ff; J. Maier, *Die Texte vom Toten Meer* II (München-Basel 1960) 10f; E. M. Yamauchi (above, no. 80) 59; A. Guillaumont, "A propos du célibat des Esséniens," in *Hommages à André Dupont-Sommer* (Paris 1971) 395–404.

<sup>118</sup> "Mani-Codex" 139 and 159. Cf. W. Brandt, *Jüd. Baptismen* (above, n. 77) 92; W. Brandt, *Elchasai* (above, n. 75) 79–85; H. J. Schoeps, *Theologie u. Geschichte des Judentums* (Tübingen 1949) 327f, 335ff; H.-Ch. Puech (above, n. 31) 144f n. 241; H. J. Schoeps (above, n. 8) 25f; K. Rudolph, *Die Mandäer* I 158 n. 1, and in *Koptologische Studien* (above, n. 29) 175; W. Schmithals, *Die Gnosis in Korinth* (Göttingen 1956) 130f. G. Widengren, *The Great Vohu Manah and the Apostle of God*. Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift, 1945: 5, 64ff esp. 66 prefers to interpret the Manichaean "doctrine of cyclic revelation as an Iranian theologoumenon," and postulates "an ancient Indo-Iranian dogma of revelation as the real background of the doctrine of Mani in this case" (cf. W. Brandt [above, n. 75] 85).

theologian that they regarded him as the True Prophet and the incarnation of the Living Logos.<sup>119</sup> This doctrine, which lies at the root of Mani's own conception of his apostleship as the concluding stage in a series of incarnations, forms, in combination with the docetism of Marcion and Bardaisan, the basis of Mani's christology.<sup>120</sup>

(8) The baptists of the Cologne Codex believed in the resurrection of the body, which they conceived of as a "resting of the garment" (*ἀνάπαυσις τοῦ ἐνδύματος*).<sup>121</sup> They shared this belief with orthodox Judaism and Jewish-Christianity.<sup>122</sup>

These parallels are overwhelming. Henceforth, the fact that Mani grew up in, and was influenced by, Jewish-Christian baptists must be reckoned with. This new insight into the religious environment in which Mani had lived for twenty years is quite a revelation in its own right and will provide fertile soil for future studies.

And yet the early history of Mani's baptists is totally in the dark. The moment we consider their origin, we indulge in speculation, a tendency which has proved particularly dangerous in these studies. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the Elchasaite connections of the Babylonian baptists may be secondary and superimposed, perhaps through the adoption of Elchasai's book of revelation, on an original Palestinian substratum. Two factors support such a hypothesis. In the

<sup>119</sup> CMC 86,1-9 *τινὲς δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν εἶχόν με ὥσει προφήτην καὶ διδάσκαλον. καὶ τινες μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἔλεγον· ζῶν λόγος* (1 Petr. 1.23, Hebr. 4.12; G. W. H. Lampe [above, n. 91] s.v. *λόγος* II.B.6; but *λόγια ζῶντα* Acts 7.38) *ἀδεταί* (cf. Philo, *Sacr. Abel.* 131 *ῥῥδεταί δὲ τις καὶ τοιοῦτος ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λόγοις*) *ἐν αὐτῶν· ποιήσωμεν αὐτὸν διδάσκαλον τοῦ δόγματος ἡμῶν.*" Cf. CMC 86,17-87,6 (quoted in "Mani-Codex" 142 n. 118).

<sup>120</sup> *Keph.* 12,9-27; PG I, 1461 C, 1464 D, 1465 A (see A. Adam [above, n. 23] 97ff). Cf. F. C. Burkitt (above, n. 33) 38ff; E. Waldschmidt und W. Lentz, "Die Stellung Jesu im Manichäismus," *Abh. Preuss. Akad. Wiss.* 1926, IV; H.-Ch. Puech, "La Gnose et le temps" (above, n. 61) 107f. The study of J. Ries (above, n. 57) is confined to some titles of Christ as used in Manichaean texts. Cf. E. Rose, *Die Christologie des Manichäismus*. Theol. Diss. Marburg 1941 (*non vidi*).

<sup>121</sup> CMC 87,5f. ("Mani-Codex" 142). *Ἀνάπαυσις* is opposed to *κόλασις* CMC 43,2f; cf. P. Vielhauer, "ANAPAYΣIΣ. Zum gnostischen Hintergrund des Thomasevangeliums," *Festschrift E. Haenchen*. Beiheft z. ZNW, 30 (Berlin 1964) 281-299. On *ἐνδυμα* see below, nn. 128 and 133.

<sup>122</sup> Pertinent references are scattered throughout Jewish and Jewish-Christian apocalyptic texts, in which eschatology and apocalyptic are closely interwoven; cf. J. Daniélou (above, n. 101) 342ff, J. Kroll, *Gott und Hölle*. Studien d. Bibliothek Warburg, 20 (Leipzig-Berlin 1932) 351ff. Characteristically, we find the same combination of eschatology and apocalyptic in CMC 86,17-87,6 ("Mani-Codex" 142 n. 118).



first place, there is strong evidence for missionary activities of Elchasaite groups, in the late second and early third centuries, in places as different as Coele Syria (Apameia), Rome, and Palestine.<sup>123</sup> It is conceivable, therefore, that another wave of this missionary tide reached southern Babylonia and mingled with existing currents, thus producing the special blend of Mani's baptists. In the second place, Mani's baptists led a communal life in isolated villages and emphasized manual labor, especially agriculture.<sup>124</sup> There is no recorded precedent for such a form of organization in Jewish-Christian sects. But there are the Essenes and the Qumran sect of Palestine which provide analogies.<sup>125</sup>

## VII

Mani's opening speech in the theological disputation which preceded the violent breach with the Babylonian baptists is a brief but brilliant exposition of the fundamental difference between the two.<sup>126</sup> The body, Mani argues, is as defiled as the matter of which it is created. Whether the food is baptized or not, its effect on the body is the same in that it produces blood, gall, evil spirits, dregs (τρύξ),<sup>127</sup> excrements of shame (σκύβαλα τῆς αἰσχύνης),<sup>128</sup> and all the defilement of the body.

<sup>123</sup> Cf. G. Strecker (above, n. 112) 1173f.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. "Mani-Codex" 146ff. Most revealing is CMC 106,15-19 ("Mani-Codex" 131 n. 84), where two baptists who converted and followed Mani are called by Mani πλη[σιόχω]ροί μου. Taken at face value, the term means that the two occupied the piece of land next to Mani's.

<sup>125</sup> Philo, *Quod omnis probus* 76; Philo ap. Eus. *P.E.* 8,11,8. Philo points out that some of the Essenes attended to occupations other than agriculture which were of a more workmanlike character. This was natural for such communities, which kept aloof from their heathen neighbors as much as possible and tended to be self-supporting. However, commerce with nonbelievers was permitted on a small scale; cf. e.g. *Dam.* XII 7-11, XIII 14f for the Qumran sect, CMC 97,18ff (quoted at "Mani-Codex" 148 n. 132) for the baptists.

<sup>126</sup> CMC 80,22-85,12 (cf. "Mani-Codex" nn. 16, 103, 105, 116, 124, 204).

<sup>127</sup> CMC 81,8-13 φαίνεται ἡμῖν ὅτι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ἐδωδῆς τῆς ἡδη βεβαπτισμένης) γίνεται αἷμα καὶ χολή καὶ πν(εύμ)ατα καὶ σκύβαλα τῆς αἰσχύνης καὶ τοῦ σώματος μιαιρότης. CMC 82,13-18 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ βδελυρότης καὶ ἡ τρυξ τῶν ἀμφο[τ]έρων (sc. baptized and unbaptized food) θεωρεῖται μὴ[δὲ]ν παραλλάττουσα ἐκα[τέ]ρας. On τρύξ (CΑΡΜΕ in the Manichaean Coptica) see *Keph.* 15,10, 121,6, 121,25-32, 133,2, 215,14ff, 223,29.

<sup>128</sup> See preceding note. Cf. CMC 81,18ff πάντα τὰ ἀπεκδ[ύμ]ατα (vox nova) τῆς αἰσχύνης κ[αὶ] βδε[λ]υρότης for the refuse of the body (for the reverse process of "putting on" the garment of the body, see CMC 22,9-13 ["Mani-Codex" 179 n. 207] πρὶν ἐνδύσασθαι τὸ ὄργανον [cf. G. W. H. Lampe (above, n. 91) 969 s.v. 5; and Syriac *mānā* which means both ὄργανον and ἔνδυμα] τότε καὶ πρὶν πλανηθῶ ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτῇ τῇ βδελυρώδει). A likely model for the phrase ἀπεκδύματα



The activity of this disgusting garbage producer can be reduced only through abstention from food in fasting. The daily baptisms are equally useless. In fact, they attest to a daily defilement of the body. Otherwise, one baptism would do once and for all. Purification of the body is impossible because of the secretion of the faeces (διὰ τὰς ἐκκρίσεις τῆς ὑποστάθμης),<sup>129</sup> which keeps the body in constant motion. The only true purity is that through Gnosis: Separation of Light from Darkness and salvation of the soul from death according to the precepts of the Lord.<sup>130</sup> The baptists, however, departed from this conception of purity when they adopted the purification of the body which was originally created in loathesomeness and is procreated in a process comparable to cheese-making (ἐτυρώθη).<sup>131</sup>

This is Mani's answer, full of borrowings from the Greek spiritualists. The comparison of impregnation by the semen to the curdling of milk is part of the terminology of Aristotelian embryology and was used by the Alexandrian school of biblical exegesis to interpret a passage in Job.<sup>132</sup> Closely associated with this passage is the interpretation of the

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τῆς αἰσχύνης is the encratitic *Gospel of the Egyptians* as quoted by Julius Cassianus ap. Clem. Str. 3.13.92 (= *Apocrypha* II, ed. E. Klostermann [3rd ed., Berlin 1929] fr. 2; Hennecke-Schneemelcher I [above, n. 22] 111, 115, 215): ὅταν τὸ τῆς αἰσχύνης ἔνδυμα πατήσῃτε κτλ. The underlying concept is the Alexandrian exegesis of Gen. 3.21 χιτῶνας δερματίνους (cf. Gen. 2.25) as the material body (Julius Cassianus ap. Clem. Str. 3.95.2); see below, n. 133, and G. Quispel in *Le Origini dello Gnosticismo*. Supplements to Numen, 12 (Leiden 1970) 633ff. The positive correlation to τῆς αἰσχύνης ἔνδυμα is "garment of glory (or light)" as a designation for Adam's state before the fall; e.g. A. F. J. Klijn, *JBL* 81 (1962) 273f, J. Z. Smith, *History of Religions* 5 (1966) 231f.

<sup>129</sup> CMC 84,5f ("Mani-Codex" 104 n. 16).

<sup>130</sup> CMC 84,9-17 ("Mani-Codex" 137 n. 103). Cf. *Evangelium Veritatis* p. 25,12-19, one of the key passages in this Valentinian text (see H. Jonas, *Gnomon* 32 [1960] 335, and above, n. 28).

<sup>131</sup> CMC 85,6-12 καὶ κατέσχατε τὴν τοῦ σώμα[ος] κάθαρσιν τοῦ μιαρωτάτου καὶ διὰ μυσαρότητος πεπλασμένον. καὶ δι' αὐτῆς ἐτυρώθη (see following note) καὶ οἰκοδομηθὲν ἔστη (cf. *Keph.* 95,11-15; 130,26). The abominable nature of both man's creation and procreation was a heretical commonplace according to Tert. *De resurr.* 4 (CCL 2 p. 925,3-7) *an aliud prius vel magis audias ab haeretico quam ab ethnico et non protinus et non ubique convicium carnis, in originem, in materiam, in casum, in omnem exitum eius, inmundae a primordio ex faecibus* (below, n. 134) *terrae, inmundioris deinceps ex seminis sui limo.*

<sup>132</sup> Job 10.10. Cf. Didymus of Alexandria's *CJob* 276,29ff ed. U. Hagedorn, D. Hagedorn, and L. Koenen (*Didymos der Blinde. Kommentar zu Hiob (Tura Papyrus)*, Teil III. Papyrologische Texte u. Abhandlungen 3 [Bonn 1968], with the editors' notes). Three centuries after Mani, Burzōē, the private physician of Chosroes I, was still familiar with Aristotelian embryology; cf. the passage quoted in G. Widengren, *Iranische Geisteswelt* (Baden-Baden 1961) 103.

"garments of skin" in Genesis as the mortal body of flesh, an image with which Mani was fully familiar.<sup>133</sup> The terms σκύβαλον, τρύξ, and ὑποστάθμη were favorites with the Neoplatonists for the least valuable part of matter.<sup>134</sup> Mani must have found this Greek terminology in Bardaisan. Bardaisan used the term "dregs" frequently to denote the primordial matter, although he valued matter so much more highly than Mani that he "regarded conception and birth as a form of purification."<sup>135</sup>

The Elchasaïtes, it has been remarked, were pre-Manichaean Manichees.<sup>136</sup> The Cologne Codex shows what the truth of this statement is. Much in Manichaeism can now be explained as the continuation or adaptation of Elchasaïte ritual or theology. But at the same time, the Cologne Codex makes us aware of the tremendous difference in their respective conceptions of purity. The baptists believed in external ablutions and vegetarian diet as means of individual purification; their final aim was the purification and salvation of the body. For Mani, purification was a cosmic process, the separation of spirit and matter in which man as a microcosmos participated.<sup>137</sup> The soul was light and could be purified until it reached salvation, the body, as matter, was part of the residue that remained after the purification of light and

<sup>133</sup> See above, nn. 121 and 128. Cf. e.g. E. R. Dodds, *Proclus: The Elements of Theology* (2nd ed., Oxford 1963) 306ff; R. McL. Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip* (London 1962) Index s.v. "Clothing."

<sup>134</sup> E.g. Plato *Phaed.* 109 C (ὑποστάθμη); Julian. *Or.* 8 (5).170 D (καὶ σκύβαλον καὶ τῶν ὄντων . . . ἀποκάθαρμα καὶ τρύγα καὶ ὑποστάθμην); Chaldaean Oracle (fr. 158 Des Places) ap. Synes. *Insomn.* 140 C (τὸ τῆς ὕλης σκύβαλον). Cf. H. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy*. Recherches d'Archéologie, de Philologie et d'Histoire 13 (Le Caire 1956) 213, 276f, 383–385, 392; O. Geudtner, *Die Seelenlehre der chaldäischen Orakel*. Beiträge zur Klassischen Philologie 35 (Meisenheim 1971) 15 and 22.

<sup>135</sup> H. J. W. Drijvers (above, n. 110) 110, 152, 221, 226. The Syriac term for dregs, sediment, and refuse is *tetrā*; see e.g. Bardaisan ap. Ephraem, *Stanzas against Bardaisan*, II p. 143,6–9, ed. C. W. Mitchell, *S. Ephraim's Prose Refutations* (above, n. 110): "that the dregs run downward, and the fine material upward" (trans. A. A. Bevan and F. C. Burkitt in Mitchell, *S. Ephraim*, lxvi; cf. Mitchell's Index verborum *ibid.* II p. clxxxii s.v.).

<sup>136</sup> Kessler, *Mani* (above, n. 34) 8 n. 3. Kessler's striking phrase was presumably occasioned by the ascetic tendencies (above, n. 114) and the strange "botanical" dualism (Flügel [above, n. 29] 133f) which are ascribed to the Elchasaïte Muḡtasila (i.e. Mani's baptists) in an-Nadīm's *Fihrist*.

<sup>137</sup> On man as microcosm see *Keph.* 90,21ff and 169,24–175,24 (cf. O. G. von Wesendonk [above, n. 81] 32 n. 1). In a Manichaean cosmogony the human body is said to be created "from the dirt of the male demons and the faeces of the female demons" (W. B. Henning, *NGWG* 1932, 217; cf. A. Vööbus [above, n. 49] 110f).

was thus doomed to damnation. The clash between these diametrically opposed conceptions was unavoidable, and the extant report on the final confrontation is a truly historical document.

Let me conclude on a somber note which reflects my personal experience with these texts. Written records are the raw material of past history, especially for the modern historian who would be at a loss without them. But in the field of ancient religious beliefs and movements, perhaps more than anywhere else, the very lack of sufficient documentation tends to call forth a rather disproportionate amount of scholarly activity, doubtless nourished by the tacit conviction that when we deal with *Geistesgeschichte*, certain invariable features of the human condition entitle us to substitute assumptions for recorded facts. What usually comes up in the rear of such forced advances into unknown territory is a large array of conflicting theories, from which scholars choose or to which they add, according to their likes and dislikes. Unmapped areas in the history of the human mind thus become the training ground for our imagination, and rightly so, as long as there are neither reliable roads nor signs to follow. With every piece of new evidence, however, an increasing sense of direction develops. Thus many a long vagary has come to an unexpected end after the discovery of major documents which opened new vistas. But it would be impossible to think of any written text which has come down to us, however well preserved and rich in information, that has solved all our problems. The triumphant feeling which great finds inspire, more often than not, gives way to a more disenchanted attitude when we come to realize that ignorance is the toll of historical truth and that behind each foothold in newly gained terrain, looms an abyss of nowhere. After we have pitched our camp in the new location, we are once more left with conjecture and imagination as our only guides.<sup>138</sup>

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

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## ON EURIPIDES' *HELEN*

CHRISTIAN WOLFF

IN recent years Euripides' remarkable play about Helen has found appreciative, careful, and intelligent discussion as well as two new, substantial commentaries.<sup>1</sup> Yet a certain doubt still seems to hang over it — about its intentions and mood; its seriousness or lightness; its poetic coherence.<sup>2</sup> The remarks which follow, though not extending to a comprehensive account of the whole play, attempt to add a few points to the discussion and suggest somewhat different viewpoints. They fall into four parts: an account of the interweaving of the motifs of eros and death (I); the relation of the three stasima to the play's action (II); and, after a note on the intellectual, abstract aspect of the play (III), a discussion of the various appearances in it of the notion of reputation and fame (IV).

In general I take the play to be chameleon-like, persistently shifting, in mood, verbal fabric, and the values which it implies. Thus an

<sup>1</sup> E.g. F. Solmsen, "ὄνομα and πράγμα in Euripides' *Helen*," *CR* 48 (1934) 110-121; the same author's "Zur Gestaltung des Intriguenmotivs in den Tragödien des Sophocles und Euripides," *Philologus* 87 (1932) 1-17, and "Euripides' *Ion* im Vergleich mit anderen Tragödien," *Hermes* 69 (1934) 390-419; W. Ludwig, *Sapheneia: Ein Beitrag zur Formkunst im Spätwerk des Euripides* (diss. Tübingen 1954); W. Strohm, *Euripides: Interpretationen zur dramatischen Form, Zetemata* 15 (Munich 1957); R. Lattimore, *The Poetry of Greek Tragedy* (Baltimore 1958) 122-125; A. N. Pippin (now Pippin Burnett), "Euripides' *Helen*: A Comedy of Ideas," *CP* 55 (1960) 151-163; G. Zuntz, "On Euripides' *Helen*: Theology and Irony," *Entretiens Fondation Hardt* VI (Geneva 1960) 199-241; K. Alt, "Zur Anagnorisis in der *Helena*," *Hermes* 90 (1962) 6-24; H. Diller, "Erwartung, Enttäuschung und Erfüllung in der griechischen Tragödie," *Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwissenschaft* 7 (1961) 103-107; K. Matthiessen, "Zur Theonoeszene der Euripideischen 'Helena,'" *Hermes* 96 (1968) 685-704. The new editions with commentaries are A. M. Dale (Oxford 1967) and R. Kannicht (Heidelberg 1969).

I have also had the great benefit of seeing the draft of the *Helen* chapter in Pietro Pucci's forthcoming book on Euripides, as well as discussions with him about this essay; and of the reading of it in an earlier form by Bernard Knox.

<sup>2</sup> For a survey of the various views about the play's seriousness, or lack of it, see Alt (above, n. 1) 8 and n. 3, and cf. 11, 15f, 21 for her sense of its seriousness.

attempt to gauge its character at a given point must allow for qualification at the next. And if this is so, then its effect must be various, implying finally detachment and distance, and offering matter for reflection. As I proceed I hope to indicate some of the ways in which this happens and on what matter the reflection may turn.

## I

Traditionally, Helen manifests the power and beauty of Aphrodite and eros, and the misery and destruction they bring. In this play their doubleness, their force for life, virtue, music and their force for death, evil, disaster,<sup>3</sup> is reflected in the doubleness adhering to the figure of Helen. During the first three-quarters of the play love appears as a negative force. Kypris, who used Helen's beauty to make herself victor in the beauty contest on Mount Ida (24-9), and so set the Trojan War in motion, is called by Helen "great killer," *poluktonos* (238, an epithet Helen had applied to herself, 198; cf. *Or.* 1142). Shortly after she sings: τὰ δ' ἐμὰ δῶρα<sup>4</sup> / Κύπριδος ἔτεκε πολὺ μὲν αἶμα (363f). Kypris, cause of Helen's evil reputation, is in the course of the play's action concerned that her own part in the matter does not come to light (cf. *IT* 711-13, *Ion* 72f, 1557f) and therefore that Menelaos be destroyed (884ff). She is a goddess rejected — politely — by the just prophetess Theonoe (1006f). When Helen must pray to her for release, the prayer turns into reproof: "Why are you so insatiable of evils, whose business is loves, deceptions, ingenious wiles and charms which make houses bloody?" (1102-4).<sup>5</sup>

But when Kypris appears for the last time she is accompanied by the Graces and Muses; she is "most beautiful" (without need of any contest) and initiates the performance of actions which cause the goddess Mother to laugh, forget her sorrow and anger, and, we infer,

<sup>3</sup> For double aspects of Aphrodite, including warlike and chthonic sides, see the material and references gathered in *Der Kleine Pauly* I (Stuttgart 1964) 427-431. For the doubleness of eros cf. *Hipp.* 525-64, *Sthen.* 16.22ff (Page), fr. 388, *IA* 548ff; Sophocles, *Ant.* 781ff, *Tr.* 497ff; also F. Lassere, *La figure d'Éros dans la poésie grecque* (Lausanne 1946) 98-103.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Bacchyl. 17.10, Κύπριδος αἶνὰ [surely preferable to ἀγνὰ] δῶρα. Here the phrase may be both, as A. M. Dale, ad loc., says, subjective and objective, carrying on the doubleness of ἔργ' ἄνεργ', terrible deeds and deeds which proved entirely illusory, never took place, just before (363). Note also the conflicting combination of ἔτεκε and αἶμα.

<sup>5</sup> The word ἔρως occurs only one other time in the play, in connection with Paris' adultery disavowed by Helen (666-8). The verb ἐρᾶν is found only once, in the phrase καταθεῖν ἐρᾶν (1639).

to allow life and growth to resume (1346ff, 1327ff). Kypris *poluktonos* becomes the catalyst of rebirth and renewed festivity for men and gods. Kannicht (II 343) notes that the presence of Kypris at this reconciliation — uniquely attested here — may derive from her part, according to some versions of the story, in the original stealing away of Persephone (cf. 1322, ἀρπαγὰς δολίους). The narrative of this second stasimon then points to a cycle: Persephone fell prey to the love of the god of the dead; blight and death follow because of her mother's grief; and then they are dispelled as she is reconciled by the goddess of love.<sup>6</sup> Helen, then, also resembles Persephone.<sup>7</sup> Both are ravished (cf. 50, 246, 1312, 1322; cf. 606 and 1671; here Helen is carried off by Hermes of course, but the language is still of abduction, ἀρπαγή); with an element of deceit (cf. 238, 1322); from a flowery meadow (243ff, *h. Cer.* 6f, 426f)<sup>8</sup> or a *choros* of girls (1312, cf. Plut. *Thes.* 31); both are thought dead (cf. 286) or lost; both are sought for,

<sup>6</sup> Kypris appears in a context colored by chthonic suggestions (in addition, of course, to the terrible anger of Demeter which will be forever reflected in her awesome daughter, queen of the dead) — the rare verb *μειλίσσων* (1339), with Zeus as subject, may suggest Zeus Meilichios, a predominantly chthonic figure (cf. L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* [Berlin 1932] 156f, and, more cautiously, Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*<sup>3</sup> [Munich 1967] I 411–414) whose name has recently been found with Demeter's and Kore's in association with the Lesser Mysteries (see M. Jameson, *BCH* 89 [1965] 159f); the presence of the *σεμναὶ Χάριτες* (1341), also chthonic figures; and the somewhat curious phrase *χαλκοῦ δ' αὐδὰν χθονίαν* (1346), which leaves vague just what instrument is being referred to, though it may recall that the sound of struck bronze was particularly associated with cults of the dead and the invocation of Kore at the mysteries (Apoliodorus *FGH* 244 F 110; cf. W. Burkert, *RhM* 105 [1962] 40).

<sup>7</sup> This is observed by Pippin (above, n. 1) 156; cf. R. Lattimore, *Story Patterns in Greek Tragedy* (Ann Arbor 1964) 53, where he also remarks that "Helen . . . enacts death and the maiden." Helen, of course, like Persephone, was originally a dying and resurrected goddess of vegetation (see, e.g. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*<sup>3</sup> I 475f and *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion* [Lund 1927] 451ff; M. Doria, *La Parola del Passato* 17 [1962] 167ff). That Euripides draws on these associations is implicit in the present essay. Like Persephone, Helen is both the maiden abducted by death (and in Egypt she is "for all practical purposes" dead, τοῖς πράγμασιν τέθνηκα, 286) and πολυκτόνος (198) she presides over death (cf. *Φερσέφασσα* and her music *φόνια* invoked by Helen, 175f). Iphigenia in *IT* is another such figure (cf. the interesting but too often tenuously argued book of J.-P. Guépin, *The Tragic Paradox* [Amsterdam 1968] 123–127, 141).

<sup>8</sup> Other examples of this setting, beautiful and then disrupted, are found in *Ion* 887f (the abduction of Creusa) and *IA* 1294–8 (the goddesses visiting Paris, sung by Iphigenia lured to her death by the promise of marriage); cf. also Moschus, *Europa* 65ff; M. Mellink, *Hyakinthos* (diss. Utrecht 1943) 115f.



and recovered — or temporarily recovered. Persephone must regularly return to Hades. And Helen — the phantom Helen recovered from Troy vanishes into heaven, returning into that element out of which she was made (605f, cf. 34, 584, 1219), which may imply her death (cf. *Su.* 532ff, *Phoen.* 809, R. Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* [repr. Urbana, Ill., 1962] 26f, 31-3) or may suggest deification (cf. 1016; 613: she calls the heaven to which she will return “father”). The new — or the original — innocent Helen is of course recovered by Menelaos; and yet, as will be noticed, she will partly fade and merge back into the other, becoming herself finally a goddess (1667; cf. 1671 and 606; 605 and 44, 609 and 52, 1515f and 605, 617f; *Or.* 1634-7).<sup>9</sup> Both Helens, after all, are instruments of destiny (cf. 1651-3 and 612f).

From the beginning, the play moves along the double line of eros and death, modulating its mood as it proceeds and following the turn of a cycle which has come from eros to death and now looks forward again to life, safety, and renewal. Paris got the phantom Helen; a sexual infatuation brought on a bloody war. Helen as we first see her was taken to Egypt by Hermes, where, remote from the carnage at Troy, she may keep herself faithful and chaste. But her chastity is threatened, and everywhere there are echoes of death.<sup>10</sup> To fend off the advances of a barbarian king she has taken refuge at a tomb (64, 466, 547, 1165f, cf. 799f and *Ar. Thesm.* 887f). When Teucer enters he sees a great palace which makes him think of Ploutos (68-70), god of wealth closely associated with his near namesake, the god of the underworld.<sup>11</sup> Then he sees Helen, ἐχθίστην . . . γυναικὸς εἰκὼ φόνιον (72f), like a figure from death's house. He brings news of deaths at Troy (94ff, 109f), Leda's suicide (134-6), the ambiguous passing of the Dioskouroi (134-6) and the rumor of Menelaos' death (132). After his abrupt departure and a scene which is not without its humor and purely speculative turns (cf. 117-22), Helen begins the music of the play with a dirge, out of despair and mourning the deaths her name has caused. Musically elaborate, we may imagine, the words

<sup>9</sup> For fine observation of Helen's doubleness cf. Zuntz (above, n. 1) 224f.

<sup>10</sup> That the Egypt of this play has something of the sense of a land of the dead about it is suggested by Guépin (above, n. 7) 128ff.

<sup>11</sup> See, e.g., Pearson's note on Sophocles fr. 273. A faint suggestion of Ploutos-Plouton adheres to Theoklymenos as the would-be seducer of Helen, a wealthy king (cf. 295f, 1254, and his grand palace) part of whose name may have recalled the name Klymenos sometimes given to Hades, especially in association with Demeter (Paus. 2.35.4-10, Lasus of Hermion fr. 1, Page, Callimachus fr. 285 Pf. with notes).



in a fluid syntax gliding over sense with the sounds of their repetitions and half-rhymes, her singing is an impressionistic representation of death in the figure of Earth's winged daughters, the Sirens, and Persephone (167-76). To the chorus who now come in, Helen's song of death sounds like a pitiful cry, the shriek of a nymph fleeing the embraces of Pan (183-90).<sup>12</sup> This poetically colored scene of abduction is a decorative echo of Helen's traditional abduction by the barbarian Paris and the abduction threatened now by the barbarian Theoklymenos (both figures associated with natural landscapes, the first as shepherd — cf. 24, 29, 359, *Andr.* 280ff, *IA* 573ff, 1291ff, the latter as hunter — cf. 63, 154, 1169ff). The account of Hermes' abduction of Helen out of a field of flowers follows shortly after (243-6). Later, a comic version of this scene — not without some pathos — is almost re-enacted, Menelaos cast in the role of would-be abductor (541ff; note the markedly lyric turns at 543, 546). Persephone, of course, just invoked as queen of the dead (175-8), is the paradigm of these abductions.

The conjunction of fugitive beauty, sexual pursuit and destruction is perhaps not extraordinary, but it persists. Euripides, however, not only displays that persistence but also allows its various manifestations to work, by their variety of mood, effects of mutual refraction. Death and eros as elements in the Trojan story and Helen's part in it are transposed into lyric and mythical modes (Troy as such is closer to history) and a private drama of adventure in a remote, exotic setting. The war and the infatuated delusion and passionate desire which feed it are partially distanced.

The adventure starts properly with the appearance of Menelaos, the destined rescuer, who first repeats Teucer's scene. He is impressed by the awesome grandeur of the palace (430f) and hopeful of rich assistance. But refused admittance he is warned that the place spells death for Greeks (437ff, cf. 151ff).<sup>13</sup> Seeing Helen he invokes Hecate, that this ghost do him no harm (569, cf. 72f); Helen protests she is no minister of Enodia — sometime double of Persephone (cf. *Ion*

<sup>12</sup> This mixture of mourning and eros is already prefigured in the Sirens (169), who have become funerary figures (see Kannicht on 167-178) and yet may have erotic associations (cf. A. Greifenhagen, *Griechische Erotiken* [Berlin 1957] 27 and fig. 25; *RE* s.v. "Sirenen" 296.7ff).

<sup>13</sup> The old woman who comes to the gate belongs to the comic type of surly doorkeepers (e.g. *Ar. Ran.* 460ff with Radermacher's commentary). Might there also be a suggestion of Hades' disagreeable gatekeepers (a similar possibility exists in Plato, *Protag.* 314c7ff, at the door of Athens' rich man Kallias, in whose house Socrates pretends to see the great shades of the underworld 315b9ff, c8f)?

1048f). Menelaos recalls death and destruction at Troy (397ff, 503, 692f, 750f, 766ff, 847ff, 969f), in which he takes some pride (cf. 504f, 806-8, 845). Death now threatens him in Egypt. Yet his reunion with Helen also re-evokes — after the seeming threat of another rape — their famous marriage (637ff, 722ff).<sup>14</sup> But his new rival, Theoklymenos, means to kill him if he stays to claim Helen; she puts it bluntly, “the sword waits for you, not my bed” (803, cf. 807).

A plot is called for which must first win the compliance of Theonoe — and thus be allowed a certain justification. In various ways the case argued by Helen and Menelaos involves death. Legally there appears to be an impasse because Proteus, the original safe-keeper of Helen, has died and it is unclear how the law governing deposit now applies. Menelaos, at any rate, appeals directly to the dead Proteus in his tomb (962ff); then to Hades himself, reckoning that the lord of the dead owes him something in return for all the bodies Menelaos dispatched at Troy (969-71).<sup>15</sup> Finally, he threatens suicide at Proteus’ tomb and everlasting disgrace for him and his daughter (977ff, cf. *IT* 973f). An earlier suicide pact made with Helen, high-flown and pathetic (835-54), is now turned to shrewd and practical advantage — a transformation typical of the latter part of the play. Theonoe is won over. (The obscure lines 1013-16, suggesting an immortality of the human faculty *gnômê* that allows the working of justice after death, transcend for a moment the various other appearances of death in the play.<sup>16</sup>)

The plot itself, the *μηχανή σωτηρίας* (1034) is neatly spun, out of pretended acquiescence in love and out of imaginary death. *Sôtêria* means escape from Egypt and looks forward to the renewal of Helen’s

<sup>14</sup> Observed by Pippin (above, n. 1) 154. The marriage was of course very famous and a favorite subject for vase painters (Hans Walter, *Vom Sinnwandel Griechischer Mythen* [Waldsassen 1959] 43f, refers to a vase at Tübingen which he takes to represent the return of Helen to Sparta in the form of a wedding). The play also looks forward to the marriage of Hermione, at last possible on her parents’ return to Sparta (1476-8, in sense; the text is corrupt; contrast 282f, 688-90, 933).

<sup>15</sup> Perhaps a twisted echo of the Aeschylean figure of Ares the gold-changer who pays ashes for men (*Ag.* 437-44). For the strain in logic to so bizarre a point cf. *El.* 1041-43, *Or.* 652-62; it is akin to the expression of utopian, usually fantastic, wishes characteristic of a number of Euripidean figures (e.g. *Hipp.* 616-24).

<sup>16</sup> For a recent discussion of these lines see Matthiessen (above, n. 1) 693f with notes. It is worth noticing that the immortal *aithêr* of which Theonoe speaks here and at 866 is also the stuff which made up the *eidôlon* of Helen (584, cf. 34) and the element through which it and Helen herself travel (44, 246, 605, 1219; cf. 1496).

and Menelaos' marriage. (There is also a suggestion of beginning anew in the references to youth: cf. 1288, *νεᾶνι*, of Helen seventeen years after leaving Sparta [for the word's possible range of tone cf. *Cycl.* 179], 1356, *παῖ*, of Helen; cf. 1562, 1593 and 396; contrast Menelaos' old attendant, 702, 734, 759.) Even the anticipation of ceremonies is represented in Theoklymenos (cf. 1183, 1231ff, 1431f). Eager for Helen and for Menelaos' death, he is easily tricked, by the feigned news of the latter, into lending the necessary assistance for a funeral — which will provide the means of escape — in return for Helen's agreeing to marrying him. Now death and love are modulated not in a lyric but a deceiving, ironic, and comic vein, though the aim is to restore an old love and perhaps disperse memories of death. Theoklymenos will get even less of Helen than her previous illegitimate suitor Paris. The difference now is that the gods do not seem to be interfering (cf. 1658–61). The human actors help themselves, indeed exploit religious practice — the funeral rites — for their own ends (1255ff; cf. and contrast 871). They are in control of a broad and unrelenting play of irony at Theoklymenos' expense. It is he who is anxious — long after Helen's and Menelaos' suicide pacts are forgotten (980–5, 835ff, cf. 351–6) — lest Helen, overwhelmed by the remembered joys of marriage, embrace a *Liebestod* at her husband's funeral (1395–8; see Kannicht ad loc. for the erotic language, and cf. E. *Suppl.* 1018ff).

However, this triumphant and self-interested human control is, after all, hedged in the very process of its exercise by a final irony of visual effect, in which love and death are held in balance. Menelaos, having first appeared as a typical Euripidean ragged hero, makes a second entrance in new clothes and newly bathed (1281f, 1296f, 1382–4) — the bath would fit the pattern of marriage ceremony (cf. *Phoen.* 347f). Helen, on the other hand, whom one had seen presumably in all her famous, if saddened, beauty, the innocent Helen singing songs of mourning, now, as she actively and optimistically participates in the escape plot, puts on the black garments of mourning to work her deception, cuts her hair and disfigures that beautiful face with bloody lacerations (1087–9, 1186–8, cf. 1419).<sup>17</sup> It is the last we see of these two figures, a paradox of wedding and funeral going on their way together. With this unusual departure from the stage they recede into

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *Odyssey* 4.244–6, a model for such self-marring; cf. *Tro.* 1025–8: Helen returned to Menelaos should be chastized by having to wear rags and with head shaven. Together with the suggestion of marriage, however, Helen's attitude of mourning in fact corresponds to ritual practice in Sparta before a marriage (Plut. *Lyc.* 15.5; cf. W. den Boer, *Laconian Studies* [Amsterdam 1954] 227ff).



a farther distance; we see them at various removes over a long finale (over two hundred and forty lines), through choral lyric, messenger speech, and address by gods *ex machina*.<sup>18</sup> They leave behind them a frustrated Theoklymenos and a temporarily endangered Theonoe, while their legend catches them up once more.

## II

The motifs of eros and death provide one scaffolding for the play's action, poetry, and Euripides' strategy of distancing. The stasima, reserved unusually for the latter third of the play, are often regarded as simply remote or hardly relevant to the play's action.<sup>19</sup> But they too touch on death and eros, as well as other points of the action around them; and they also represent more general and distant perspectives.

The first choral ode (1107-64) follows the successful persuading of Theonoe, the working out of a good escape plan, and high optimism on the part of Helen and Menelaos (cf. 1081f, 1075f). Now with success in sight the chorus sings in lamentation — takes up again the sad music with which Helen began the play. After a long invocation of the nightingale's mournful song — and one may think of the background of eros and blood in Procne's story — they take us back to the coming of Paris, the deaths of Trojans and Greeks, deceit and ruin for those returning from the war, and the bitter emptiness of Menelaos' prize, a cloud, an eidolon (1135f). The latter was reported vanished some five hundred lines before (605ff); but the sense of waste which it occasioned (cf. 603, 704-7, 750f; cf. 1220) still receives emphatic expression. Theological speculation follows: the divine is a random force, incomprehensible, contradictory, and unpredictable (cf. 711f, 715). Witness Helen's lot; though a child of Zeus she has been reviled throughout Greece as the sum of all wickedness. Thus, it would seem, there is no divine providence, no certainty, no clarity.<sup>20</sup> Returning to the

<sup>18</sup> *IT*, which *Helen* parallels in so many respects, also ends in this way, at a great distance from its main protagonists—two hundred and sixty-six lines, beginning with the remote choral ode about Apollo (*IT* 1234-83).

<sup>19</sup> Exceptions are Zuntz and Pippin (above, n. 1) and particularly Kannicht; K. Alt, *Untersuchungen zum Chor bei Euripides* (diss. Frankfurt 1952) has unfortunately not been available to me.

<sup>20</sup> The right reading at lines 1149f is not yet found (cf. Dale and Kannicht). That the chorus should declare a faith in the reliability and perspicuity of the gods seems to me impossible and contrary to everything else in the ode. It is more likely that they repeat something like the view of Menelaos's old servant reacting both to the information about the *eidôlon* — that the war was fought for nothing, and the happy fortune which has reunited Helen and Menelaos



subject of war, another possible illustration of the obscure workings of the gods, the chorus claim that seeking by means of arms to win glory or to put an end to human tribulations is mindless folly.<sup>21</sup> Folly because, wherever decisions are reached through blood contest, strife — *eris* — will only be perpetuated. Because of *eris* men found their graves at Troy, though the *eris* about Helen could have been set right by words (1159; this seems sometimes to be the way of the gods: cf. 878). But in fact men died, Troy burned, and Helen endures (note the present tense, 1163) suffering upon suffering. The chorus opens a very wide view, though itself in turn qualified by a certain contradiction: the plot of the play concludes in accordance with a divine promise (56–9, cf. 45f, 1669); something like providence has been at work. At the same time, their utopian faith in the power of words is undercut — by the actual course of history, as they themselves describe it,<sup>22</sup> and insofar as *eris* is part of Zeus's larger plan (34–41, cf. 1652f; cf. 248, 708, 1508; incidentally there had been a fatal *eris* about Achilles' arms, 100, and now there is *eris* again among the gods, 878). Strife, from this viewpoint, is given, part of an unending cycle and self-perpetuating. Thus Menelaos' prize brought home from the war can be called no prize, but rather *eris* once again (1133f). The ode, tracing a circle of its own, ends as it began, on a note of lamentation (1163f), echoing Helen's first lament (173, cf. 684).

There is within the chorus a conflict — unequal — between the overpowering, recurring fact of war (whether in myth or history) and a moral awareness — a repugnance of war, as well as hope in the reasonable use of *logoi*; the latter being fragile and seemingly helpless.

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(711–19). (I can think of no declarations in Euripides of faith in the workings of the gods which are not undercut [e.g. *HF* 757–759, 773f, 801f, 811–14, *Tro.* 884–8].) The play shows that the gods' promise to Helen (56–9) is fulfilled; she is rescued and vindicated. But the chorus in this ode, as remarked, are quite remote and unaffected by the action going on around them.

<sup>21</sup> The correction of *ἀπαθῶς* into *ἀμαθῶς* at 1153, though easy, seems unnecessary. *ἀμαθῶς* merely underlines *ἄφρονες* (1151), whereas *ἀπαθῶς* would proceed, giving the sense "trying to end the troubles of men without any harm being done," i.e. you cannot check men's troubles by taking up arms and expect no damage to result; thus 1155–7. Though the adverbial form is found only here in classical Greek, the adjective in the sense "having suffered no damage," "unharméd," is not uncommon (*A. Pers.* 861, joined with *ἀπόνους*; *Thuc.* 1.26.5; 5.16.1; 8.24.3; cf. *Hdt.* 9.79.2).

<sup>22</sup> And no doubt by the well-known story of the fruitless attempts at a negotiated settlement, the *Helenês apaitêsis* (cf. *Bacchyl.* 15; *A. C. Pearson, The Fragments of Sophocles I* 121f; *J. D. Beazley, Proc. Brit. Acad.* 43 [1957] 233ff).

This may be reflected in the ode's conflict of mood with the surrounding action, a conflict reinforced by the threefold vocative address of Helen (1120, 1144, 1160) — a Helen prior to Menelaos' appearance in Egypt; by a second evocation of war-widows with shorn hair and desolate homes (1124f, cf. 367–74) — when Helen's escape trick involves playing just such a part (1087–9); and by the account of Nauplios' sinister deception with the beacon fires (1126–31) — as another, relatively harmless and amusing deception is under way.

The chorus, seeming to ignore the progress of the play's action, return to the dark and fantastic aspect — Zeus as swan father (1145f, contrast 17–21, 258f) — of Helen's story. They keep before us the larger circle within which a more private adventure now takes place. Helen and Menelaos work out their escape; but wars go on. Very little, except perhaps the quality of our awareness, taught by Euripides' play, really changes. This play counterbalances, but surely does not wipe out, the memory of the other, deadly Helen; Euripides will not let us forget her entirely.<sup>23</sup> The ode concentrates a sense of bitterness — wasted lives, reputations lost for nothing, the futility of human reconciliations — as does no other part of the play. One effect of this is to allow the exciting, amusing, and satisfactory quality of the action around it — even as this action distracts us from that bitterness — to be stabilized and preserved from frivolity.

After a scene in which Theoklymenos is wittily and successfully deceived, there follows the central of the three choral odes, the mysterious and beautifully made song about the Mother goddess (1301–68).<sup>24</sup> Its relation to the play has often been questioned, and as long as lines 1353f and 1366f remain unreadable the matter cannot be surely discussed. Yet some observations may still be possible.

The first ode was distanced from the action around it by its mood. This one stands apart because of its content. Both have a sense of circularity. Here, in a setting first in nature, then Olympian, then again in nature, the beginning is with the Mother's frantic, racing course, the ending an evocation of ecstatic celebration and the racing Bacchant (1364). Noisy music punctuates the ode three times (1308,

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Zuntz (above, n. 1) 224f.

<sup>24</sup> On the syncretism in the representation of this figure see now the extensive discussion of Kannicht, *ad loc.* Among much else, he recalls that, bold though this syncretism is — and thus characteristic of late fifth-century developments in religion and art, it has a certain precedence for Athenians in the earlier association of Kybele/Mêter and Demeter in the Metroon (see H. A. Thompson, *Hesperia* 6 [1937] 205ff; Nilsson, *Geschichte der griech. Rel.*<sup>3</sup> I 725f).

1347-52, 1362f). Goddesses attempt first to intervene and are prevented by Zeus (1314-23), then Zeus sends goddesses to intervene and soothe the Mother's anger (1339ff). Laughter and joy take the place of grief. But in the final antistrophe the Mother has again been offended and is angry (for whatever reason) with Helen,<sup>25</sup> as before she had vented her anger on the world at large (cf. 1355, 1339-43).

The chorus ends with the phrase *μορφῇ μόνον ἡὔχεις*, "you" — this can only be Helen — "trusted only in your beautiful appearance" (1368). On this cue Helen returns to the stage in mourning, hair cut and face disfigured. Though its purpose is not clear, this effect must be calculated.<sup>26</sup> The contradiction at any rate is matched by another. Kypris, original patron of the other Helen, now declared by Theonoe to be hostile (884-6), was addressed by our Helen with sharp reproof (1097-1104) — though shading into a suggestion of beneficence: *εἰ δ' ἤσθα μετρία, τᾶλλα γ' ἡδίστη θεῶν / πέφυκας ἀνθρώποισιν* (1105f; cf. *Med.* 630f, *Hipp.* 529, *IA* 543ff, fr. 388, Democritus fr. 73). In the choral ode directly following, however, Aphrodite is prominent as Paris's guide and the source of disasters (1113-21). Now, with the Graces and Muses, she appears as a force of reconciliation. Her unusual presence in this part of the Mother's story indicates a link to the play's action; the apparent contradiction of her new role is part of the doubleness and cycle of eros and death, and similar to the doubleness of Helen. The ode, then, marks a point of reversal, both in Aphrodite's effect and in the play's action in which Helen and Menelaos are on their way to success. The goddess's saving action in the ode is like an answer to Helen's earlier prayer (1097-1106). On the other hand, the exceptional character of the ode and its oblique relation to the events on stage may suggest that such a benign Aphrodite is exceptional. The just, virginal prophetess Theonoe, unlike Helen, excludes the goddess entirely from her life (1006-8), though she knows one must pray to her (1024f). As in the previous ode, there is a certain discordance — between the perpetual force of the goddess of love, amoral, alternately beautiful and fierce, and the almost incidental presence of the chaste seer, who is unfailing in her knowledge and justice.

<sup>25</sup> The difficulty, of course, is that, though divine anger because of neglect is a familiar theme, we are ignorant of any version of it involving Helen. The nearest example concerns her father Tyndareus who, while sacrificing neglected Aphrodite, and she in her anger made his daughters promiscuous (Stesichorus 17 Diehl = 46 Page).

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Kannicht II 334, who also notes the contrast to Helen's curse of her own beauty (cf. 27, 261-5, 304f, 381-5).



Part of the ode's story, the loss of a maiden by abduction, is, as remarked earlier, like Helen's original story. More particularly, the chorus describe the Mother's grievous sense of loss, her frantic search and the exhaustion of it which becomes for the world sterility, death, famine, and drought (1327-37). The allusive and discontinuous narrative has features typical of comparable versions of the story;<sup>27</sup> but there are also echoes and refractions from elsewhere in the play: the location on Mount Ida (1324) — where the Idaean Paris (24, 29, cf. *Andr.* 706, *Hec.* 944, etc.) made his fateful choice, by Troy, the Idaean city (658); the landscape — rocks (1326, cf. 188f), greenery and woods (1303, 1360 — contrast 1326f; cf. 180-3, 243f, 349, 1107), waters (1307f — contrast 1335f; cf. 1, 179, 210, 349, 676f; later, 1465; cf. 1481-5 and 1327f) and snow (1323, 1326, cf. 3); musical instruments (1308, 1346-52, 1362, cf. 170-2); outcry (1309, cf. 184-90, 370f); running (1301, 1314, 1319, implied at 1364) — compare Helen's dash for safety like a Bacchant (543f, the only Bacchic reference in the play outside of the ode); hair shaken on the wind (1364) — contrast hair cut in mourning (367f, 1087, 1124, 1188, 1224); search and wandering (1319-21, cf. 203, 597f, 1212 and, later, 1676);<sup>28</sup> the loss of a child — compare Helen's of Hermione (282f, 688f, 933 and, later, 1474) and the Trojan mothers' of their sons (367); bringing tribulation to an end (1320, cf. 1076, 1153f); the guiding hand of Zeus (1317f, 1339, cf. 36f, 1669; for his lightning at 1317 cf. 1162) and the notion of another destiny reserved against interference (1318, cf. 642f and the speech of the Dioskouroi, 1642ff, where, like Zeus, they check a vengeful anger: cf. 1339f and 1642).

These are glancing, even casual, associations; nevertheless they evoke generally, in the background of the play's action, a natural world with divine presences. Not only *eris* exists among the gods, and works its way down into human history, but also loss and extreme sorrow, which reverberate through nature (cf. 179-190). The ruin on earth caused by the Mother's sorrow — and anger (1327-37), though a traditional motif (*h. Cer.* 304-12), is like the devastation wrought at Troy (52f, 109f, 196f, 239, 362ff, etc.), both set in motion by Zeus. The war of men at Troy he caused in order to alleviate mother earth

<sup>27</sup> For which see Kannicht particularly and P. Maas, *Epidaurische Hymnen* (*Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft* IX 5 [1933]) 138-147.

<sup>28</sup> There is, then, a suggestion of a parallel between Menelaos in his wanderings and the Mother — strange and bizarre, perhaps, but in that quality comparable to such passages in the play as 375-85 (cf. Dale on 376), 256ff (see note 42 below), 541-556 (and the stage business implied), 968-974.



from an excessive burden of human beings (36-40).<sup>29</sup> The wedding of Persephone and Hades brought on a dead season of the year (cf. *h. Cer.* 305-7), as it were, nature's war. This perspective, though distant, offers a kind of consolation, for Spring always returns, bringing life and communal celebration back to earth (cf. 1338f). The forces of destruction and life, death and eros, balance and complement one another. However, if one cares to reflect further, and would take natural and human season as analogous, the cyclical pattern thus imposed on human events may seem to deny the final value of sustained human effort. Or, at least, as Menelaos' old attendant had earlier remarked, there is a discontinuity between human striving and success (718f).<sup>30</sup>

Like the previous ode, this one has its theological aspect. Excepting the final antistrophe, it is a self-contained hieros logos which, as suggested long ago,<sup>31</sup> could be seen as a response to the earlier ode's question, "Who can say . . . what a god is, or a non-god, or the in-between" (1137)? No human discourse, that chorus indicated, can

<sup>29</sup> Again, a traditional motif; see F. Jouan, *Euripide et les légendes des chants Cypriens* (Paris 1966) 41-54.

<sup>30</sup> A suggestion common to other plays which end with human success and escape, namely *IT*, *Ion*, and, in its extreme way, *Orestes*. Effort and initiative are essential to that success — and some commentators have thought this so much the case that they find these plays in effect wholly secularized: men work out their *sôteria* by their own unaided wits. But in fact the larger designs of these plays are brought to realization by something like divine providence. As in the saying of Democritus, "Boldness is the beginning of achievement, but *tukhê* is master of its end" (fr. 269). *Helen* puts the greatest stress on providence at the start of the escape action (Menelaos' appearance in Egypt and, in a more tenuous way, Theonoe's compliance [cf. Matthiesen, above, n. 1, 697 with notes 1 and 2]), and the least at the end — the immediate assistance of the Dioskouroi is deflected from the protagonists to Theonoe. *Orestes* is exactly opposite. *IT* and *Ion* stand in between. In each Athena must first clear a particular obstacle (a sudden change of weather on the Taurian coast and a determination on Ion's part to question Apollo directly about his paternity) before the final aetiologies. In each human expectations are somewhat deflected: Iphigenia would have returned to Argos and family, but she will go to Brauron and continue her life as a priestess; Ion had preferred his life as a servant of Apollo in Delphi, but he will be a king in Athens. Where in *Orestes* there is a radical break between human purposes (which are perverse and criminal) and Apollo's final intervention, in *Helen* the protagonists simply get what they want. It could be said that their higher destinies — the province of divine attention — have already been played out at the point where the action of this drama begins. They can go their human ways without further interference, though that human passage seems somehow empty in prospect, as if only waiting for a return to a world dictated by the gods (cf. the perfunctory lines 1662-5 followed by 1666-77). (With *Helen* 316-19 cf. *Ion* 378-80; also *Hel.* 1441-50.)

<sup>31</sup> By W. Scott, *CQ* 3 (1909) 168-170; cf. Kannicht II 332f.

comprehend the gods (note ἀντιλόγοις, 1142), though *logoi* were offered as the means to resolve men's quarrels (1159). But strife appears inseparable from the gods, and now the response to the question about divinity takes the form, not of an attempted definition, but of a story, poetic, enigmatic, and noncommittal. The song, obliquely and tenuously related to the action around it, is a beautiful diversion — like the music offered the Mother which makes her laugh (1349) — from an unanswerable question, or unforgettable grief (cf. 1337).<sup>32</sup> The Mother is won over — by a raucous, wild, self-forgetful Bacchic music, more like the music of nature (cf. βαρύβρομον of the aulos, 1351, and of the sea wave, 1305) than of men in their cities.

The third and last stasimon shifts to another kind of music. After the wildness of Phrygia and the Dionysiac din, there is a limpid, decorative poetry of calm seas, Spartan festivals, migrating birds, and the call to Helen's divine brothers for safe passage home. Dionysus is replaced by Apollo (1473, 1511). Reference to Hermione's renewed prospect of marriage (1476–8), to Menelaos' achievement of his purpose — the destruction of Troy (1493f) — and to the vindication of Helen's fame (1506–11), all point to an imminent and happy conclusion.

However, though looking forward, the ode, like its predecessors, also looks back and implies a cyclical movement. The opening evocation of calm sea voyage recalls earlier voyages, to and from Troy (192–4, 229–35, 1117 [cf. 1120f and 1463f], 1127–31).<sup>33</sup> The chorus imagine Helen's return, as though nothing had changed, to an idyllic Sparta (contrast Helen's own earlier prospects of return, 287–9, cf. 929–31, and the return to be described in *Or.* 56ff, 71–130). There she will join the girls at the festivals (1465ff), as though she were herself a girl once more, as she had been, gathering flowers for Athena of the bronze temple (cf. 243–5 and 1466f) when Hermes carried her off — abduction is suggested here by the mention of the Leukippidae, carried off by Helen's brothers (see Kannicht on 1465–7). As in the hints of Helen's

<sup>32</sup> Pippin (above, n. 1) 155 and Zuntz (above, n. 1) 201, 226f, make of this moment in the ode a symbol of the intention of the play as a whole, that it should be a diversion for the Athenians after the disaster at Sicily. I agree to the extent indicated in the last section of this paper. Here I would stress the context of the diversion, as noted above, both preceded and followed by the goddess's anger; and the spectrum implied by the sequence of Graces, Muses, Kypris, whose double-edged nature has been plainly indicated before, and Bacchic celebration, neglected at one's peril.

<sup>33</sup> Lines 1456–8, (ῥεῦ)νήνεμον . . . Γαλάνεια, may also echo *A. Ag.* 740, νηέμου γαλάνας. Fair wind and smooth sea brought Helen to Troy with Paris according to the *Cypria* (Hdt. 2.117).

similarity to Persephone, we catch a glimpse of her as the maiden goddess she originally was, a figure among Spartan celebrations beautifully described a year later in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* 1296–1315. The chorus give an account of one of the festivals, probably Sparta's most important, the Hyakinthia, which may have had to do with fertility and harvest rites, with Hyakinthos as vegetation god undergoing death and again resurrected.<sup>34</sup> Though the words of the chorus neither confirm nor refute this possibility, they do describe joyous celebration and the commemoration of death. The pattern of this festival and its yearly recurrence is like the pattern of the myth told in the previous ode, of loss and gloom followed by the restoration of life and joy.<sup>35</sup> The sense of seasonal change underlying both is now evoked by the chorus's description of migrating cranes leaving winter behind, flying over land both rainless and fruitful (1478–86).<sup>36</sup>

The sense of cycle is also, once more, called forth by the reappearance of Troy, first mentioned with an almost casual bluntness as the object of Menelaos' conquest (1493f, cf. 503; the phrase falls just before the end of the stanza, with some emphasis). The following, final stanza ends with a request to the Dioskouroi to rid their sister of her ill-fame, "which she acquired as a punishment for the strife on Ida" — *ἀν Ἰδαίων ἐρίδων / ποινὰθεῖσ' ἐκτήσατο* — "when in fact she never went to the land of Ilion, the towers of Phoebus" (1506–11). The last two lines balance the prayers for a safe journey home — each stanza has ended with a reference to home (1464, *οἴκων*; 1476, *οἴκοις*; 1494, *δόμον*) — with a reference to a journey that never took place. But what is most striking is the suggestion that Helen's misfortune in having her name so unhappily used is a punishment, for an affair concerning the gods.<sup>37</sup> One may take the expression in an objective sense, that is, Helen pays recompense with her good name for something done by the gods and Paris (cf. 1507), without being herself responsible (cf. 270, 615). Yet somehow, if she has been punished, there must have

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Mellink (above, n. 8) 31ff. The later (but not later than ca. 500 B.C. [see Mellink 168f]) story of the beautiful youth Hyakinthos, beloved and killed accidentally by Apollo, though not directly alluded to here, might still come to mind as a further instance of the pattern of eros and death.

<sup>35</sup> The two odes also share references to sacrifice (1333, probably 1353f; 1474; cf. 1357, *σεβίζουσα*, and 1475, *σέβειν*) and nocturnal celebration (1356; 1470).

<sup>36</sup> This may also refer to the paradoxical situation of Egypt (cf. 1–3) — the only possibility allowed by Kannicht (on 1484–5), too narrowly, I think.

<sup>37</sup> For "punishment," *δοῦναι δίκην*, in a matter stemming, it would seem, simply from the gods, cf. *HF* 841f; and cf. with Helen's protestations of innocence (270, confirmed by the divine double, 615) *HF* 1310.



been guilt. Earlier in the play Helen speaks as though she were the cause of deaths and ruin at Troy (52, 109, 196ff), and once formulates her guilt in all its paradoxical form: "my mother [Leda] died [she had committed suicide], and I am her killer, unjustly [does this lot befall me = am I thus designated], and yet this injustice is mine [is part of my being]" (280f, cf. 200-2, 135). The powerful force of Helen's very name — which is the other Helen — intrudes even in this tranquil and optimistic ode. It is impossible, finally, to forget Helen's doubleness and to detach her completely from the bitter story of Troy.

Of the play's three stasima this last is closest to the events on stage, though it too creates effects of distance, by its decorative style, and by the scope and spaces evoked: the clear open sea across to Lakedaimon, the high course of birds from Libya to the banks of the Eurotas, the constellations above them and over the Dioskouroi riding down from the heavens to the sea again, and, at another remove in time and space, Ida and the walls of Troy built by Apollo (cf. the mention of Perseus as founder of Mycenae, 1464). The sense of geographical space, as in Aristophanes' *Birds*, may also suggest release and freedom, escape from oppressive confinements; though, as in *Birds*, to shake off all that one started from is hard: the ode concludes with Troy. Different as these choral songs are, they all share this combination of distance and cycle, remoteness and recurrence. They break up, decorate, and qualify the direct, lively continuity of the play's action, causing the play as a whole to have a doubleness of movement and feeling — between the excitement and pleasure of success and reflection on the larger context of that success.

Addressed directly in all three odes, Helen herself is the other point of connection between them. In the first, the chorus uphold her complete innocence; her undeserved misfortune causes them to question and find inexplicable the nature of the gods. In the second, though obscurely in our corrupt text, they refer to a specific transgression on her part, claiming she has neglected a ritual obligation to the Mother and generally failed to appreciate the power of Bacchic celebration (1358-65). Finally, in the third ode Helen is imagined taking part once more in the gods' festivals and sacrifices at Sparta, but there is also a suggestion that she had been punished in connection with Troy. Thus not only is there a persistent suggestion of guilt attached to Helen, for she is inseparable from the story of Troy; but it is also implied that this is dependent on the presence and activity of the gods: the chorus in the second and third odes accept them unquestioningly and support their worship.



Then the messenger comes in and tells how Helen with Menelaos worked her masterful deception — with religious rituals; and how she spurred on his men — by invoking the glorious deeds of Greeks at Troy (1602–4).<sup>38</sup> The perspective shifts again, narrowing to an all but secular (Menelaos does call on Poseidon, 1584–7) and self-interested plot, though it is not the last shift.

### III

To recapitulate: the play as it progresses acquires a poetic coherence and resonance by winding around manifestations of death and eros, whose turns by their variety set off our feelings and reflections at various distances. The choral odes further these effects, enlarging the distances, and add — or support — a suggestion of discrepancy between the force of things as they are, sometimes made beautiful by the poetry of myths and the presence of gods, and a moral awareness or longing for moral ideals.

Theonoe stands mostly for the latter. Helen finally is a blend of the ingredients of this discrepancy. The old Helen, in whom eros and ruin combine, is most like things as they are, and like the cause of them, the cause of the war, for example. The new Helen is a virtuous, exemplary wife, and she is far from the public world. As the play proceeds, however, she does not repudiate the old Helen so much as assimilate her, her wiles, sexual attraction, and inspiration to fighting. Yet these qualities now serve private success and happiness, and thus become acceptable. Euripides has managed both to vindicate Helen's virtue and to endow her with edge, charm, and resourcefulness, echoing from a still audible erotic, guileful, and destructive power.

These antithetical features in the representation of Helen have suggested Sophistic affinities.<sup>39</sup> Exploiting a double mythical tradition and vindicating a figure sometimes regarded as evil, Euripides, like Gorgias in his *Helen* and later Isocrates, offers a paradoxical defense of a weaker argument in the manner of the *dissoi logoi*. But making a play and not a speech, he gives us not contrary arguments but a doubling or blending of poetic accounts, not *dissoi logoi*, contentious and divisive (cf., for example, *Phoen.* 499–502), but a *dissos muthos* which indicates

<sup>38</sup> For further suggestions of the other Helen, cf. 1526–8, . . . λιποῦσα . . . σοφώταθ' ἄβρὸν πόδα τιθεῖσ' ἀνέστανε . . . — and A. *Ag.* 404–8: λιποῦσα [Helen is subject] . . . βεβάκει ρίμφα . . . πολλὰ δ' ἔστενον [the seers in Menelaos' house]; and 1570f, πλήσασα κλιμακτῆρας εὐσφύρω ποδὶ / 'Ελένη καθέζει' ἐν μέσοις ἔδωλοις (Helen boarding the ship) — and perhaps Stesichorus' palinode, οὐδ' ἔβας ἐν νηυσὶν εὐσέλμοις (11 Diehl, 15 Page = Plato, *Phaedrus* 243a).

<sup>39</sup> M. Pohlenz, *Die Griechische Tragödie*<sup>2</sup> (Göttingen 1954) I 386.

connections and makes out of divergences a kind of harmony. There is also a more purely speculative strain, parallel to the doubleness of Helen, in the antithetical play and interweaving of the forces of name and substance, *onoma* and *pragma* (or, more often in the language of this play, *sôma*), illusion and reality.<sup>40</sup> F. Solmsen noted how this resembled Gorgias's treatise *On Nature* or *On Non-Being* which makes epistemological quicksand by declaring the relation of the things that are, *ta onta*, and words, *onomata*, completely incommensurable. A. Pippin has nicely described the interplay in the drama of illusion and reality. Here we remark for a moment only on the following elaboration.

The play refers to two seemingly antithetical beings who have the same name (cf. 487–99), Helen. One is represented as “real,” physically present on stage, evidently *sôma*. The other is called a phantom, a copy of the original, an insubstantial after-image.<sup>41</sup> She exists only by report, in the words of others. But immediately there are complications — out of which much of the play's wit, irony, and pathos follow. The Helen on stage is an isolated figure, evidently a dramatic innovation (cf. *Ar. Thesm.* 850); she even views her own lineage with a certain distance (18, 21, cf. 256ff).<sup>42</sup> Her insubstantial double, on the other hand, has

<sup>40</sup> See Solmsen's first cited article and Pippin (above, n. 1).

<sup>41</sup> For a discussion of *eidôlon* as part of a psychological category, the double, in archaic Greek thinking see J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les grecs* (Paris 1965) 251–264, esp. 255–258, a discussion including Helen and A. *Ag.* 410–26 — Helen as Menelaos' dream phantom still haunting his house after she had gone to Troy. One is tempted to think that Euripides' play owes as much to this passage as to the general, double mythical tradition about Helen. *Helen* otherwise echoes *Agamemnon* remarkably often: cf. above, nn. 15, 33 and 38; *Hel.* 111 and *Ag.* 278; *Hel.* 123–32 and *Ag.* 624–33; *Hel.* 196–9 — Helen *poluktonos* and the destruction her name caused (also, e.g. 52f, 383–5), and *Ag.* 681ff — *poluktonos* of the lion cub grown up (734), 1455–67; *Hel.* 392 and *Ag.* 44; *Hel.* 397–9 and *Ag.* 433–55; *Hel.* 935 and *Ag.* 350 (with Fraenkel ad loc.); *Hel.* 1120–1 — Πάρις αἰνόγαμος / πομπαῖσιν Ἀφροδίτας and *Ag.* 712 — Πάριν τὸν αἰνόμετρον and 748 — πομπῇ Διὸς ξενίου (of Helen coming to Troy as Erinys); *Hel.* 1158 (see Dale ad loc.) and *Ag.* 452–4; *Hel.* 1306 and *Ag.* 414; finally, the whole combination of wedding and funeral which makes up the escape plot can be seen as a light transformation of *Ag.* 699–716. The cumulative effect of these echoes, then, is to give added weight to Helen's doubleness in Euripides' play, the serious and sinister Aeschylean figure hovering behind the new, rehabilitated one.

<sup>42</sup> Lines 257–9 were bracketed by Badham, followed by Murray and Kannicht. Dale defends them, but not decisively from the grammatical side; though she notes that their grotesque content in this play is nothing against them. R. Renehan, *Greek Textual Criticism* (Cambridge, Mass. 1969) 35–36, offers an attractive solution. Noting that the diction is, in fact, especially characteristic of Euripides, he suggests transposition of 256 after 259.

haunted much of earlier Greek literature. She has a long poetic lineage. Though a creation of words, they are Homer's, Sappho's, Aeschylus's, and Euripides' own. Her effects have been palpably devastating, in the history of Troy and Greece, and for the Helen before us. They have been so powerful, in fact, that the latter, for all her innocence, speaks of herself as responsible for them. Here the play not only alludes to epistemological dilemmas but dramatizes the power of subjective and mass illusion, created by the irresistible pressure of reputation and past tradition.<sup>43</sup>

## IV

One aspect of these issues can be found in the play's various representations of the notion of fame and reputation.

The speech with which Helen opens the play concludes as she insists she will keep herself chaste

ὥς, εἰ καθ' Ἑλλάδ' ὄνομα δυσκλεές φέρω,  
μή μοι τὸ σῶμά γ' ἐνθάδ' αἰσχύνῃν ὀφλῇ. (66f)

Her fame, her bad reputation, is in the world at large, throughout Greece (cf. 81, 926–8). It is her social and public being which she must bear like an imposed necessity (cf. 254, 1163). Set against it (line 67 repeats exactly the rhythm of 66 except for the chiasmus of the middle words, Ἑλλάδ' ὄνομα / σῶμά γ' ἐνθάδ') is her private self, the physical presence before us. We know already that the basis of her bad name is a figment made out of thin air by Hera in annoyance at having lost the beauty contest (31–6), and supported by Zeus in the interests of world history (36–43, cf. 1652, 1669–72). Here is fame quite empty: no human deed underlies it. Helen, her private existence and will thus obliterated, can only wait, like Odysseus on Calypso's island, for the gods to do something. She persists, and yet her struggle to do so, to keep herself chaste, is expressed in the language of reputation and judgment in the eyes of others — “incur the charge of disgrace.”

There is occasion here for tragic conflict, between external situation, conventional values, and inner being; in the difficulty of conveying moral ideas which can be only understood as internalized.<sup>44</sup> But Euripides deflects it, by the wit and paradox of its formulation, allowing it only an intermittent intensity.

<sup>43</sup> Cf., for the case of Menelaos, Alt (above, n. 1) 18–20, and the fine remarks of Diller (above, n. 1) 106f.

<sup>44</sup> For the elaboration of such a conflict in *Hippolytus* see now C. Segal, *Hermes* 98 (1970) 278ff.



A more extended instance of this combination of convoluted ratiocination with high feeling is Helen's speech at lines 255–305, set off between two extended lyric sections. After referring to her monstrous origins (cf. for this procedure *HF* 1255ff), she blames her misfortune on an external agent, Hera (261). One may notice, however, that it is thanks to Hera's phantom that Helen herself is saved from Paris and the actual loss of her virtue (cf. 241–6, 44–8, 1670–2). At any rate, Helen also blames her own beauty (261), which — or the fame of which — seduced Paris (cf. 27f). Her beauty, though given and external, is more clearly part of herself, her *sôma*. She might herself do something about it, namely, wipe it out and make herself ugly (262f). And this she actually does later in the play, though her purpose then is deception and escape, not, as here, to compel a harmony of inner and outer self. She is not culpable, *adikos*, she insists, but only possessed of a bad reputation, *duskleês* (270, cf. *Or.* 600f, Gorgias, *Helen* 15, Antiphon 2.2.1, 13). A moral condition is differentiated from a state of reputation: the latter has no basis in fact and thus none in justice (cf. 992f where Helen argues the converse, that knowing *ta onta* should make one do *ta dikaia*). Then she appears to locate the real source of her anguish: the greater *kakon* than truth, *alêtheia* — the greater misfortune than knowing or seeing what is true — is possession of “intangible misfortunes,” τὰ μὴ προσόντα κακά (271f). Nothing is worse than to experience, in all helplessness, a discrepancy between the world's opinion and one's own knowledge of oneself.

The notion of reputation in these instances underlines a great gap between the inner, private person and his outward, public existence.<sup>45</sup> The play also refers a number of times to the renown and heroic glory which *kleos* most often designates. This is a notion whose importance in the Greek world, from the time of the Homeric poems, can hardly be underestimated. To recall only one more recent example, Thucydides' Pericles makes it the ultimate prize, or consolation, of political life: “know that this city possesses the greatest reputation

<sup>45</sup> The strain on the conventional notion of *kleos* may be seen in Helen's expression αἰσχρὸν κλέος (135), which even late in the fifth century must have sounded paradoxical, in the manner of such Euripidean turns as τὸ κακὸν ἀγαθόν (644) or κάλλιστον ὄνειδος (*Phoen.* 821, cf. *Or.* 819). The word *kleos* is not found with a negative sense before Thucydides (2.45.2; Pindar, *N.* 8.36, is not an exception because there the negative modifier is part of a litotes). Only from the period of Euripides' play does *kleos* take on moral qualification (Kritias B44, Anon. Iambl. 2.2, 4; 5.2; cf. Greindl, *RhM* 89 [1940] 216–228, and generally G. Steinkopf, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Ruhmes bei den Griechen* [Halle 1937]).



[ὄνομα μέγιστον] among men because she does not give way in misfortunes, and expends in war the greatest quantity of men [σώματα] and effort [πόνους]; and for future generations . . . the memory will be left for ever [ἐς αἶδιον . . . μνήμη καταλελείβεται] . . .” (2.64.3; cf. 2.41.4; 2.44.4).<sup>46</sup> This glory in *Helen* is inseparable from the Trojan War. Zeus's famous plan, to ease the earth of her burden of men and to make the mightiest man of Greece renown (36–41), incorporates it from the beginning and joins it with death. Achilles' glory goes hand in hand with the many men whose deaths he caused. Death is sought out for the sake of fame (cf. 298, 841, 851–4). A *mnêma*, like Proteus's on stage, is a mark of fame, a memorial (cf. 1165–8) and a tomb.

Yet the movement of the play, as remarked earlier, is generally away from death and toward prospects of marriage, Spring, new life, success, and happiness; no longer from death to fame but from death back to eros. The traditional ideal of fame has already been qualified by contrast to the private self and by the demonstration of how hazardous or empty a name and reputation may be. It is further undercut in the figure of Menelaos. In the shadow of Homer's Odysseus, and the Odysseus of *Cyclops*, he comes to the shores of a strange, remote place where the person in power kills all visitors and is entirely unimpressed by the sack of Troy (cf. *Od.* 9.273ff, *Cycl.* 283f). He introduces himself with no small sense of his reputation (392–4, contrast 16–18, 21) and thinks his famous name will win him favor and food (501–4) — though it is precisely his identity which would destroy him if Theoklymenos found it out (780ff, 817ff). Before the old woman at the gate he asks miserably, τὰ κλεινὰ ποῦ 'στί μοι στρατεύματα (453), only to be answered, “Well, you may have been high and mighty there [in Troy], but you're not here.” The effect is comically deflating, and, insofar as Menelaos has nothing but his fame at Troy to cling to, pathetic. He soon discovers that the object of the expedition and the companion of his long, unfinished journey home (cf. 413, 424–7) was a phantom. All his trouble (cf. 392–9) was for nothing (603, 707, cf. 751, 1135f). His *kleos* rests on the pursuit of an empty image. But he will not let it go. “It was for you,” he tells the Helen who never went to Troy, “that I sacked Troy” (806). He will do nothing “unworthy,” οὐκ ἄξια, of Ilion (808). He will not bring shame, καταισχυνῶ, on τὸ Τρωικόν

<sup>46</sup> At 2.41.4 the phrase *μνημεῖα κακῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν αἶδια* is noteworthy: the emphasis falls on the permanence rather than the content of fame, the latter including both disasters and successes, both bad and good (*κακῶν* should, of course, not be emended: cf. H. Flashar, *Der Epitaphios des Perikles* (SB *Akad. Heidelberg*, Phil.-Hist. Kl. [1969, 1] 26 n. 52).

κλέος (845, cf. 948f; and cf. 67). The irony, the seeming irrelevance, of such assertions is brought home by the chorus when they decry the folly of war as a pursuit of *aretai*, that is, glory (1151-3; for the language cf. Thucydides 1.123.1).

And yet Menelaos's reliance on the spirit of Troy thus qualified, and regarded by Helen as impetuous folly (811), is also what keeps him with her and prevents him attempting to save only himself, as she advises (780, 805). It works like the force of *aidôs* (cf. 805). If the pursuit of glory in war is ruinous folly, the pressure of reputation — as well as the experience of loss and death in war (cf. 847-50; and cf. its effect at 589, 593) — can give a man the courage to risk his life. (It is, incidentally, never said that Menelaos risks his life for the love of Helen.) Euripides plays these discordant views of fame off one another, mixing again an ideal, moral issue — the critique of war as a pursuit of glory — with a practical one — the useful pressures of a sense of reputation, which finally lead to escape and survival.

After the escape plot has succeeded — with the use of *logoi*, not as the reasonable instruments of clarification which the chorus had urged (1159), but as the means of a useful deception — the valor that conquered Troy is once again invoked at the rout of the Egyptian sailors. Menelaos calls on his men, "O you who sacked Ilion's city" (1560), and Helen exhorts them, "Where is that fame you won at Troy [*τὸ Τρωικὸν κλέος*] — show these barbarians!" (1603f). Therewith the Greeks once more outwit and slaughter their barbarian enemy, a simple, lust-befuddled king and a band of unarmed rowers (the Greeks are armed with swords: 1600-1).

Evidently the successful escape of Helen and Menelaos is satisfactory. Something like comedy is at work, both in the sense of life renewed and in the reduction in size of the heroic and terrible, turning the war at Troy into a brawl between sturdy young Greeks (cf. 1540, 1562) and a handful of simple Egyptians left at their mercy by a stupid king. Perhaps only the unduly squeamish would find the shift from the evocation of the miseries of defeated Troy and homecoming Greeks to the cheerful call on Troy's glory too abrupt; or a minority of *sophoi* might think it ironic. On the other hand, the grim aspect of Troy, like the phantom Helen, may be dissipated and exorcized, or rather transposed to a distance which might make some forget it entirely and still allow others to regard it calmly, neither, in the latter case, denying the force of it or some hope of escaping it.

This possibility of a more serious basis of the play could be supported generally by recalling the time of its performance in 412 and Athens'

grim circumstances then; by a need for distraction not so irrelevant as to seem frivolous and by the need for some space larger than the confines of despair. It can also be supported by one other view of fame. When Helen and Menelaos plead with Theonoe for her complicity in their escape plot, they appeal on the grounds not only of the justice of their cause but also, and most emphatically, on the grounds of Theonoe's, and her father Proteus's, reputation for justice. Helen ends her speech saying "this is the finest glory [κλέος κάλλιστον]: for a child born of a good father to rival his parents' ways" (941-3). Menelaos is harsher. Pointing out that Theonoe has a reputation to lose (958, cf. 993), and that she will never, surely, allow her father, τὸν πρὶν εὐκλεέστατον, to suffer ill-fame (967), he threatens to disgrace both daughter and father by committing suicide with Helen on Proteus's tomb, ἀθάνατον ἄλγος σοί [Theonoe], ψόγος δὲ σὺ πατρί (982-7). The rhetoric is shrewd, forceful, and in a good cause. Theonoe responds with a nice combination of her own, religious sense of justice (997, 1002) and her sense of reputation, for herself raised to the level of *amour propre* and for her father a form of filial piety:

φιλῶ τ' ἐμαυτήν, καὶ κλέος τοῦμοῦ πατρὸς  
οὐκ ἂν μιάναιμι, οὐδὲ συγγόνῳ χάριν  
δοίην ἂν ἐξ ἧς δυσκλεῆς φανήσομαι.

(999-1001, cf. 1028f)

Here *kleos* satisfies both moral and practical requirements. It is something other than either the negative and empty ill-fame which had been Helen's or the amoral though useful Trojan glory.

Finally, Euripides manages the plot of his play so that we may see the notion of fame in a still more pure form. Helen and Menelaos leave in the wake of their successful departure Theonoe and the chorus exposed to the fury of Theoklymenos's anger. The chorus leader (cf. Dale and Kannicht on 1627) braves that anger to protect Theonoe. She risks being killed for a just cause (1631-8) "because for noble servants to die on their masters' behalf is the most glorious thing of all [εὐκλεέστατον]" (1640f; cf. 1639, κτείνε, with 993). Is this a last touch of sentimental melodrama? Or might one recall Euripides' preoccupation with noble, willing sacrifices for selfless causes?<sup>47</sup> This curiously anonymous expression of willingness to die at least differs

<sup>47</sup> For a similar brief, almost incidental, scene cf. *IA* 303-316, and esp. 312 and *Hel.* 1640f.

from Helen's earlier, self-absorbed flirtations with suicide and Menelaos's desire to come to an end worthy of Troy. It is most like Theonoe's mysterious lines about retribution and immortality (1013-16), allowing a brief glimpse into a realm of values or ideals which, though outside the main lines of the play's action, indicates yet another kind of distance.

CENTER FOR HELLENIC STUDIES, WASHINGTON, D.C., AND  
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE



ALEXANDER, PALAMEDES, TROADES, SISYPHUS—  
A CONNECTED TETRALOGY? A CONNECTED  
TRILOGY?

GEORGE LEONIDAS KONIARIS

*For James Hutton and Friedrich Solmsen*

FROM Aelian<sup>1</sup> in combination with two Aristophanic *scholia*<sup>2</sup> we know that Euripides produced the *Alexander*, the *Palamedes*, the *Troades* and the (satyr play) *Sisyphus* in the Great Dionysia of the year 415 B.C. and that he won the second prize, defeated by the obscure dramatist Xenocles.

Of the three Euripidean tragedies, only the last play has reached us in its entirety. Of the remaining two we have only fragments. About two lines have also been preserved from *Sisyphus*.

I take for granted that my reader is conversant with the text of the *Troades*. I shall therefore offer here only the necessary information about the plots of the *Alexander*, the *Palamedes*, and the *Sisyphus*, assuming that my reader is not familiar — or at least not sufficiently familiar — with the particulars of these dramas.

The reconstruction of Euripides' *Alexander* is doubtful in its details,

This paper is based on a James C. Loeb Classical Lecture which I had the honor of delivering at Harvard University on 17 November 1971, under the title "Euripides' Trojan Women: the Problem of the Tetralogy." All books and articles consulted in the preparation of this paper, and cited by author's name in the footnotes, will be found in the BIBLIOGRAPHY at the end of the article.

<sup>1</sup> Aelian *Var. Hist.* II.8. Κατὰ τὴν πρώτην καὶ ἐνενηκοστὴν ὀλυμπιάδα, καθ' ἣν ἐνίκα Ἐξαίνετος ὁ Ἀκραγαντίνος στάδιον, ἀντηγωνίσαντο ἀλλήλοις Ξενοκλῆς καὶ Εὐριπίδης. Καὶ πρῶτός γε ἦν Ξενοκλῆς, ὅστις ποτὲ οὐτός ἐστιν, Οἰδίποδι καὶ Λυκάονι καὶ Βάκχαις καὶ Ἀθάμαντι σατυρικῶ. Τούτου δεύτερος Εὐριπίδης ἦν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ Παλαμήδει καὶ Τρωάσι καὶ Σισύφῳ σατυρικῶ.

<sup>2</sup> *Vesp.* 1326; *Av.* 842.

<sup>3</sup> The fragments of *Alexander* come mainly from (a) Stobaeus (fr. 42-64); (b) three papyrus fragments in Strasburg (Pap. Strasb. 2342-44 of the 1st cent. B.C.); and (c) Ennius, who wrote an *Alexander* believed to be in the main a translation of the Euripidean *Alexander*. Some further help toward the reconstruction of the *Alexander* has been sought in Seneca's *Agamemnon*

but the plot as a whole has been recovered with certainty.<sup>3</sup> Hecuba, when pregnant with Paris, dreamed that she had given birth to a fire-brand. The dream was interpreted to mean that unless the child was killed it would bring disaster upon Troy. The decision was made, therefore, to put it to death, and soon after its birth the infant was exposed in the wilderness to die. The child, however, under circumstances we do not know, was saved to grow up among cowherds and become a cowherd himself, knowing nothing, of course, of his royal descent, whether or not anyone among the cowherds knew anything about the child's real parents.

Games were held to commemorate the supposedly deceased child, and at these games a prize bull, the pet of the young cowherd Paris,<sup>4</sup> seized contrary to his wish, was offered as a trophy. Paris could regain his bull only by entering the competition and by winning. Therefore,

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(Strzelecki has argued that in some passages of the *Agamemnon* Seneca utilized the Euripidean *Alexander* [Strzelecki, 5-25]); in mythographers (for example, Apollod. III.12.5, and Hyg. *Fab.* 91; *Fab.* 273); in grammarians (e.g. Varro *Ling.* VII 82), in commentators (e.g. Serv. *ad Aen.* 5. 370); in poets (e.g. Ovid *Her.* 16), and in Etruscan art (i.e. in scenes depicted on Etruscan vases and mirrors (see Wüst *passim*; Türk, cols. 1605ff; J. Davreux, 108ff). The fragments of the Strasburg papyrus (comprising about 150 verses from the tragedy, of which at least half are irreparably mutilated) were first published by Crönert. They were again published, together with the fragments from Stobaeus and the fragments from Ennius, by Lefke and more successfully by Snell. Only the Strasburg papyrus fragments with English translation were published by Page (54-60). The fragments of the *Alexander* (but without the Latin fragments from Ennius) can also be found in the *TGF* 373-79 [= Eur. fr. 42-64]. For bibliographical sources concerning the *Alexander*, up to about 1935, a more or less complete account is given by Lefke. The work by Snell still remains the fundamental work for the restoration of the *Alexander*. For works pertaining to the restoration of the *Alexander* and published after Snell's monograph, a judicious selection is found in Jouan, p. 113, and in Webster (*The Tragedies of Euripides*, 166). Valuable also are Jouan's and Webster's discussions of the *Alexander* in the same books (113-42 and 165-74, respectively).

<sup>4</sup> It is not certain whether in the play Euripides makes the cowherds call the young cowherd Paris (from the wallet in which he was placed) or Alexander (= repeller-of-men), or both. Hyg. *Fab.* 91 tells us explicitly that the cowherds called him Paris (. . . *eumque Parim nominaverunt*). Apollod. III.12.5 narrates that the cowherd who found the exposed child called him Paris (. . . *ὁ δὲ . . . εὐράν . . . ὡς ἴδιον παῖδα ἔτρεφεν ὀνομάσας Πάριον*), but that later when Paris grew up and successfully defended the herds against robbers, he was in addition named Ἀλέξανδρος (*γενόμενος δὲ νεανίσκος . . . αὐθις Ἀλέξανδρος προσωνομάσθη ληστὰς ἀμυνόμενος καὶ τοῖς ποιμνίοις ἀλεξήσας*). Both names are used since the time of Homer and without appreciable difference. For the *πήρα* in which the baby had been placed and reared cf. Schol. Eur. *Andr.* 293: . . . διὸ καὶ Πάρις ὠνομάσθη ὁ ἐν τῇ πήρᾳ τραφεῖς.

he participated in the games and won<sup>5</sup> over all competitors, whether the latter were the sons of Priam only or other noblemen as well.<sup>6</sup>

While Hector accepted the defeat in a dignified manner, Hecuba and Deiphobus, son of Priam, were infuriated. Deiphobus in particular could not accept a slave as the victor. The case was referred to Priam, before whom Paris and Deiphobus engaged in a debate, with the result that Priam ruled in favor of the herdsman.

Hecuba, in concert with Deiphobus, plotted to murder the cowherd, who was finally attacked (we do not know whether Hecuba participated in the actual attack) but in the nick of time (under details we again do not know) the cowherd was recognized<sup>7</sup> as the son of Priam and Hecuba and was received into the royal palace as prince.

The prologue of the play very likely told of Hecuba's dream, the exposing of Paris, and the institution of the funeral games. The remainder of the story formed the main action of the play, although we frequently do not know who is the speaking persona and who were the personae involved in each scene; we are also in doubt as to who is delivering the prologue<sup>8</sup> and the epilogue,<sup>9</sup> and as to whether the chorus consisted of Trojan men or Trojan women<sup>10</sup> (although we are sure that the play comprised, also, a chorus of cowherds,<sup>11</sup> a *parachoregēma*, which appeared for some time on the stage accompanying Alexander, probably in the scene where Deiphobus and Alexander debated before Priam, if not in other scenes as well).

We know less of Euripides' *Palamedes*<sup>12</sup> than we do of the *Alexander*. We have no papyrus fragments but only quotations from the play found in Greek authors and a parody of an event in the play (whether it took place on the stage or was reported) mentioned in Aristophanes' *Thesm.* 770ff. We also derive some help from ancient authors who in one fashion or another dealt with the legend of *Palamedes*. But what can be made out of the last type of source is only very tentative with respect to the Euripidean plot. In general, stories about Palamedes were in wide circulation in antiquity, reaching at least as far back as

<sup>5</sup> For speculations on the athletic events in these games see Jouan, 123 n. 6.

<sup>6</sup> See *ibid.*, 123 nn. 3 and 4.

<sup>7</sup> For possibilities concerning the manner in which the recognition of Alexander was effected see Jouan, 130ff.

<sup>8</sup> See *ibid.*, 116 n. 2.

<sup>9</sup> The choice is between Cassandra and Aphrodite.

<sup>10</sup> See Jouan, 119 n. 1.

<sup>11</sup> See *schol.* to Eur. *Hipp.* 58.

<sup>12</sup> For *Palamedes*, see Jouan, 339-63; and Webster, *The Tragedies of Euripides*, 174-176.



the date of the *Cypria* (7th century B.C.?). The subject Palamedes, varying in detail, was extensively treated by tragedians.<sup>13</sup> Palamedes also provided a common subject in rhetorical schools.<sup>14</sup> Later centuries abound in references to Palamedes found not only in Greek but also in Roman authors.

The action of the Euripidean play took place in the Greek camp. Palamedes, the great philanthropic inventor, was falsely accused of betraying the Greek cause and of having become a spy for the Trojans. On this charge he was brought to trial. The prosecutor, Odysseus, asked for the death penalty, which finally was carried out after Palamedes' apology failed to undermine the falsified evidence against him. No doubt in this play, Odysseus<sup>15</sup> as prosecutor, Agamemnon as judge, as well as all the Greeks who stoned Palamedes to death, appeared as villains of the worst sort. Emotionalism must have reached a fever pitch in the play. The aforementioned *scholium* of the *Thesmophoriazusae*, giving the details of Aristophanes' parody in the corresponding lines of this comedy, says that Euripides, in the *Palamedes*, made Palamedes' brother Oeax carve the story of his death on ships, and likewise upon oars, which he cast into the sea in the hope that their father, Nauplius, might learn from them how Palamedes had met his end. It seems that upon the advice of Odysseus, it was decided that no information should be carried to Nauplius about the death of Palamedes for fear that Nauplius might create trouble for the Greeks (in Aeschylus' *Palamedes*<sup>16</sup> Nauplius

<sup>13</sup> We know that, in addition to Euripides' *Palamedes*, Aeschylus, Sophocles and the younger Astydamos wrote plays bearing the title *Palamedes*, that Sophocles wrote two more plays with the respective titles *Ναύπλιος καταπλέων* and *Ναύπλιος πυρκαεύς*, while Astydamos (the father of Astydamos the younger), Lycophron, and Philocles each wrote a *Ναύπλιος*. These latter plays concerning Nauplius, the father of Palamedes, were most probably, many would say certainly, associated to a large extent with Palamedes.

<sup>14</sup> To go no later than the fourth century B.C., two extant pieces, Gorgias' speech in defense of Palamedes and pseudo-Alcidamas's speech of Odysseus against Palamedes, easily come to mind.

<sup>15</sup> We do not know how Euripides motivated Odysseus' turn against Palamedes. Perhaps one motive was jealousy on the part of Odysseus because of the reputation for wisdom which Palamedes enjoyed in the Greek camp. But perhaps Odysseus was presented as having reasons for hating Palamedes even before he set foot on Trojan soil. According to the story in the *Cypria* (Procl. *Chr.* = Allen, *Hom. Op.* V, 103, lines 25-27), Odysseus, in order to avoid going to Troy, had pretended that he was mad. But Palamedes, outwitting him, exposed his illness as sham and so forced Odysseus to enlist. Naturally, Odysseus could be presented by Euripides as looking forward to revenge.

<sup>16</sup> See TGF 60 (= Aesch. fr. 181 [= 305 Mette]) and cf. Webster, *The Tragedies of Euripides*, 175.



came to the Greek camp pressing charges against those responsible for his son's death). Thus probably Oeax, imprisoned in the Greek camp and unable to find a man who would carry the message of Palamedes' death to their father directly, tried in despair to inform Nauplius indirectly with messages carved on oars and on ships.

Of the *Sisyphus*, little can be said. But Murray's conclusions about the general lines of the play's plot are attractive. He writes:

The only surviving fragment [of the *Sisyphus*] is addressed to Heracles:

Son of Alcmena, noblest of mankind  
'Tis joy to me to see thee safe from death  
Returning, and the bloody murderer slain.

I think the indication is sufficient. I know of no part of the Sisyphus saga which brings Heracles and Sisyphus together after the death of a 'bloody murderer' except one. When Eurystheus sent Heracles on one of the most terrible of his Labours, viz. to take from the Thracian tyrant Lycurgus the horses which Lycurgus fed upon human flesh, Heracles slew Lycurgus, mastered the raging horses, and was bringing them back in triumph to Eurystheus, when unfortunately he met Sisyphus, who stole them!<sup>17</sup>

It was Murray who, in 1932, first argued systematically that the four Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. form a "connected" tetralogy.<sup>18</sup> He again expressed the same view in 1946.<sup>19</sup> Since then the idea that these plays form either a "connected" tetralogy or a "connected" trilogy of one kind or another has rapidly gained favor — the view has been accepted by many others, among them: Buschor (73ff), Delebecque (177), Duclos (83), Ebener (*Die Hel. der Tr.* 691; *Eur. Werke* II 348), Ferguson (109-10), Friedrich (61-75), Kitto (219), Lattimore (207-8), Lesky (382),<sup>20</sup> Lucas (419),<sup>21</sup> Mason (87), Menegazzi (190-91),

<sup>17</sup> Murray, "The Trojan Trilogy," 655 = Murray, *Greek Studies*, 142.

<sup>18</sup> Murray *loc. cit.* Some scholars before Murray (including Wilamowitz, 260ff) had expressed the view that the Euripidean plays (at least the three tragedies) of 415 B.C. form a "connected" group, but they offered no systematic argument to establish their view. For references see Lefke, 106-107 (and add the names of Robert, *Oidipus*, 396, and Witkowski, 107ff, both of whom pronounce the *Alexander*, the *Palamedes*, and the *Troades* a "connected" trilogy).

<sup>19</sup> Murray, *Greek Studies*, 127-48.

<sup>20</sup> Speaking more exactly, Lesky admits that the trilogy is "connected," but he adds that the connection cannot have been "very close." Hanson (*Hermes* 92 [1964] 171-181) seems to hold a similar view. Be that as it may, I am the first, so far as I know, to have attempted a systematic refutation of the view that the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. constitute a "connected" tetralogy or trilogy.

<sup>21</sup> Lucas' words are: "*Troades* (with *Alexander*, *Palamedes*, *Sisyphus*) 415, plays connected in subject . . ." I take his statement to mean that the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. form a "connected" tetralogy.

Parmentier-Gregoire (3ff), Pertusi (251), Pickard-Cambridge (81),<sup>22</sup> Scarcella (61 n. 4; 66-70), Scharold (12), Scheidweiler (325), Schmid-Stählin (474ff, esp. n. 6), Snell (passim), Stössl (288-89), Strzelecki (11), Webster (*Trag. of Eur.* 165; "Euripides' Trojan Trilogy," 207-13), and Wilson (221-23). While there still remain a few who entertain mild doubts (e.g. Page<sup>23</sup>), it appears that Murray's view represents the current philological consensus on the subject. It can be easily perceived that the *sine qua non* for the correct interpretation of the *Troades* depends on answering correctly the question whether the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. are "connected" or "unconnected," that is, whether the *Troades* should be experienced per se as an independent *holon*, or in the light of the other plays, as the third play in a trilogic or tetralogic unity.

In the present paper I hope to establish with strong probability that the four Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. are "unconnected" and that the correct interpretation of the *Troades* can therefore be achieved only by studying the *Troades* by itself, as a unity independent of the *Alexander*, the *Palamedes*, and the *Sisyphus*.<sup>24</sup>

Murray's argument for a "connected" trilogy runs as follows:<sup>25</sup> "The first play [= the *Alexander*] gave us the curse upon Troy due to mistaking the Curse-child Alexander for the child of blessing, and cherishing the destroyer instead of the Saviour. The second [= the *Palamedes*] gave us the curse upon the Greeks, due to their preference of the false wisdom over the real wisdom... and ultimately their

<sup>22</sup> While in the *New Chapters* (137) Pickard-Cambridge had found it "not possible to judge how far they [= *Alex.*, *Palam.*, *Tro.*] may have formed a connected trilogy," later (probably under the influence of Murray) he inclined in favor of a "connected" trilogy.

<sup>23</sup> Page, 57. I may add that Lanza takes the view that from what we possess of the *Alexander* and the *Palamedes* there is no evidence against the hypothesis that the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. constitute a "connected" trilogy; he characterizes the three tragedies as "trilogia... di argomento Trojano" (p. 230), but he also adds that due to the fact that so little has been preserved from the *Palamedes*, a comprehensive judgment about this trilogy cannot go beyond the limits of a hypothesis.

<sup>24</sup> It would have given the present article, already long as it stands, the proportions of a large book had I tried to refute every single point which has appeared in print in support of the view that the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. form a "connected" trilogy. I have instead attempted to refute what seemed to me the stronger points and have left out all the others, which become by implication invalid if my refutation of the stronger points stands.

<sup>25</sup> Murray, "The Trojan Trilogy," 656 [repeated almost verbatim in Murray, *Greek Studies*, 148].

murder of the innocent. The last [= the *Troades*] shows the fulfillment of both curses."

But the cause of the disaster which is to fall upon the Greeks in their home voyage from Troy has nothing to do with the trial and death of Palamedes. The reason Athena turns against the Greeks and seeks the help of Poseidon to destroy the Greek ships on their home voyage, is explicitly given in the text of the *Troades*. Athena is enraged with the behavior of Ajax the Lesser (the Locrian), who outraged Athena's temple and shamed her by dragging Cassandra by force from the altar.<sup>26</sup> Athena's wrath, we are explicitly told, is extended to the other Greeks because they did not punish or even reproach Ajax for his behavior, although they knew that they had sacked Troy mainly with Athena's help. Athena, speaking of the lesson which the impending destruction of the Greek fleet should convey to the Greek world at large, declares:<sup>27</sup> "So after this [i.e. the destruction of the Greek ships and the drowning of those on board] Greeks may learn how to use with fear / my sacred places, and respect all gods beside." And when Poseidon, just before leaving the stage, summarizes the situation in gnomic fashion, he only says: "That mortal who sacks fallen cities is a fool, / who gives the temples and the tombs, the hallowed places / of the dead to desolation. His own turn must come."<sup>28</sup> All this, certainly, is too remote from the false accusation, unjust condemnation, and death of Palamedes.

I may add here that even if one assumes that at the end of the *Palamedes* a god or a prophet spoke of the misfortunes which were to fall upon the Greeks on their voyage home as punishment for Palamedes' condemnation and death, such a statement would still have to stay within the *Palamedes*, outside the causes which produce the forthcoming disaster of the Greeks mentioned in the prologue of the *Troades*. Above all, one must not forget that with the exception of a possible allusion to Nauplius, father of Palamedes, found in two words in the *Troades*,<sup>29</sup> one never hears anything in the *Troades* explicit or implicit connected with Palamedes or Nauplius or Oeax. Furthermore, I shall

<sup>26</sup> Most probably Euripides did not mean to imply that Ajax raped Cassandra, but simply that he dragged her from the altar, where she had taken sanctuary, to lead her out of the temple as captive. The story of Cassandra's rape by Ajax seems to be an Alexandrian invention. For a discussion of the matter see Mason, 82.

<sup>27</sup> *Tro.* 85-86. The translated passages from the *Troades* and the *Helen* appearing in this paper belong to Lattimore (see Bibliography).

<sup>28</sup> *Tro.* 95-97.

<sup>29</sup> *Tro.* 90.



strenuously contest the view that with the two aforementioned words in the *Troades*, Euripides attempts a link between the *Palamedes* and the *Troades*.

The two words I am referring to are *Καφῆρειοι . . . ἄκραι* "Capherean promontories," which have been constantly adduced as a link of unity between the *Palamedes* and the *Troades*. As is well known, in order to get revenge on the Greeks for his son's unjust execution, Nauplius through deceptive fire-signals caused the destruction of a large part of the Greek fleet among the cliffs of the promontory Caphereus in the southeast coast of Euboea.

Consider, however, the following. In the *Troades* the destruction of the Greek fleet is not confined to the area of Caphereus, but is envisioned in the Aegean sea as a whole — the cliffs of Caphereus being only one of the explicitly mentioned places to be filled with the bodies of the drowned Greeks; those who cause the destruction of the Greeks are explicitly Poseidon and Athena (partially helped by Zeus) — not Nauplius; and, further, the Greek fleet is to be destroyed explicitly through direct natural causes — the fire of thunderbolts and a tremendous sea tempest raging over the Aegean — causes other than the deceptive beacons of Nauplius.<sup>30</sup> There is, then, no sufficient reason to assume that, regardless of its context, the mention of the Capherean cliffs in the *Troades* must imply the traditional story of Nauplius and his deceptive fire-signals. The poet may have made reference to the Capherean cliffs only to infuse into his text the horror with which these cliffs were invested in Greek tradition in connection with the drowning of the Greeks, and not to imply a relation to Nauplius' story, seeing that in the *Troades* Poseidon and Athena — not Nauplius — are mentioned as causing the destruction of the Greek fleet; that is, Euripides, in the *Troades*, possibly adopted from tradition only as much as he needed for his tragedy, namely, the Capherean cliffs, while leaving out Nauplius. Let us remember that in his plays Euripides often handles tradition freely, according to his artistic purpose, and that, the name of Nauplius is, after all, left out of the text of the *Troades*. But in order to be as fair as possible, let us assume that Euripides wanted his audience to remember the story of Nauplius' false beacons when they heard the words "the Capherean cliffs." Would the reference to these cliffs necessarily constitute a link between the *Palamedes* and the *Troades*?

In the *Helen* of Euripides, Nauplius and his fire-signals are mentioned

<sup>30</sup> *Tro.* 77–84.



not implicitly but explicitly, and not once but twice. In v. 767 Menelaus speaks "of the Euboean wrecking fires Nauplius set," and the chorus in vv. 1126-30 sings:

Many Achaeans besides  
the man of the single oar\* drowned  
off waterswept Euboea  
when he lit his wreck fires, blazed  
the false flares, and crashed them to death  
on Aegean rocks at Caphereus.

\* [i.e. Nauplius who hastily left Troy in a fishing-boat before the Greek fleet sailed, to make his preparation for wrecking it.]

But no one will argue that the reference to Nauplius and his fire-signals in *Helen* was meant to create a unity between this play and the *Palamedes* of Euripides.

The story of Nauplius' causing the destruction of the Greeks when they sailed from Troy back to Greece is a traditional story of wide circulation and not an idiosyncratic element found only in the Euripidean trilogy of 415 B.C. Taking this into account and observing further that elsewhere in the *Troades* we never find any explicit or implicit reference to the Palamedes story — let alone to the story of Palamedes as treated idiosyncratically by Euripides in the play *Palamedes* — we must conclude that it is highly probable, if not absolutely certain, that the reference to the Capherean cliffs must be understood as deriving from the traditional story of what happened to the Greeks on their homeward voyage from Troy and as entering the text of the *Troades* only because in this play mention is made of this traditional homeward voyage. Consequently, to take the Capherean cliffs in *Troades* 90 as proof, or even an indication, of a connection between the *Palamedes* and the *Troades* is at best only a *petitio principii*. I may add here that since Poseidon<sup>31</sup> is the ancestor of Palamedes, Euripides most probably would have had Poseidon make an explicit reference to Palamedes and/or Nauplius, if he, Euripides, had wished to link the *Palamedes* with the *Troades*.

But the insubstantiality of the view that in the *Troades* one witnesses the fulfillment of the curse which falls upon the Greeks as a result of what took place in the *Palamedes* may also be appreciated from another angle. In the *Palamedes*, Agamemnon as judge and Odysseus as prose-

<sup>31</sup> For the relation of Nauplius-Palamedes to Poseidon, see *OCD*<sup>3</sup> s.v. Nauplius.

cutor among all Greeks, share the main responsibility for the condemnation and subsequent execution of Palamedes. But they will both survive the disaster that is to befall the Greeks on their homeward voyage, and this we know not only through traditional accounts, but also from Cassandra in the *Troades*, who reveals the future of Agamemnon and that of Odysseus. Would Euripides have fulfilled the curse uttered against the Greeks as a result of the execution of Palamedes in a way which affects neither Odysseus nor Agamemnon?<sup>32</sup>

Murray's view, that the *Troades* reveals the fulfillment of the curses developed in the *Alexander* and in the *Palamedes*, is thus an arbitrary one with reference to the *Palamedes-Troades*. The same is true with reference to the *Alexander-Troades*.

A summary of the story of the *Alexander* appears above. From the story itself it is obvious that the play pivots on predestination and bears unmistakable similarities to the story of Oedipus. In both sagas, prophecies (whether or not interpreting dreams) warn a king to procreate no child (Laius-Oedipus saga), or to destroy any baby of his as soon as it is born (the Priam-Alexander saga). The advice is not followed (Laius, intoxicated, becomes the father of Oedipus); or is not followed carefully (Priam, instead of ascertaining that the child is killed, has it only exposed and so, whether willingly or unwillingly, permits the child to be saved). The newborn, a boy, is exposed in the wilderness, to perish from starvation or be killed by predatory animals, but is saved by a herdsman (or herdsmen) and eventually proves to be the curse as prophesied (Oedipus kills Laius, and so on; Alexander causes the destruction of Troy). The story somewhere involves a recognition of the man and his identification with the cursed child<sup>33</sup> of the past prophecies.

In the *Alexander* the crucial factor is the personality of Paris, who emerges *καλὸς καὶ γαυρός* in the highest degree, a truly perfect human being. One need not say much of the physical *κάλλος* of Alexander, for he is always glorified for his extraordinary handsomeness.<sup>34</sup> The

<sup>32</sup> As the Greek text of the *Troades* stands, Cassandra's prophecies about the future of Agamemnon and Odysseus have no relation at all to the condemnation and execution of Palamedes.

<sup>33</sup> For the motif of the exposed baby, see Murray, "The Trojan Trilogy," 650-52 [repeated almost verbatim in Murray, *Greek Studies*, 136-68].

<sup>34</sup> To confine myself to the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. cf. *Tro.* 987ff, where Hecuba, speaking to Helen about Alexander says: "Nonsense. My son was handsome beyond all other men. / You looked at him, and sense went Cyprian at the sight, / . . . You saw him in the barbaric splendor of his robes, / gorgeous with gold. It made your senses itch."

aspect ἀγαθός is Alexander's idiosyncratic characteristic in the Euripidean play. Not only does Alexander achieve a glorious victory in the games (cf. the victory of Oedipus over the Sphinx), but he also achieves a second important victory, when in front of the king, he, a cowherd, courageously succeeds in refuting the prince Deiphobus. Thus, Alexander emerges in this tragedy as such a perfect man that (like Oedipus), had he not been predestined to prove a curse, one would have expected him eventually to become the greatest of leaders, to raise his country to the summits of glory. But, alas, predestination has reserved for him (as for Oedipus) a future which would normally fit only the *κάκιστος καὶ μοχθηρότατος*, the ugliest and most evil of men. Alexander is not destined to achieve what one would expect from his natural gifts — the gifts of a perfect prince — but only what predestination has decreed for him to achieve in contradiction of these very gifts: all of which throws the far-reaching power of predestination<sup>35</sup> into stark relief.

If Euripides wrote the *Troades* with the intention of presenting the fulfillment of the curse conceived in the *Alexander*, it is only natural to expect the *Troades* to be written in the spirit of the *Alexander*. In other words, in the *Troades* we should not simply expect to see the destruction of Troy as a result of Alexander, but as a result of the *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς Ἀλέξανδρος* of the Euripidean *Alexander* and in close connection with the idiosyncratic spirit in which the Euripidean *Alexander* had been written (e.g. with particular events in the *Alexander*, particular sayings in the *Alexander*, particular mental-emotional attitudes of the characters in the *Alexander*, and so forth). For without the existence of some such relation between the *Alexander* and the *Troades* we cannot speak seriously of an intended connection on the part of Euripides between these two plays. We may substitute for the *Troades* any play, whether by Euripides or someone else, which in broad lines involves the destruction of Troy, and then pronounce

<sup>35</sup> Ferguson (109–110) argues that Alexander became corrupt because he was removed “from the manly life of the shepherds to the decadent and unscrupulous life of the court.” This view is untenable. To begin with, at least Priam and Hector are presented as lofty characters. Nor do I see any trace of decadence and unscrupulousness in Cassandra. Deiphobus and perhaps Hecuba, appear unsympathetic but hardly decadent and unscrupulous to the point of energizing a *κάκιστος* Alexander out of an *ἄριστος* Alexander. Even if the Trojan court were decadent and unscrupulous, the moral inferiority of such a court would in reality be irrelevant to Alexander as the destroyer of Troy, seeing that predestination has determined that, if he lives, Alexander will destroy Troy, and therefore Alexander has no choice but to fulfil his fate regardless of whether Deiphobus and Hecuba were schemers or saints!



the two plays — say, the *Alexander* and the *Hecuba* by Euripides, or the *Alexander* by Euripides and the *Troades* by Seneca — as “connected,” on the ground that in the *Alexander* the destiny of Troy is prophesied and in the other play fulfilled!

Let us, then, enter into the *Troades* in order to determine the extent to which this play preserves the peculiar spirit of the *Alexander*.

We shall search in vain to find mention of Alexander in the prologue of the *Troades*. We hear, among others, about Epeus (v. 10), Priam (v. 41), Helen (v. 35), Hecuba (v. 37), Polyxena (v. 39), Agamemnon (v. 43), Ajax the Lesser (v. 70), but absolutely nothing about Alexander. Is it not strange that in the prologue of the *Troades* there is no mention of Alexander, the pivotal character of the tragedy *Alexander* and the very carrier of the curse supposedly to be fulfilled in the *Troades*? Is it not amazing that in the *Troades* the first mention of Alexander is postponed almost to v. 600, after we have reached approximately the middle of the play? Is it not *a priori* highly probable that had Euripides been interested in connecting the *Troades* with the *Alexander* — not only consciously but unconsciously as well — he would have mentioned Alexander at least once in the first half of the *Troades*?

But let me come to the curse which leads to the destruction of Troy.<sup>36</sup> In the *Alexander*, the play as a whole focuses on the curse Alexander. In the *Troades*, however, the play as a whole focuses on the curse Helen. Not only that, but even more importantly, while in the *Alexander* the concept of curse is exclusively (or almost exclusively) seen through its connection with predestination, in the *Troades* the concept of curse is primarily seen through its connection with freedom of will. In what follows I shall establish this fundamental difference between the two plays.

The shift of interest from the curse-Alexander to the curse-Helen,

<sup>36</sup> Speaking of the destruction of Troy, the following paradox also emerges as early as the prologue of the *Troades* for one attempting to align the thought of this play with the *Alexander*. In vv. 45–47 Poseidon says that if it were not for Athena Troy *would still exist* (. . . εἴ σε μὴ διώλεσε / Παλλὰς Διὸς παῖς, ἥσθ' ἂν ἐν βάθροισι ἔτι). If Euripides wished the *Troades* to continue the thought of the *Alexander*, what is the purpose of these verses in the very prologue of the *Troades*, especially in view of the complete absence in this prologue of any mention of predestination, or of Alexander, or of Hecuba's dream, etc.? Indeed, is not this paradox even further strengthened when, for example, in v. 72, Poseidon states that the Greeks stormed Troy thanks to *the strength of Athena* (καὶ μὴν ἔπερσάν γ' Ἴλιον τῷ σῶ σθένει)? Is not all this utterly confusing? And is not this confusion all the more puzzling since the prologue of the *Troades* (*qua* prologue) is expected to offer the direction of the play's thought?

and with it the shift of interest from destiny to freedom of will, is already clear from the prologue of the *Troades*. For while Alexander is not mentioned in the prologue of the *Troades*, Helen is. In vv. 32-35 Poseidon says:

While all the women of Troy yet unassigned are here  
beneath the shelter of these walls, chosen to wait  
the will of princes, and among them Tyndareus' child  
Helen of Sparta, named — with right — a captive slave.

Why is Helen *rightly* considered a captive by Poseidon? Beyond any doubt: because she came to Troy *on her own free will*. We know this first from Cassandra who in vv. 370-73 states:

... Their general — clever man — [i.e. Agamemnon]  
in the name of a vile woman [i.e. Helen] cut his darling down  
[i.e. Iphigenia],  
gave up for a brother the sweetness of children in his house,  
all to bring back that brother's wife, a woman who went  
of her free will, not caught in constraint of violence.

From Cassandra's mouth comes only the truth.<sup>37</sup> Her statement about Helen — that she followed Paris of her free will — cannot possibly be taken as false; it must be as truthful as her prophesies about her own death and the death of Agamemnon,<sup>38</sup> or about the sufferings in store for Odysseus.<sup>39</sup> That Helen followed Alexander willingly is also argued most forcefully by Hecuba<sup>40</sup> and is subsequently admitted by Menelaus, who tells Hecuba (vv. 1036-39):

All you have said falls into line with my own thought.  
This woman [= Helen] left my household for a stranger's bed  
of her own free will, and all this talk of Aphrodite\*  
is for pure show. Away, and face the stones of the mob.

\* [i.e. Helen's arguments that Aphrodite forced her to follow Alexander.]

<sup>37</sup> I agree with Murray when he writes (*Greek Studies*, 142-43): "what Cassandra says must be true . . . Any dramatist putting Cassandra on the stage must so represent her [i.e. present her as seeing and speaking the truth but as not being believed]. Again, though gods in their private capacities are *capables de tout*, a god pronouncing judgement *ex cathedra* must be meant to carry weight . . . When Poseidon in the prologue describes the condition of Troy one believes him; one believes that the avenging storm is waiting for the Greeks on the Aegean."

<sup>38</sup> *Tro.* 357ff.

<sup>39</sup> *Tro.* 432ff.

<sup>40</sup> *Tro.* 969-1032.

With Helen's coming to Troy of her own free will, the destruction of Troy in the *Troades* becomes logically, at least, half Helen's deed and not wholly attributable to predestination. Furthermore, in the *Troades* what is stressed constantly and from many viewpoints is Helen's wickedness.<sup>41</sup> Not only is Helen, through statements emanating from different sources accused of being responsible for the ills which befell Trojans and Greeks, but Euripides has brought on the stage of the *Troades* a whole trial scene, which may well be styled "the obligatory scene" of the *Troades*, consisting of about two hundred lines, in which Helen defends herself, Hecuba accuses her, and Menelaus, as judge, passes sentence condemning Helen as having followed Alexander of her own free will — the correctness of his sentence, as we have seen, being guaranteed directly through Cassandra, who had said<sup>42</sup> that Helen followed Alexander of her own free will, and indirectly through Poseidon, who had said that Helen was justly — *ἐνδίκως* is the Greek word — included among the captives.<sup>43</sup>

That the speech of Hecuba (*Tro.* 969ff) against Helen represents, in fact, the artistic position of Euripides in the *Troades* seems a highly probable conclusion from the following rhetorical-logical considerations. Since Helen is the accused and Hecuba the accuser, the expected sequence of the speeches of the two women would have been, first, the speech of Hecuba propounding the accusations against Helen, and, second, the speech of Helen answering Hecuba. But this sequence did not fit the purpose of Euripides. If both speeches were to be rhetorically effective, but at the same time, if Euripides were to make Hecuba refute Helen clearly, Helen's speech ought not to be the last, that is, Helen ought not to be given the opportunity to argue against Hecuba's points but on the contrary Hecuba ought to argue against those raised by Helen. Indeed, Helen speaks first, arguing not against Hecuba's charges, but in defense of herself against what may be charged to her by her accusers at large, while Hecuba is given the opportunity to attack the specific arguments in Helen's defense. This arrangement of itself clearly demonstrates the concern of Euripides to make Hecuba win in the eyes of the spectator. Moreover, with an Athenian audience of 415 B.C. a rationalistic thesis was, *a priori*, likely to prevail over a mythological thesis. Thus Hecuba's rationalistic thesis is, *a priori*, more likely to reveal that Euripides is interested in presenting Hecuba prevailing over Helen. As if this were not enough, Euripides throws onto the scales in favor of Hecuba the

<sup>41</sup> *Tro.* 130-37; 766-73; 780-81; 890-94; 966-68; 1213-15.

<sup>42</sup> *Tro.* 373.

<sup>43</sup> *Tro.* 35.



patriotism of the Athenian audience. He first presents Helen arguing that Pallas Athena would have given Alexander power to lead the Phrygian army to Greece and make it desolate had he only been willing to proclaim her the fairest in the contest with Hera and Aphrodite (vv. 925–26). Then Euripides presents Hecuba answering Helen in defense of the honor of Pallas Athena, the guardian goddess of Athens, thus bringing to Hecuba's side not only rationality but also the patriotic feeling of the average Athenian spectator. Says Hecuba (vv. 969–74): "First, to defend the honor of the gods, and show / that the woman [= Helen] is a scandalous liar . . . / . . . the virgin Pallas Athene / would never be so silly and empty-headed / . . . [as to] let Athenians be the slaves of Troy." When Hecuba has reached the end of her speech, little, if anything, remains of Helen's arguments. The chorus says (1033–35): "Menelaus, keep the ancestral honor of your house. / Punish your wife, and purge away from Greece the stigma / on women. You shall seem great even to your enemies." Menelaus (1036–41) cannot but agree with what Hecuba has said, and Helen is presented as being able to do nothing further in her own defense but to embrace the knees of Menelaus and once more repeat in a sentence her argument, already advanced by her and refuted by Hecuba, that the gods are responsible for what she did — an argument indeed refuted proleptically before Hecuba's speech, indirectly by Poseidon (who had said that Helen is counted *rightly* among the captives [35]), and directly by Cassandra (who had stated that Helen followed Alexander *willingly*, 369–73). Note that after the Hecuba-Helen scene comes the scene in which Hecuba laments over the body of the dead Astyanax. The scene loses all its tender tragic pathos if Hecuba has unjustly condemned Helen as a liar, and if Hecuba, in the eyes of the audience, therefore appears as the vicious mother-in-law.<sup>44</sup> So far as I can see, Helen, in the *Troades*, is meant by Euripides to be seen as a completely corrupt and shameless person, like her daughter Hermione in the Euripidean *Andromache*. Attempts on the part of critics to save Helen in the *Troades* from such condemnation in order to maintain the tetralogic or trilogic unity

<sup>44</sup> Vellacott (16–20), who also is a proponent of the view that the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. form a "connected group," has argued just this, that in the *Troades* Hecuba is the jealous and vicious mother-in-law, while Helen is the superior human being, "the beauty which unites flesh and spirit indissolubly in an intelligent personality." Vellacott seems to me to have gone as far as one can go in misinterpreting the *Troades*. Friedrich (62–64) has also attempted to defend Helen, but only partially. Friedrich's mistake is to begin his analysis of the *Troades* with the assumption that the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. form a "connected" trilogy.

of the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. are illogical, arbitrary at best, and only result in making the *Troades* an inferior tragedy.

But while Helen is presented and condemned in the *Troades* as self-willed evil, in the *Alexander*, as far as one can say, she can only be thought of as the victim of superior powers: there exists a fragment of Euripides attributed by the great majority of scholars to the *Alexander*. It consists of two verses and is cited by Strabo,<sup>45</sup> who tells us that the two verses come from Euripides and explains, without identifying the play, that the verses make the voyage of Alexander to Sparta the work of Zeus. The verses read as follows:

Ζεὺς γὰρ κακὸν μὲν Τρωσί, πῆμα δ' Ἑλλάδι  
θέλων γενέσθαι ταῦτ' ἐβούλευσεν πατήρ,

"For father Zeus decided these things in his wish that evil befall the Trojans and suffering Greece." Since, in the *Alexander*, the βουλή of Zeus is not yet revealed to men by its results — Trojans and Greeks are still far from the Trojan war — it is obvious that these two verses in the *Alexander* must be uttered either by a prophet or by a god forecasting the Trojan war. The βουλή of Zeus in the aforementioned two verses (cf. ἐβούλευσεν) becomes more intelligible as the cause of the war between Trojans and Greeks in the light of the βουλή of Zeus in the *Κύπρια*, where<sup>46</sup> Zeus decided to create a great war to relieve the earth from its dense population (and achieved it in the well-known sequence of events: the apple of ἔρις, the contest of beauty between Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite with Alexander as judge, the voyage of Alexander to Sparta, his return to Troy with Helen as his wife, and the war of the Greeks against the Trojans, which ended with the destruction of Troy). The βουλή of Zeus has, of course, the power of predestination and should be fulfilled. Consequently, in the frame of this βουλή we can hardly imagine that Helen is given free choice to follow or not follow Alexander, and so a free choice to thwart the βουλή of Zeus. Clearly, the question whether Helen follows Alexander willingly or unwillingly is meaningless in a play where the βουλή of Zeus has decided what should happen. It should be noted that, by contrast, Euripides in the *Troades*, in order to project the moral significance of the fact that Helen came to Troy of her own free will, extricates Helen's coming to Troy from divine βουλή: Hecuba's rationalistic attack against Helen denies that Aphrodite came

<sup>45</sup> Strabo 4.1.7. For the connection between this fragment with the *Alexander* see, among others, Snell, 55, and Jouan, 135.

<sup>46</sup> Allen, 117-118 [= *Cypria* fr. I].

to Sparta with Alexander and that the contest of beauty between the three goddesses was made for a serious purpose — the three goddesses, Hecuba argues, came “for sport . . . and mirth in beauty’s strife to Ida.”<sup>47</sup>

The spirit of the aforementioned fragment from Strabo is also parallel to the spirit of another fragment preserved for us in Latin<sup>48</sup> which scholars trace back to the Euripidean *Alexander* (assuming Ennius as translator or paraphraser of the original Greek). This fragment comes from Cic. *Div.* I.50.114 and presents Cassandra saying: *eheu videte: / iudicavit inclitum iudicium inter deas tris aliquis: / quo iudicio Lacedaemonia mulier, furiarum una adveniet, / “alas! look! someone judged [= will judge?] the famous contest between three goddesses: by means of which judgement a Lacedaemonian woman, one of the furies, will arrive.”* Here the arrival of Helen appears as a result of the judgment of Paris; and this leads far more naturally to a Helen who comes to Troy because superior powers have so decided than to a Helen who comes to Troy of her own free will. If either the fragment from Plutarch or the fragment from Cicero, or both fragments, go back to Euripides’ *Alexander*, the persona of Helen in the *Alexander* and the persona of Helen in the *Troades* blatantly contradict each other.<sup>49</sup> In the *Alexander* (mythological thought) Helen is to follow Paris as a result of Aphrodite’s promise that if he proclaimed her as the fairest among the three goddesses he would receive for himself the fairest among women (which makes Helen a tool of divine will traceable through the will of Aphrodite back to the will of Zeus), while in the *Troades* the judgment of Paris is not a consequential matter but innocent merry-making<sup>50</sup> having little to do with Helen’s following Paris — she followed him of her own free will.

<sup>47</sup> *Tro.* 975–76.

<sup>48</sup> Snell, 7.

<sup>49</sup> Even if it were to be proved that neither of the two fragments belonged to the *Alexander*, still I would insist that in a play where predestination exclusively or predominantly frames the action (and it is highly improbable to argue that this is not the case in the *Alexander*), Helen is far more likely to be heralded (or understood) as coming to Troy because of predestination than because of her own free will.

<sup>50</sup> If we put a period after *ποτε* (v. 975) and a question mark after v. 976, we make Hecuba deny that the goddesses ever came to Ida in beauty’s contest and therefore that this contest ever took place. This punctuation is suggested by the ancient scholiast (*Scholia in Euripidem*, ed. E. Schwartz, II (Berlin 1891), who writes: ἀνοίκειον τοῦτο τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. ἔδει γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀγεῖν \*\* καὶ μὴ εἰπεῖν ὅτι παίζουσαι ἦλθον εἰς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους ἔριν . . . δύναται δὲ καὶ καθ’ ὑπόκρισιν ἐρωτηματικῶς ἀκούεσθαι αἱ παιδίαῖς καὶ τρυφῇ ἦλθον εἰς Ἰδην; [οὐκ ἦλθον] οὐ δῆτα· ὥστε εἶναι πάντων τῶν προειρημένων ἀναιρετικόν. τὸν γὰρ ἐναντίον λόγον χειρίζουσα ὀφείλει ἀναιρεῖν ἐκεῖνα. Lattimore (punctuating ἐρωτηματικῶς) translates 971–77: “Hera and the virgin



In the *Troades* we have not only a shift of interest from Alexander to Helen, and from predestination to freedom of will, but also another shift, no less important, from predestination to the evaluation of the Trojan war as such. The futility of the evaluation of the Trojan war not only manifests itself from the prologue of the *Troades*, where announcement is made of the impending drowning on a large scale of the victorious Greeks during their voyage back to Greece, but this futility is systematically analyzed in the Cassandra scene, where the inspired prophetess concludes that in an overall estimate of what was lost and what gained from the Trojan war by the Greeks and the Trojans, respectively, the Trojans, the conquered, should be thought of as more blessed than the Greeks, the conquerors.<sup>51</sup> Again, all this becomes wholly irrelevant and drastically confusing if the *Troades* is to be understood in the spirit of the *Alexander*.

Murray has also argued that the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. are likely to have been connected, because in Murray's opinion Euripides produced the *Troades* as a kind of protest for what had recently happened to the Melians. He writes:

During the summer and winter of 416 B.C. there occurred an event of very small military importance, to which nevertheless Thucydides devotes twenty-six continuous chapters in a significant part of his work — the part just before the opening of the final catastrophe. The event was the unprovoked siege and capture of the little island of Melos, a neutral in the war, the massacre of all its adult men and the enslavement of its women and children . . . If the massacre of Melos made such an effect . . . if the *Troades* marks a turning point in the thought of Euripides and his relations with his fellow citizens, this [i.e. to assume that the *Troades* is not connected with the *Alexander* and the *Palamedes*] would seem curious. It would be odd to make one play of the tetralogy a great profession of faith and the other three mere pieces of entertainment.<sup>52</sup>

But, to begin with, no one knows whether or not Euripides favored what happened in Melos. To say that Euripides, contrary to the feelings of most of his compatriots, could not endorse what happened

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Pallas Athene / could never be so silly and empty-headed / that Hera would sell Argos to the barbarians, / or Pallas let Athenians be the slaves of Troy. / They went to Ida in girlish emulation, vain / of their own loveliness? Why? Tell me the reason Hera / should fall so much in love with the idea of beauty." Of course, with such punctuation Helen in the *Alexander* and Helen in the *Troades* (indeed, the *Alexander* and the *Troades* as a whole) diverge even further.

<sup>51</sup> *Tro.* 365ff.

<sup>52</sup> Murray, "The Trojan Trilogy," 645-46.

in Melos is an instance of arbitrary idealization of the man Euripides. But regardless of how much Euripides lamented, rejoiced at, or remained indifferent to the events at Melos, it becomes crystal clear from the text of the *Troades* that Euripides, in that play, has nothing to say about the Melians. Consider this: if we are to see the defeated Melians in the *Troades*, then the Melians must be identified with the defeated Trojans. It was the Athenians who destroyed the Melians, the latter being Dorians. But in the *Troades* the chorus of the *Troades* sings (207-13):

Might I only be taken to Athens, domain  
of Theseus, the bright, the blessed!  
Never to the whirl of Eurotas, not Sparta  
detested, who gave us Helen,  
not look with slave's eyes on the scourge  
of Troy, Menelaus.

Are the Melians wishing to pass their days of slavery among the Athenians rather than among the Dorian Lacedaemonians? Further, if we identify the Trojans with the Melians, what is the meaning of such verses as 799ff, where the chorus sings the encomium of Salamis and Athens? Are the Melians eulogizing Athens? And how are we to interpret the intensified hatred of the Troades (= Melians) against Helen and Menelaus, the latter two standing for the Dorian Lacedaemonians? And may I add that neither in the prologue of the *Troades* — where the shores of Myconos, the Delian reefs, Scyros and Lemnos, and the Capherean cliffs are mentioned as destined to receive the drowned bodies of the Greeks — nor elsewhere in the *Troades*, where names of various places are given, do we hear any mention of Melos and the Melians.

The only possible contemporary political overtones in the play are its general eulogy of Athens and its attack on Sparta through the persona of Helen (and to some degree of Menelaus).<sup>53</sup>

<sup>53</sup> The view that in the *Troades* Euripides refers to the destruction of Melos by the Athenians has been widely propagated up to the present time. Some go even further in investing the play with political allusions. They suggest that, with the wrecking of the Greek fleet announced in the prologue of the *Troades*, Euripides prophesies the Sicilian disaster! Many even thought that in the trilogy of 415 B.C. Alexander represents Alcibiades. And some in their enthusiasm for political allusions went so far as to suggest that Helen represents Alcibiades! Briefly speaking, all of these theories at best seem to me to be idle speculations. I do not see how one can argue intelligently that Euripides in 415 B.C. was not one of the adherents of Alcibiades' foreign policies, for at least the years 416-415, as were most of the Athenians at that time. True, in the

Murray further attempted to unite the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. on the following grounds:

Diogenes the Cynic, when he was asked his ultimate purpose in life . . . replied *παράχαρττειν τὸ νόμισμα* "to deface, or restamp, the coinage." He meant to deface all the images and superstitions upon all the *nomismata* — the word of course means "conventions" as well as "coins" — because all the labels of the world are wrong. So in the *Troades* one finds a kind of tragic *paracharaxis*, showing how the things called good are those that should be called evil, the things pursued those that should be fled from, and all the superscriptions false. . . . The *paracharaxis* [in the *Palamedes*] is clear. The wicked man is he whom the world trusts and calls wise, the innocent he whom the world condemns and kills. Also the benefactor of mankind is slain by men because of his benefits and through his benefits.<sup>54</sup>

Murray grants that in the *Alexander*, if read by itself, there is not much of *paracharaxis* but, he adds, the *paracharaxis* appears if we read the *Alexander* in connection with the *Troades*, for then we realize that in the *Alexander* "the thing that seemed victory was really defeat; what seemed the averting of evil was the rejection of salvation; the thing beloved was the thing to be loathed, and the brave and young and

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*Frogs* (1427–29) Euripides is presented as entertaining unfriendly sentiments toward Alcibiades. But (assuming that this has a historical basis and is not a comic product) the *Frogs* were presented in 405, not in 415. Let us not forget that Plutarch (*Alc.* 11) tells us that Euripides wrote an *epinicion* in honor of Alcibiades (in 416 B.C.?, see Schmid-Stählin 324) which the "pacifists" have failed to prove a forgery, not to mention that, if *Electra* was produced in 413 B.C., the words of Castor (*El.* 1347–56) offer excellent grounds for arguing that Euripides, at least down to the city Dionysia of 413 B.C., approved of the Sicilian expedition, or at least was not willing to denounce it publicly. *Troades* 223, where the Sicilians are presented as victors in the games (*καρύσσεσθαι στεφάνους ἀρετῆς*), need not imply that the Sicilians will defeat the Athenians, but that the Sicilians will defeat their enemies. Who are their enemies? Athenian propaganda would certainly deny that the enemies of Sicily are the Athenians. These enemies must be the antidemocratic and pro-Spartan element of Sicily. We should not forget that the Segestans (and the Leontines) had only recently invited the Athenians to come to Sicily as their defenders and that Segestan ambassadors were possibly sitting in the theatre when the Euripidean plays were performed, all the more identifying themselves with the suffering Trojans, since the Segestans were supposedly the descendants of Trojans (see Thuc. 6.2). Surely, from an Athenian viewpoint prevailing in the Theater of Dionysus at Athens in 415 B.C., those Sicilians whose victorious *ἀρετή* is celebrated by the herald in the public games cannot be but the "good" Sicilians, the pro-Athenian Sicilians (as pro-Athenian as the chorus of the *Troades*).

<sup>54</sup> Murray, "The Trojan Trilogy," 645ff; see also Murray, *Greek Studies*, 127ff.



beautiful prince was the embodied curse of the land.”<sup>55</sup> As for the satyr play, Murray does not tell us where its *paracharaxis* lies, adding only that it “suits the tone of our tetralogy” (perhaps in the sense that it also involves deceit, the stealing of the horses).<sup>56</sup> It is not difficult to see where the weakness in Murray’s argument lies. His concept of tragic *paracharaxis* has such vast application that it can be used in one sense or another of almost every tragedy through the ages (whether it be a tragedy of frustration, where the *paracharaxis* is pessimistic, turning what was thought to be value into non-value, or a tragedy of accomplishment, where the *paracharaxis* is optimistic, turning what seemed non-value into value). If this is the case, *paracharaxis tragica* by itself may provide a link connecting the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C., but in reality that link is scarcely more helpful or precise than the one provided by the simple fact that all four plays are dramas.

Parmentier and Gregoire argue for the dramatic unity of the three tragedies on the grounds that one takes place before, one during, and one after the Trojan war, and that all three can be classified further as plays dealing with the Trojan war itself.<sup>57</sup> And yet the sequence *A(lexander)*, *P(alamedes)*, *T(roades)* may very well be the result of an alphabetical arrangement of the three tragedies (in which arrangement the time sequence would be accidental). To go no further than Euripides, let us not forget that the nine Euripidean plays without *scholia*, found on *cod. L*, clearly suggest an Alexandrian alphabetical (more accurately quasi-alphabetical) edition,<sup>58</sup> and that in addition to ancient lists of the plays of Euripides arranged alphabetically, a papyrus with Euripidean hypotheses published recently (*P. Oxy.* 2455–56 of the second century A.D.) was also arranged alphabetically by titles. But even if we knew that the arrangement *Alexander*, *Palamedes*, *Troades*, represents the sequence of the 415 B.C. performance as Euripides himself wished it, such knowledge would not establish that the three tragedies are connected. Suppose that we were to have a theater production of the Sophoclean *Antigone*, *Oedipus the King*, and *Oedipus at Colonus* in one sequence. We know that these plays were not meant by Sophocles to form a “connected” trilogy. Not only was *Antigone* produced about a dozen years before *Oedipus the King*, and *Oedipus the King* almost three decades before *Oedipus at Colonus*, but, to mention only one essential contradiction among these three plays, the persona of Creon

<sup>55</sup> Murray, “The Trojan Trilogy,” 650.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 655 [= Murray, *Greek Studies*, 142].

<sup>57</sup> Parmentier-Gregoire, 3ff.

<sup>58</sup> Barrett, 5off.

in each of them is unique, in no way resembling the character in the other two plays. And yet, if the three tragedies were to be performed together and the most meaningful sequence in performing them were sought for a general public, what would have been more attractive than to present them in the time sequence of the Theban myth: first, *Oedipus the King*, second, *Oedipus at Colonus*, and third, *Antigone*, even though the three plays were not written to be a "connected" trilogy? Similarly, Euripides could in 415 B.C. arrange his plays in the time sequence of the Trojan myth, *Alexander*, *Palamedes*, *Troades*, even though these three tragedies were not to be understood as a "connected" trilogy. As for the fact that the three Euripidean tragedies of 415 B.C. belong to the saga of the Trojan war, we must not forget that the Trojan war is an extremely broad link, only more precise than such general topics as "Greek mythology," and so of little practical value in arguing for a "connected" trilogy. This is all the more true since Euripides wrote a considerable number of plays directly connected with the Trojan war,<sup>59</sup> and consequently a Euripidean tetralogy containing three plays dealing with the Trojan war may be due to the frequency with which Euripides used this subject rather than to his interest in producing a "connected" trilogy on this subject.

To perceive in practical terms how very weak are the arguments based on a loose time sequence and on the Trojan war as thematic link, consider the following: the *Alexander* by Sophocles,<sup>60</sup> the *Palamedes* by Aeschylus,<sup>61</sup> the *Troades* by Euripides, no matter how wholly "unconnected," if arranged in this sequence would nonetheless exhibit the same sequence of time, much the same general thematic unity, and consequently as much trilogic unity — according to the criteria applied by Parmentier-Gregoire — as the three Euripidean tragedies of 415 B.C. in their sequence — *Alexander*, *Palamedes*, *Troades*.<sup>62</sup> I should, of course, add in view of the argument that the connection exists not only for these three tragedies but for all four plays (e.g.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *Alexander*, *Cyclops*, *Epeus*, *Hecuba*, *Helen*, *Iphigenia in Aul.*, *Palamedes*, *Protesilaus*, *Philoctetes*, *Rhesus* (whether or not the extant *Rhesus* is by Euripides), *Scyrians*, *Telephus*, *Troades*; to which may also be added *Andromache*, *Oeneus*, and *Orestes*.

<sup>60</sup> See TGF 150-51.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 59-60.

<sup>62</sup> Similar unity is achieved if — to limit ourselves to Euripidean tragedies — we form triadic combinations in proper time sequence between such plays as *Alexander*, *Hecuba*, *Helen*, *Iphigenia in Aul.*, *Philoctetes*, *Protesilaus*, *Rhesus*, *Telephus*, *Troades* (e.g. *Alexander*, *Protesilaus*, *Troades* or *Alexander*, *Rhesus*, *Hecuba* or *Alexander*, *Troades*, *Helen* etc.).

Murray, and, as we shall see, Webster) that neither the time sequence nor the argument of the Trojan saga affords any possibility of a connecting link, since the events in the *Sisyphus*, the satyr play, must precede in time the Trojan plays and, most probably, almost certainly, must be outside the Trojan saga.

Webster at first seems to premise the unity of the *Alexander*, the *Palamedes*, and the *Troades* on the basis of a more or less common Euripidean pattern of trilogic (tetralogic) variations: recognition play, camp-play (or variant of the camp-play), play about an ill-treated woman (or women), play about a good woman, a resistance play.<sup>63</sup>

This pattern of variation, according to Webster, manifests itself in the following groups:

*Cretan Women* = "play about a bad woman"

*Alcmeon in Psophis* = "play about an ill-treated woman"

*Telephus* = "camp-play"

*Alcestis* = "play about a good woman"

*Medea* = "play about a bad woman"

*Philoctetes* = "variant of a camp-play"

*Dictys* = "play about an ill-treated woman"

*Alcmeon in Corinth* = "recognition play"

*Iphigenia in Aulis* = "variant of the camp-play"

*Bacchae* = "resistance play"

*Alexander* = "recognition play"

*Palamedes* = "camp-play"

*Troades* = "play about ill-treated women"

But the constituents of this variation are too broad to be meaningful. If the *Medea* is only a play about "a bad woman" and the *Alcestis* only a play about "a good woman," then in these two categories we can classify all tragedies where the protagonist is a woman, since, over-all, a woman may be said to be either "good" or "bad." Similarly, in a tragedy where the protagonist is a woman, the chances are *a priori* that this woman in one sense or another is ill-treated. Consequently,

<sup>63</sup> Webster, "Euripides' Trojan Trilogy," 207-8. As I understand, Webster did not argue that such trilogies or tetralogies should necessarily be understood as forming "connected" trilogies but rather as conforming to a principle that conjoins three tragedies or three tragedies plus a satyr play on the basis of an existing pattern of limited thematic variations and not on the basis of any chance variations.



the classification of the *Dictys* as "a play about an ill-treated woman," and of the *Troades* as "a play about ill-treated women," is again too broad to mean anything. Notice also that while Webster needs a pattern to present only a trilogic unit, he nonetheless is forced to use not three but seven classifying entries.

Observe now that although Webster has introduced such extremely broad classifying entries — and he had to classify only thirteen plays (one tetralogy and three trilogies) — he fails to reduce these few plays to a rigid pattern with respect to their sequence. Thus the first trilogic play twice concerns "a bad woman" (*Cretan Women* and *Medea*), and twice a "recognition play" (*Alcmeon in Corinth* and *Alexander*). The second trilogic play is once "about ill-treated women" (*Alcmeon in Psophis*), once a "camp-play" (*Palamedes*), twice a "variant of a camp-play" (*Philoctetes*, *Iphigenia in Aulis*). The third trilogic play is once about "a camp-play" (*Telephus*), once about "an ill-treated woman" (*Dictys*), once about "ill-treated women" (*Troades*), and once a "resistance play" (*Bacchae*). Taking into account, then, that (1) Webster's classifying entries are too broad, (2) he has only about a dozen plays to classify, and (3) he fails to produce a classification involving a rigid trilogic pattern, we must conclude that he imposes *a posteriori* on Euripides a loose variation of trilogic pattern which Euripides never intended.

Webster also suggests links between the *Alexander* and the *Troades* on such grounds as the following:<sup>64</sup> In the *Troades*

Kassandra dances out of the tent like a maenad brandishing torches, singing her own wedding song. We have seen her enter like this before in the *Alexandros*, when she prophesied the fall of Troy and no one believed her . . . Andromache comes with the baby Astyanax, and again the *Alexandros* comes to mind: Hektor was the generous, magnanimous prince there, who accepted defeat in the games and wanted the young herdsman to have his prize . . . Hecabe's lament for her baby grandson becomes even more poignant, when we remember that we first saw her in inconsolable tears for her lost baby, Paris.

What Webster here utilizes as links, he still must prove actually are links. He must prove, for example, that Cassandra in the *Troades* is the same Cassandra as in the *Alexander* and not merely the Cassandra who belongs in the *Troades* by virtue of mythology.<sup>65</sup> Webster seems

<sup>64</sup> Webster, "Euripides' Trojan Trilogy," 210-11.

<sup>65</sup> The reader should be cautioned here against assuming that, though Cassandra in the *Troades* does not appear in connection with what she said or did in the *Alexander*, nevertheless Euripides expected the Athenian audience

to overlook completely that not a word in the *Troades* refers to the prophecies of Cassandra in the *Alexander*, or to anything whatever that Cassandra did or said in the *Alexander*. Similarly, he overlooks the fact that in the *Troades* we never hear of anything Hector did or said in the *Alexander* and, what is more, that in the *Troades* the person held responsible for the death of Astyanax is Helen, not Paris or Hector.<sup>66</sup>

Webster tried also to achieve a connection between the three Euripidean tragedies and the satyr play of 415 B.C. by reminding us that "Sisyphos was the reputed father of Odysseus, who had a major part [as prosecutor] in the *Palamedes* and contrived the death of Astyanax in the *Trojan Women*."<sup>67</sup> The connection Webster tried to make, however, is very tenuous on close inspection. In the *Troades* (and in what we also have preserved from the *Palamedes*) there is no mention whatever of Odysseus as son of Sisyphus; nor can it be plausibly argued that in the *Sisyphus* this crafty Corinthian king was introduced as the father of Odysseus. (The reputed affair between Sisyphus and Anticlea, the mother of Odysseus, may not even have been alluded to in the *Sisyphus*, since the plot of this satyr play, as restored by Murray, deals with the stealing of the horses of Lycurgus from Heracles by Sisyphus, a subject which hardly makes relevant the question of whether Sisyphus was or was not the lover of Anticlea.)

But let us assume that, in the *Palamedes* and in the *Sisyphus*, Odysseus was mentioned as the son of Sisyphus. Does that offer any reason for speaking of "connected" tetralogy? If our only extant complete satyr drama, the *Cyclops* of Euripides (where Odysseus plays a major part), had been wrongly assigned by tradition as the satyr play performed

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of 415 B.C. to understand Cassandra in the *Troades* as continuing Cassandra of the *Alexander* on the ground that the performance of the *Alexander* preceded the performance of the *Troades*, i.e. on psychological grounds. Pickard-Cambridge (81) states: "[Sophocles] certainly presented, as a rule, four independent plays. So, as a rule, did Euripides." This view (which, I may add, represents the philological consensus) being correct, it becomes obvious that ancient audiences would *a priori* expect from Sophocles and Euripides, on the basis of the usual practice of these authors, a nonconnected trilogy and a nonconnected tetralogy. Such an audience, then, was *a priori* prone to interpret "links" between plays as accidental and only under the force of sufficient reason, *a posteriori*, to conclude occasionally that a given trilogy or tetralogy by Euripides or Sophocles was "connected." It follows that the audience of 415 B.C. should be thought of as psychologically predisposed to view the four plays by Euripides as independent rather than as "connected."

<sup>66</sup> *Tro.* 1213-15.

<sup>67</sup> Webster, *The Tragedies of Euripides*, 165.

after the *Troades*, Webster may have argued that Euripides, through the crafty Odysseus in the *Cyclops*, aimed at a "connected" tetralogy. Indeed, the application of Webster's "links" gives one ample ammunition for defending "connections" between the *Cyclops* and the trilogy of 415 B.C. In the *Cyclops*, not only do we hear of the destruction of Troy, of Helen, of the house of the Priamids, of Alexander, of Menelaus, of Poseidon, of Athena, but in addition the pastoral atmosphere in the *Cyclops* affords an impressive tie with the pastoral atmosphere of the *Alexander* (in the latter play, as we have seen, not only did Alexander appear as herdsman but there was also a second *chorus*, a *parachoregema*, consisting of herdsmen). The reference to the tongue of Odysseus in the *Cyclops* (314-15) may be taken to constitute a flashback to Odysseus as prosecutor in the *Palamedes* and as the villain convincing the Greeks to sacrifice Astyanax in the *Troades*. The appearance of the satyrs as "slaves" brings to mind the "slaves" of the *Troades*. The murder of the followers of Odysseus by Cyclops reminds us of the murders in the *Palamedes* and the *Troades*. The fact that the Greeks are at first the victims of Cyclops, but that the situation then reverses itself and Cyclops becomes the victim of the Greeks, is in spirit parallel to the reversals seen in the trilogy; and even the prophecy concerning the torch-baby Alexander which is fulfilled in the *Troades* finds a parallel in the prophecy found at the end of the *Cyclops* (696-700). And given the irresistible fascination that ring composition exercises on contemporary literary critics, one might easily conclude that the *Cyclops* closes the trilogy with a ring because it comprises elements found in the preceding three tragedies! And yet we know that the *Cyclops* has nothing to do with the *Alexander*, the *Palamedes*, or the *Troades*. I may add here that to consider Odysseus in the *Palamedes* and Odysseus in the *Troades* as one and the same person in the sense of a psychological *continuum* of one character amounts to making an absolutely arbitrary assumption. As in the case of Cassandra, what we hear about Odysseus in the *Troades* is never connected with what Odysseus said or did in the *Palamedes*.

Here I wish to raise the question as to whether such "links" as divined by those who argued that the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. are "connected," have any place in the aesthetic reality sustaining a pre-Alexandrian tragic poet and his audience.

With regard to extant evidence, the term *τετραλογία* may occur first in Aristotle, but this is not certain. The scholiast on Aristophanes' *Birds* 282 mentions the *Pandionis* tetralogy by the poet Philocles, *τῇ Πανδιονίδι τετραλογίᾳ*, and continues with the information that this



tetralogy was recorded in Aristotle's *Didaskaliai*, ἣν (sc. τετραλογίαν) καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ταῖς Διδασκαλίαις ἀναγράφει. The word τετραλογία is used by the scholiast but does not necessarily belong to the text of Aristotle. Indeed, as Pickard-Cambridge observes,<sup>68</sup> it is even questionable whether Aristotle used the collective title *Pandionis*. Aristotle in his text may simply have given the titles of the four dramas by Philocles, but the Aristophanic commentator chose to refer to the four plays in an abbreviated manner with the collective *Pandionis*, which may also have been the usual way in which reference to this tetralogy was made at the time of the scholiast. For the word *τριλογία* we possess no testimony earlier than the Alexandrian Grammarians (Aristarchus and Apollonius — *schol.* Aristophanes *Ran.* 1155).

It is logical to assume that a pre-Alexandrian Greek, if asked, could distinguish a "connected" trilogy (say Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, *Choephoroi*, *Eumenides*) from an "unconnected" one (say Xenocles' *Oedipus*, *Lycaon*, *Bacchae*). But the extant evidence points to the conclusion that interest in questions about "connected" trilogy or tetralogy was limited. It does not seem accidental that although Aristotle, in his *Poetics*, has so much to say about the structure of a tragedy, he has not a sentence about the structure of a trilogy or tetralogy. In all likelihood, for him and his contemporaries, questions of unity were mainly pertinent to a drama but not to groups of dramas. It is the tragedy which mainly (or even exclusively) forms a logical esthetic *holon*, a unity which has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It is probably for this reason that in his *Poetics* Aristotle sees not only the *desis* and *lysis* (the complication and unraveling of the tragic plot), but also the *catharsis*, always in connection with a single play and never with reference to the tetralogic or trilogic *holon* to which this single play belongs.

For fifth- and fourth-century Greece one can speak in terms of two broad dramatic unities: the play, and, in the case of "connected" groups, the tetralogy or trilogy to which this play belongs (whether in those centuries the words τετραλογία and τριλογία were or were not used). What is important, however, is that not only for Aristotle but, so far as our evidence goes, also for the Greeks up to at least Aristotle's death, interest in the second dramatic unity, the tetralogical-trilogical, is minimal and at its best a side issue in aesthetics. I have already referred to the *Poetics* of Aristotle, I may now add that neither from pre-Alexandrian inscriptions recording dramatic victories nor from

<sup>68</sup> Pickard-Cambridge, 80 n. 5.

fifth- and fourth-century Greek authors generally is there any evidence showing an active interest in questions pertaining to "connected" tetralogies or trilogies. Also, consider the following: (1) The only "connected" trilogy which has come down to us in its entirety is the Aeschylean *Oresteia*. Here, each of the three tragedies, the *Agamemnon*, the *Choephoroi*, and *Eumenides*, can be acted alone as an independent play. Similar independence is obvious in all the other plays of Aeschylus preserved for us, of which at least the *Seven Against Thebes* and the *Suppliants* belonged to "connected" trilogies. This indirectly shows that the important unity in the mind of the poet is that of the individual play *even in case of an obviously "connected" group*, for even here the individual play is written in such a way that its independence in form and thought is fully guaranteed. (2) Speaking in particular of Euripides, I wish to emphasize that in the relatively bulky ancient *scholia* referring to nine extant Euripidean plays (one of which is the *Troades*!), we find not a single *scholion* displaying a vestige of interest in trilogic or tetralogic "unity" in Euripides. What is more important, so far as we can tell, there is no evidence in the whole of Graeco-Roman antiquity for anyone ever arguing that Euripides wrote a "connected" tetralogy or trilogy.

If, then, extant evidence establishes as probable that, in general, the interest in "connected" tetralogies and "connected" trilogies was a side issue in aesthetics for the pre-Alexandrian Greeks, and was completely lacking in the whole of antiquity for Euripides, it becomes highly improbable that any Greek of c. 415 B.C. would ever have gone so far as to apply the far-fetched "links" of Murray and of those who follow him to join the *Alexander*, the *Palamedes*, the *Troades* and the *Sisyphus* into either a "connected" tetralogy or "connected" trilogy. It seems to me that Murray and his followers here adopt a typically un-Greek attitude.

We may now, with some epistemological perspicuity, arrange the points which we have advanced against the view that the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. form a "connected" tetralogy or "connected" trilogy, and then draw our conclusions.

One could hardly put together a number of things and then be wholly unable to find some sort of link between them. Socrates, Napoleon, and Beethoven form a *holon* if, for example, I remind myself that they are *men*. If next to them I add a sparrow, I again can form a *holon* by recognizing that the four are *animals*. If to them I add an oak-tree, I can once more form a *holon* by realizing that the five are organisms. If to them I add the moon, I shall again form a *holon* by reminding

myself that the six are bodies; and, if I happen to believe in spirit as something nonmaterial and thus opposed to the six aforementioned bodies, I shall again have no difficulty in forming a *holon*, if, for example, to the aforementioned six bodies I add the Holy Ghost, for the seven unite as soon as I predicate them as *substances*.

Let me give another example. If one opens a book written in English, selects two words at random from two different pages, and determines to establish "links" between these two words, he will certainly find no great difficulty achieving his goal. To begin with, both words are English words. But, further than that, they may have the same number of syllables, they may have the same number of letters, they may belong to the same part of speech (they may both be verbs or adjectives, and so on), they may have the same case or number or tense or mood, or person, they may begin with the same letter, they may end with the same letter, the one may begin and the other end with the same letter (e.g. rock-mother), they may both begin or both end, or one may begin and the other end with consecutive letters of the alphabet (e.g. mix-night, or sum-moon, or mug-balloon); they may contain a number of identical letters, they may rhyme, they may be synonyms, they may be antonyms, they may be homonyms, they may convey a happy or sad meaning, they may . . . they may . . . endlessly. The result is that one cannot possibly offer two words chosen by chance which will be absolutely unlinked, since there will always be a viewpoint, and almost certainly more than one viewpoint, which will establish a relation between these words. But of course all these "links" between these two words are accidental and have nothing to do with the intention of the author of the book from which the two words are taken.

It is likewise obvious that if we take any group of dramas and wish to find "links" among them so as to argue for a unity, we shall have no difficulty finding such links, especially where, as in the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C., the plays not only are written by the same author, but also belong to the same period of the author's development (and so have their roots in the conscious, subconscious, and unconscious mind of the poet Euripides in c. 415 B.C.). To establish such links we simply have to keep changing viewpoint, and each time register the link produced by an applied viewpoint. Since the viewpoints from which two or more dramas can be viewed are practically endless, it is anything but surprising if *a posteriori* we end with long catalogues of "links" of this or that sort between these tragedies. Of such type and value are the "links produced by Murray and his followers.

Hence, if we wish to say something more intelligent than that the



Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. form a "connected" tetralogy or "connected" trilogy of the type which may always be achieved out of any chance three tragedies plus a satyr drama, or any three tragedies through the utilization of subtle "links," then it is time to make clear what "connection" and "connected" must mean versus "non-connection" and "unconnected." I am inclined to believe that Murray and his followers confused themselves and others by their failure to define the "connected" versus the "unconnected," and then predicated the Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. as "connected."

Suppose that no testimony existed to inform us that the *Alexander*, the *Palamedes*, the *Troades*, and the *Sisyphus* were performed together in the Great Dionysia of 415 B.C., but that we knew only that these four pieces were written by Euripides and that the *Alexander*, the *Palamedes*, and the *Troades* were tragedies, while the *Sisyphus* was a satyr play. Under such circumstances, would any one ever have concluded that the *Alexander*, the *Palamedes*, the *Troades*, and the *Sisyphus* must form a "connected" trilogy or "connected" tetralogy? If the honest answer to this question is no, it is obvious that those who see in these plays a "connected" trilogy or a "connected" tetralogy, reach this conclusion fallaciously, not via the content and form of these four plays per se, but via the information that these plays were performed together in the Great Dionysia of 415 B.C. If an ancient grammarian had mistakenly told us that, for example, the *Alexander*, the *Troades*, the *Helen*, and the *Epeus*, and so on, were performed in the Great Dionysia of 415 B.C., on the basis of this information and utilizing such "links" as those employed by Murray and his followers, one could have argued at least equally well that such a group of plays were "connected!"

Assume now that the Aeschylean *Agamemnon*, *Choephoroi*, and *Eumenides* had reached us without the information that they were acted together. Would anyone have hesitated to place these three tragedies together and proclaim them a "connected" trilogy? It is clear, then, that we can speak of "connected" plays if they are "stamped,"<sup>69</sup> so to speak, in such an idiosyncratic way that the average man

<sup>69</sup> I use the word "stamped" to indicate metaphorically any connection, significant and evident to the mind of the average man, between three tragedies or three tragedies plus a satyr drama in the area of their form and meaning to the effect that, in the judgment of the same average man, no play of the group can be substituted by another extant play (unless written with the purpose of fitting into the group) without seriously damaging the aesthetic (under which I also understand the logical) relation of the parts into a *holon*.

would recognize that they must stand together as a unit. For if we reject this norm and instead allow subtler "links" to operate, we drift into subjective criticism and into a situation of utter confusion, where no dividing line between "connected" and "unconnected" can be drawn, and where any chance three tragedies plus a satyr play might pass for a "connected" trilogy or "connected" tetralogy.

My final conclusion: Beginning with Aelians's information that the *Alexander* and the *Troades* were performed together, but not paying due attention to the fact that the intellectual atmosphere and purpose of the *Alexander* differ widely from those of the *Troades*, without admitting that the *Palamedes* obstructs the transition from the *Alexander* to the *Troades*, and, finally, without evaluating the obvious possibility that general elements shared in common by the *Alexander* and the *Troades* may be due to the fact that both plays derive from the same legend, Murray and his followers forced the conclusion that the *Troades* presents what the *Alexander* left out. This led to the hypothesis that Euripides, in 415 B.C., presented "connected" plays. The easy and fallacious application of far-fetched "links" then made possible an insubstantial connection between these two plays and the *Palamedes*. Some stopped here, arguing only for a connected trilogy. Others, however, following Murray, went further and effected a "connected" tetralogy even at the expense of making Euripides and his audience of 415 B.C. think like one putting together a *surrealistic collage*! If the term "connected" is to be distinguished from the term "unconnected" and not comprise the "unconnected" as well and so to become a meaningless term capable of application to any chance three tragedies or any chance three tragedies plus a chance satyr drama, then beyond reasonable doubt the four Euripidean plays of 415 B.C. cannot form either a "connected" trilogy or a "connected" tetralogy.

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS (BOSTON)

#### APPENDIX

There are a few passages in the *Troades* which *prima facie* may suggest a coordination in thought between the *Alexander* and the *Troades*. A more careful examination, however, will show that the said coordination is wholly unguaranteed. These passages are the following:

(A) *Tro.* 595–600. “*Hecuba*: O sorrowful, such is our fortune; *Andromache*: lost our city. *Hecuba*: and our pain lies deep under pain piled over. *Andromache*: We are the hated of God, since once your youngest escaping / death, brought down Troy’s towers in the arms of a worthless woman, / piling at the feet of Pallas the bleeding bodies of our young men / sprawled, kites’ food, while Troy take up the yoke of captivity.” One could first observe that the above passage, concerning the deliverance of Alexander from Hades, need not necessarily presuppose the exposure of Alexander, let alone refer to the dream of Hecuba, the consultation of Apollo, and further details leading to the child’s exposure as narrated in the prologue of the *Alexander*. The meaning of the statement — that Alexander was delivered from Hades — may only be that the parents of Alexander, in spite of prophecies by Cassandra that the baby was cursed (and perhaps in spite of original thoughts of killing it), decided against killing it and in favor of keeping it in the palace, because Cassandra’s prophecies were not believed — she, under the curse of Apollo, being considered a mad girl rather than a prophetess. True, in the debate between Helen and Hecuba, Alexander is mentioned as having judged the three goddesses (but see above, n. 50) on mount Ida (*Tro.* 976). Yet his appearance on Ida does not presuppose his exposure. Long ago, Robert<sup>70</sup> established on the basis of passages in the *Iliad* that tending cattle on Ida was a normal part of royal activities. Let us remember, after all, that Homer does not know of the exposure of Alexander; nor do we have any conclusive evidence that the exposure was known to the poet of the *Cypria*. Thus, not only Euripides, who frequently treated tradition freely in his tragedies, but any tragic poet who wished to stick to the older tradition, could feel free to ignore the detail of Paris’ exposure found in later tradition. But apart from imagining Alexander in the *Troades* as a slave-cowherd on Mt. Ida, there is not even sufficient reason to imagine him tending cows as prince, since nowhere in the *Troades* does Alexander have anything to do with cows and bulls, including the pet bull of the tragedy *Alexander*. In the *Troades* we may possibly imagine prince Alexander on Ida hunting or having gone to Ida from the palace *iussu Mercurii*.

But let us assume that *Troades* 595–600 not only alludes to the exposure of Alexander but also to the dream of Hecuba, just as both were narrated in the prologue of the *Alexander*. Does this prove that the *Troades* stems from the *Alexander*? Not necessarily, for the elements

<sup>70</sup> Carl Robert, *Bild und Lied* 234 and *Die Gr. Heldens.* 978 n. 3.



of the dream of Hecuba and of the exposure of Alexander are common-places which could very well be independently utilized in both plays. The story of Hecuba's dream is at least as old as Pindar:<sup>71</sup> "(Seeing Paris) hasting forth, at once Cassandra's most holy inspired heart cried aloud with grievous moanings and made utterance on this wise: — 'O infinite, O far-seeing son of Cronus, surely now shalt thou fulfil the doom that was destined long ago, when Hecuba told the Trojans the vision which she saw, when she carried this man in her womb. She deemed that she bore a fiery (πυρφόρον) hundred-handed Fury,<sup>72</sup> who with his stern strength hurled all Ilium to the ground; and she told the marvel of her slumber. But her forethought was unavailing.'" It is not certain that Pindar knew of Paris' exposure. It is almost certain, however, that Sophocles knew of it. Fragment 90 of Sophocles' *Alexander* reads βοτῆρα νικᾶν ἄνδρας ἀστίτας, "that a herdsman defeats townsmen." This verse, according to philological consensus, almost certainly refers to the victory of the herdsman Paris, not yet identified as the son of Priam, over his brothers, and it presupposes the story of Alexander's exposure. It is unlikely that, in his *Alexander*, Sophocles omitted telling how the young Alexander was exposed, or that he substituted some other story, such as a kidnapping, especially since the exposure of Paris was also mentioned in Sophocles' *Priamus*.<sup>73</sup> From a *scholion* in Arist. *Vesp.* 289 we know that Sophocles in this play used the verb χυτρίζειν, explained by the scholiast thus: ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτιθεμένων παιδίων ἐν χύτραις, "from children exposed in pots." The correctness of this interpretation of the verb is verified by Ar. *Thesm.* 505 τὸ δ' εἰσέφερε γραῦς ἐν χύτρᾳ τὸ παιδίον, "meanwhile the old woman brought the baby in a pot," and also by the definition of the verb χυτρίζειν in Hsch. 4.302. Surely the verb χυτρίζειν in a play bearing the title *Priamus* most probably, even certainly, refers to the ἔκθεσις, the exposure, of the baby Alexander. So far, then, we have seen that the dream of Hecuba and the exposure of Alexander are details found not exclusively in Euripides' trilogy of 415 B.C., but also in other writers of the fifth century, if not earlier.<sup>74</sup> Let us now consider works of Euripides other than the trilogy of 415 B.C.

<sup>71</sup> *Paean* fr. 8 (Loeb = fr. 8b Turyn = fr. 8a Snell) in the translation of Sir J. E. Sandys.

<sup>72</sup> Sandys reads 'Επι[νὸν / ἐκατόγχειρα. But Robert's ἐπι[σφάγον (cf. Eustath. *Od.* 1636,8 = Pind. 303 Turyn) or ἐπι[βρεμέταν / Ἐκατόγχειρα is more convincing.

<sup>73</sup> *TGF* 489 (*Priamus* may possibly be a second title for the Sophoclean *Φρύγες* (see Schmid-Stählin VII.1.2,447).

<sup>74</sup> Since Euripides' *Alexander* dates from as late as 415 B.C. it is an unlikely assumption that both the *Alexander* and the *Priamus* of Sophocles were written

In the *Iphigenia in Aulis* 1283-99 we read: "O snow-beaten Phrygian glen and Ida's / hill: there on a day was the tender suckling thrown, / Priam's child, from his mother torn, / for the doom of death; it was the herdsman / of Ida, Paris of Ida, / so named, so named in his Trojan city. / Would God they had never reared him, / reared Alexander, herdsman of cattle, / to dwell by the silvery waters, / by the nymphs and their fountains, / by that meadow green and abundant / with roses and hyacinths / gathered for goddesses."<sup>75</sup> Here we have the explicit mention of Alexander's exposure. In *Androm.* 293-300 we read: "Oh but if only his mother had broken the / sorry creature's [= Alexander's] skull at once / before he / settled there on Ida's side — / when the marvelous laurel implored, when shrill / Cassandra wild-eyed clamored 'Kill / the spreading pollution of Troy, our land!' / And frenzied everywhere to needle, wheedle, warn / prominent men / with: 'Destroy the newborn!'"<sup>76</sup> Before these verses, the chorus sings how the three goddesses, Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite, accompanied by Hermes came to Alexander on Ida to let him decide who among them was the fairest. Alexander is described as "boyish shepherd fond of solitude" (281). In view of vv. 293-300 it seems likely that when, a few verses above, we find Alexander as herdsman on Ida, it is the result of his being exposed to die there rather than that the royal family decided to keep Alexander isolated on Ida as the prince-herdsman.

From the passages I have adduced it becomes clear that the dream of Hecuba certainly, and the exposure of Alexander probably, are details of the Alexander saga of the fifth century B.C. — widely known details which should not be considered peculiar to the Euripidean *Alexander*. Surely the story of the exposure explicitly mentioned in the *Iphigenia in Aulis*, and probably assumed in the *Andromache*, does not make either of those tragedies a continuation of the *Alexander*. We should, then, conclude that *Tro.* 595-600, even if referring to the dream of Hecuba and to the exposure of Alexander, need not derive

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after 415 B.C. At least one of these plays must with reasonable probability have been written before 415 B.C. (there seems to be agreement among scholars that the Sophoclean *Alexander* was written before the Euripidean *Alexander* (see Lefke, 103-4 and Jouan, 138); as for the *Priamus*, nothing can be said for either an earlier or a later date than the date of the Euripidean *Alexander*). We cannot argue therefore that the exposure of Alexander was a Euripidean invention. Most likely the story of Alexander's *ἔκθεσις* was widely known in fifth-century Greece, whether the story goes back to the *Cypria* or to Stesichorus or to prose writers before the age of the tragic poets (see Lefke, 103).

<sup>75</sup> In the translation of Walker.

<sup>76</sup> In the translation of Nims.

from the *Alexander*, since these verses may as well derive from sources outside it.

(B) In *Troades* 922, Helen calls Alexander δαλοῦ πικρὸν μίμημα "a bitter imitation of a torch." If we read the Greek text without preconceptions, we must admit that here, too, there is no sufficient reason for arguing that these words refer to Hecuba's dream — let alone that they refer to the dream of Hecuba in the *Alexander*. What Helen says in the *Troades* is simply that the baby, which Priam did not slay, was a "semblance of a torch," and this need be no more than a metaphorical description of the cursed baby having nothing to do with the story of Hecuba's dream. Furthermore, even if the "semblance of a torch" did refer to the dream of Hecuba, it would still remain highly doubtful whether the image of the Paris-torch, occurring only once in the *Troades*, was meant to constitute a "link" between the *Troades* and the *Alexander*, all the more so since we do not know what was the Greek word (or words) for this "torch" in the *Alexander* (Ennius has the word *fax*, which may translate the Greek δαλός, but also λαμπάς or δᾶς or πυρός, among many other possibilities). More importantly, the mention of Alexander as "imitation of a torch" in the argument of Helen which, as we said, is rejected in the argument of the *Troades* as a whole, sounds more like shameless rhetoric on the part of Helen than an attempt on the part of Euripides to link in spirit the *Alexander* with the *Troades*. It seems to me that one can estimate accurately to what degree Euripides concerned himself with the torch-baby of the *Alexander* while composing the *Troades* as follows: In the scene starting with v. 1260 of the *Troades* and ending with the last verse of this play, Troy is set on fire by soldiers bearing lighted torches (cf. 1257 δαλοῖσι), and emotions reach their peak. This scene is also important in that it closes the third tragedy. Here, Euripides had a magnificent opportunity to forge an unmistakable link between the *Alexander* and the *Troades*, for the burning torches of the Greek soldiers afforded him an excellent chance for bringing into the aesthetic field of the scene the torch-child of the *Alexander*, an opportunity that would hardly escape his notice if he were interested in the torch-child of the *Alexander*, while writing the *Troades*. But in this scene of the *Troades*, while we hear of Odysseus and Priam and others, we hear absolutely nothing of Alexander — let alone of the torch-child of the *Alexander*, the fulfillment of whose destiny involved the burning down of Troy. And what of the events acted in the *Alexander*? Of the series of idiosyncratic δρώμενα which constituted the specific tragedy *Alexander* (the games, the victory of the cowherd in these games, the incidents subsequent to this victory involving what



was said and/or done by Deiphobus, Hecuba, Alexander, Hector, Priam, Cassandra, the chorus, all leading to the recognition of Alexander and his admittance in the palace), we find nothing in the *Troades*. References to the dream of Hecuba and to the exposure of Alexander made in the *Alexander*, and very obscurely alluded to in the *Troades* (if Hecuba's dream is really alluded to at all in that play), are in essence elements of the prologue of the *Alexander* and, at any rate, elements outside the main action of the *Alexander*. Since, then, there is no contact between the *Troades* and the δρώμενα proper of the *Alexander*, an apparent contact between the *Troades* and the *Alexander* based on elements outside the δρώμενα proper of the *Alexander* must in all probability be only accidental and result from the fact that both tragedies derive from the Alexander saga rather than from Euripides' own intention to link the tragedy *Alexander* with the tragedy *Troades*. Had Euripides attempted through flashbacks to make the *Troades* a continuation of the *Alexander*, why would he have abstained so systematically from making references in the *Troades* to the δρώμενα proper of the *Alexander*? Why would he have utilized elements found only outside the δρώμενα proper of the *Alexander* and why would he have used them so obscurely when he had endless opportunities in the *Troades* for introducing effective flashbacks to the δρώμενα proper of the *Alexander*?

(C) In Plut., *De Iside et Os.* 71.379 D, we have the verse 'Εκάτης ἄγαλμα φωσφόρου κύων ἔσῃ, which Plutarch tells us belongs to Euripides, although he offers us neither the play from which the verse comes nor the persona who delivers the verse. Snell<sup>77</sup> attributes the verse to the Euripidean *Alexander* and hypothesizes that Cassandra is talking. The κύων refers to the transformation of Hecuba to a dog. Now in *Tro.* 428-30 we read: "Where are all Apollo's promises / uttered to me, to my own ears, that Hecuba / should die in Troy? . . ." If we assume that the verse mentioned by Plutarch belongs to the *Alexander* and is spoken by Cassandra, should we suspect that the obscure vv. 428-30 of the *Troades* refer to the *Alexander*? Not necessarily. In Eur. *Hec.* 1265, Polymestor says to Hecuba κύων γενήσῃ πύρσ' ἔχουσα δέργματα "a dog with fire-red eyes shalt thou become,"<sup>78</sup> and in 1271-73 the same Polymestor says to Hecuba . . . τύμβω δ' ὄνομα σὼ κεκλήσεται / . . . κυνὸς ταλαίνης σῆμα, ναυτίλοις τέκμαρ, "and thy grave shall bear a name / . . . the wretched Dog's Grave,

<sup>77</sup> Snell, 7.

<sup>78</sup> Translated by A. S. Way in *Euripides I*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. 1947).

sign to seafarers." *Hecuba* was performed c. 424 B.C. It is clear, then, that the transformation of Hecuba into a dog is a commonplace; it cannot be considered an idiosyncratic element linking the *Alexander* with the *Troades*. Add to this that even if the verse from Plutarch occurred in the *Alexander*, still it could not possibly be connected with what Cassandra says in *Tro.* 428ff, unless in the *Alexander*, too, the prophecy was delivered from Apollo-Cassandra as it is in the *Troades*. Furthermore, the verse from Plutarch refers only to the transformation of Hecuba into a dog of Hecate, but nothing is said of the place of Hecuba's death, which, in the aforementioned verses from the *Troades*, is established to be Troy.

(D) In *Tro.* 921 the words  $\delta \gamma \acute{\epsilon} \rho \omega \nu$  have been considered to afford a "link" with the *Alexander*.<sup>79</sup> The argument runs that the  $\gamma \acute{\epsilon} \rho \omega \nu$  is a slave (appearing or mentioned) in the *Alexander* to whom the baby Alexander was given, with the order that he should exterminate it, but who instead took pity on the poor child and spared his life (similarly an old slave saves the life of Oedipus). But, to begin with, that such an old slave was mentioned in the *Alexander* is only a hypothesis. Later authors speak of a slave who was entrusted with the murder of the baby Alexander,<sup>80</sup> but whether the detail is drawn from the Euripidean *Alexander* is unknown. Following Degen, Wilamowitz, Kuiper, Robert,<sup>81</sup> Lefke,<sup>82</sup> and Stinton,<sup>83</sup> I believe that  $\delta \gamma \acute{\epsilon} \rho \omega \nu$  in the *Troades* is Priam. In my opinion, since Helen has attacked Hecuba as the cause of the Trojan war (*Tro.* 919), she would rhetorically weaken her own defense if she were to identify as second cause of the Trojan war a mere slave instead of Priam, the husband of Hecuba and father of Alexander. As Helen used  $\eta \delta \epsilon$  to refer to Hecuba with some contempt, she likewise disrespectfully styled the dead king as  $\delta \gamma \acute{\epsilon} \rho \omega \nu$ .

(E) When Hecuba hears from Talthybius that she has been allotted as slave to Odysseus she exclaims (*Tro.* 279ff): "Oh no, no! / Tear the shorn head, / rip nails through the folded cheeks. / Must I? / To be given as slave to serve that vile, that slippery man, / right's enemy, brute, murderous beast, / that mouth of lies and treachery, that makes void / faith in things promised / and that which was beloved turns to hate . . ." Are we to see in this, as Parmentier and Gregoire do,<sup>84</sup> a

<sup>79</sup> See Snell, 35.

<sup>80</sup> For references see Snell, 35 n. 3, and Jouan, 119 n. 3.

<sup>81</sup> For references, see Snell, 36 n. 2.

<sup>82</sup> Lefke, 9.

<sup>83</sup> Stinton, App. I.

<sup>84</sup> Parmentier-Gregoire, 9.

specific reference to Odysseus in the *Palamedes*? I believe the answer is a resounding no. For to assume that Hecuba speaks about Odysseus with reference to the injustice done to Palamedes by Odysseus is to accuse Euripides of a ridiculous ineptitude. In the first place, why is it an *εἰκός* that Hecuba knows the story of Palamedes, an event of the Greek camp? Even if we assume that Hecuba knows this story, what reason has she to condemn Odysseus so passionately for what he did to one of Troy's enemies? So far as Hecuba is concerned, Palamedes was one of Troy's arch enemies (in fact, since at least the time of the *Cypria*, tradition had it that it was Palamedes who forced Odysseus to participate in the expedition against Troy!). The probable, if not certain, conclusion, is that Euripides expected his audience to understand Hecuba's dislike of Odysseus without any specific reference to — or at least without any specific focusing on — the Palamedes event; but on the basis of a broadly unfavorable picture of Odysseus deriving from the *Cypria*, the *Little Iliad* and, above all, from the tragedians as a whole including Euripides.<sup>85</sup> After all, let us not forget that nowhere in the *Troades* does Hecuba say anything about Palamedes.

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<sup>85</sup> Compare, for example, Odysseus in the *Hecuba* and Odysseus as discussed by Menelaus and Agamemnon in the *Iph.* in Aul. 522ff.



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## PROMETHEUS BOUND 114-117 RECONSIDERED

BRUCE E. DONOVAN

IN "*Prometheus Bound* 114-117," *HSCP* 75 (1971) 59-62, Professor Tracy has made several observations which merit reconsideration. After discussing the meters of these verses and "the layout of the printed page in the standard editions, those of Murray and Wilamowitz,"<sup>1</sup> Tracy asks the following question: "Why has the poet emphasized the outcry and fleeting consternation of his principal character in this way?"<sup>2</sup> Immediately, and with an assurance which his evidence does not justify, the author replies. "Surely his intent is to force the audience to think of the principal event of Prometheus' enchainment: the eagle and the agonies Prometheus was to suffer as it feasted on his liver."<sup>3</sup> A bit later this idea is repeated: "Prometheus' words subtly require us to think of a bird and, at the very least, to imagine the approach of something unpleasant."<sup>4</sup> After the menacing nature of lines 1-87, and especially the emphasis on Prometheus' isolation,<sup>5</sup> an audience might well expect some additional horror; Prometheus' attitude would not discourage such suspicion. This view, however, is far from Tracy's assertion, which is based primarily on the three words ὀδμά and προσέπτα (line 115), and θεόσυτος (line 116).

"It [ὀδμά] is . . . not a very common word and connotes a very strong, penetrating odor — the sort of smell associated with carrion birds, not the daughters of Ocean."<sup>6</sup> Tracy cites the six appearances of the word in Homer. At *Iliad* 14.415 reference is made to the thunderbolt of Zeus. The three instances from *Odyssey* 4 (lines 406, 442, 446)

<sup>1</sup> Tracy, 60. Several editors — Sikes and Wilson, Weil, Mazon — have in fact come very close to Tracy's suggested format. In discussing line 117, Tracy (60, n. 8) writes: "Dale, *ibid.* [*The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama* (Cambridge 1948)] 78 n. 1, supports the retention of the mss." In this context "supports" seems a strong word; but, in any case, the reference to *Prometheus Bound* 117 does not appear in Dale's second (1968) edition.

<sup>2</sup> Tracy, 61.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> See lines 2, 21ff, 83-84 in particular.

<sup>6</sup> Tracy, 61. On the spelling see W. S. Barrett, *Euripides Hippolytos* (Oxford 1964) 437 on line 1391.



clearly connote unpleasantness, the smell of seals. At *Odyssey* 5.59, however, the description is of Calypso's island: ... τηλόθι δ' ὀδμή / κέδρου τ' εὐκέατοιο θύου τ' ἀνὰ νῆσον ὀδώδει / δαιομένων ... And at *Odyssey* 9.210 the description is of wine: ... ὀδμή δ' ἡδεῖα ἀπὸ κρητῆρος ὀδώδει, / θεσπεσίη ... Even in Homer the word need not have unpleasant associations. The Homeric *Hymn to Demeter*, wherein, again, the word is not pejorative, has also been cited in connection with this passage.<sup>7</sup> To this list may be added Pindar, Fragment 135.6 (Turyn), a description of Elysium.<sup>8</sup> Again, Euripides, *Hippolytus* 1391, where Artemis is first addressed ὦ θεῖον ὁσμῆς πνεῦμα has been cited by many editors and also furnishes evidence for connotations of pleasantness. Although the only other Aeschylean use of ὀδμή (*Eumenides* 253) is an instance of its pejorative sense, there seems no necessity to assume at *Prometheus Bound* 115 that an audience need think of anything unpleasant. The interpretation of the scholiast — ἴσως αἱ Ὠκεανίδες εὐωδίας ἔπνεον — seems credible.

"προσέπτα clearly indicates a bird."<sup>9</sup> Although the first meaning for προσπέτομαι in *LSJ* is indeed "fly to or towards," the second entry is more to the point: "generally, come upon one suddenly, come over one." Under this second entry is ranked *Prometheus Bound* 115. More important is the fact that at lines 555 and 644 — the only two other occurrences of the word in this play and in all of Aeschylus — this second, figurative meaning is preferable. Surely the primary meaning is permissible here, but there is no clear sign that the approach of a bird is indicated.<sup>10</sup>

"θεόσυντος specifically points to the eagle sent by Zeus."<sup>11</sup> Once again the exclusiveness of Tracy's comment is disturbing. This word also appears two other times in this play and although in each instance, viz. lines 597 and 643, there are evil connotations, in neither instance

<sup>7</sup> H. S. Long, "Notes on Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 102 (1958) 239, on line 115 makes reference to line 227: ὀδμή δ' ἡμερόεσσα θυγέντων ἀπὸ πέπλων / σκιδνατο, . . .

<sup>8</sup> ὀδμή δ' ἔρατόν κατὰ χῶρον κίδναται / αἰεὶ θύα μειγνύντων πυρὶ τηλεφανεῖ / παντοῖα θεῶν ἐπὶ βωμοῖς.

<sup>9</sup> Tracy, 61.

<sup>10</sup> I do not mean to imply that entries in lexica should be final determinants in interpretative debates; I do deny that this word in this context must suggest a bird. Indeed, A. M. Dale, *Euripides Alceste* (Oxford 1954) 86, in commenting on this word writes: "the metaphor can be used of the approach of something intangible — sound or smell — through the air, as in A. *PV* 115, 555, or of the hostile swoop of some evil, as of a bird of prey: so here [*Alceste* 420-421] and *PV* 644, S. *Aj.* 282."

<sup>11</sup> Tracy, 61. The purport of the reference to *Theogony*. 523 (n. 9) is obscure.

is the eagle even remotely suggested. At line 116, rather, the word seems roughly equivalent to *θεῖος* and as such to approach the meaning of *θείοτος* in line 765, where the same contrast as here — with *βρότειος* — is effected.

There is nothing about the diction of lines 115-117 which would require the audience to shift its thoughts to the advent of an eagle, nor need we assume that Prometheus feared such an event. H. S. Long has observed: "To a helpless person every sound, even odor (115), no matter how harmless seeming, is terrifying."<sup>12</sup> It may be that some members of the audience would think of an eagle; Tracy does not convince me that such need hold for many viewers, or indeed for any at all.

Tracy concludes with a final note. "The startling stage effects of the opening, I believe, must have led the audience to expect that the eagle would actually be brought on stage in some manner."<sup>13</sup> There are alternatives which might prove equally exciting. The diversity of *paradoi* in Attic tragedy has been noted, and the peculiarities of the *parodos* of the *Prometheus Bound* properly observed.<sup>14</sup> Several writers have suggested that the chorus here entered during Prometheus' second anapaestic section, lines 120ff.<sup>15</sup> If this were the case any thought of an eagle would have been short-lived; no sooner would the eagle have come into the minds of the audience than they would have been disabused of this notion. But the tension of the spectacle, between the knowledge of the audience of who approached and Prometheus' fear of what might approach, would provide good theatre.

In sum, I am convinced neither by the diction of the *Prometheus Bound* nor by considerations of theatrical effects that at lines 115 and following the expectation of an eagle — which I cannot, of course, disprove — was intended by the poet.

CENTER FOR HELLENIC STUDIES, WASHINGTON, D.C.  
BROWN UNIVERSITY

<sup>12</sup> Long (above, n. 7) 240 on line 126.

<sup>13</sup> Tracy, 62 n. 10.

<sup>14</sup> A. Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens* (2nd ed. rev., J. Gould and D. M. Lewis, Oxford 1968) 242ff.

<sup>15</sup> A. Pickard-Cambridge, *The Theatre of Dionysus in Athens* (Oxford, 1946) 39ff; H. J. Rose, *A Commentary on the Surviving Plays of Aeschylus* I (Amsterdam 1957) 254; F. Duysinx, "Les Passages lyriques dans le *Prométhée enchaîné* d'Eschyle," *L'Antiquité Classique* 34 (1965) 48.





## THE φύσις OF COMEDY

ERICH SEGAL

IT all seems perfectly clear. "Old Comedy" refers to an ancient dramatic genre whose masters were Eupolis and Cratinus and Aristophanes and at least forty other poets *quorum comoedia prisca virorum est*. "New Comedy" is the genre of Philemon, Diphilus and especially Menander, the prototype and norm for all comedies written since. And if we do not recognize it as a distinct genre, we nonetheless understand "Middle Comedy" as a chronological specification referring to plays composed roughly between the fall of Athens and the Battle of Chaeronea. But what valid critical use do we make of these terms?

Alexandrian scholars found "Old" and "New" to be convenient labels. "Middle Comedy" seems to be a much later notion, not antedating Apuleius' description of Philemon as "*mediae comoediae scriptor*."<sup>1</sup> Some would adduce Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1128a), a passage discussing comedies τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν, as a precedent for distinguishing between comic genres. Still, it is quite obvious from the context that Aristotle himself is making no such distinctions, but simply comparing plays ancient and modern, preferring the ὑπόνοια of the present to the αἰσχρολογία of the past. Moreover, the *Poetics* never uses the terms παλαιά or νέα at all. Nor does Aristotle state — for better or worse — what later scholars would maintain so often: that Old Comedy "died intestate."<sup>2</sup> Poor Old Comedy, no heirs to perpetuate its traditions. What grief its so-called demise has evoked.

<sup>1</sup> *Florida* 3.16. According to Athenaeus (11.482c), Antiochus of Alexandria wrote a περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ μέσῃ κωμῳδίᾳ κωμωδουμένων ποιητῶν. Kock does not recognize this third category and so his edition of fragments (Leipzig, 1880) is bipartite. Among those who do accept "Middle Comedy" as a literary genre are Körte *RE*, 1256–58; Philippe Legrand, *The New Greek Comedy*, trans. J. Loeb (London, 1917) *passim*; Karl Reinhardt, "Aristophanes und Athen," *Von Werken und Formen* (Godesberg, 1948) 309; T. B. L. Webster, *Studies in Later Greek Comedy*, 2nd ed. rev. (Manchester, England, 1970) *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. Gilbert Murray, *Aristophanes* (Oxford, 1933) 199; Cedric H. Whitman, *Aristophanes and the Comic Hero* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964) 2. Intestate or not, it was unquestionably defunct. With the exception of the *Ploutos*, Aristophanes was never revived. The latest to remark upon this is K. J. Dover, *Aristophanic Comedy* (London, 1972) 223.

Neither epic nor dithyramb has had so many scholarly mourners or nostalgic eulogizers.

But it is the present argument that we must not continue to regard "Old Comedy" as a separate artistic entity and must cease the frustrating attempts to define and describe it as an independent genre.<sup>3</sup> Rather, we must come to grips with a basic fact which literary history has clearly affirmed: Aristophanes *atque alii* represent merely a stage — several stages perhaps — of a work in progress. Quite simply, a step towards the ultimate development of the single genre we all know as Comedy.

The thesis is not presented here for the first time. But for a variety of reasons, it has rarely been welcomed. It is most vehemently opposed by critics of the perennial *fautores veterum* school. A. W. Schlegel, for example, was outraged at the notion of considering Aristophanes a mere way station to Menander. To him, Aristophanes was beyond dispute "eine ursprüngliche und reine Gattung."<sup>4</sup> In our own day, Albin Lesky has categorically opposed any attempt to link Old and New Comedy in an evolutionary scheme.<sup>5</sup> And yet some scholars, including K. J. Dover, have offered arguments in support of a "comic continuity."<sup>6</sup> And there is a lengthy advocacy in Wilhelm Süss's *Aristophanes und die Nachwelt*.<sup>7</sup>

Perhaps there would be no dispute if the entire *Poetics* were extant. As it is, we have merely enough to justify our hypothesis. In Chapter IV (1449a9ff), Aristotle opens his discussion of comedy and tragedy with tantalizing and ambiguous explanations of their origins. He then considers whether tragedy is a fully developed form and decides affirmatively. Having begun as improvised episodes, tragedy underwent many changes, *πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα*, and finally stopped growing and came to rest — *ἐπαύσατο* — having reached its fullest

<sup>3</sup> Despite energetic attempts to prove the contrary by scholars like F. M. Cornford, *The Origin of Attic Comedy* (1914; ed. T. H. Gaster, Garden City, 1961) and O. Navarre, "Les Origines et la structure technique de la Comédie Ancienne," *Rev. études anciennes* (1911) 245-295. Whitman (above, n. 2) 9ff offers a brief defense of Aristophanic structure. But Reinhardt (above, n. 1) 292 reviews the various generic explanations and cautions against attempts to fit Aristophanes into any "Gattungs- oder Ursprungsformel."

<sup>4</sup> A. W. Schlegel, *Vorlesungen über Dramatische Kunst und Literatur* (Dreizehnte Vorlesung, Stuttgart et al., 1966) 157. Ironically, Schlegel then asserts that *New Comedy* is not a real genre.

<sup>5</sup> Albin Lesky, *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur*, 2nd ed. (Bern, 1963) 425.

<sup>6</sup> K. J. Dover, "Greek Comedy," in *Fifty Years (and Twelve) of Classical Scholarship* (Oxford, 1968) 147.

<sup>7</sup> Wilhelm Süss, *Aristophanes und die Nachwelt* (Leipzig, 1911) 190ff.

natural form, its φύσις (1449a10-15).<sup>8</sup> Aristotle's essential view is that tragedy had been fully developed since the early days of Sophocles' career. This would, of course, admit the *Oresteia* as mature tragedy as well.

Then, in the next chapter, he turns to comedy. He discusses how certain of its elements originated, but he does not consider whether comedy has reached its φύσις. He does note in V.3 (1449b1-2) that comedy got a much later start, receiving an official chorus long after public presentation of tragedies was an old and accepted tradition. But even from the scant remains of fifth-century comedy we can see what drastic changes it underwent in a very short time. There is an infinitely greater difference between the *Acharnians* and the *Ploutos* than between the *Prometheus* and the *Bacchae*. And it is of no small significance that Aristotle never once uses the term κωμωδία in reference to Eupolis, Cratinus — or Aristophanes.

Ironically, comedy was reaching its φύσις at precisely the moment Aristotle was composing the *Poetics*. For in Menander we find the "classic" comedy, what E. R. Curtius calls *Normalklassik*.<sup>9</sup> In Menander the form is canonized; there are no more μεταβολαί. Indeed one of the essential characteristics of classical comedy is its inexhaustible sameness. Menander and Marivaux are cut from the same comic cloth; the *Birds* and the *Ecclesiazusae* are certainly not. Meter, as Aristotle notes at the beginning of the *Poetics* (1447b6ff), does not a genre make. Indeed, most Plautine comedies have more lyrics than the *Ecclesiazusae*, three quarters of which is in iambic trimeter. Moreover, every definition of comedy, from antiquity to our own day, refers exclusively to the Menandrian form.<sup>10</sup> Like it or not, Menander's comedy has determined the classical tradition for more than two thousand years.

We may perhaps briefly note some of the aspects of Attic comedy

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Politics* 1252b 33-36: ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν, οἷον γὰρ ἑκάστων ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκίας.

<sup>9</sup> E. R. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Bern, 1948) 275ff. Georg Luck adapts the term as "normative" (opposed to "absolute") in "Scriptor Classicus," *CL* 10.2 (Spring 1958) 150ff.

<sup>10</sup> It is interesting to note that in Chapter 3 of his passionate anticlassical manifesto, *Racine et Shakespeare* (1823), Stendhal cheerfully announces the end of classical comedy, to be replaced of course by *la comédie romantique* which firmly rejects each and every New Comedy convention. Stendhal devotes an entire page to listing the titles of fresh new-style comedies destined to sweep the classics into oblivion. Ironically, none of these plays is remembered today, and the list is frequently omitted by editors of *Racine et Shakespeare*.



which succumbed to the evolutionary process. The genesis of comedy resembles the Creation as told by Hesiod: in the beginning there was Chaos.<sup>11</sup> The earliest comic writers are criticized for formlessness and chaotic construction. The cry is as old as comedy itself, for even Susarion, its semilegendary inventor, is accused of managing things sloppily, ἀτάκτως.<sup>12</sup> This is a charge hurled often at Aristophanes, and Cratinus was likewise criticized for ἀταξία.<sup>13</sup> One may excuse or explain this as the necessary result of Attic comedy's attempts to absorb the disparate elements of various popular traditions (Dorian, Megarian, the epirrhematic agon), but the fact needs no apology. For Aristophanes *atque alii* were great artists whose theatrical forte happened to be a kind of episodic vaudeville. One may agree with Pickard-Cambridge that Aristophanes progressively absorbed the various heterogeneous elements into a kind of texture,<sup>14</sup> but Aristophanic comedy is still essentially a string of short episodes.

Yet comedy ultimately rejected loosely jointed vaudeville, growing more and more into tightly structured *mythos*. The chaos in Aristophanic Cloudland becomes the cosmos of Menandrian Athens. There is a parallel phenomenon in later antiquity: Livy, discussing the beginnings of real theater in Rome, emphasizes the importance of 240 B.C., the date when Livius Andronicus introduced the first play *with a plot*: "ab saturis ausus est primus argumento fabulam serere" (7.2.8). Thus the appearance of a structured story likewise signals the φύσις of Roman comedy.<sup>15</sup>

There have been numerous attempts to explain why fifth-century comedy discarded its political and allegorical elements in favor of more personal and domestic matters.<sup>16</sup> But far from very beginning

<sup>11</sup> Theog. 166ff. Cf. Aristophanes' parody in the genealogy of the *Birds* (693ff).

<sup>12</sup> Tzetzes (περὶ κωμωδίας 3.16), Kaibel C.G.F. 18.

<sup>13</sup> Platonios, περὶ διαφορᾶς, Kaibel, 6; Tzetzes (above, n. 12) 18.

<sup>14</sup> A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy*, 2nd ed. rev. T. B. L. Webster (Oxford, 1962) 194ff.

<sup>15</sup> Friedrich Leo astutely noted that the similarities between Livy's account and Aristotle's remarks on the development of comedy were too great to be merely coincidental. "Varro und die Satire," *Hermes* 24 (1889) 76ff. There is further illuminating discussion in G. L. Hendrickson, "The Dramatic Satira and the Old Comedy at Rome," *AJP* 15.1 (1896) 1ff.

<sup>16</sup> It is not possible to resolve the question of how "political" Aristophanes really was. One extreme is the view of Reinhardt (above, n. 1) 294: "politisch ist [die Komödie] ganz und gar, politisch in ihrem Entwurf, politisch in ihrer dramatischen Aktion — und wird überpolitisch durch die Eigentümlichkeit ihrer politischen Symbolik." On the other hand, simple references to politicians

we see in Aristophanes a tendency to domesticate rather than politicize.<sup>17</sup> Aristophanic comedy characteristically reduces statecraft to housekeeping.

In Murray's distinction, "Old Comedy" deals with *res publica*, "New" with *res privata*.<sup>18</sup> But which of these distinctions best describes the *Acharnians*? Is Dikaiopolis really concerned with the state at large? Or is he rather a private person who makes a private peace for private gain and celebrates a private Dionysia in his private home? His peace treaty is actually a trade agreement which enables him to open his own common market to all cities.<sup>19</sup> In 971ff, the chorus notes that Dikaiopolis is out to make a fast profit and has amassed a good supply of household items and luscious foodstuffs. His motives are so private and personal that they are downright selfish. At 1018ff, he flatly refuses to share any of his peace with the visitors who come to request some. The chorus specifically comments for a second time on this selfish attitude at 1037ff (especially 1038-39: *κοὺκ ἔοικεν οὐδενὶ μεταδώσειν*). In the finale, Lamachos leaves to fight a national war while Dikaiopolis stays to continue his private party. The *Acharnians* does indeed celebrate the joy of peace and condemn the folly of war, but its tone is as much domestic as polemic.

This domesticating tendency is also manifest in the *Knights*, where the Sausage Seller is advised that ruling the city is no different than cooking up meat patties (214ff). This advice anticipates Lysistrata's lengthy speech (567ff) in which she predicts how women will run the state as they do their households, and untangle political problems the way they unravel wool. Understandably, the Athenian proboulos is outraged by the comparison.

The *Knights* and *Lysistrata* bring government into the kitchen. In an ironic bourgeois reversal of the *Oresteia*, the *Wasps* brings the court into the living-room. Here even the judgment urn is less important

did not disappear from comedy after Aristophanes. There are numerous political names dropped until the time of Demetrius of Phalerum. Cf. Webster (above, n. 1) 37ff; Dover (above, n. 2) 233. Also Viola Guinness Stephens, *Political Figures in Late Comedy*, diss. unpub., Yale University, 1967.

<sup>17</sup> And the very earliest extant fragment of Greek comedy (Susarion 3K) involves the most domestic of *οἰκεῖα πράγματα*. It is misogynistic in a *nec tecum ne sine tec* vein, but concludes that whereas a man may be able to do without a woman, a home cannot do without a wife (lines 4-5):

*κακὸν γυναῖκες, ἀλλ' ὅμως, ὧ δημόται,  
οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖν οἰκίαν ἄνευ κακοῦ.*

<sup>18</sup> Gilbert Murray (above, n. 2) 251. Cf. Donatus (Kaibel 67): *Comodia est fabula diversa instituta continens affectuum civilium ac privatorum . . .*

<sup>19</sup> *Acharnians* 623-625; 720-728.

than certain domestic crockery. Philocleon can prosecute the household animals while close to the comforts of his chamber pot.<sup>20</sup>

Finally, there is Praxagora in the *Ecclesiazusae* who would apply to the state women's rule ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις (210ff) and domesticate even the municipal buildings to make Athens one big happy household. Even the Courts and Colonnades will become dining rooms (673-76):

ΒΛ. Τὴν δὲ δίαιταν τίνα ποιήσεις;

ΠΡ. Κοιμήν πᾶσιν. Τὸ γὰρ ἄστν  
μίαν οἴκησιν φημι ποιήσιν συρρήξας εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα,  
ὥστε βαδίζειν ὡς ἀλλήλους.

ΒΛ. Τὸ δὲ δεῖπνον ποῦ παραθήσεις;

ΠΡ. Τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τὰς στοιάς ἀνδρώνων πάντα ποιήσω.

There is little need to stress the domesticity of the *Ploutos*. The wife is a New Comedy *matrona* and Cario a typical slave who here outfaces Hermes better than Sosia will in Plautus' *Amphitruo*. In the *Ploutos* Aristophanes conforms to what became standard New Comedy practice: he offers a unified plot. And the city street to which Aristophanes here moves is the very one that Menander rarely leaves. In fact it may have been a flourishing comic thoroughfare long before Aristophanes arrived. Simply stated, some of Aristophanes' contemporaries seem to have been moving earlier toward unified domestic *mythos*.

We have enough of Cratinus' *Pytine*, for example, to see that although it contained a few allegorical characters, it was still essentially a domestic comedy in which the hero leaves his wedded wife for a mistress.<sup>21</sup> Later, the protagonist senses a conspiracy against him. One particular fragment (185K) shows him pondering what sort of παρασκευή the members of his household are concocting. This intrigue-making suggests Plautus' *Casina*, not to mention Feydeau.<sup>22</sup>

To Aristotle, only Crates is worthy to be considered as a writer of κωμωδία, perhaps because — as Aristotle emphasizes — he was the first to abandon sheer raillery, ἀφέμενος τῆς ἱαμβικῆς ἰδέας, and compose orderly plots, λόγους καὶ μύθους (*Poetics* 1449b8-9). There

<sup>20</sup> *Wasps* 763ff, especially 799-810; 931-935.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. also frags. 181, 182, 188K. The scholiast to *Knights* 400 adds some helpful details.

<sup>22</sup> In an important essay, Bernard Knox proposes Euripides' *Ion* as the first modern comedy, primarily because of the *intrigue*. "Euripidean Comedy," in *The Rarer Action: Essays in Honor of Francis Fergusson* (New Brunswick, 1971) 68ff. The limits of this paper preclude an examination of the relationship between Euripides and Aristophanes.



is plenty of domestic chatter in the fragments of Crates,<sup>23</sup> but of course we have no notion of what his plots were like. An ancient commentator noted that Pherecrates stopped indulging in raillery, τὸ λοιδορεῖν, and became especially inventive at plot-making, εὐρετικὸς μύθων.<sup>24</sup> We may infer from the fragments that Pherecrates' *Korianno* presented some sort of romantic rivalry between a *senex amator* and his son.<sup>25</sup> It seems more "traditional" than the finale of Aristophanes' *Wasps*, and anticipates the likes of Menander's *Aspis*, Plautus' *Mercator*, and Molière's *L'Avare*. This comic gamut is traditionally resolved according to "Figaro's Law," as expounded at the curtain of *Le Barbier de Seville*: "quand la jeunesse et l'amour sont d'accord pour tromper un vieillard, tout ce qu'il fait pour l'empêcher peut bien s'appeler à bon droit *la Précaution inutile*." Thus, what is true of Aristophanes' later style may have been characteristic of his contemporaries much earlier. F. M. Cornford observed that "the fragments of Krates and Pherecrates are hardly distinguishable from the manner of New Comedy."<sup>26</sup>

New Comedy is essentially bourgeois and emphatically plot-oriented. In late Aristophanes we see another of Figaro's remarks validated: "l'or c'est le nerf de l'intrigue." The marked increase in use of financial language in both the *Ecclesiazusae* and the *Ploutos* can be explained only in part by the contemporary Athenian financial woes.<sup>27</sup> As comedy develops, Ploutos replaces Phales as the central divinity. What is more, especially in Aristophanes' final play, we see a concern for the rewarding of the just, which will be a key Menandrian theme.

Even Aristophanes seems to have written at least one comedy entirely in the *véa* style. The *Vita* states that the late (now lost) *Kokalos* contained rape, recognition, and "all those other things Menander loved."<sup>28</sup> Thus, Aristophanes could be Menandrian, though Menander would never be Aristophanic.

None of this is to overrate Menander's art, although one cannot

<sup>23</sup> Crates, *frags.* 14-17K.

<sup>24</sup> Anonymos, *περὶ κωμωδίας*, Kaibel, 8.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *Korianno*, frag. 71K, which clearly articulates the Youth-Age amorous antagonism:

ἀπαρτὶ μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ μὲν εἰκὸς ἐστ' ἐρᾶν  
σοὶ δ' οὐκέθ' ᾧρα.

<sup>26</sup> Cornford (above, n. 3) 189.

<sup>27</sup> Lysias (19.11) specifically refers to the scarcity of money in the city at about the time the *Ploutos* was presented. Cf. Victor Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1951) 253ff.

<sup>28</sup> *Vita Aristophanis* 28.65 (Dübner): . . . φθορὰν καὶ ἀναγωρισμὸν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ᾧ ἐζήλωσε Μένανδρος.

overstress his influence. Rather, it is to signal the development of the comic genre toward its ultimate *φύσις*: the structured plot with happy ending.<sup>29</sup> Tragedy underwent a similar development. In both mature genres, Aristotle's constant emphasis on structure, the *σύστασις τῶν πραγμάτων*,<sup>30</sup> has proved to be not only the prime critical criterion but the primary popular pleasure. His remark that plot was the *ψυχὴ* of drama is substantiated by scientific fact: the happy ending does indeed appeal directly to certain needs of the human psyche.<sup>31</sup>

Aristophanes did not live merely to write "Old" Comedy. He was a great dramatic poet who well understood that "the drama's laws the drama's patrons give." Like any man of the theater, he wrote for a public, not posterity. The fact that his final plays were vastly different from the episodic vaudeville with which he began his career reflects not a decline in his art or the decay of a genre — for "Old Comedy" never was one — but a natural evolution. Surely Aristophanes, who himself was young during the infancy of the comic theater, was delighted to witness as well as present the *φύσις* of comedy.

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<sup>29</sup> Aristotle (*Poetics* 1453a36) posits the happy ending as the basic *ἡδονή* of comedy. For a fuller discussion, see E. Segal, "The Meaning of Comedy," *Horizon* XV.1 (Winter 1973).

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *Poetics* 1450a15 (also 1447a2, 1451a32–33).

<sup>31</sup> In a paper in progress, I discuss the illuminating similarity between the plots of Menandrian Comedy and what psychologists call the "Family Romance" syndrome, the pleasure in mentally reliving the infantile experiences of separation and reunion. See, for example, Otto Rank, *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*, trans. F. Robbins and Smith Ely Jelliffe (New York, 1952) 63–64. Also, Géza Róheim, "The Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Culture," in *Man and His Culture: Psychoanalytic Anthropology after 'Totem and Taboo,'* ed. Warner Meunsterberger (New York, 1970) 43–45. Martin A. Berezin demonstrates the psychic need for a well-structured "Happy End" not only in comedy but music as well: "Some Observations on Art (Music) in its Relationship to Ego Mastery," in *Bulletin of the Philadelphia Association for Psychoanalysis*, 7:2 (June 1958) 49ff.

# PHAETHON, SAPPHO'S PHAON, AND THE WHITE ROCK OF LEUKAS

GREGORY NAGY

## I

IN the arcane Greek myths of Phaethon and Phaon, I have come upon some latent motifs which help resolve three vexing exegetical problems in Greek poetry. The first problem is in Alkman's *Partheneion*. It concerns the wondrous horse conjured up in a simile describing the beauty of the maiden Hagesichora:

δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡμεν αὐτὰ  
ἐκπρεπῆς τὼς ὥπερ αἴτις  
ἐν βοτοῖς στάσειεν ἵππον  
παγὸν ἀεθλοφόρον καναχάποδα  
τῶν ὑποπετριδίων ὀνείρων

(Alkman 1.45-49P)

The question is, what is the meaning of ὑποπετριδίων? The scholia of the Louvre Papyrus connect this adjective with πέτρα and quote the following passage from the *Odyssey*:

παρ δ' ἴσαν Ὠκεανοῦ τε ῥοὰς καὶ Λευκάδα πέτρην  
ἦδ' ἐπαρ' Ἡελίοιο πύλας καὶ δῆμον ὀνείρων

(ω 11-12)

This interpretation is rejected by Page, who argues: "The reference to Hom. *Od.* ω 11f is irrelevant; nothing is said there about dreams living 'under rocks'."<sup>1</sup> Instead, Page follows the *Etymologicum Magnum* (783.20), where we read ὑποπετριδίων. In support of this interpretation, Page adduces passages where dreams are represented as winged beings (e.g. Euripides, *Hekabe* 70).<sup>2</sup> All the same, Page retains the reading ὑποπετριδίων in his text, so that we are left to assume some sort of *ad hoc* metathesis in Alkman's dialectal pronunciation of the word for "wing." In this instance, Wilamowitz proves to be more cautious, in

<sup>1</sup> D. Page, *Alkman / The Partheneion* (Oxford 1951) 87.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.



that he allows for some vague notion of dreams abiding underneath some mysterious rock in the Lakonian poetic imagination.<sup>3</sup> In his excellent school edition of Greek Lyric, Campbell chooses to take ὑποπετριδίων at face value: "the dreams are those of siestas taken underneath a shady rock."<sup>4</sup>

It follows that the second exegetical problem concerns the context of the White Rock in the Odyssey:

Ἑρμῆς δὲ ψυχὰς Κυλλήνιος ἐξεκαλείτο  
 ἀνδρῶν μνηστήρων. ἔχε δὲ ῥάβδον μετὰ χερσὶ  
 καλὴν χρυσεῖην, τῇ τ' ἀνδρῶν ὄμματα θέλγει  
 ὡν ἐθέλει, τοὺς δ' αὖτε καὶ ὑπνώοντας ἐγείρει.  
 τῇ ῥ' ἄγε κινήσας, ταὶ δὲ τρίζουσαι ἔποντο  
 ὥς δ' ὅτε νυκτερίδες μυχῶ ἄντρον θεσπεσίοιο  
 τρίζουσαι ποτέονται, ἐπεὶ κέ τις ἀποπέσῃσιν  
 ὄρμαθοῦ ἐκ πέτρης, ἀνά τ' ἀλλήλησιν ἔχονται,  
 ὥς αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἄμ' ἦσαν. ἄρχε δ' ἄρα σφιν  
 Ἑρμείας ἀκάκητα κατ' εὐρώεντα κέλευθα.  
 πᾶρ δ' ἴσαν Ὠκεανοῦ τε ῥοὰς καὶ Λευκάδα πέτρην  
 ἣδὲ παρ' Ἥελίοιο πύλας καὶ δῆμον ὀνείρων  
 ἦσαν. αἶψα δ' ἵκοντο κατ' ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα,  
 ἔνθα τε ναίουσι ψυχαί, εἰδῶλα καμόντων

(ω 1-14)

This passage, known as the Introduction to the Second Nekyia, represents a distinct subgenre of Greek Epic. It is replete with idiosyncrasies in both theme and diction,<sup>5</sup> and its contents afford a precious glimpse into early Greek concepts of the afterlife. Nowhere else in Homeric diction do we find the puzzling expressions Ἥελίοιο πύλας, δῆμον

<sup>3</sup> U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Der Chor der Hagesichora," *Hermes* 32 (1897) 252n2: "Es ist nicht zu verlangen, dass wir in solchen Stücken volle Kenntnis der lakonischen Phantasie erreichen könnten."

<sup>4</sup> D. A. Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry* (London 1967) 203. I infer that Campbell had in mind passages like Hesiod's *Works and Days* 588f.

<sup>5</sup> For a survey, see D. Page, *The Homeric Odyssey* (Oxford 1955) 116-119. For Page, such idiosyncrasies mean that the passage is an insertion and does not intrinsically belong where it is found in the text. I disagree, believing that the Epic genre consists of several subgenres, and that each subgenre has its idiosyncrasies in theme and diction. For a survey of the principle that each Epic subgenre (such as that of similes) has its own distinctive archaisms as well as innovations, see F. W. Householder and G. Nagy, "Greek," *Current Trends in Linguistics* IX (ed. T. Sebeok, 's-Gravenhage 1972).

Addendum: at ω 11, the Rylands Papyrus has Ὠκεανοῦ ῥοὰς, as also the Alkman scholion. I prefer this reading, *pace* Wilamowitz (n17) 31n3.

ὄνειρων, and Λευκάδα πέτρην. In Homeric theme, however, there do exist parallels to the first two of the three expressions.

In the instance of Ἡελίοιο πύλας, there is a thematic parallelism between πύλαι and Homeric Πύλος. As Frame has demonstrated in his brilliant doctoral thesis, the royal name Nestor and the place-name of his realm, Pylos, are based on mythological archetypes.<sup>6</sup> I should stress that Frame is not interested in minimizing a historical Nestor and the historical Pylos, but rather in showing that the kernel of any original epic about Nestor and Pylos was based on cult and myth. One such original epic survives in Iliad A, the Tale of Nestor's Cattle Raid.<sup>7</sup> Stripped of its historicized layers,<sup>8</sup> this Pylian tale tells of Nestor's retrieving the cattle of Pylos from the Epeians (A 671-761), and Frame argues convincingly that the retrieved cattle are a thematic analogue to the Cattle of the Sun.<sup>9</sup> The etymology of Nestor's name, "he who retrieves," is relevant because words with the root *NEZ-* are used in Homeric diction to connote the theme of sunrise.<sup>10</sup> In fact, the entire plot of Odysseus' travels is interlaced with diction which otherwise connotes the theme of sunset followed by sunrise. To put it more bluntly, the Epic plot of Odysseus' travels operates on an extended solar metaphor, and it is to Frame's credit that he confirms this proposition with the internal evidence of Homeric theme and diction. Likewise, when Nestor returns the cattle to Pylos, it is implicit that Pylos is the Gate of the Sun and an entrance to the underworld.<sup>11</sup> There are survivals of this hieratic connotation in the local Pylian lore of classical times (Pausanias 4.36.2-3).<sup>12</sup> In a Homeric allusion to the myth about Herakles' descent into the underworld and his wounding of Hades (E 395-404), the name Pylos actually serves to connote the realm of the otherworld rather than any realm of this world:

<sup>6</sup> D. Frame, *The Origins of Greek NOYΣ* (unpubl. diss. Harvard 1971) 97-107: chap. IV.2, "Nestor's Original Function."

<sup>7</sup> See also H. Mühlestein, "Namen von Neleiden auf Pylostäfelchen," *Museum Helveticum* 22 (1965) 158.

<sup>8</sup> On which see R. Cantieni, *Die Nestorerzählung im XI. Gesang der Ilias* (Zürich 1942).

<sup>9</sup> Frame 97-102. Just as Nestor brings his cattle back to Pylos, so also another figure, Melampous, on whose solar significance see Frame 102f.

<sup>10</sup> Frame (passim), who also shows that sunrise is symbolically parallel with a return to consciousness, the Greek word for which was "νοῦς"; the etymological connotation of its root *NEZ-* is "return to life and light." Note especially Frame's discussion of ν 93 and following, where the "return" of Odysseus coincides with sunrise: 87f, 176.

<sup>11</sup> Frame 104, 214n20.

<sup>12</sup> For details, see Frame 101-104.

ἐν Πύλῳ ἐν νεκύεσσι

(E 397)

Hades himself is the *πυλάρτης* (Θ 367, etc.), that is, "he who closes the gates." In sum, the thematic associations of *Πύλος* imply that the Gate of the Sun is also the Gate of the Underworld, so that we have a parallel to the context of *Ἡελίοιο πύλας* in ω 12. Accordingly, the Homeric expression *πύλας Αἴδαο περήσειν* (E 646; cf. Ψ 71) implies that the *ψυχαί* of the dead traverse to the underworld through the same passage traveled by the sun when it sets.

In the instance of *δῆμον ὀνείρων* (ω 12), the concept of a community of dreams situated past the Gates of Hades is thematically consistent with other Homeric expressions involving dreams. After a person dies, his *ψυχή* flies off like a dream:

ἐπεὶ κε πρῶτα λίπη λεύκ' ὀστέα θυμός,  
ψυχὴ δ' ἥντ' ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται

(λ 221-223)

Hermes, who is conducting the *ψυχαί* of the dead Suitors (ω 1), is also the conductor of dreams, *ἡγήτορ' ὀνείρων* (H *Hermes* 14). Since it is Hermes who leads the *ψυχαί* of the Suitors past the Gates of the Sun (ω 11), it is significant that another of his inherited epithets is *πυληδόκος* (H *Hermes* 15), to be interpreted as "he who receives [the *ψυχαί*] at the Gates."<sup>13</sup> These are the Gates of Hades, or we may call them the Gates of the Sun. But there is also another name available. Since Hermes conducts dreams as well as the ghosts of the dead, and since dreams move like ghosts, it is not surprising that dreams too have gates:

δοιαὶ γὰρ τε πύλαι ἀμενηνῶν εἰσὶν ὀνείρων

(τ 562; cf. δ 809)<sup>14</sup>

Since the *Ἡελίοιο πύλας* are already mentioned in ω 12, we may expect *δῆμον ὀνείρων* in the same line to be a periphrastic substitute for a redundant concept "Gates of Dreams."

<sup>13</sup> This epithet serves as a counter-example to the argument of Page (n5) 117, that in Homeric poetry Hermes functions as psychopomp only in *Odyssey* ω. See also C. H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (Cambridge 1958) 217f, on *Iliad* Ω; also Frame 176-178.

<sup>14</sup> As for the epithet of *ὀνείρων* here, it is applied exclusively to the dead in its other attestations from the *Odyssey*: *νεκύων ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα* (κ 521, 536, λ 29, 49). For a detailed study of τ 562-567, see A. Amory, "The Gates of Horn and Ivory," *Yale Classical Studies* 20 (1966) 1-57.



In the instance of *Λευκάδα πέτρην* (ω 11), we find no parallel in Homeric theme and diction. All we can say about the White Rock at this point is that its collocation with *δῆμον ὀνείρων* (ω 12) seems parallel to Alkman's expression *τῶν ὑποπετριδίων ὀνείρων*. Nevertheless, the exegetical problem remains.

As we begin to examine the attestations of *Λευκάς πέτρα* beyond Homer, we come upon the third exegetical problem, concerning the White Rock and Phaon:

οὐδ' δὴ λέγεται πρώτη Σαπφῶ  
τὸν ὑπέρκομπον θηρώσα Φάων'  
οἰστρῶντι πόθῳ ῥῦσαι πέτρας  
ἀπὸ τηλεφανοῦς. ἀλλὰ κατ' εὐχὴν  
σὴν, δέσποτ' ἄναξ, εὐφημείσθω  
τέμενος περὶ Λευκάδος ἀκτῆς

(Menander, fr. 258K)<sup>15</sup>

This fragment, alluding to a story about Sappho jumping into the sea for love of Phaon, is from a play of Menander's entitled *The Leukadia*. We infer from Menander's lines that Sappho leapt off the White Rock of Leukas in pursuit of Phaon. It is to Strabo that we owe the preservation of these lines (10.2.9). He is in the process of describing Cape Leukas, a prominent white rock jutting out from Leukas into the sea and towards Kephallenia.<sup>16</sup> From this rock, Sappho is supposed to have jumped into the sea after Phaon. Strabo goes on to describe a shrine of Apollo Leukatas situated on Cape Leukas and an ancestral cult practice connected with it. Every year, he reports, some criminal was cast down from the white rock into the sea below for the sake of averting evil, *ἀποτροπῆς χάριν*. Wings and even birds would be fastened to him, and men in fishing boats would be stationed below the rock in order to retrieve the victim after his plunge.

As Wilamowitz has convincingly argued,<sup>17</sup> Menander chose for his play a setting which was known for its exotic cult practice involving a white rock and conflated it in the quoted passage with a literary motif likewise involving a white rock. There are two surviving attestations of this motif:

<sup>15</sup> This passage must have belonged to the introductory anapests of the play (*ΣΑ* to Hephaestion, de poem. 6.3).

<sup>16</sup> Corinthian settlers called the entire territory Leukas, after Cape Leukas; cf. Strabo 10.2.8.

<sup>17</sup> U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Sappho und Simonides, Untersuchungen über griechische Lyriker* (Berlin 1913) 25-40.

- 1) ἄρθεις δηῦτ' ἀπὸ Λευκάδος  
πέτρης ἐς πολὺν κύμα κολυμβῶ μεθύων ἔρωτι  
(Anakreon 376P)<sup>18</sup>
- 2) ὥς ἐκπιεῖν γ' ἂν κύλικα μαινοίμην μίαν  
πάντων Κυκλώπων <μὴ> ἀντιδοῦς βοσκήματα<sup>19</sup>  
ῥῖφαί τ' ἐς ἄλμην Λευκάδος πέτρας ἄπο  
ἅπαξ μεθυσθεὶς καταβαλὼν τε τὰς ὄφρυς.  
ὥς ὅς γε πίνων μὴ γέγηθε μαίνεται  
(Euripides, *Cyclops* 163–168)<sup>20</sup>

In both instances, falling from the white rock is parallel to falling into a swoon — be it from intoxication or from making love. As for Menander's allusion to Sappho's plunge from a "Λευκάς," Wilamowitz reasonably infers that the poetess must have used a similar motif, which does not survive. Within the framework of this motif, Sappho must have pictured herself as driven by love for a certain Phaon, or at least so it was understood by the time New Comedy flourished.<sup>21</sup> The question is, why should Sappho seem to be in love with a mythical figure?

About Phaon himself we have no textual evidence beyond the meager reports gathered in Sappho fr. 211LP. It appears that he was an old ferryman, *πορθμεύς*, who was transformed into a beautiful youth by Aphrodite herself. Also, the goddess fell in love with this beautiful Phaon and hid him in a head of lettuce. Besides specifically attesting the latter myth in Kratinos, Athenaios (2.69) also cites striking parallels in Euboulos and Kallimachos; Adonis too was hidden in a head of lettuce by Aphrodite.<sup>22</sup> This thematic parallelism of Aphrodite/Phaon and Aphrodite/Adonis becomes more important as we come to another myth about the second pair.

According to the account in Book VII of the mythographer Ptolemaios Chennos (ca. A.D. 100),<sup>23</sup> the first to dive off the heights of Cape

<sup>18</sup> For an appreciation of the contextual nuances in δηῦτε, I recommend as a fascinating esthetic exercise the consecutive reading of the Lyric passages cited by Campbell (n4) 266, with reference to lines 15, 16, 18 of Sappho 1LP.

<sup>19</sup> For a discussion of Kirchhoff's restoration μῆ, see Wilamowitz (n17) 30–31n2; following Wilamowitz, Dieterich (n55) vii, retracts his earlier reading without μῆ.

<sup>20</sup> My translation: "I would be crazy not to give all the herds of the Cyclopes in return for drinking one cup [of that wine] and plunging from the white rock into the brine, once I am drunk, with eyebrows relaxed. Whoever is not happy when he drinks is crazy."

<sup>21</sup> Wilamowitz (n17) 33–37.

<sup>22</sup> Kratinos fr. 330K, Euboulos fr. 14K, Kallimachos fr. 478P.

<sup>23</sup> A. Westermann, ed., *ΜΥΘΟΓΡΑΦΟΙ: Scriptores poeticae historiae graeci* (Brunswick 1843) 197–199; via Photios, Bibl. 152f Bekker.

Leukas was none other than Aphrodite herself, out of love for a dead Adonis. After Adonis has died (how it happened is not said), Aphrodite goes searching for him and finally finds him at "Cypriote Argos," in the shrine of Apollo *Ἐπίθιος*. She consults Apollo, who instructs her to seek relief from her love by jumping off the white rock of Leukas, where Zeus sits whenever he wants relief from his passion for Hera. Then Ptolemaios launches into a veritable catalogue of other figures who followed Aphrodite's precedent and took a ritual plunge as a cure for love. For example, Queen Artemisia I is reputed to have leapt off the white rock out of love for one Dardanos, succeeding only in getting herself killed. Several others are mentioned who died from the leap, including a certain iambographer Charinos who expired only after being fished out of the water with a broken leg, but not before blurting out his four last iambic trimeters, painfully preserved for us with the compliments of Ptolemaios (and Photios as well). Someone called "Makes" was more fortunate: having succeeded in escaping from four love affairs after four corresponding leaps from the white rock, he earned the epithet "Leukopetras." Wilamowitz rightly questions the full historicity of such accounts,<sup>24</sup> but he fails to point out a far more significant fact. In the lengthy and detailed account of Ptolemaios, Sappho is not mentioned at all, let alone Phaon. From this silence I infer that the source of this myth about Aphrodite and Adonis is independent of Sappho's own poetry or of later distortions based on it.<sup>25</sup> Accordingly, the ancient cult practice at Cape Leukas, as described by Strabo (10.2.9), may well contain some intrinsic element which inspired lovers' leaps, a practice also noted by Strabo (*ibid.*). The second practice seems to be derived from the first, as we might expect from a priestly institution which becomes independent of the social matrix that had engendered it. Abstracted from their inherited tribal functions, religious institutions have a way of becoming mystical organizations.<sup>26</sup>

Another reason for doubting that Sappho's poetry had been the inspiration for the lovers' leaps at Cape Leukas, *pace* Wilamowitz, is the attitude of Strabo himself. He specifically disclaims Menander's version about Sappho's being the first to take the plunge at Leukas. Instead, he offers a version of the *ἀρχαιολογικώτεροι*, that Kephalos son of Deioneus was the first, impelled by love for Pterelas (Strabo

<sup>24</sup> Wilamowitz (n17) 28.

<sup>25</sup> *Pace* Wilamowitz (n17) 28.

<sup>26</sup> For an articulate discussion of this general tendency, see H. Jeanmaire, *Couroi et Courètes, Essai sur l'éducation spartiate et sur les rites d'adolescence dans l'antiquité hellénique* (Lille 1939), especially p. 310 on the Mysteries.



10.2.9). Again, I see no reason to take it for granted that this myth concerning historical *Λευκάς* had resulted from some distortion of the cult's features because of Sappho's literary influence.<sup>27</sup> The myth of Kephalos and his dive may be as old as the concept of *Λευκάς*. I say "concept" because the cult practice of casting victims from a white rock such as that of Leukas may be an inheritance parallel to the Epic tradition about a mythical White Rock on the shores of the Okeanos (as in *ω 11*) and the related literary motif of diving from an imaginary White Rock (as in *Anakreon* and *Euripides*). In other words, it is needless to assume that the cult preceded the myth or vice versa. Actually, there are other historical places besides Cape Leukas which are associated with myths about diving. For example, Charon of Lampsakos (v B.C., FGrH iii 262.7)<sup>28</sup> reports that Phobos the Kodrid, founder of Lampsakos, was the first to leap *ἀπὸ τῶν Λευκάδων πετρῶν*, located apparently on the north shore of the Smyrnaean Gulf, not far from Phokaia.<sup>29</sup> Compare, too, the myth about the death of Theseus. He was pushed by Lykomedes and fell into the sea from the high rocks of the island *Σκῦρος* (*Herakleides* 1.2 in FHG 2.208; *Pausanias* 1.17.6; *Σ Aristophanes*, *Ploutos* 627). As Gruppe has pointed out, the island derives its name *Σκῦρος* from its white rocks; see LSJ s.vv. *σκῦρος* and *σκῖρος/σκίρρος*.<sup>30</sup> In fact, the entire Theseus myth is replete with themes involving names derived from *ΣΚΥΡΟΣ/ΣΚΙΡΟΣ*. Even

<sup>27</sup> Pace Wilamowitz (n17) 27.

<sup>28</sup> *Ap.* Plutarch, *mul.uit.* 255.

<sup>29</sup> See F. Jacoby, FGrH iii 262.7, p. 16, of commentary.

<sup>30</sup> O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte* I (Munich 1906) 585. The basic meaning of *σκῖρος* "hard rock" (→ "chalk, gypsum") survives in the variant reading for *Ψ* 332f, preserved by Aristarchos (*Σ Townley*). Nestor is telling about a landmark, an old tree trunk (*Ψ* 326–328),

*λαε δὲ τοῦ ἐκάτερθεν ἐρηρέδαται δύο λευκῷ*

(*Ψ* 329)

In the Vulgate, this formation of two white rocks propped up on a tree trunk is described as either a *σῆμα* or a *νύσσα* belonging to a past generation:

*ἢ τευ σῆμα βροτοῖο πάλαι κατατεθνηῶτος  
ἢ τό γε νύσσα τέτυκτο ἐπὶ προτέρων ἀνθρώπων,  
καὶ νῦν τέρματ' ἔθηκε ποδάρκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς*

(*Ψ* 331–333)

Instead of 332–333, Aristarchos reads

*ἢ ἐ σκῖρος ἔην, νῦν αὖ θέτο τέρματ' Ἀχιλλεύς.*

In the *Tabulae Heracleenses* (1.19, 144), *σκῖρος* designates a rocky area unfit for planting, on which trees grow wild. For a useful discussion of words formed with *ΣΚΙΡ-*, see C. Robert, "Athena Skiras und die Skirophorien," *Hermes* 20 (1885) 349–379.

the "grandfather" of Theseus is Σκύριος (Apollodoros 3.15.5), while Theseus himself casts Σκίρων off the Σκιρωνίδες πέτραι (Strabo 9.1.4; Plutarch, Theseus 10; Pausanias 1.44.8).<sup>31</sup> For the moment, I merely note in passing the ritual nature of the various plunges associated with Theseus and his "father" Aigeus,<sup>32</sup> and the implications of agonistic death and mystical rebirth in both cult and myth.<sup>33</sup>

A more immediate concern is that the mythological examples I have cited so far do not attest the lovelorn motif as a feature of the plunges from white rocks. There is, however, a more basic sexual motif associated with the Θορίκιος πέτρος "Leap Rock" of Attic Kolonos (Sophokles, *Oidipous at Kolonos* 1595). Kolonos itself, meaning "summit," is proverbially white (ἄργής κολωνός: Sophokles, *OK* 670). As for the name Θορίκιος, it is formally derived from θορός "semen" (Herodotos 2.93) via the adjective θορικός; the noun θορός is in turn built on the aorist θορεῖν of the verb θρόσσω "leap."<sup>34</sup> Even the verb can have the side-meaning "mount, fecundate" (Aischylos, fr. 133N, Eumenides 660). From the form Θορίκιος itself, it is difficult to ascertain whether the name may connote leaping as well as fecundating. And yet, thematic associations of the formally related name Θόρικος suggest that leaping is indeed involved. The provenience of Kephalos (son of Deioneus), who leapt from the white rock of Leukas (Strabo 10.2.9), is actually this very Thorikos, a town and deme on the southeast coast of Attica (Apollodoros 2.4.7).<sup>35</sup> The sexual element inherent in

<sup>31</sup> Pausanias tell us (*ibid.*) that the specific name of Skiron's white rock was Molouris, and that it was sacred to Leukothea. It is from the Molouris that Leukothea flung herself into the sea with her "son" Melikertes (Pausanias 1.44.7). At the top of Molouris is a shrine of Zeus Aphesios, the "Releaser" (Pausanias 1.44.8).

<sup>32</sup> As for the agency of *Lykomedes* in the plunge of Theseus, compare the agency of *Lykourgos* in the plunge of Dionysos (*Z* 130-141). Notice too the words describing what happened to Dionysos after he dove into the sea:

Θέτις δ' ὑπεδέξατο κόλπῳ

(*Z* 136)

For the ritual significance of the wolf motif, see Jeanmaire (n26) 581.

<sup>33</sup> For a detailed discussion, see Jeanmaire 324-337. Note generally the parallelism between ritual of initiation (cult) and fiction of death (myth).

<sup>34</sup> H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* I (Heidelberg 1960) 689; P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* II (Paris 1970) 444.

<sup>35</sup> The leap of Kephalos into the sea was at first probably localized in Thorikos and only later transposed to Cape Leukas. For a discussion of the political motivations for such a mythographical transposition, see O. Gruppe, "Die eherne Schwelle und der Thorikische Stein," *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 15 (1912) 373.

the motif of a white rock recurs in a myth about Kolonos. Poseidon fell asleep in this area and had an emission of semen, from which issued the horse Skironites:

ἄλλοι δέ φασιν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοὺς πέτρους τοῦ ἐν Ἀθήναις  
Κολωνοῦ καθευδήσας ἀπὸ σπέρματός γε καὶ ἵππος Σκύφιος ἐξῆλθεν,  
ὁ καὶ Σκιρωνίτης<sup>36</sup> λεγόμενος

(Σ Lykophron 766)

The name Skironites again conjures up the theme of Theseus, son of Poseidon, and his plunge from the white rocks of Skyros.<sup>37</sup> This Attic myth is parallel to the Thessalian myth of Skyphios:

Πετραῖος τιμᾶται Ποσειδῶν παρὰ Θεσσαλοῖς, . . . ὅτι ἐπὶ τινος  
πέτρας κοιμηθεὶς ἀπὸ σπέρματος, καὶ τὸν θορόν δεξαμένη ἡ γῆ  
ἀνέδωκεν ἵππον πρῶτον, ὃν ἐπεκάλεσαν Σκύφιον

(Σ Pindar, Pythian 4.246)

There is a further report about this first horse ever created:

φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀγῶνα διατίθεσθαι τῷ Πετραίῳ Ποσειδῶνι, ὅπου  
ἀπὸ τῆς πέτρας ἐξεπήδησεν ὁ πρῶτος ἵππος

(Σ Pindar, *ibid.*)<sup>38</sup>

The myth of Skironites/Skyphios, featuring the motifs of leaping, sexual relief, and the state of unconsciousness, may help us understand those puzzling verses of Anakreon 376P, since they too seem to contain the same motifs:

ἄρθοις δὴ τ' ἀπὸ Λευκάδος  
πέτρης ἐς πολὺν κύμα κολυμβῶ μεθύων ἔρωτι.

The motif of jumping is overt, and the motif of sexual relief is latent in the poetry,<sup>39</sup> while the situation is reversed in the myth. In the poem,

<sup>36</sup> The reading Σκιρων- is correct, not Σκειρων-, as we know from the evidence of vase inscriptions; see P. Kretschmer, *Die griechischen Vaseninschriften, ihrer Sprache nach untersucht* (Gütersloh 1894) 131ff.

<sup>37</sup> Gruppe (n35) 372 argues that Kolonos marks one of the places claimed to be the spot where Theseus descended into the underworld.

<sup>38</sup> The rock associated with Skyphios is the Πέτρη Αἰμονίη: Apollonios, *Argonautika* 3.1244, and scholia. Note too the Argive custom of sacrificing horses by throwing them into the sea (Pausanias 8.7.2). See M. P. Nilsson, *Griechische Feste* (Leipzig 1906) 71f.

<sup>39</sup> If plunging is symbolic of sexual relief, it follows that the opposite is symbolic of sexual frustration:

ἀναπέτομαι δὴ πρὸς Ὀλυμπον πτερύγεσσι κούφης  
διὰ τὸν ἔρωτ'. οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ — ὦ θέλει συνηβᾶν

(Anakreon 378P)



the unconsciousness comes from what is likened to a drunken stupor; in the myth, it comes from sleep.<sup>40</sup> As for the additional motif of a horse in the myth, consider again the emblem of Hagesichora's charms, that wondrous horse of Alkman's Lakonian fantasy, who is "from those dreams under the Rock,"

τῶν ὑποπετριδίων ὀνείρων

(Partheneion 49)

Finally, notice that just as Poseidon obtains sexual relief through the unconsciousness of sleeping at the white rocks of Kolonos, so also Zeus is cured of his passion for Hera by sitting on the white rock of Apollo's Leukas. At Magnesia, those who were *ἱεροί* to Apollo would leap from precipitous rocks into the river *Ληθαῖος* (Pausanias 10.32.6). In the underworld, Theseus and Peirithoos sat on the *θρόνος τῆς Λήθης* (Panyassis fr. 9K; Apollodoros, ep. 1.24). I have already quoted the passage from the *Cyclops* of Euripides (163-168) where getting drunk is equated with leaping from a proverbial white rock. Notice the wording of the verses which immediately follow that equation, describing what it is like to be in the realm of drunken stupor:

ἵν' ἔστι τουτί τ' ὀρθὸν ἐξανιστάναι  
μαστοῦ τε δραγμὸς καὶ παρεσκευασμένου  
ψαῦσαι χεροῖν λειμῶνος, ὀρχηστὺς θ' ἅμα  
κακῶν τε λῆστις

(*Cyclops* 169-172)

Again, we see the theme of sexual relief and the key word *λήστις*. In sum, the White Rock is the boundary delimiting the conscious and the unconscious — be it a trance, stupor, sleep, or even death. Accordingly, when the Suitors are led past the White Rock (ω 11), they reach the *δῆμος ὀνείρων* (ω 12); beyond that is the realm of the dead (ω 14).

Even with the accumulation of this much evidence about the symbolism of the White Rock, it is still difficult to see how it relates to the mythical figure Phaon and how he relates to Sappho. One approach which might yield more information is to study the mythical figure Phaethon, who shares several characteristics with Adonis and Phaon. Wilamowitz has attempted such a study of Phaethon, but his conclusion

<sup>40</sup> Note the association of wine with the shade from a rock in the diction of Hesiod:

εἴη πετραίη τε σκῆ καὶ βίβλινος οἶνος

(*Works and Days* 589; see further at 592-596)

that Phaethon represents the morning/evening star in Hesiod has been convincingly refuted by Diggle.<sup>41</sup>

Diggle has not disproved, however, the striking parallelisms of the Phaethon figure with Adonis and Phaon. For now, I postpone the details and citations, offering here only the essentials. Like Adonis and Phaon, Phaethon is loved by Aphrodite, and like them he is hidden by her. Like Adonis, Phaethon dies. Like Phaon, Phaethon means "bright" (for the morphology of  $\Phi\acute{\alpha}\omega\nu$  /  $\Phi\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\theta\omega\nu$ , compare Homeric  $\phi\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$  /  $\phi\lambda\epsilon\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\theta\omega$ ). Unlike Phaon, however, the Phaethon figure confronts us with an enormous mass of unwieldy and conflicting details, some of which I propose to examine in the next section.

## II

In the commentary to his edition of the *Hesiodic Theogony*, West observes that  $\Phi\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\theta\omega\nu$  (line 987), like  $\Upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$ , is a hypostasis of the sun-god  $\text{Ἡ}\lambda\iota\omicron\varsigma$ .<sup>42</sup> The original thematic identity of  $\text{Ἡ}\lambda\iota\omicron\varsigma$  with  $\Upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$  and  $\Phi\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\theta\omega\nu$  is apparent in Epic diction, where  $\upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$  ( $\alpha$  8, etc.) and  $\phi\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\theta\omega\nu$  ( $\Lambda$  735, etc.) are fixed epithets of  $\text{Ἡ}\lambda\iota\omicron\varsigma$ . The mythological separation of identities is symbolized in genealogical terms: in one case,  $\Upsilon\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omega\nu$  is the father of  $\text{Ἡ}\lambda\iota\omicron\varsigma$  ( $\mu$  176, *Theogony* 371–374), while in the other,  $\Phi\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\theta\omega\nu$  is the son of  $\text{Ἡ}\lambda\iota\omicron\varsigma$ . The latter relationship is a basic feature of the myth treated by Euripides in the tragedy *Phaethon*, the fragments of which have been recently re-edited by Diggle.<sup>43</sup> What follows is an outline of the myth as found in the Euripidean version.

Phaethon, the story goes, was raised as the son of Merops and Klymene. His real father, however, is not the mortal Merops but the sun-god Helios. At his mother's behest, Phaethon travels to Aithiopia, the abode of Helios, in a quest to prove that the Sun is truly his father. He borrows the chariot of Helios for a day; driving too near the earth he sets it afire. Zeus then strikes him dead with his thunderbolt, and Phaethon falls from the sky. For other attestations of the same myth, including Ovid's well-known treatment (*Metamorphoses* 1.750–2.328), I refer to the diligent and critical survey by Diggle.<sup>44</sup>

The basic motifs of this Phaethon story are founded on mythological universals. There are notable typological parallels, for example, in

<sup>41</sup> J. Diggle, *Phaethon* (Cambridge 1970) 11–15, of the Prolegomena; see also Wilamowitz (n17) 36–40.

<sup>42</sup> M. L. West, *Hesiod/Theogony* (Oxford 1966) 427.

<sup>43</sup> Diggle (n41).

<sup>44</sup> Diggle 3–32.

the myths of the Kwakiutl and Bella Coola Indians, British Columbia. From the material collected by the anthropologist Boas,<sup>45</sup> the following outline emerges. The Sun impregnates a woman, who bears him a son (called Born-to-be-the-Sun in the Kwakiutl version). When the boy goes to visit his father, he is permitted to take the Sun's place. Exceeding his limits, the boy sets the earth on fire, whereupon he is cast down from the sky.<sup>46</sup>

There seems to be, *a priori*, a naturalistic element in these myths. The personalized image of the sun's surrogate descending from the sky is parallel, let us say, to the actual setting of the sun. In the specific instance of the Phaethon myth, his fall has indeed been interpreted as a symbol of sunset.<sup>47</sup> I intend to reword this interpretation later, but at the moment I am ready to argue that there is at least a thematic connection between the Phaethon story and the actual process of sunset as described in Greek Epic diction. An essential link is the parallelism between Okeanos and Eridanos, the river into which Phaethon falls from the sky (Choirylos fr. 4N; Ion of Chios fr. 62N). By the banks of this river Eridanos, the daughters of the Sun mourn for the fallen Phaethon:

ἀρθείην δ' ἐπὶ πόντιον  
 κύμα τᾶς Ἀδριηνᾶς  
 ἄκτᾶς Ἑριδανοῦ θ' ὕδαρ,  
 ἔνθα πορφύρεον σταλάσ-  
 σουσ' εἰς οἶδμα τέλειναι  
 κόραι Φαέθοντος οἴκτω δακρύων  
 τὰς ἡλεκτροφαεῖς αὐγὰς

(Euripides, Hippolytos 735-741)

To understand the meaning of the Eridanos, we must review the role of Okcanos in Epic diction. Before I even begin such a laborious review,

<sup>45</sup> See F. Boas, *Kwakiutl Tales* (New York and Leyden 1910: Columbia University Contributions to Anthropology II) 123, 125, 127; also Boas, *The Mythology of the Bella Coola Indians* (New York 1898: Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History II: The Jesup North Pacific Expedition) 100-103.

<sup>46</sup> For detailed comparisons with the Greek myth, see J. G. Frazer, *Apollodorus* II (London/New York 1921: Loeb) 388-394, Appendix xi: "Phaethon and the Chariot of the Sun."

<sup>47</sup> C. Robert, "Die Phaethonsage bei Hesiod," *Hermes* 18 (1883) 440: "Allabendlich stürzt der Sonnengott im Westen nieder und allabendlich erglänzen das Firmament und die Berge in roter Glut, als sollte die Welt in Flammen aufgehen. Es brauchte nun bloss dieser regelmässig wiederkehrende Vorgang als einmaliges Ereignis aufgefasst und der Sonnengott Helios-Phaethon zu dem Heros, dem Sonnenkind Phaethon, hypostasiert zu werden und der Mythos war fertig."



I wish to apprise the reader of my eventual conclusion. Like the White Rock and the Gate of the Sun, the Okeanos and Eridanos are symbolic boundaries delimiting light and darkness, life and death, wakefulness and sleep, consciousness and unconsciousness. Birth, death, and the concept of *NEΣ*-, which Frame explains as “return to life and light” (passim), are the key acts which cross these boundaries.

The Okeanos marks the extremities of Earth, as when Hera says:

ἔρχομαι ὀψομένη πολυφόρβου πείρατα γαίης  
Ὠκεανόν τε

(*Ξ* 301f)

It is from Okeanos that Helios the Sun rises:

Ἡέλιος μὲν ἔπειτα νέον προσέβαλλεν ἀρούρας,  
ἐξ ἀκαλαρρείταο βαθυρρόου Ὠκεανοῖο  
οὐρανὸν εἰσανιών

(*H* 421-423; cf. *τ* 433f)

Likewise, it is into Okeanos that the Sun falls at sunset:

ἐν δ' ἔπεσ' Ὠκεανῷ λαμπρὸν φάος Ἡελίοιο

(*Θ* 485)

Thus Okeanos must surround the Earth.

Those who die also fall into Okeanos, as when Penelope says:

Ἄρτεμι, πότνα θεά, θύγατερ Διός, αἶθε μοι ἤδη  
ἰὼν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι βαλοῦσ' ἐκ θυμὸν ἔλοιο  
αὐτίκα νῦν, ἣ ἔπειτα μ' ἀναρπάξασα θύελλα  
οἴχοιτο προφέρονσα κατ' ἡερόεντα κέλευθα,  
ἐν προχοῇς δὲ βάλοι ἀψορρόου Ὠκεανοῖο

(*υ* 61-65)

Bordering on the Okeanos is the land of the Aithiopes:

Ζεὺς γὰρ ἐς Ὠκεανὸν μετ' ἀμύμονας Αἰθιοπῆας  
χθιζὸς ἔβη κατὰ δαῖτα

(*A* 423f)

εἶμι γὰρ αὖτις ἐπ' Ὠκεανοῖο ῥέεθρα,  
Αἰθιοπῶν ἐς γαῖαν, ὅθι ῥέζουσ' ἐκατόμβας  
ἀθανάτοισι, ἵνα δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ μεταδαίσομαι ἱρῶν

(*Ψ* 265-207)

Just as the Okeanos flows both in the extreme East and in the extreme West, so also the land of the Aithiopes is located in the two extremities:

Αἰθίοπες, τοὶ διχθὰ δεδαίεσθαι, ἔσχατοι ἀνδρῶν,  
οἱ μὲν δυσομένου Ὑπερίονος, οἱ δ' ἀνιόντος

(α 23f)

This instance of *coincidentia oppositorum*, a mythological motif where identity consists of two opposites,<sup>48</sup> is reinforced thematically in μ 1 and following. In this passage, there are two opposite places which add up to the same place. From the overall plot of the *Odyssey*, we know that Odysseus is wandering in the realms of the extreme West when he comes upon the island of Aiaie (κ 135). It is from Aiaie, island of Kirke, that Odysseus is sent on his way to the underworld by traveling beyond the sea until he and his men reach the Okeanos:

αὐτοὶ δ' αὖτε παρὰ ῥόον Ὀκεανοῖο  
ῥομεν, ὄφρ' ἐς χῶρον ἀφικόμεθ' ὃν φράσε Κίρκη

(λ 21f)<sup>49</sup>

Later, on the way back from the underworld, the ship of Odysseus leaves the Okeanos and returns to Aiaie, which is now described as situated not in the extreme West but in the extreme East. In fact, Aiaie now turns out to be the abode of Eos and sunrise:

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ποταμοῖο λίπεν ῥόον Ὀκεανοῖο  
νηὺς, ἀπὸ δ' ἔκετο κῦμα θαλάσσης εὐρυπόροιο  
νησόν τ' Αἰαίην, ὅθι τ' Ὁυῖς ἠριγενείης  
οἰκία καὶ χοροὶ εἰσι καὶ ἀντολαὶ Ἥελίοιο

(μ 1-4)<sup>50</sup>

The head-spinning directional placements of mythical Okeanos in the Epic tradition lead to confused and divergent localizations in later traditions. On rational grounds, Herodotos ridicules the concept of an Okeanos surrounding Earth (4.36), but he uses the name in the still-current acceptance "Ocean" when he designates the seas in the vicinity of Gades/Cadiz (4.8). Consider also Pindar's *Pythian* 4.251, where the Argonauts reach the Red Sea via Okeanos.

Similarly with Eridanos, there are several exotic localizations of this mythical river. Aischylos places it in Spain and identifies it with the Rhône (fr. 73N = 107M; Pliny, NH 37.2.31f),<sup>51</sup> while Euripides

<sup>48</sup> M. Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion* (tr. R. Sheed, *Traité d'histoire des religions*; Cleveland/New York 1963) 419-423, 428f.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Frame (n6) 57-60, who also discusses the thematic intrusion of a northerly direction into the narrative.

<sup>50</sup> See also Frame 68-73.

<sup>51</sup> Diggle (n41) 27-32.

imagines it emptying into the Gulf of Venice (*Hippolytos* 736f). Rejecting still another such contrivance, Herodotos specifically volunteers that Eridanos is myth rather than reality (3.115; cf. Strabo 5.215). The basic difference in the post-Epic treatments of Eridanos and Okeanos is that the former still counts as a river while the latter, thanks to expanding geographical information about the Atlantic, came to designate the varied concepts of "Ocean."

From the standpoint of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, however, the Okeanos is a ποταμός (*Σ* 607, λ 639; cf. *Theogony* 242); it surrounds the Earth, and for that reason the macro- and microcosmic visual themes on Achilles' Shield are actually framed by a pictorial Okeanos along the circular rim (*Σ* 607f; cf. Hesiodic Shield 314). To repeat, the sun drops into the Okeanos (*Θ* 485) and rises from it (*Η* 421-24, τ 433f); ultimately, all rivers and streams flow from it (*Φ* 195-197). With such a thematic heritage from the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, it is not surprising that the name Okeanos came to designate the "Ocean" in post-Homeric times.

From the standpoint of Epic in general, the more obscure Eridanos is thematically parallel to Okeanos. In fact, Eridanos is the "son" of Okeanos, according to Hesiod (*Theogony* 337f); this relationship would be insignificant, since Okeanos sired several major rivers,<sup>52</sup> if it were not for other special features of Eridanos. Besides the distinction of being mentioned straightaway in the first line of the catalogue of rivers (338 of 338-345), Eridanos gets the epithet βαθυδίνης, which is otherwise reserved for Okeanos himself in the *Theogony* (133; also *Works and Days* 171).<sup>53</sup> The magic horses of Achilles are born in the following manner:

τοὺς ἔτεκε Ζεφύρῳ ἀνέμῳ ἄρπυια Ποδάργη  
βοσκομένη λειμῶνι παρὰ ῥόον Ὀκεανοῖο

(π 150f)

Significantly, there survives a variant reading for Ὀκεανοῖο in this passage, namely, Ἡριδανοῖο. (Note the thematic parallelism of Ὀκεανός / Ἡριδανός here with the Θορίκιος πέτρος: wondrous horses were born at either place, and the name Σκιρωνίτης conjures up a mythical White Rock.)

I turn now to parallelisms between Okeanos and Eridanos which relate directly to the Phaethon figure. We know from Pliny's testimony

<sup>52</sup> *Theogony* 337-345. Some of the rivers in this catalogue are real while others are only mythical: see West (n42) 259-263.

<sup>53</sup> I propose to study elsewhere the application of βαθυδίνης to Alpheios (Hesiod fr. 193.9MW) and to Skamandros/Xanthos (*Υ* 73, *Φ* passim).



(NH 37.2.31f) that in Aischylos' treatment of the Phaethon myth, the daughters of the Sun were turned into poplars on the banks of the Eridanos (A. fr. 73N = 107M), into which river Phaethon had fallen (Choirylos fr. 4N; Ion of Chios fr. 62N).<sup>54</sup> There is a parallel association in the *Odyssey*, where poplars grow on the banks of the Okeanos, at the edge of the underworld:

ἀλλ' ὅπότε' ἂν δὴ νηὶ δι' Ὠκεανοῖο περήσῃς,  
 ἐνθ' ἄκτῇ τε λάχεια καὶ ἄλσεα Περσεφονείης,  
 μακραί τ' αἰγυριοὶ καὶ ἰτέαι ὠλεσίκαρποι,  
 νῆα μὲν αὐτοῦ κέλσαι ἐπ' Ὠκεανῷ βαθυδίνῃ  
 αὐτὸς δ' εἰς Αἴδεω ἰέναι δόμον εὐρώεντα

(κ 508-512)

Like Okeanos, Eridanos too is associated with the theme of transition into the underworld. Besides the specific instance of Phaethon's death, there are also other attestations linking Eridanos with the underworld. For example, in the *Codex Vaticanus* 909 of Euripides' *Orestes*, there is a scholion to verse 981 which reads

εἰς τὸν Ἡριδανὸν ποταμὸν κρέματα ὁ Τάνταλος.<sup>55</sup>

I conclude from such parallelisms between Eridanos and Okeanos that the fall of Phaethon into the Eridanos is an analogue to the fall of the sun into the Okeanos at sunset, as in Θ 485:

ἐν δ' ἔπεσ' Ὠκεανῷ λαμπρὸν φάος Ἥελίοιο.

There is also a genealogical dimension to this mythological analogy: just as Phaethon is the son of Helios, so also Eridanos is the son of Okeanos (as in *Theogony* 337f). In a pseudo-rationalist story of the mythographer Dionysios Skytobrachion (ii/i B.C.), who is not concerned with cult and its awareness of the Divine, Helios himself is cast in the role of plunging to his death in the Eridanos (*ap.* Diodoros 3.57.5).

It does not necessarily follow, however, that the Phaethon myth merely represents the sunset. I sympathize with Diggle's reluctance to accept Robert's theory<sup>56</sup> that "Phaethon's fall attempts to explain in mythical terms why the sun sinks blazing in the west as if crashing to earth in flames and yet returns to its task unimpaired the following

<sup>54</sup> J. Murr, *Die Pflanzenwelt in der griechischen Mythologie* (Innsbruck 1890) 17.

<sup>55</sup> See A. Dieterich, *Nekyia* (Leipzig/Berlin 1913) 27. For a more familiar reference to the underworld Eridanos, see Virgil, *Aeneid* 6.659 (also Servius on *Aeneid* 6.603). The name Eridanos also figures in the myths about Herakles in the Far West: Pherekydes, FGrH i 3.16f, 74.

<sup>56</sup> Robert (n47) 440.

day.”<sup>57</sup> Diggle’s reasoning is as follows: “Phaethon’s crash is an event out of the ordinary, a sudden and unexpected calamity, occurring once and not daily.”<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, in such matters I feel compelled to heed the intuitively appealing approach of Lévi-Strauss. A myth, he concedes, “always refers to events alleged to have taken place in time: before the world was created, or during its first stages — anyway, long ago.”<sup>59</sup> Nevertheless, “what gives the myth an operative value is that the specific pattern described is everlasting: it explains the present and the past as well as the future.”<sup>60</sup> Accordingly, I find it unnecessary to entertain Diggle’s alternative proposal, based only on naturalistic intuition, that the Phaethon myth represents the fall of a meteorite.<sup>61</sup> Diggle’s reasoning, like Robert’s, operates on the assumption that the message of the Phaethon myth is simply a metaphorical expression of some phenomenon that occurs in the sky. I disagree. The Phaethon myth presents a problem, not a solution. Furthermore, this problem involves *la condition humaine*, not just celestial dynamics. Consider again the analogues of the Phaethon myth from British Columbia. In the Bella Coola version, the boy is angry because other children laugh at him for claiming that his father is the sun. In the Kwakiutl version, Born-to-be-the-Sun, as yet unaware of his true identity, weeps when his playmate laughs at him for not having a father. The parallel *Angst* of Phaethon, ridiculed by his youthful friend, is well known from Ovid’s treatment:

erubuit Phaëthon iramque pudore repressit

(*Metamorphoses* 1.755)

We must not confuse the code of a myth with its message. Whatever its message, the Phaethon myth operates on a code of solar behavior combined with human behavior. For example, the motif of riding across the sky counts as a solar *function* for Helios but as a human *deed* for Phaethon. Phaethon may re-enact what Helios does because his father is the Sun, but he fails in his solar role because his mother is

<sup>57</sup> Diggle (n41) 10n3.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> C. Lévi-Strauss (writing in English), “The Structural Study of Myth,” *Myth: a Symposium*, ed. T. Sebeok (first published 1955, Bibliographical and Special Series of the American Folklore Society, vol. 5; reprinted by Indiana University Press, Bloomington/London 1958) 85. This important article of Lévi-Strauss is also available in his *Structural Anthropology* (French portions of the English edition tr. by C. Jacobson and B. G. Schoepf; New York 1967) 202–228.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Diggle (n41) 10n3.

human. The Phaethon figure projects a crisis of identity. He seeks proof that his father is really the sun, according to what he suspects, what his own name suggests, and what his mother actively affirms. This dilemma is fundamental to the myth dramatized by Euripides. Phaethon's mother, Klymene, assures him that Helios rather than Merops is his real father, and that Phaethon is entitled to one request from Helios. She promises Phaethon that if his request is granted, he will have proof that his origin is divine: θεοῦ πέφυκας (verse 48D). Phaethon wavers (εἵπερ πατήρ πέφυκεν: verse 51D), but finally decides to go to Helios:

‘Ἡλίου μολὼν δόμους  
τοὺς σοὺς ἐλέγξω, μήτερ, εἰ σαφεῖς λόγοι  
(vv. 61-62D)

His one request, to drive the chariot of Helios, is of course granted by his father. Ironically, however, this proof of his divine nature, inherited from his father, leads to a fiery death. His death in turn is proof of his human nature, inherited from his mother. The self-delusion of Phaethon is that he overrated the relationship with his father. His real identity is composed of two ingredients, part “father” = immortal, part “mother” = mortal, but his imagined identity is all “father,” that is, he imagines that he can function as an immortal since his father is immortal. His imagined identity impels him to assume the solar role of his father, but his real identity, part mortal, destines him to fail and die. Viewed from a standpoint outside the myth, Phaethon's real identity is indeed that of the Sun, by way of hypostasis. Inside the myth, however, this identity is simply Phaethon's imagination, and his real identity is only partially solar. The self-delusion of Phaethon is comparable to that of another tragic figure, Oedipus. The delusion of Oedipus is that he underrated the relationship with his wife. His real identity is both “husband” and “son” of the same woman, but his imagined identity is only “husband.”<sup>62</sup> A basic distinction between the delusions of Phaethon and Oedipus is that one forgets his real identity while the other is unaware of it. Forgetting that his mother is human, Phaethon tries to be the Sun. Not knowing who his mother is, Oedipus marries her. In both cases, the imagined identity is then tragically shattered.

Aside from the dilemma of being human, the Phaethon myth also tells us something about the mystery of the sun. *A priori*, we expect

<sup>62</sup> I benefit here from the discussion of Lévi-Strauss (n59) 89-93, who treats the Oedipus problem from several vantage-points, including Freud's. I should note that my use of the terms overrate/underrate differs from that of Lévi-Strauss.



Helios the sun-god to be immortal. In the diction of Greek Epic, he is counted among the ranks of the immortal gods. Yet the movements of the sun suggest the theme of death and rebirth. With the waning of day, the old sun submerges beyond the horizon into the west Okeanos; then, after night has passed, a new sun emerges from the east Okeanos with the waxing of another day. Given the inescapable fact of man's mortality, the fundamental dichotomy of man vs. god extends into the dichotomy of man = mortal vs. god = immortal, as we see throughout Greek Epic diction: ἀθάνατοι is a synonym of θεοί. Accordingly, it becomes inappropriate to associate any inherent death/rebirth of the sun directly with Helios the sun-god, who must be immortal. The Phaethon myth fills a gap. At sunset, when the sun undergoes a process naturally suggestive of death, it is personified not as Helios the sun-god but as Phaethon, child of the immortal Helios, also child of a mortal. The father Helios represents the divine permanence of the sun's cycle, while his child Phaethon represents the mortal aspect of the sun's alternating death/rebirth cycle. This dichotomy accommodates the original veneration of Helios as sun-god, still reflected in Homeric diction. Contrast the contrivance of Dionysios Skytobrachion (*ap.* Diodoros 3.57.5): no longer concerned with any inherent divine element in the sun, he features Helios himself in the role of Phaethon, and we are left with a secularistic allegory about sunset.

There is another Phaeton myth, preserved by Hesiod, which is preoccupied with both aspects of the solar cycle, not only death but also rebirth. I quote the entire text from the *Theogony* (West's edition):

Τιθωνῶ δ' Ἡὼς τέκε Μέμνονα χαλκοκορυστήν,  
 Αἰθιοπῶν βασιλῆα, καὶ Ἡμαθίωνα ἀνακτα.  
 αὐτὰρ τοι Κεφάλῳ φυτύσατο φαίδιμον υἱόν,  
 ἴφθιμον Φαέθοντα, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελον ἄνδρα.  
 τόν ῥα νέον τέρεν ἄνθος ἔχοντ' ἔρικυδέος ἥβης  
 παῖδ' ἄταλά φρονέοντα φιλομμειδῆς Ἀφροδίτῃ  
 ὦρτ' ἀνερειψαμένη, καί μιν ζαθέοις ἐνὶ νηοῖς  
 νηοπόλον μύχιον ποιήσατο, δαίμονα δῖον

(*Theogony* 984-991)

Underneath the surface, the first two lines of this quotation, where Eos mates with Tithonos, are thematically related to the next six, where Eos mates with Kephalos and Aphrodite mates with their son Phaethon. Notice that Aphrodite abducts Phaethon (ἀνερειψαμένη: 990). In the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, when Aphrodite seduces Anchises, she herself cites the abduction of Tithonos by Eos as precedent:

ὥς δ' αὖ Τιθωνὸν χρυσόθρονος ἤρπασεν Ἡώς  
(*H Aphrodite* 218)

Similarly, Eos abducts one Kleitos:

ἀλλ' ἦ τοι Κλεῖτον χρυσόθρονος ἤρπασεν Ἡώς  
κάλλεος εἵνεκα οἴο, ἵν' ἀθανάτοισι μετεῖη  
(o 250f)

Or again, the nymph Kalypso cites the abduction of Orion by Eos (ε 121-124) as a precedent for her abduction of Odysseus.<sup>63</sup>

Homeric diction preserves traces, albeit indirect, of the precise manner in which such abductions were envisaged. For a clearer impression, though, let us first examine the following verbs which designate the events:

*Aphrodite abducts Phaethon, Theogony* 990: ἀνερειψαμένη  
*Eos abducts Kephalos, Euripides, Hippolytos* 455: ἀνήρπασεν  
*Eos abducts Tithonos, H Aphrodite* 218: ἤρπασεν  
*Eos abducts Kleitos, o 250*: ἤρπασεν  
*Eos abducts Orion, ε 121*: ἔλετο.

There is another abduction which is parallel to these, that of Ganymedes. The parallelism is explicit in the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, where Aphrodite herself cites the fates of Ganymedes (verses 202-217) and Tithonos (218-238) as a precedent for the fate of Anchises. Notice that when the gods abduct Ganymedes for Zeus, it is for the following reason:

κάλλεος εἵνεκα οἴο, ἵν' ἀθανάτοισι μετεῖη  
(Υ 235)

Similarly, when Eos abducts Kleitos, it is for the following reason:

κάλλεος εἵνεκα οἴο, ἵν' ἀθανάτοισι μετεῖη  
(o 251)

These thematic parallelisms of Ganymedes/Tithonos and Ganymedes/Kleitos are important because the verb used in the *Iliad* to designate the abduction of the Ganymedes figure is ἀνερείψαντο (Υ 234), aorist indicative corresponding to the aorist participle ἀνερειψαμένη, which designates the abduction of the Phaethon figure (*Theogony* 990). Furthermore, in the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, the verb used to designate the

<sup>63</sup> Significantly, it can be shown on the basis of Epic diction that Kalypso is a hypostasis of Aphrodite herself, in the aspect *Μελαινίς*; see H. Güntert, *Kalypso, Bedeutungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiet der indogermanischen Sprachen* (Halle a.S. 1909), esp. p. 189.

abduction of Ganymedes is ἀνήρπασε (verse 208). Only, the subject here is more specific than the general θεοί, subject of ἀνηρεύσαντο in Y 234:

ὅππῃ οἱ φίλον υἷὸν ἀνήρπασε θέσπις ἄελλα  
(*H Aphrodite* 208)

Not only here but also in every other Homeric attestation of ἀνηρεύσαντο besides Y 234, the notion “gusts of wind” serves as subject of the verb. When Penelope bewails the unknown fate of her absent son Telemachos, she says:

νῦν αὖ παῖδ' ἀγαπητὸν ἀνηρεύσαντο θύελλαι  
(δ 727)

When Telemachos bewails the unknown fate of his absent father Odysseus, he says:

νῦν δέ μιν ἀκλειῶς ἄρπυιαι ἀνηρεύσαντο  
(α 241)

The identical line is used when Eumaios bewails the unknown fate of his absent master Odysseus (ξ 371).

The meaning of θύελλα “gust of wind” is certain (cf. ἀνέμοιο θύελλα: Z 346, etc.). As for ἄρπυια, the same meaning is apparent from the only remaining Homeric attestation of the verb ἀνηρεύσαντο. When Penelope prays that Artemis smite her dead and take her θυμός straight-away, she adds:

ἢ ἔπειτά μ' ἀναρπάξασα θύελλα  
οἷχοιτο προφέρουσα κατ' ἡερόεντα κέλευθα,  
ἐν προχοῇς δὲ βάλοι ἀφορρόου Ὠκεανοῖο  
(υ 61-65)

As precedent for being snatched up by a gust of wind and cast down into the Okeanos, she invokes the fate of Pandareos' daughters:

ὥς δ' ὅτε Πανδάρεου κόουρας ἀνέλοντο θύελλαι  
(υ 66)

Compare the use of ἀνέλοντο here with that of ἔλετο when Eos abducts Orion:

ὥς μὲν ὅτ' Ὠρίων' ἔλετο ῥοδοδάκτυλος Ἥως  
(ε 121)



After further elaboration of the story, the central event is presented in the following words:

τόφρα δὲ τὰς κούρας ἄρπυιαι ἀνηρεύψαντο

(v 77)

So much for all the Homeric attestations of ἀνηρεύψαντο and the solitary Hesiodic attestation of ἀνερευψαμένη. As for ἄρπυια, the only other Homeric attestation besides those already surveyed is in the *Iliad*, where the horses of Achilles are described as follows:

Ξάνθον καὶ Βαλίον, τὼ ἄμα πνοιῇσι πετέσθην,  
τοὺς ἔτεκε Ζεφύρῳ ἀνέμῳ ἄρπυια Ποδάργη,  
βοσκομένη λειμῶνι παρὰ ῥόον Ὠκεανοῖο

(II 149-151)

Finally, consider the Hesiodic description of the Harpies, two in number:

ἡϋκόμους θ' Ἀρπυίας, Ἀελλῷ τ' Ὠκυπέτην τε  
αἷ ῥ' ἀνέμων πνοιῇσι καὶ οἰωνοῖς ἅμ' ἔπονται  
ὠκεΐης πετερύγεσσι. μεταχρόνιαι γὰρ ἴαλλον

(*Theogony* 267-269)

Besides the derivation of Ἀελλῷ from ἄελλα, the formation Ὠκυπέτη is comparable to Ποδ-άργη, also a ἄρπυια (II 150).<sup>64</sup> In sum, the Epic attestations of ἄρπυια betray a regular association with wind. Furthermore, this noun may be formally connected with the verb transmitted as ἀνηρεύψαντο and ἀνερευψαμένη in Homer and Hesiod, as we may infer from the variant ἀρεπυῖα, attested in the *Etymologicum Magnum* (138.21) and on a vase from Aigina.<sup>65</sup>

The prime significance of this contextual survey is that it establishes how Phaethon, Kephalos, Tithonos, Kleitos, Orion, and Ganymedes were abducted in the Epic imagination: *they were snatched away by a gust of wind*. The imagery is most explicit in the story of Ganymedes. The *immediate agent* of the abduction is a gust of wind, and Ganymedes' father does not know where it took his son:

οὐδέ τι ᾗδει  
ὄππῃ οἱ φίλον υἷὸν ἀνήρπασε θέσπις ἄελλα

(*H Aphrodite* 207f)

<sup>64</sup> West (n42) 242. For a contribution to West's discussion of μεταχρόνιαι, see below on v 63.

<sup>65</sup> Kretschmer (n36) 208f.

Notice, however, that the *ultimate agent* is Zeus himself:

ἦ τοι μὲν ξανθὸν Γανυμήδεα μητίετα Ζεὺς  
ἤρπασεν ὃν διὰ κάλλος ἔν' ἀθανάτοισι μετείη  
(H *Aphrodite* 202f)

Notice too that as compensation for the taking of Ganymedes, Zeus gives to the boy's father a team of wondrous horses:

δίδου δέ οἱ υἱὸς ἄποινα  
ἵππους ἀρσίποδας, τοί τ' ἀθανάτους φορέουσι  
(H *Aphrodite* 210f)

Thereafter, the father is consoled with the horses, which have *feet of wind*:

γῆθόσυνος δ' ἵπποισιν ἀλλοπόδεσσιν ὄχεϊτο  
(H *Aphrodite* 217)

In this instance, both motifs of taking and giving in return involve the element of wind.

After ascertaining how the likes of Phaethon were abducted, it remains to ask where they were taken. The most explicit Homeric imagery about this aspect of *θύελλαι/ἄρπνιαι* occurs in Penelope's death-wish, where she wants a gust of wind to snatch her up and drop her into the Okeanos (v 63–65). The *immediate agent* is the *θύελλα* (v 63), but the *ultimate agents* are the gods themselves:

ὥς ἔμ' αὔστώσειαν Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες  
(v 79)

Note that it is on the banks of the Okeanos that the *ἄρπνιαι* Podarge gave birth to the wind-horses of Achilles (Π 149–151). Note too again that the *varia lectio* of Ὀκεανοῖο in Π 151 is Ἡριδανοῖο.

By dying, Penelope will have fallen into the Okeanos (v 65), but later there is a further detail, that *she will have gone underneath the earth*:

ὄφρ' Ὀδυσῆα  
ὀσσομένη καὶ γαῖαν ὕπο στυγερὴν ἀφικοίμην  
(v 80f)

These motifs of 1) falling into Okeanos and 2) going underneath the earth also apply to the sun itself:

1) ἐν δ' ἔπεσ' Ὀκεανῷ λαμπρὸν φάος Ἥελίοιο  
(Θ 485)

- 2) ὦ φίλοι, οὐ γὰρ ἴδμεν ὅπῃ ζόφος οὐδ' ὅπῃ ἡώς,  
οὐδ' ὅπῃ ἡέλιος φαεσίμβροτος εἶσ' ὑπὸ γαῖαν  
οὐδ' ὅπῃ ἀννέϊται

(κ 190-192)

From the human standpoint, I infer, the significance of Okeanos is that when you die, a gust of wind carries your spirit to the extreme West, where it drops you into the Okeanos; when you traverse the Okeanos, you reach the underworld, which is underneath the Earth. From the solar standpoint, the significance of Okeanos is that when the sun reaches the extreme West at sunset, it likewise drops into the Okeanos; before the sun rises in the extreme East, it stays hidden underneath the Earth. When the sun does rise, it emerges from the Okeanos in the extreme East:

Ἡέλιος μὲν ἔπειτα νέον προσέβαλλεν ἀρούρας,  
ἐξ ἀκαλαρρείταιο βαθυρρόου Ὠκεανοῖο  
οὐρανὸν εἰσανιών

(H 421-423; cf. τ 433)

Thus the movements of the sun into and from the Okeanos serve as a cosmic model for death and rebirth. From the human standpoint, the sun dies in the West in order to be reborn in the East. Since Okeanos is thematically parallel with Eridanos, the sunset motif of a dead Phaethon falling into Eridanos implies a converse sunrise motif of a reborn Phaethon emerging from Eridanos.

In this respect, Phaethon's mother Eos becomes thematically significant. Homeric Ἡώς has a fixed epithet ἡριγένεια which is exclusively hers, as in the frequent verse

ἦμος δ' ἡριγένεια φάνη ῥοδοδάκτυλος Ἡώς

(β 1, etc.)

This epithet ἡριγένεια is built on what survives as the old locative adverb ἦρι "early," and Homeric diction actually preserves ἦρι in collocation with ἡώς:

ἦωθεν δὲ μάλ' ἦρι λοέσσαι τε χρίσαι τε

(τ 320)

The form ἦρι is related to Avestan *ayarə*, meaning "day." As for the name Ἡρι-δανός, it is likewise built on ἦρι, plus -δανος, which should mean "dew" or "fluid" from the Indo-European standpoint.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Rig-Vedic *dānu-* "fluid, dew," etc. See H. Güntert, *Der arische Weltkönig und Heiland* (Halle a.S. 1924) 36n1.



We come now to the association of Phaethon with Aphrodite in *Theogony* 988–991. It arises, I propose, from a sexual motif implicit in a solar transition from death to rebirth. I imagine a setting sun mating the goddess of regeneration so that the rising sun may be reborn. If the setting sun is the same as the rising sun, then the goddess of regeneration may be viewed as both mate and mother. Such an ambivalent relationship actually survives in the hymns of the Rig-Veda, where the goddess of solar regeneration, the dawn Uṣas, is the wife or bride of the sun-god Sūrya (1.115.2, 7.75.5, etc.) as well as his mother (7.63.3, 7.78.3).<sup>67</sup> In the latter instance, the incestuous implications are attenuated by putting Uṣas in the plural, representing the succession of dawns; similarly, Uṣas in the plural can designate the wives of Sūrya (4.5.13). Yet even if each succeeding dawn is wife of the preceding dawn's son, the husband and son are always one and the same Sūrya, and the basic motif of incest remains intact. This comparative evidence from the Rig-Veda is invaluable for understanding the Greek evidence, because Sūrya and Uṣas are formally cognate with *ἥλιος* and *ῥῥῥῥ*;<sup>68</sup> furthermore, the epithets of Uṣas, *divá(s) duhitár-* and *duhitár- divás*, are exact formal cognates of the Homeric epithets *Διὸς θυγάτηρ* and *θυγάτηρ Διός*.<sup>69</sup>

The Homeric hexameter preserves these epithets only in the following patterns:

- A. —  $\underline{\underline{\vee}}$  —  $\underline{\underline{\vee}}$  — || *θυγάτηρ Διὸς* || —  $\underline{\underline{\vee}}$  —  $\underline{\vee}$  6 times  
 B. —  $\underline{\vee}$  *Διὸς θυγάτηρ* ||  $\underline{\underline{\vee}}$  —  $\underline{\underline{\vee}}$  —  $\underline{\underline{\vee}}$  —  $\underline{\vee}$  8 times  
 C. —  $\underline{\underline{\vee}}$  —  $\underline{\underline{\vee}}$  —  $\underline{\vee}$  || *Διὸς θυγάτηρ*  $\underline{\underline{\vee}}$  — — 18 times.

Significantly, it is cumbersome for the meter to accommodate the word *ῥῥῥῥ* in a position contiguous with these epithets. Thus it is not surprising that Eos is not combined with these epithets anywhere in attested Greek Epic, despite the comparative Rig-Vedic evidence that such a combination had once existed. In fact, within the framework of the hexameter, there could have been only one position where this combination was feasible in an epithet-noun sequence:

- D. \* —  $\underline{\underline{\vee}}$  —  $\underline{\underline{\vee}}$  —  $\underline{\underline{\vee}}$  — || *θυγάτηρ Διὸς* —  $\underline{\vee}$ ,

with *ῥῥῥῥ* following the epithet. However, when *ῥῥῥῥ* occupies the final portion of the hexameter and when it is preceded by an epithet

<sup>67</sup> For more on Indic sun-gods, see Nagy, "Asura" (forthcoming).

<sup>68</sup> See R. Schmitt, *Dichtung und Dichtersprache in indogermanischer Zeit* (Wiesbaden 1967) chap. IV.

<sup>69</sup> Schmitt 169–173.

with the metrical shape  $\cup\cup - \cup\cup$ , this epithet is regularly  $\rho\acute{o}d\omicron\delta\acute{o}\alpha\kappa\tau\upsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ , not  $\theta\upsilon\gamma\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\rho \Delta\iota\acute{o}\varsigma$ . In other words, the epithet  $\theta\upsilon\gamma\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\rho \Delta\iota\acute{o}\varsigma$  in position D must have been ousted by the fixed epithet  $\rho\acute{o}d\omicron\delta\acute{o}\alpha\kappa\tau\upsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ , as in the familiar verse

$\eta\acute{\iota}\mu\omicron\varsigma \delta' \eta\rho\iota\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\iota\alpha \phi\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta \rho\acute{o}d\omicron\delta\acute{o}\alpha\kappa\tau\upsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma 'H\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ .

In sum, for both metrical and formulaic reasons, Greek Epic fails to preserve the combination of  $'H\acute{\omega}\varsigma$  with  $\Delta\iota\acute{o}\varsigma \theta\upsilon\gamma\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\rho$  and  $\theta\upsilon\gamma\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\rho \Delta\iota\acute{o}\varsigma$ .<sup>70</sup> By contrast, when the name  $\textit{Ἀφροδίτη}$  occupies the final position of the hexameter, her fixed epithet is  $\Delta\iota\acute{o}\varsigma \theta\upsilon\gamma\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\rho$ :

$- \cup\cup - \cup\cup - \cup \parallel \Delta\iota\acute{o}\varsigma \theta\upsilon\gamma\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\rho \textit{Ἀφροδίτη}$   
(Γ 374, etc.)

Thus from the standpoint of comparative analysis, Aphrodite is a parallel of Eos in Epic diction. Furthermore, from the standpoint of internal analysis, Aphrodite is a parallel of Eos in Epic theme. Just as Eos abducts Tithonos (*H Aphrodite* 218), Kleitos (ο 250), Orion (ε 121), and Kephalos (Euripides, *Hippolytos* 455), so also Aphrodite abducts Phaethon (*Theogony* 990). When Aphrodite seduces Anchises, she herself cites the abduction of Tithonos by Eos for an actual precedent (*H Aphrodite* 218–238), as I have repeatedly stressed before. Throughout the seduction episode, Aphrodite is called  $\Delta\iota\acute{o}\varsigma \theta\upsilon\gamma\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\rho$  (*H Aphrodite* 81, 107, 191).

The archaic parallelism of Eos and Aphrodite suggests that the former figure became a rival of the latter in such functions as that of  $\Delta\iota\acute{o}\varsigma \theta\upsilon\gamma\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\rho$ . From the comparative evidence of the Rig-Veda, we would expect Eos to be not only mother but also consort of the Sun. There is no such evidence in Greek Epic for either Helios or any hypostasis such as the Phaethon figure. Instead, the Hesiodic tradition assigns Aphrodite as consort of Phaethon, while Eos is only his mother (*Theogony* 986–991). In other words, the Hesiodic tradition seems to have split the originally fused roles of mother and consort and divided them between Eos and Aphrodite respectively. This way, the theme of incest could be neatly obviated.

<sup>70</sup> I disagree with Schmitt's statement that Eos is daughter of Helios (172f). Technically, she does appear as daughter of the Sun in *Theogony* 371–374, but here the name of her "father" is Hyperion; as for Helios, he is her "brother" (ibid.). For the image of Eos as daughter of the Sun, compare the special Rig-Vedic image of Uṣas as daughter of the Sun-God Sūrya (2.23.2), vs. the usual Rig-Vedic image of Uṣas as daughter of the Sky-God Dyaus (passim: *divás* + *duhitár-*), who is cognate of *Zeús*.

There are, however, instances in Homeric diction where the relationship of *Ἡώς* and *Φαέθων* is directly parallel to the relationship of Rig-Vedic *Uṣas* and *Sūrya*. Besides being a fixed epithet of *Helios* (Λ 735, etc.), the name *Φαέθων* is assigned to one of the two horses of *Eos*:

*Λάμπων καὶ Φαέθονθ' οἷ τ' Ἡὼ πῶλοι ἄγουσι*

(ψ 246)

Notice that *Lampos*, the name of her other horse, is also associated with the notion of brightness.<sup>71</sup> The Rig-Vedic parallel here is that *Sūrya* the sun-god is called the “bright horse,” *śvetām . . . āśvam*, of the dawn-goddess *Uṣas* (7.77.3; cf. 7.78.4). There is also, within the Greek Epic, an internal analogue to the combination of *Φαέθων* and *Λάμπων* in ψ 246. The names for the daughters of *Helios* the sun-god are *Φαέθουσα* and *Λαμπετή* (μ 132), which are feminine equivalents of *Φαέθων* and *Λάμπων*.<sup>72</sup> The Rig-Vedic parallel here is that the name for the daughter of *Sūrya* the sun-god is *Sūryā* (1.116.17), which is a feminine equivalent of the masculine name. The comparative evidence of this contextual nexus suggests that the Horses of the Dawn in ψ 246 had once been metaphorical aspects of the Sun. As in the Rig-Veda, the Sun could have been called the bright stallion of the Dawn — by such names as *Φαέθων* or *Λάμπων*. Once the metaphor is suspended, then the notion “Horse of the Dawn” must be taken at face value: if the Dawn has a horse, she will actually require not one but two for a chariot team, and the two kindred solar aspects *Φαέθων* “bright” and *Λάμπων* “bright” will do nicely as names for two distinct horses. Yet the surviving role of *Φαέθουσα* and *Λαμπετή* as daughters of *Helios* serves as testimony for the eroded personal connotations of the names *Φαέθων* and *Λάμπων*. By contrast, the metaphor is maintained in the Rig-Veda, where *Sūrya* the sun-god is both bridegroom and horse of the dawn-goddess *Uṣas*. There is even a special word which incorporates both roles of *Sūrya*, namely *mārya-* (1.115.2, 7.76.3).<sup>73</sup> In fact, the metaphorical equation of stallion and bridegroom is built into various rituals of Indic society, such as that of initiation, and a key to this equation is the same word *mārya-* and its Iranian cognates.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>71</sup> Notice too that Ψ 246 is the only place in either the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey* where a solar deity has a chariot team.

<sup>72</sup> For the morphology of *Λαμπετή*, see G. Nagy, *Greek Dialects and the Transformation of an Indo-European Process* (Cambridge 1970) 43–44n121; also Frame (n6) 224n25, on *Nāsatyā*.

<sup>73</sup> For the etymology of *mārya-*, see Nagy, “*ἀνὴρ* and *ἄνθρωπος*” (forthcoming).

<sup>74</sup> S. Wikander, *Der arische Männerbund: Studien zur indo-iranischen Sprach- und Religionsgeschichte* (Lund 1938) 22–30, 81–85, esp. 84.



Significantly, there is a corresponding Greek attestation of such a metaphorical equation, in the hymenaeus of Euripides' *Phaethon*, verses 227-235D:

Ὑμῆν Ὑμῆν.  
τὰν Διὸς οὐρανίαν ἀείδομεν,  
τὰν ἐρώτων πότνιαν, τὰν παρθένους  
γαμήλιον Ἀφροδίταν.  
πότνια, σοὶ τάδ' ἐγὼ νυμφεῖ' ἀείδω,  
Κύπρι θεῶν καλλίστα,  
τῷ τε νεόζυγι σῷ  
πῶλῳ τὸν ἐν αἰθέρι κρύπτεις,  
σῶν γάμων γένναν.

As Diggle has laboriously argued,<sup>75</sup> the πῶλος of Aphrodite must be Hymen himself. His epithet νεόζυγι, I should add, implies that Hymen is Aphrodite's bridegroom (compare the diction in Aischylos, *Persai* 541f; Euripides, *Medea* 804f; fr. 821N). As for the appositive σῶν γάμων γένναν, it clearly implies that Hymen is also Aphrodite's son. Note that this hymenaeus is sung in honor of Phaethon, and that his bride-to-be is in all probability a daughter of the Sun.<sup>76</sup> Note too that Aphrodite here functions as Διὸς θυγάτηρ:

τὰν Διὸς οὐρανίαν ἀείδομεν

(*Phaethon* 228D)

Besides Eos and Aphrodite, other Homeric goddesses too are called Διὸς θυγάτηρ: they are Athena (Δ 128, etc.), the Muse of the *Odyssey* (α 10), Ate (T 91), Persephone (λ 217), Artemis (ν 61), and Helen (δ 227).<sup>77</sup> It is beyond the scope of this present investigation to examine each context and to correlate with the contexts of the Rig-Vedic cognate *divá(s) duhitár-*, which applies only to Uṣas the dawn-goddess. From my own informal survey, I infer that there is a striking parallelism between the Homeric and Rig-Vedic contexts, but I concede that a formal demonstration is required to carry conviction.<sup>78</sup> I confine myself here to observations which relate to the motif of abduction.

<sup>75</sup> Diggle (n41) 148-160. Note especially his refutation of Wilamowitz, "Phaethon," *Hermes* 18 (1883) 396-434.

<sup>76</sup> So Diggle 158-160.

<sup>77</sup> On the divine aspects of Helen in Homeric diction and on the relationship of Διὸς θυγάτηρ to Διὸς κοῦροι, see the forthcoming doctoral dissertation of Linda L. Clader (Harvard University). On the divine aspects of Helen in the cult-language used by Euripides, see the forthcoming doctoral dissertation of John Hamilton, S.J. (University of Minnesota).

<sup>78</sup> See the forthcoming doctoral dissertation of Deborah D. Boedeker (St. Louis University).

The Rig-Vedic Uṣas is a beneficent goddess, well-known for her function of dispelling the darkness (1.92.5, 2.34.12, etc.). Yet her epithet *divá(s) duhitár-* is ambivalent. In a hymn which is part of the Vedic liturgical canon for animal sacrifice, Uṣas combined with the Night are together called *divó duhitārā* (10.70.6). In other words, both Dawn and Night are daughters of the Sky, Dyaus (cognate of Ζεύς). When Dawn drives away the Night, the latter is actually called her sister (1.92.11, 4.52.1). There is a parallel ambivalence in the cognate epithet Διὸς θυγάτηρ. In one instance, it can describe a beneficent Athena who has just rescued Menelaos and who is compared to a mother fostering her child (Δ 128). This function of the Διὸς θυγάτηρ as patroness of the Hero is typical.<sup>79</sup> In another instance, however, the epithet describes a maleficent Persephone, goddess of the dead (λ 217). In still another instance, it describes Artemis when Penelope wants to be shot and killed by her (ν 61). Although the epithet Διὸς θυγάτηρ does not survive in combination with Eos, the goddess herself is likewise ambivalent. Homeric diction features her snatching up youths as if she were some Harpy, and yet she gives them immortality. For review, the example of Kleitos will suffice:

ἀλλ' ἦ τοι Κλεῖτον χρυσόθρονος ἥρπασεν Ἡὼς  
κάλλεος εἵνεκα οἴο, ἔν' ἀθανάτοισι μετεΐη

(ο 251f)

Such an ambivalence inherent in the Eos figure is so uncomfortable that it tends to be attenuated in the diction. For instance, the verb used to describe the abduction of Orion by Eos is not the concretely violent ἥρπασε but the more abstract ἔλετο (ε 121). Once the wording ἥρπασε is removed, the connotation of death from Harpies disappears and a new motif is introduced, death from Artemis:

ὥς μὲν ὅτ' Ὀρίων' ἔλετο ῥοδοδάκτυλος Ἡώς,  
τόφρα οἱ ἡγάσθε θεοὶ ῥεῖα ζῶντες,  
ἦος ἐν Ὀρτυγίῃ χρυσόθρονος Ἀρτεμις ἀγνή  
οἷς ἀγανοῖς βελέεσσιν ἐποιχομένη κατέπεφνεν

(ε 121-124)

Notice that death is at least not violent at the hands of Artemis (ἀγανοῖς βελέεσσιν). Similarly, when Penelope wants to be killed by Artemis, the death is implicitly gentle:

<sup>79</sup> Other examples of Διὸς θυγάτηρ as patroness of the Hero: Athena/Odysseus (ν 369), Aphrodite/Alexander (Γ 374), Aphrodite/Aineias (Ε 312).

"Αρτεμι, πότνα θεά, θύγατερ Διός, αἶθε μοι ἤδη  
 ἰὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι βαλοῦσ' ἐκ θυμὸν ἔλοιο  
 αὐτίκα νῦν, ἣ ἔπειτα μ' ἀναρπάξασα θύελλα  
 οἴχοιτο προφέρουσα κατ' ἡερόεντα κέλευθα,  
 ἐν προχοῇς δὲ βάλοι ἀψορρόου Ὠκεανοῖο

(v 61-65)

The alternative to a gentle death from Artemis is a violent abduction by some gust of wind, but the ἣ ἔπειτα of verse 63 is puzzling.

An internal explanation immediately follows the passage just quoted, in the story of the daughters of Pandareos. Here we learn that even gusts of wind have both maleficent and beneficent aspects:

ὥς δ' ὅτε Πανδαρέου κούρας ἀνέλοντο θύελλαι.  
 τῇσι τοκῆας μὲν φθίσαν θεοί, αἱ δ' ἐλίποντο  
 ὀρφαναὶ ἐν μεγάροισι, κόμισσε δὲ δι' Ἀφροδίτη  
 τυρῶ καὶ μέλιτι γλυκερῶ καὶ ἡδέϊ οἴνω.  
 Ἥρη δ' αὐτῇσιν περὶ πασέων δῶκε γυναικῶν 70  
 εἶδος καὶ πινυτήν, μῆκος δ' ἔπορ' Ἀρτεμις ἀγνή,  
 ἔργα δ' Ἀθηναίη δέδασε κλυτὰ ἐργάζεσθαι.  
 εὖτ' Ἀφροδίτη διὰ προσέστιχε μακρὸν Ὀλυμπον,  
 κούρης αἰτήσουσα τέλος θαλεροῖο γάμοιο,  
 ἐς Δία τερπικέραυνον — ὁ γάρ τ' εὖ οἶδεν ἅπαντα, 75  
 μοῖράν τ' ἁμμορίην τε καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων —  
 τόφρα δὲ τὰς κούρας ἄρπυιαι ἀνηρεῖψαντο  
 καὶ ῥ' ἔδοσαν στυγερῇσιν ἐρινύσιν ἀμφιπολεῦειν.  
 ὥς ἔμ' αἰστώσειαν Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες,  
 ἥέ μ' εὐπλόκαμος βάλοι Ἀρτεμις, ὄφρ' Ὀδυσῆα 80  
 ὀσσομένην καὶ γαῖαν ὑπο στυγερὴν ἀφικοίμην

(v 66-81)

The phrase ἣ ἔπειτα, it seems, refers to the fate described in verse 77, not the earlier one in verse 66. The first gust of wind is preservative,<sup>80</sup> but the second is destructive. The sequence is strikingly similar to the one in the story of Orion (ε 121-124):

- A. Eos abducts (ἔλετο) Orion directly
- B. He is saved
- C. The gods take care of him
- D. Artemis kills him directly
- E. He dies.

<sup>80</sup> Notice, however, the residual ambivalence: the gods use their θύελλαι to take away and preserve the girls, but they destroy the parents of the girls.



- A'. The gods abduct (ἀνέλοντο) the daughters indirectly by θύελλαι  
 B'. They are saved  
 C'. The gods take care of them  
 D'. The gods abduct (ἀνηρεύβαντο) them indirectly by ἄρπυιαι  
 E'. They die.

In Penelope's death-wish, death from Artemis is considered an alternative to death from the Harpies (υ 61-65). In the story of Orion, we see in sections DE this first alternative as opposed to the second alternative in sections D'E' of the story of Pandareos' daughters. In both stories, the themes of abduction (A and A') and death (DE and D'E') have been split by an interlude of preservation (BC and B'C'). Contrast the story of Kleitos:

ἀλλ' ἦ τοι Κλεῖτον χρυσόθρονος ἥρπασεν Ἡὼς  
 κάλλεος εἵνεκα οἴο, ἔν' ἀθανάτοισι μετείη

(ο 251f)

The themes of abduction and preservation are explicit, while the theme of death is implicit (in the word ἥρπασεν). Rather than *precede* it, preservation in this story *follows* death.

The Kleitos figure is represented as son of Μάντιος (ο 249) and grandson of the seer Μελάμπος (ο 242). As Frame has shown,<sup>81</sup> the Melampous myth centers on the theme of retrieving the Cattle of the Sun. Suffice it here to note the following suggestive verses:

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἔκφυγε κῆρα καὶ ἤλασε βοῦς ἐριμύκους  
 ἐς Πύλον ἐκ Φυλάκης

(ο 235f)<sup>82</sup>

The solar function of the Melampous figure and his genetic affinity with the Kleitos figure imply a solar affinity as well. The wording ἥρπασεν for the abduction of Kleitos implies that he was taken by a maleficent Harpy and dropped into the Okeanos. This motif of death is parallel to sunset. On the other hand, the subject of ἥρπασεν is Eos herself, and the motif of sunrise is parallel to rebirth. Since the abductor of Kleitos is represented as the Dawn, it is at least implicit that Kleitos is to be reborn like the Sun and thus preserved.

As long as the Dawn is present, the day waxes. Once the Sun reaches noon, however, the Dawn ceases and the day wanes. This vital role of Eos is explicit in Homeric diction:

<sup>81</sup> Frame (n6) 102f.

<sup>82</sup> See Frame's chapter "Nestor's Original Function," 97-107.

ὄφρα μὲν Ἡὼς ἦν καὶ ἀέξετο ἱερὸν ἡμαρ  
τόφρα μάλ' ἀμφοτέρων βέλε' ἤπτετο, πίπτε δὲ λαός.  
ἡμος δ' Ἡέλιος μέσον οὐρανὸν ἀμφιβεβήκει,  
καὶ τότε δὴ χρύσεια πατὴρ ἐτίταινε τάλαντα

(Θ 66-69)

Implicitly, the Sun is united with the light of Dawn until noon: afterwards, the Sun descends into the Okeanos, only to be reborn the next day. In the story of Eos and Kleitos, a parallel death and rebirth are implied. The sequence of events is

abduction = death  
preservation.

In the Orion story, the sequence is the converse:

abduction = preservation  
death.<sup>83</sup>

Notice that Orion is an astral representation already in Homer (ε 274, Σ 488), and the relation of Orion's movements to the Dawn is the converse of the Sun's movements. Like the Sun, the constellation Orion rises from the Okeanos and sets in it (ε 275, Σ 489), but unlike the Sun, it rises and sets at nighttime, not daytime. In the summer, at threshing time, Orion starts rising before Dawn (*Works and Days* 598f). In the winter, at ploughing time, Orion starts setting before Dawn (*Works and Days* 615f). In summer days, the light of Dawn catches up with the rising Orion, and he can be her consort in the daytime.<sup>84</sup> In winter days, the light of Dawn arrives too late to keep Orion from setting into the Okeanos. One related star which does not set, however, is Arktos:

οἷη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο  
(ε 275 = Σ 489)

The Arktos "Bear" watches Orion, Ὠρίωνα δοκεύει (ε 274 = Σ 488), and the verb δοκεύω implies doom. In Homeric diction, it is used when marksmen or savage beasts take aim at their victims (N 545, II 313,

<sup>83</sup> As for the Tithonos story in *H Aphrodite*, the sequence is suspended: abduction = preservation, with no death ensuing. Appropriately, Tithonos therefore never rises from the Okeanos, as would a reborn Sun. Whenever Eos rises, she leaves Tithonos behind (T 1f vs. ε 1f; *H Aphrodite* 227, 236).

<sup>84</sup> Formally, Ὠρίων (Ὠρίων) seems to be connected with ὄαρ "wife," ὄαρος "companionship."

Θ 340).<sup>85</sup> As for the Arktos, she is Kallisto, mother of Arkas, progenitrix of the Arkadians, whom the epichoric myth represents as turning into a bear (Pausanais 8.3.6-7).<sup>86</sup> Καλλιστώ herself is a hypostasis of Ἄρτεμις Καλλίστη, as Müller has shown long ago.<sup>87</sup> In other words, the astral passages ε 273-275 and Σ 487-489 implicitly repeat the motif of Orion dying at the hands of Artemis, explicit in ε 121-124. The latter passage involves two goddesses, a beneficent Eos and a maleficent Artemis. Contrast the passage about Kleitos, involving an ambivalent Eos who is both maleficent and beneficent:

ἀλλ' ἥ τοι Κλείτον χρυσόθρονος ἥρπασεν Ἡὼς  
κάλλεος εἶνεκα οἴο, ἔν' ἀθανάτοισι μετέιη

(ο 251f)

The theme of death is implicit in ἥρπασεν, while the theme of preservation is explicit in ἔν' ἀθανάτοισι μετέιη.

Similarly, Aphrodite is ambivalent in the Hesiodic passage about Phaethon:

παῖδ' ἀταλὰ φρονέοντα φιλομειδῆς Ἀφροδίτη  
ᾧρτ' ἀνερειψαμένη, καί μιν ζαθέοις ἐνὶ νηοῖς  
νηοπόλον μύχιον ποιήσατο, δαίμονα δῖον

(Theogony 989-991)

Again, the theme of death is implied in ἀνερειψαμένη. The epithet δαίμονα, on the other hand, implies divine preservation, as we see from the usage of δαίμων in *Works and Days* 109-126. Compare too the preservation of Erechtheus by Athena, functioning as Διὸς θυγάτηρ:

ὅν ποτ' Ἀθήνη  
θρέψε Διὸς θυγάτηρ, τέκε δὲ ζεῖδωρος ἄρουρα,  
καὶ δ' ἐν Ἀθήνῃς εἶσεν, ἔῳ ἐν πτόνι νηῶ.  
ἐνθα δὲ μιν ταύροις καὶ ἄρνειοῖς ἰλάονται  
κοῦροι Ἀθηναίων περιτελλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν

(B 547-551)

The preservation of both Phaethon and Erechtheus is represented in these passages by the blatant implication of Hero Cults. If the hero is

<sup>85</sup> N 545: Antilochos catches Thoön off guard and deals him a mortal blow; Π 313: similarly, Phyleides kills Amphiklos; Θ 340: Hektor is compared to a hunting dog stalking a boar or lion.

<sup>86</sup> In retelling the Kallisto myth, Pausanias actually cites ε 272-273.

<sup>87</sup> K. O. Müller, *Prolegomena zu einer wissenschaftlichen Mythologie* (Göttingen 1825) 73-76; also *Die Dorier* I (Breslau 1844) 376. Note especially Pausanias 8.35.8, where we hear of a sanctuary of Artemis Kalliste located on the Mound of Kallisto.



situated in a sacred precinct and if he is propitiated at set times, then he is being treated like a god and it follows that he must be like a god. Thus he must be in some sense alive.<sup>88</sup> From the standpoint of myth, he is explicitly dead, but from the standpoint of cult, *he is implicitly reborn and thus alive*. Myth has it that, like Phaethon, Erechtheus too had once been struck dead by the thunderbolt of Zeus (Hyginus 46). It is clear that Erechtheus has an underworld phase:

χάσμα . . . κρύπτει χθονός  
(Euripides, *Ion* 281)

Similarly, the adjective *μύχιος* describing Phaethon in *Theogony* 991 implies a stay in the underworld, as we see from the usage of *μυχός* in such expressions as

μυχῶ χθονός εὐρυοδείης  
(*Theogony* 119)

As for Aphrodite, the goddess who abducted Phaethon and made him *μύχιος*, she herself is known as *Μυχία* in Greek Cult (as at Gyaros: *IG* 12.5.651; cf. Aelian, *HA* 10.34).<sup>89</sup> Another such cult-title implying an underworld phase is *Μελαινίς* (Pausanias 2.2.4, 8.6.5, 9.27.5). In the Phaethon myth preserved by Euripides, even the mother's name Klymene connotes the underworld. The masculine equivalent, *Κλύμενος* was a euphemistic epithet of Hades himself, as in the epichoric cults of Hermione (Pausanias 2.35.9). Behind the Hermionian precinct of "Chthonia" is the "Place of Klymenos," and in this place is a *γῆς χάσμα* through which Herakles brought up the Hound of Hades (Pausanias 2.35.10). Accordingly, I am inclined to view Klymene as a hypostasis of chthonic Aphrodite.

To sum up: like Eos, Aphrodite is both maleficent and beneficent in the role of abductor, since she confers both death and preservation. When Phaethon's parents are Helios and Klymene, the stage is set for his death, implicit in the Klymene figure. When his parents are Kephalos and Eos, the stage is set for both his death and his preservation, implicit in the Eos figure as well as in her alternate, Aphrodite. Thus I disagree with the spirit of Diggle's claim that "on the evidence available to us the son of Helios and the son of Eos and Cephalus must

<sup>88</sup> E. Rohde, *Psyche* (Tübingen 1921) 134-137. Farnell's rationalization about priest-kings is an exercise in euhemerism: see L. R. Farnell, *Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality* (Oxford 1921) 17.

<sup>89</sup> See S. Eitrem, *RE* 16.993-995, s.v. Mychioi Theoi. See also Güntert (n63) 185 on the mystical function of the word *μυχός* and its relation to the name *Καλυψώ* in the *Odyssey*.

be pronounced entirely different persons.”<sup>90</sup> Such an attitude is overly prosopographical. We are dealing not with different persons, but with different myths about the same figure.

### III

Since the epithet *μύχιος* of Phaethon in *Theogony* 991 implies that he was hidden by Aphrodite, we see here an important parallelism with Phaon and Adonis, who were also hidden by Aphrodite.<sup>91</sup> Just as Phaethon implicitly attains preservation in the cult of Aphrodite, so also Adonis in the cult of Apollo *Ἐπίθιος*.<sup>92</sup> As for Phaon, he explicitly attains preservation in the myth where he is turned into a beautiful young man by Aphrodite (Sappho fr. 211LP). From the myths of Phaethon, we see that the themes of concealment and preservation are symbolic of solar behavior, and we may begin to suspect that the parallel myths of Phaon and Adonis are based on like symbolism.

The very name Phaon, just like Phaethon, suggests a solar theme. His occupation too, that of ferryman (Sappho fr. 211LP), is a solar motif, as we see from the studies of Güntert on other mythological ferrymen.<sup>93</sup> As an interesting parallel to Phaon, I should single out the Rig-Vedic solar deity Pūṣan, who regularly functions as a psychopomp and who is once featured as traveling in golden boats (6.58.3); he is the wooer of his mother (6.55.5) and the lover of his sister (6.55.4, 5).<sup>94</sup> A frequent and exclusive epithet of Pūṣan is *āghr̥ṇi-* “glowing, bright,” comparable in meaning to *Φάων* and *Φαέθων*.

<sup>90</sup> Diggle (n41) 15n3.

<sup>91</sup> See n22.

<sup>92</sup> See n23.

<sup>93</sup> See especially *Kalypso* (n63) 179f and *Weltkönig* (n66) 273. For the problem of the Ásvins, see n94.

<sup>94</sup> Note that the standard Rig-Vedic sun-god Sūrya is both son and consort of the dawn-goddess Uṣas (7.63.3, 7.78.3; 1.115.2, 7.75.5, etc.). Note too that Eos is the sister of Heliōs (*Theogony* 371–374). The “fathers” of Pūṣan, Ásvins (10.85.14), share with Pūṣan such characteristics as traveling in boats (1.116.3). They are described as “born differently” (*nānā jātáu*, 5.73.4) and born “here and there” (*ihēha jātā*, 1.181.4), one the son of Sūmakha “Good Warrior” and one the son of Dyaus “Sky.” The adjectives *makhá-* and *sūmakha-* are Rig-Vedic epithets denoting the heroic aspect of both men and gods. In Yāska (Nirukta 12.2), a passage is quoted about the Ásvins where “one is called the son of Night, the other the son of Dawn.” I view these images as solar symbols of day/night, bright/dark, immortal/mortal, alive/dead. When the two Ásvins are treated as a pair, on the other hand, only one side of their split personalities is revealed. Accordingly, the two of them together are the sons of Dyaus (1.182.1, etc.) and the sons of Uṣas (3.39.3 and Sāyana *ad loc.*). By the time of the Rig-Veda, the solar nature of Pūṣan and the Ásvins is no longer overt in all situations.

Another solar theme is the plunge of Phaon from a white rock, an act which is parallel to the solar plunge of Phaethon into the Eridanos. We have seen that the Eridanos is an analogue of the Okeanos, the boundary delimiting light and darkness, life and death, wakefulness and sleep, consciousness and unconsciousness. We have also seen that the White Rock is another mythical landmark delimiting the same opposites, and that these two landmarks are mystical coefficients in Homeric diction:

παρ δ' ἴσαν Ὠκεανοῦ τε ῥοὰς καὶ Λευκάδα πέτρην  
(ω 11)

Even the Phaethon figure is connected with the White Rock, in that his "father" Kephalos is supposed to have jumped off Cape Leukas (Strabo 10.2.9) and is connected with the place-name *Θόρικος* (Apollodoros 2.4.7). The motif of plunging is itself overtly solar, as we see from Homeric diction:

ἐν δ' ἔπεσ' Ὠκεανῷ λαμπρὸν φάος Ἥελιοιο  
(Θ 485)

In the Nostoi (fr. 4A), the lover of Klymene is not Helios but Kephalos himself.

If indeed the Phaon and Adonis myths operate on solar motifs, it remains to ask about the relevance of Aphrodite. Most important of all,

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Furthermore, as Güntert (n66) 271 has shown, the Ásvins evolve from solar into astral figures, representing the morning/evening star. The figure Sūryā, daughter of the Sun, relates to the Ásvins in their astral function. (On the other hand, Uṣas the dawn-goddess relates to them in their solar function.) The Ásvins are Sūryā's two husbands (4.43.6). As Frame has shown (n6) 150-162, their epithet Násatyā means "retrievers," because they retrieved the light of the sun (see also Güntert 268). The message of the Násatyā theme is that the morning star, as it rises from the horizon, "recovers" the light of the sun, represented by Sūryā. The night before, the evening star had dipped over the horizon after the sinking sun, in order to effect its recovery the next morning by the alter ego, the morning star. For a discussion of the Indic equivalent to the Greek Okeanos beyond the horizon, see Nagy, "Asura" (forthcoming). For the parallelism of the Ásvins with the Greek *Διὸς κοῦροι*, see Güntert (n66) 260-276. While the former are named after the word for "horse," *ásva-*, the latter are known as *λευκόπῳλοι* (Pindar, Pythian 1.66). Note that the Dioskouroi have a horse called *Ἄρπαγος*, son of *Ποδάργα* (Stesichoros 178.1P); compare the *ἄρπυια Ποδάργη*,<sup>5</sup> who bore the horses of Achilles at the banks of Okeanos/Eridanos (Π 150f). Note too the Lakonian guild of priestesses called *Λευκιππίδες*, also called *πῳλοι*, who seem to be associated with a Helen-figure called *Ἀώτις* (Alkman, *Partheneion* 87); for details and discussion, see C. M. Bowra, *Greek Lyrik Poetry*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford 1961) 52-55.



how do we interpret Aphrodite's plunge from the White Rock? We hear of her doing so out of love for Adonis, and the act itself is difficult to reconcile with her known function as substitute for the Indo-European dawn-goddess of the Greeks, Eos. As we have seen, Aphrodite has even usurped the epithet of Eos, *Διὸς θυγάτηρ*, as well as the roles that go with the epithet. From the Homeric standpoint, Aphrodite is actually the *Διὸς θυγάτηρ* par excellence, since even her "mother's" name is *Διώνη* (E 370, 381). If, then, we cannot explain Aphrodite's plunge from the White Rock as a feature which is characteristic of an Indo-European *Διὸς θυγάτηρ*, we may do well to look toward Aphrodite's older, Semitic, heritage. As the Greek descendant of the Semitic fertility-goddess Ištar, Aphrodite has inherited as her astral symbol the planet of Ištar, better known to us as Venus.<sup>95</sup> The planet Venus is of course the same as *Ἑσπερος* the Evening Star and *Ἑωσφόρος* the Morning Star. In the evening, Hesperos sets after sunset; in the morning, Heosphoros rises before sunrise. We have the testimony of Sappho's near contemporary, Ibykos (fr. 331P), that Hesperos and Heosphoros were by this time known to be one and the same.<sup>96</sup> By implication, Ibykos must know that they are the planet of Aphrodite. As for Sappho, her Hesperos was a nuptial star, as we know directly from the fragment 104LP and indirectly from the deservedly famous hymenaeus of Catullus 62, *Vesper adest*. Since Hesperos is the evening aspect of the astral Aphrodite, its setting into the horizon, beyond which is Okeanos, could have inspired the image of a plunging Aphrodite.

If we imagine Aphrodite diving into the Okeanos after the sun, it follows that she will rise in the morning, bringing after her the sun of a new day. This image is precisely what the Hesiodic scholiasts preserve to explain the myth of Aphrodite and Phaethon:

ὁ ἡῶος ἀστήρ, ὁ ἀνάγων τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τὸν Φαέθοντα,  
ἡ Ἀφροδίτη

(Σ Theogony 990)<sup>97</sup>

<sup>95</sup> See A. Scherer, *Gestirnnamen bei den indogermanischen Völkern* (Heidelberg 1953) 78–84, 90, 92, 94.

<sup>96</sup> From the Indo-European standpoint, they must be twins, as represented by the *Διὸς κοῦροι*: see Güntert (n66) 266f. At the battle of Aigospotamoi, there is supposed to have been an epiphany of the Dioskouroi in the form of stars, on either side of Lysander's admiral ship; after their victory, the Spartans dedicated two stars of gold at Delphi (Plutarch, *Lysander* 12, 18). For the *Ásvins*, see n94.

<sup>97</sup> Both Wilamowitz (n17) 37n3 and Diggle (n41) 15n1 find this statement incomprehensible.



For the mystical meaning of ἀνάγω as “bring back to light from the dead,” see Hesiod, *Theogony* 626 (εἰς φάος); Plato, *Republic* 521c (εἰς φῶς); Aischylos, *Agamemnon* 1023 (τῶν φθιμένων), and so on.<sup>98</sup>

From Menander fr. 258K, we infer that Sappho spoke of herself as diving from the White Rock, crazed with love for Phaon. The implications of this image are cosmic. Sappho is vicariously projecting her identity into the goddess Aphrodite herself. By loving Phaon, she becomes parallel with Aphrodite, who loves the native Lesbian hypostasis of the Sun-God himself. By diving from the White Rock, she does what Aphrodite does in the form of Evening Star, diving after the sunken Sun in order to retrieve him the next morning in the form of Morning Star. If we imagine her pursuing the Sun the night before, she will be pursued in turn the morning after. There is a potential here for *amor uersus*, a theme which haunts Sappho elsewhere:

καὶ γὰρ αἰ φεύγει, ταχέως διώξει

(1.21LP)

Sappho's special association with Aphrodite is apparent throughout her poetry. The very first poem of the Sapphic tradition is, after all, an intense prayer to Aphrodite, where the goddess is implored — unconventionally, I feel — to be the σύμμαχος of the poetess (1.28LP). Strangely, Sappho pictures herself and Aphrodite as parallel rather than reciprocal agents:

ὅσσα δέ μοι τέλεσαι  
θῦμος ἰμέρρει, τέλεσον

(1.26–27LP)

Notice the wording τέλεσαι, an active infinitive instead of the expected passive τελέσθην.<sup>99</sup> If someone else needs something done by Aphrodite, Sappho chooses the passive infinitive τελέσθην, not active τέλεσαι:

Κύπρι καὶ] Νηρήϊδες ἀβλάβη[ν μοι  
τὸν κασί] γνητον δ[ό]τε τυίδ' ἴκεσθα[ι  
κῶσσα F]οι θύμῳ κε θέλη γένεσθαι  
πάντα τε]λέσθην

(5.1–4LP)

<sup>98</sup> See again Frame (n6) 150–162 on the epithet of the Ásvins, Násatyā “they who bring back to life and light”; for the Ásvins as Evening/Morning Star, see n94.

<sup>99</sup> For a similar effect, compare the opposition of active *faciam* vs. passive *fieri*, both referring to the verbs *odi et amo* in Catullus 85.

Sappho projects mortal identity onto the divine explicitly as well as implicitly. A significant example is fr. 96LP, where we see expressions like

πόλ]λακι τυίδε [ν]ῶν ἔχουσα  
 . . .  
 σε θέα σ' ἰκέλαν ἀρι-  
 γνώτα, σῶ δὲ μάλιστ' ἔχαιρε μόλπα  
 (2-5)

ἐ]ῦμαρ[ες μ]ὲν οὐκ ἄμμι θέαισι μόρ-  
 φαν ἐπή[ρατ]ον ἐξίσω-  
 σθαι  
 (21-23)

An even more significant example is fr. 58.25-26LP, two verses quoted by Athenaios 15.687b. The context of the quotation is a tedious conversation about whether ἀβρότης, which to Athenaios means something like “daintiness,” can have anything “luxurious” (τρυφερόν) about it without ἀρετή. Sappho is snobbishly cited as a woman who professes not to separate τὸ καλόν from ἀβρότης:

ἐγὼ δὲ φίλημμι' ἀβροσύναν, [. . .] τοῦτο, καί μοι  
 τὸ λάμπρον ἔρος τῷ ἐλίῳ καὶ τὸ κάλον λέλογχε

“but I love ἀβροσύνα, . . . this,  
 and yearning for the sun has won me Brightness and  
 Beauty.”<sup>100</sup>

From *P. Oxy.* 1787 we can restore one more word in the Athenaios quote, τοῦτο. More important, we see from the papyrus fragment that these two verses are at the end of a poem alluding to mythical topics. According to Lobel/Page, “vv. 19 seqq. de Tithono referri manifestum est” (LP 58). Be that as it may, we do see images about growing old:

]ντα χροά γῆρας ἤδη  
 ]ντο τρίχες ἐκ μελαίναν  
 ]αι, γόνα δ' [ο]ῦ φέροισι  
 (13-15)

Somebody is feeling helpless:

ἀ]λλὰ τί κεν ποείην;  
 ]οῦ δύναντον γένεσθαι  
 (17-18)

Also, the Lesbian Eos is mentioned:

<sup>100</sup> The translation is mine. A key to understanding this passage, I proffer, is the usage of λαγχάνω (see LSJ s.v., I.1).

]βροδόπαχυν Αὔων  
 ἔσ]χατα γὰρ φέροισα[  
 ]ον ὕμῳς ἔμαρψε[  
 ]άταν ἄκοιτιν

(19-22)

As a coda to this poem, the last two verses amount to a personal and artistic manifesto. The ἄβροσύνα of Sappho is different from the banal ἄβρότης of Athenaios. For Sappho, ἄβρος is the epithet of Adonis (140LP) and of the Charites (128LP), on whose chariot Aphrodite rides (194LP). At 2.13-16LP, ἄβρως is the adverb describing the scene as Aphrodite is asked to pour νέκταρ. Sappho's use of ἄβρος/ἄβροσύνα reminds us of the Roman neoterics and their allusive use of *lepidus/lepos* in expressing their artistic identity. As for Sappho's "yearning for the sun" and "love of ἄβροσύνα," these motifs combine profound personal and artistic ideals. In verses preceding the coda, Sappho perhaps alluded to Phaon as an old man, compared to Tithonos. Or perhaps Phaon was son of Tithonos. We do hear of a myth where Phaethon is son of Tithonos (Apollodoros 3.14.3); just as Phaethon was son of Ἥως, perhaps Phaon was son of Αὔως, mentioned in verse 19. The ἔσχατα γὰρ φέροισα of verse 20 and the ἔμαρψε of verse 21 remind us of Okeanos/Eridanos and Harpies. In any case, the fact remains that there is a Lesbian myth about Phaon as an old man (211LP); significantly, in this same myth, Aphrodite herself assumes the form of an old woman, whom the old Phaon generously ferries across a strait. I cannot help but suspect that Sappho in her later years grew fond of identifying herself with this figure of an old woman. In other words, there is a mythical precedent for an aging lady like Sappho to love Phaon. The implicit hope is retrieved youth. After Aphrodite crossed the strait, she became a beautiful goddess again, conferring youth and beauty on Phaon too (211LP). For all these reasons, Sappho loves Phaon.

This piece is dedicated to the original members of the Thursday Group (D.B., L.C., D.F., L.M., R.S.), whose encouragement has meant a great deal to me. I would also like to thank Wendell Clausen, John Finley, Emily Vermeule, Calvert Watkins, and Cedric Whitman for their help and advice.

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## ON THE DEATH OF ACTAEON

GREGORY NAGY

THE myth of Actaeon the hunter is famous from the version in Ovid. *met.* 3.13ff, where Artemis literally turns Actaeon into a stag. The hapless victim is then torn to shreds by his own hounds. Rose<sup>1</sup> claims to see the same theme in Stesichorus 236P (= 68B), a fragment derived from the following passage in Pausanias (9.2.3):

τοῖς δὲ ἐκ Μεγάρων ἰοῦσι πηγὴ τέ ἐστὶν ἐν δεξιᾷ καὶ προελθοῦσιν ὀλίγον πέτρα. καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν μὲν Ἀκταίωνος κοίτην, ἐπὶ ταύτῃ καθεύδειν φάμενοι τῇ πέτρᾳ τὸν Ἀκταίωνα ὁπότε κάμοι θηρεύων, ἐς δὲ τὴν πηγὴν ἐνιδεῖν λέγουσιν αὐτὸν λουομένης Ἀρτέμιδος ἐν τῇ πηγῇ. Στησίχορος δὲ ὁ Ἰμεραῖος ἔγραψεν ἐλάφου περιβαλεῖν δέρμα Ἀκταίῳ τὴν θεόν, παρασκευάζουσάν οἱ τὸν ἐκ τῶν κυνῶν θάνατον ἵνα δὴ μὴ γυναῖκα Σεμέλην λάβοι.

If we follow Rose's interpretation, the expression ἐλάφου περιβαλεῖν δέρμα Ἀκταίῳ reflects Stesichorus' own words, and it means that the goddess transformed the δέρμα "hide" of Actaeon into that of a stag. For this purportedly traditional usage of περιβαλεῖν in the sense of "transform," Rose adduces a parallel in Aesch. *Ag.* 1147, where the gods have transformed Philomele into a nightingale:

περέβαλον γάρ οἱ πτεροφόρον δέμας

While conceding that the verb περιβάλλω implies "transform" in this passage, Bowra<sup>2</sup> rejects a parallel interpretation in Stesichorus 236P. Rather, he reads ἐλάφου περιβαλεῖν δέρμα Ἀκταίῳ to mean that Artemis merely flung a deerskin around Actaeon. For support, he cites the evidence from Greek iconography, where the motif of a dying Actaeon clad in deerskin is clearly attested.<sup>3</sup> As a prime example, he singles out a metope from Temple E in Selinus (middle fifth century

<sup>1</sup> H. J. Rose, "De Actaeone Stesichoreo," *Mnemosyne* 59 (1931) 431f.

<sup>2</sup> C. M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford 1961) 99f.

<sup>3</sup> Bowra 99f, 125f. Cf. also P. Jacobsthal, *Aktaions Tod* (*Marburger Jahrbuch für Kunstwissenschaft* 5, Sonderdruck), which also surveys the alternative representation of Actaeon sprouting antlers.

B.C.),<sup>4</sup> which features Actaeon wearing the deerskin and his hounds lunging more at it than at him.<sup>5</sup>

Such evidence is inconclusive: the motif of Actaeon wearing rather than having the hide of a stag may be a *visual* as well as *verbal* metaphor. On the verbal level, περιβάλλω implies clothing, as in the Philomele passage of Aeschylus (*Ag.* 1147). The gods transform Philomele into a nightingale, but Aeschylus represents the action as if they *clothed* her with the δέμας "body" of a nightingale:

περέβαλον γάρ οἱ πτεροφόρον δέμας.

The meaning of περιβάλλω as "clothe" is commonplace in Greek (*Od.* 5.231, 22.148; *Hdt.* 1.152, 9.109; *E. IT* 1150; etc.), and the derivative περίβλημα actually means "garment" (*Arist. Pr.* 870<sup>a</sup>27, etc.). I propose, then, that the wording ἐλάφου περιβαλεῖν δέρμα Ἀκταίωνι is also metaphorical: "[that the goddess] flung the hide of a stag round Actaeon," meaning that the goddess transformed him into a stag. Bowra, however, insists on the nonmetaphorical interpretation, noting simply that "δέρμα is not the same as δέμας."<sup>6</sup>

This objection does not reckon with the notion of equating one's identity with one's "hide." The lexical evidence of the Indo-European languages reveals traces of this primitive equation. Consider, for example, the cognate of Rig-Vedic *tvác-* "hide," and Greek *σάκος* "cowhide-shield," namely Hittite *tweka-*: besides meaning "body," this word is also regularly used to designate "person, self, one's own self." Consider also Latin *uersipellis*, meaning literally "he whose hide is turned" (from verb *uertō* "turn" and noun *pellis* "hide"). In *Plaut. Am.* 123, *uersipellis* designates Jupiter when he transformed himself into the human Amphitruo; in *Plin.* 8.22.34 and *Petr.* 62, *uersipellis* means "werewolf."

Thus we have philological evidence for the assertion that the text of Stesichorus 236P reflects a traditional usage which we can interpret metaphorically to mean that Actaeon was indeed transformed into a stag. The iconographical evidence may be explained as the result of a misunderstanding of the original expression περιβαλεῖν δέρμα, or perhaps an equally symbolic means of representing the same conception.

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<sup>4</sup> G. Richter, *The Sculpture and Sculptors of the Greeks* (New Haven 1950) Fig. 411.

<sup>5</sup> Bowra 125.

<sup>6</sup> Bowra 100.

## THEMATIC S-AORISTS IN HOMER

CATHARINE PRINCE ROTH

**A**MONG the verb forms traditionally called "mixed aorists," the two most common types — those based on οἴσεται and ἄξειτε, and those based on δύσεται and βήσεται — are, at least in origin, not aorists at all but forms of the future.<sup>1</sup> The only remaining thematic s-aorists in Greek are the imperatives λέξεο and ὄρσεο (along with which ὀρέοντο may be treated) and the third person indicative ἴξε, ἴξον.

To start with the verb ὄρνυμι, the third person plural form ὀρέοντο (*B* 398, *Ψ* 212) has been explained on the one hand by Magnien as imperfect of the future ὀρεῖται (*Υ* 140),<sup>2</sup> and on the other hand by Bechtel as an iterative in \*-εγο- of ἔρετο, cited by Hesychius in the sense ὠρμήθη.<sup>3</sup> There is, however, some internal evidence that ὀρέοντο is an innovation in the epic. It occurs only twice. Compare *B* 398:

ἀνστάντες δ' ὀρέοντο κεδασθέντες κατὰ νῆας,

and *N* 738f:

οἱ μὲν ἀφεστᾶσιν σὺν τεύχεσιν, οἱ δὲ μάχονται  
παυρότεροι πλεόνεσσι, κεδασθέντες κατὰ νῆας.

In *N* 739 the aorist participle κεδασθέντες is used correctly, to indicate an existing state. In *B* 398, on the other hand, it is used in the sense of a present participle, describing the action in process. The incongruity of the tense in *B* 398 suggests that this verse is secondary to *N* 739. Again, compare *Ψ* 212f:

ἦ μὲν ἄρ' ὥς εἰποῦσ' ἀπεβήσεται, τοὶ δ' ὀρέοντο  
ἦχῇ θεσπεσίῃ . . .

and (for instance) *E* 133:

ἦ μὲν ἄρ' ὥς εἰποῦσ' ἀπέβη γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη.

<sup>1</sup> C. L. Prince, "Some 'Mixed Aorists' in Homer," *Glotta* 48 (1970) 155ff.

<sup>2</sup> V. Magnien, *Le futur grec* (Paris 1912) 2.1.

<sup>3</sup> F. Bechtel, *Lexilogus zu Homer* (Halle 1914) 252f.

Phrases with ἀπεβήσето are often replacements of those with ἀπέβη.<sup>4</sup> For the second half of Ψ 212, compare N 833f:

ὦς ἄρα φωνήσας ἡγήσατο· τοὶ δ' αὖ' ἔποντο  
ἡχῇ θεσπεσίῃ . . .

It seems that Ψ 212 is a conflation of two formula-types. If, therefore, ὀρέοντο appears in only two verses, each demonstrably secondary, it is more probable that it is an analogical formation of the epic language than that it is a survival of some old derivational category.

Karl Meister showed that, in the epic language, the usual athematic aorist middle ὦρτο has been renewed by thematization, giving ὠρετο (*M* 279, *E* 397, *X* 102).<sup>5</sup> The coexistence of these thematic and athematic forms then can provide a basis for further thematization; that is, it suggests that a thematic vowel may optionally be inserted before the desinence. The third-person plural of ὦρτο would be ὄροντο<sup>6</sup> (in Homer this form is attested only from the verb ὀρομαι, at γ 471; but the Vedic cognate of ὄρνυμι has an archaic form *ranta* "moved themselves," RV 555.3, which corresponds to ὄροντο). Then the following analogical diagram can be set up:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \omega\rho\text{-}\tau\omicron & \rightarrow & \acute{o}\rho\text{-}\omicron\tau\omicron \\ \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ \acute{o}\rho\text{-}\epsilon\text{-}\tau\omicron & \rightarrow & \text{x} \quad \text{x} = \acute{o}\rho\text{-}\acute{\epsilon}\text{-}\omicron\tau\omicron \end{array}$$

Thus ὀρέοντο is seen to be merely an epic variant of the aorist.

The analysis of ὄρσεο is a little more complicated. As middle and intransitive, it clearly cannot be connected with the active causative aorist ὦρσα or with the causative future participle ὄρσουσα (*Φ* 335). If, as Wackernagel said, it is an analogical development from ὄρσο, the athematic imperative corresponding to ὦρτο,<sup>7</sup> why is it not \*ὄρεο? Of course there is no metrical incentive to create a tribrach; whereas a dactyl is desirable, and especially at the beginning of the verse, where imperatives are usually found.<sup>8</sup> But metrical advantage is not sufficient for the creation of an otherwise unmotivated form. The following series of events is proposed as a fuller explanation. When intervocalic *s* was

<sup>4</sup> P. Wahrmann, "Zur Frage des Aoristus mixtus im Griechischen," *Festschrift Kretschmer* (Vienna 1926) 310.

<sup>5</sup> K. Meister, *Die homerische Kunstsprache* (Leipzig 1921) 20f.

<sup>6</sup> C. Watkins, *Indogermanische Grammatik* III/1. *Geschichte der indogermanischen Verbalflexion* (Heidelberg 1969) 37.

<sup>7</sup> J. Wackernagel, "Miscellen zur griechischen Grammatik," *Kleine Schriften* (Göttingen 1953) 676.

<sup>8</sup> Wahrmann 308.



lost in Greek, the middle imperative desinence came to be perceived as *-o* instead of *-so*. Consider the hesitation shown in restoring *-so* after a vowel.<sup>9</sup> Then *ὄρσο* was resegmented as *ὄρσ-o* instead of *ὄρ-σο*. The *s* was now taken as an extension of the stem. Then the thematic vowel *e* was inserted before the desinence *-o*, as follows:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \bar{\omega}\rho-\tau o & \rightarrow & \bar{o}\rho\sigma-o \\ \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ \bar{\omega}\rho-\epsilon-\tau o & \rightarrow & x \quad x = \bar{o}\rho\sigma-\epsilon-o \end{array}$$

The peculiarity of *ὄρσεο* is not the process of thematization in itself, but the fact that the process started from a synchronically unmotivated form.

As with *ὄρσεο*, so also with *λέξεο*, connections with the sigmatic aorist and the future may be eliminated. The imperative corresponding to *ἐλέξατο* is *λέξαι* (*κατάλεξαι* τ 44, before a vowel, with variant reading *καταλέξε*). In order to connect *λέξεο* with the future, Leumann had to assume an imperatival future *λέξεσθε*.<sup>10</sup> But *λέξεσθε* does not occur, either as future or as imperative, and in any case the imperatival future is a doubtfully Homeric usage.<sup>11</sup> The future *λέξομαι* occurs only in the singular (all three persons) and always verse-initial (except compounds; *λέξεται* Δ 131 is subjunctive). If *λέξεο* were based on the future, one would expect it to occur in the same metrical position as the future, especially since imperatives tend to be verse-initial of their own accord. But *λέξεο* occurs only in the fourth and fifth feet (once each):

I 617 οὔτοι δ' ἀγγελεύουσι, σὺ δ' αὐτόθι λέξεο μίμνων  
τ 598 ἔνθα κε λεξαίμην· σὺ δὲ λέξεο τῶδ' ἐνὶ οἴκῳ.

We must return to Wackernagel's opinion, that *λέξεο* was founded on *λέξο*, the imperative corresponding to *ἔλεκτο*.<sup>12</sup>

Leumann suggests that *λέξεο* was the model for *ὄρσεο*, the two verbs forming a pair of opposites ("lie down" and "get up").<sup>13</sup> But *ὄρσο* and *ὄρσεο* are more common than *λέξο* and *λέξεο* (*ὄρσο* occurring five times in Homer, *ὄρσεο* seven, *λέξο* and *λέξεο* twice each). Hence it

<sup>9</sup> G. Nagy, *Greek Dialects and the Transformation of an Indo-European Process* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970) 134 n. 141; M. Lejeune, *Traité de phonétique grecque* (Paris 1955) 81.

<sup>10</sup> M. Leumann, "'Aoristi mixti' und Imperative vom Futurstamm im Griechischen," *Kleine Schriften* (Zürich 1959) 240.

<sup>11</sup> E. Schwyzler, *Griechische Grammatik* (Munich 1939) 2.291.

<sup>12</sup> Wackernagel 676.

<sup>13</sup> Leumann 240.

is more probable that the influence went the other way, i.e. that λέξεο was modeled on ὄρσεο:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \text{ὄρσο} & \rightarrow & \text{ὄρσεο} \\ \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ \text{λέξεο} & \rightarrow & \text{x} \quad \text{x} = \text{λέξεο} \end{array}$$

With the explanation of ὄρσεο already proposed, we can thus account for both of these imperatives as alterations of the archaic athematic aorist.

One thematic s-aorist remains: third person singular ἴξε(ν), plural ἴξον, second person singular ἴξες (*H. Apoll.* only). Magnien thought this was an imperfect of the future;<sup>14</sup> but, as he himself observed, the future is ἴξομαι with middle forms. In fact, the only active form from this root is the present ἴκω. With this, therefore, ἴξε must be connected.

If we investigate the relationship of ἴξε ἴξον to ἴκε (\*ἴκον does not occur) on the one hand and to ἴκετο ἴκοντο on the other, a curious pattern emerges. In meaning, ἴξε ἴξον cannot be distinguished from ἴκετο ἴκοντο: "he, they came" or "reached" (a place), usually with a personal subject. Compare *E* 773:

ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ Τροίην ἴξον ποταμῷ τε ῥέοντε,

and *A* 170:

ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ Σκαιάς τε πύλας καὶ φηγὸν ἴκοντο.

On the other hand, ἴκε(ν) is limited, as Wahrmann saw, to the cadence-formula οὐρανὸν ἴκε (verse end and before the main caesura, in the *Iliad* and *H. Apoll.*).<sup>15</sup> The subject is noise, light, or smoke; for example, *B* 458:

αἴγλη παμφανόωσα δι' αἰθέρος οὐρανὸν ἴκε.

In accordance with Kuryłowicz's fourth principle of analogy,<sup>16</sup> it is evident that ἴκε, with its restricted usage, is the older form, whereas ἴκετο and ἴξε are the newer forms which have replaced it in the primary function. Of these two, ἴκετο is an ordinary thematic aorist middle form. The coexistence of ἴκετο and ἴκε presumably has a metrical cause, namely that ἴκετο could not replace ἴκε in all metrical positions (there are some where it could have, like *Z* 172, as Leumann

<sup>14</sup> Magnien 2.1.

<sup>15</sup> Wahrmann 313.

<sup>16</sup> J. Kuryłowicz, "La nature des procès dits 'analogiques,'" *Esquisses linguistiques* (Wrocław 1960) 79.

points out<sup>17</sup>). For the plural, we can infer that  $\text{ἴξον}$  has replaced  $*\text{ἰκον}$ . The noun  $\text{πόρος}$  "ford" occurs in Homer virtually only in the formulaic verse  $\Xi\ 433 = \Phi\ 1 = \Omega\ 692$ :

$\alpha\lambda\lambda' \ \delta\tau\epsilon \ \delta\eta \ \acute{\rho}\acute{o}\rho\omicron\nu \ \text{ἴξον} \ \epsilon\ddot{\upsilon}\rho\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma \ \rho\omicron\tau\alpha\mu\omicron\iota\omicron.$

The only other occurrence is in the Catalogue, *B* 592. This<sup>18</sup> might lead us to believe that  $\text{ἴξον}$  was an old form, in contradiction to what has just been said about the singular  $\text{ἴξε}$ . But since  $*\text{ἰκον}$  and  $\text{ἴξον}$  have the same metrical shape, we may suppose that the original formula contained  $*\text{πόρον ἰκον}$ . When  $\text{ἴξε}$  replaced  $\text{ἰκε}$  in the primary sense "came," then  $\text{ἴξον}$  also replaced  $*\text{ἰκον}$  in that sense. The plural evidently did not occur in formulae of the sort where  $\text{ἰκε}$  survived.

Why, then, should  $\text{ἰκε}$  have been replaced? Evidently because it came to be felt as imperfect and not aorist when the formal opposition between imperfect and aorist was established.<sup>18</sup> At that stage there was a use for a form marked as aorist and having the same metrical shape as  $\text{ἰκε}$ .<sup>19</sup> For the creation of  $\text{ἴξε}$ , Meillet suggests a line of approach when he compares  $\text{ἴξον}$  to a class of Indo-Iranian thematic sigmatic aorists from roots ending in velars.<sup>20</sup> Kuryłowicz has explained the Sanskrit forms (seventh aorist) as thematic aorists which have had an *s* added (not sigmatic aorists which have been thematized).<sup>21</sup> Following his argument in the Sanskrit case, we can construct a similar explanation of the isolated Greek aorist  $\text{ἴξε}$ . The starting point is a situation in which certain verbs have aorists with *s* before endings beginning with a vowel but no *s* before endings beginning with a consonant. In Greek this situation appeared in the case of verbs which had a radical athematic middle but a sigmatic active; for example,  $\acute{\omega}\rho\tau\omicron$ ,  $\acute{\omega}\rho\sigma\epsilon$  and  $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\kappa\tau\omicron$ ,  $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\acute{\xi}\epsilon$ . These forms, though of different ages, coexisted at least in the epic language. The sigmatic aorists active are causative in sense and a productive formation. The archaic athematic middles may, at least in some cases, have been originally sigmatic, but this does not affect the argument. As Kuryłowicz says of the Indian aorists, the asigmatic aorist, because it has no suffix, is formally dominated by the sigmatic aorist.<sup>22</sup> In other words, the compound morpheme tends to replace

<sup>17</sup> Leumann 241.

<sup>18</sup> C. Watkins, *Indo-European Origins of the Celtic Verb* (Dublin 1962) 55.

<sup>19</sup> Währmann 313.

<sup>20</sup> A. Meillet, "Sur l'aoriste sigmatique," *Mélanges Saussure* (Paris 1908)

99.

<sup>21</sup> J. Kuryłowicz, "Le VII<sup>e</sup> aoriste indien," *Esquisses linguistiques* (Wrocław 1960) 126ff.

<sup>22</sup> Kuryłowicz, *Esquisses linguistiques*, 128.

the simple morpheme in the same function.<sup>23</sup> Now, in the case of *ἴκω*, there was not only the imperfect or aorist *ἴκε* but also the athematic aorist middle *ἴκτο* (Hesiod *Theogony* 481). The epithet *ἴκμενον* may be the participle of this aorist. The opposition in this verb

*ἴκτο* : *ἴκε*

does not show the same distribution of *s* as in the other verbs just mentioned, namely *s* before a vowel, no *s* before a consonant:

*ᾠρτο* : *ᾠρσε*  
*ἔλεκτο* : *ἔλεξε*.

Because of the dominance of the sigmatic aorist, this pattern is imposed on *ἴκω*, giving the new opposition:

*ἴκτο* : *ἴξε*.

As in the Sanskrit Aorist VII, the process of sigmatization still preserves the thematic vowel. The fundamental morpheme of the "sigmatic" aorist is the *a*, which under certain conditions is preceded by *s*.<sup>24</sup> The principal morpheme *a* can bring in the accessory morpheme *s*, for example after a vowel stem where the original *s* had been lost; but the *s* without *a* is not sufficient to characterize a form as "sigmatic aorist," and therefore does not bring in an *a*. For *ἴκε* \**ἴκον*, we thus get *ἴξε* *ἴξον*, not *ἴξε* \*\**ἴξαν*. Here is an analogical development which occurred in Sanskrit in the natural language, but in Greek only in an isolated case of the poetic language. The process was available in Greek, but it became operative only when meter made the regular development impossible.

We thus have two contrary processes illustrated in these "mixed aorists." In *ἴξον* we have the sigmatization of a thematic past tense (undifferentiated aorist or imperfect); in *ᾠρσεο* and *λέξεο* we have the thematization of sigmatic forms, with the qualification that the sigmas are not suffixal but desinential in origin. There is no case of a "first aorist" in which alpha is replaced by the thematic vowel *e/o*. Nevertheless, *ᾠρσεο*, *λέξεο*, and *ἴξον* are all analogical modifications of archaic aorist forms. If the term "mixed aorist" is to have any meaning, this must be it.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. 70.

<sup>24</sup> J. Kuryłowicz, *L'apophonie en indo-européen* (Wrocław 1956) 274.



# AN INDO-EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL TERM: LATIN *ADOR*, HITTITE *HAT*-

CALVERT WATKINS

THE Latin neuter *ador*, *adōris* "a coarse grain, emmer wheat" (Oxford Latin Dictionary), "spelt," is first attested in Horace, Sat. 2.6.89 *esset ador loliumque, dapis meliora relinquens*. But the derivative *adoreus*, substantivized *adoreum*, is found already in Cato, Ag. 34.2 *in creta . . . et ager qui aquosus erit, semen adoreum potissimum serito*.<sup>1</sup> As J. André states (*Lexique des termes de botanique en latin*), *ador* is the "nom ancien du *far*." Compare Pliny, Nat. 18.81 *far, quod ueteres adoreum appellauere*. The word is thus clearly archaic, and was recognized as such by the Romans themselves; Cato is using an ancient agricultural term.

Since we know that *far* has cognates in the Italic dialects, Slavic, and Germanic (English *bar-ley*), we should expect the still older *ador* which it replaced to have cognates as well. And the uniqueness of Latin *ador* in stem-formation and gender marks it as a word with a right to an Indo-European etymology.

Yet the only cognate hitherto proposed has been a wholly isolated word in Germanic occurring twice (in identical passages) in the Gothic Bible, and in High German. At Luke 6.1 and Mark 2.23 the Greek διὰ τῶν σπορίμων "through the cornfields" is rendered by Gothic *pairh atisk*. Old High German shows *ezzesc*, pl. *ezzisca* "Saat, Saatfeld; Flur," Middle High German *ezzisch*, and a reflex is sporadically preserved in modern dialects: Swiss *Aesch* "Feldflur eines Dorfes." Though occasionally questioned, due to the isolation of the Latin and Germanic forms, this etymology need not be doubted, so far as it goes; the proposed connection of *ador* with Greek ἀθήρ "awn, spike of grain" is certainly to be rejected, with Chantraine and Frisk. For Tocharian A *āti*, B *atīyai* (obl.) "grass," which probably belongs with *ador* and *atisk*, see note 4 below.

Thanks are due to Ives Goddard for assistance in preparing this paper for the press.

<sup>1</sup> Note the archaic relative clause, which is not a mere lapsus.

Germanic specifies the consonant of the root as Indo-European \*-d- (Latin -d- can reflect either \*d or \*dh). Pokorny, *Indogerm. etym. Wb.*, 3 sets up \*ades- for the Indo-European base, and derives Gothic *atisk* from \*ades-ko-. But the Germanic form looks rather more like an adjectival derivative, as in the σπόριμα (σπόρ-ιμος) which it translates, which would better account for the transferred semantic specialization "cornfield, field of grain." As such Gothic *atisk* is better analyzed as *at-isk*, with the productive adjectival suffix -isk, as it was already taken by Jakob Grimm in 1822 (*Deutsche Grammatik* 1.598).

If Latin *ador* was in fact an original *s*-stem, it is surprising that in a word of such evident antiquity and ritual association there is no trace of the old -s(-) preserved, as in *arbōs*. It is furthermore abnormal for the -s of the nominative singular to be replaced by -r in a neuter noun; contrast *decus*, *genus*. I therefore prefer to take the -r of *ador* at face value, as an old *r*-stem \*ad-r̥. The hesitation in the quantity of the vowel in the oblique cases may indicate that the stem *adōr-* is secondary, and replaces an older heteroclitic *r/n*-stem \*ad-r̥ / \*ad-en-. Compare the word for "water," Hittite *wātar* / *weten-*, and especially the ancient Old Irish word for "grain" *arbor*, genitive *arbae* < \*arū-r̥ / *arū-en-s*, in the same semantic area.

More recently, O. Szemerényi (*Studi linguistici in onore di Vittore Pisani* 2.968-9 [1969]) has sought to connect *ador* with the Iranian stem *ādu-* "grain," whose meaning was securely established by R. Emmerick, *Trans. Phil. Soc.* 1966, 1-7, 1967, 204. But within Iranian the semantic parallels favor a development from "eat" to "grain," and therefore favor Emmerick's original derivation of the Iranian word from \*ēdu- and the root of Latin *edō* and especially *edū-lis*, as he has now shown at *TPS* 1969, 201-2. Szemerényi's etymology must therefore be rejected, and we are still left with the isolated comparison of *ador* with Gothic *atisk*. Emmerick, *loc. cit.*, quite rightly focused attention on the crucial lack: the absence of "a suitable Indo-European verbal base \*ad-."

The etymology requires a verbal base \*ad-, in laryngeal notation \**ə<sub>2</sub>od-* (\**hod-*). Purely formally, such a verbal base does exist in one Indo-European language, and the most ancient: Hittite *ḫat-* "dry out (intrans.)." The spelling with single -t- indicates an Indo-European voiced stop. The Hittite verb has hitherto been linked only with Greek ἄζομαι (\*ad-yo-), by Benveniste, *BSL* 50, 1954, 39.

The following forms of the Hittite verb, belonging to the *ḫi*-conjugation, are attested:

3 sg. pres. *hāti*: KUB VIII 3 I 12 (moon-omen, Laroche, CTH 533,2) *k]a-aš-za ki-ša na-ap ha-a-ti* "famine will occur and it will dry up."

3 sg. pret. *hazta*, pl. *hāter*: KUB XVII 10 I 14f (Telepinu-myth) *hal-ki-iš ZÍZ-tar Ú-UL ma-a-i* "grain [and] spelt do not grow," (16) HUR.SAG<sup>AŠ.AŠ.HI.A</sup> *ha-a-te-er* GIŠ<sup>HI.A</sup> *-ru ha-a-aš-ta . . .* (17) *ú-e-ša-e-eš ha-a-te-er TÚL<sup>HI.A</sup> ha-a-aš-ta* "the mountains dried up, the trees dried up, . . . The meadows dried up, the springs dried up." The spelling *haš(z)ašta* of the 3 sg. pret. occurs in the mythological fragment KUB XII 62 I 8' (CTH 338) *ša-ra-a-ma GIŠ-ru ha-za-aš-ta* "the tree dried up," and in the horse-training tablet XXIX 40 IV 20 *na-at ha-a-aš-za-aš-ta* "and it dried up" (A. Kammenhuber, *Hippologia Hethitica* 187 [1961]). The 3 sg. pret. is probably to be analyzed as *hat-šta*, with the ending of *memi-šta*.

3 sg. impv. *hādu* KUB XVII 28 II 43 (a curse, CTH 458.2) *a-pi-el-la e-eš-ša-ri* (44), *É-ZU QA-TAM-MA ha-a-du* "may his form [and] his household likewise dry up," (46) *nu-uš-ši hal-ki-iš* (47) *li-e ma-a-i* "and may grain not grow for him."

participle *hātant-* "dried": nom. sg. masc. *ha-ta-an-za* KUB XVII 28 II 43, nom. sg. neut. *ha-a-ta-an* KBo XVI 78 I 8' (v. infra) et passim.

Beside this *hi*-verb we have an inchoative stative in *-eš-*, 3 sg. *hatešzi*: Bo 4859 IV 13 *na-at ha-te-eš-zi a-pi-e-da-ni-ma* UD.KAM-ti "(of a fruit:) it will dry out in the same day (as it is picked)," cited by C. G. von Brandenstein, Or. NS 8, 76. The Greek verb is likewise first used of the drying out of a felled tree (ἄζομένην Δ487).

In the form and meaning the Hittite verb belongs to a very archaic class in Indo-European: that of "adjective-verbs," where the basic adjectival value is expressed verbally. On the type see Watkins, "The Indo-European denominative statives in *-ē-*," *TPS* 1971, and J. Jasanoff, "The Germanic third class of weak verbs," *Language* 1972. The coexistence of stative suffix *-ē-*, *-ē-s-* and originally middle intransitive

sitive 3 sg. *-e/o* (on which see my *Indogerm. Gram.* III/1, ch. 8) which we find in the Hittite adjective-verb "DRY" is precisely what we find in the adjective-verbs "COLD" and "LIGHT, BRIGHT":

Hitt. <i>ḫati</i>	Gk. <i>ῥριγε</i> <i>ῥριγει</i>	Hitt. <i>luk(kat)ta</i> Skt. <i>rocate</i> Toch. <i>lyuketär</i> (*-o-tor) <sup>2</sup>
Hitt. <i>ḫateš-</i>	Lat. <i>frīgē-</i> Gk. <i>ρύγησ-</i> (aor. and fut.)	Lat. <i>lūcē-</i> Hitt. <i>lukkeš-</i>

In Indo-European shape

* <i>ḥod-e/o</i>	* <i>srīg-e/o</i>	* <i>leuk-e/o</i>
* <i>ḥod-ē-</i>	* <i>srīg-ē-</i>	* <i>leuk-ē-</i>
* <i>ḥod-ē-s-</i>	* <i>srīg-ē-s-</i>	* <i>leuk-ē-s-</i>

In Latin *ador* and Hittite *ḫat-* we have an exact formal match: a necessary, but scarcely sufficient, condition for an etymology. How can we link the Hittite verb for "dry out" with the Latin word for "spelt"? If we can, then we will have given Lat. *ador* the etymology which it lacked before. To do so, we must look more deeply into the texts in both languages.

Beside the general sense of "dry up," e.g. of vegetation during a drought, Hittite *ḫat-* can refer to drying in the processing and preserving of cereals. The semantics are precisely those of American English *parch* in *parched corn*, the principal diet of the Confederate Army. The usage is ancient in Hittite. In KBo XVI 78, an Old Hittite text (cf. A. Kammenhuber, Or. NS 39.560 [1970]) listing "offrandes de villes pour des cultes locaux" (Laroche, CTH 662) we find several itemizations of rations of ZÍD.DA ZÍZ "spelt meal" (Vs. I 2' XXX PA ZÍD.DA ZÍZ "30 measures of spelt meal." The text continues with the fuller description

I 7' ]ZÍD.DA-aš *pa-at-ti-ya-ta-aš-še-et da-a-an-z[i*  
8'? ZÍD.DA-aš *ḫa-a-ta-an ma-al-la-an* [

They take a ——— (measure or container) of meal . . . of meal? dried (and) milled

<sup>2</sup> The explanation of the Tocharian *e*-class is due to J. Jasanoff, and supersedes that in my *Celtic Verb* 71 (1962).



Though the restoration of ZÍJD.DA-*aš* is uncertain, the context and the juxtaposition of *hātan* "dried" with *mallan* "ground, milled" (: Lat. *molere*), both nom. sg. neut. of the participles *hātant-*, *mallant-*, shows that we have a technical term in the processing of grain, and grain which is destined specifically for cultic use.

The same can be inferred from the use of the Sumerogram ZÍD.DA HĀD.DU.A (UD.DU.A) "dried meal" in a Hittite text: KUB XII 4 I 7', IV 5, a fragmentary text dealing again with cultic administration (Laroche, CTH 530). IV 4 *nu-za kiš-an ha-an-da-a-iz-zi* (5) I PA ZÍD.DA A II PA ZÍD.DA HĀD.DU.A "And he arranges as follows: . . . 1 measure of wet meal, 2 measures of dry meal." It has already been assumed by A. Kammerhuber, *Hippologia hethitica* 328 (1961), that the Sumerogram HĀD.DU.A stands for the Hittite participle *hātant-*, on the basis of the equation *uzuḫri* HĀD.DU.A = *welku hātant-* "dried grass, hay."<sup>3</sup> We may assume the same in ZÍD.DA. HĀD.DU.A "dried meal."<sup>4</sup>

An additional example may be cited from Hittite:

IBoT II 93 Vs. 12'

]III PA ZÍD.DA ZÍZ *ha-a-ta-an-da-aš*

The text is edited by Volkert Hass, *Der Kult von Nerik* 124-5 [Studia Pohl 4], Rome, 1970, who incorrectly translates "drei parisu-Masse des h.-Spelts," rather than "three parisu-measures of flour of dried spelt." The full writing of ZÍD.DA ZÍZ *hātantaš* confirms the interpretation of the Old Hittite passage cited above. From Vs. 10' of IBoT II 93 ZÍD.DA ŠA *še-ep-pi-it-ta-aš* "flour of barley, (?)," compared with KBo XVII 36 IV 5' *me-ma]-al še-ep-pi-da-aš* (as restored by my student Mary-Anita Browne), we may substantiate the construction with the defining genitive ("flour of barley", "flour of dried spelt"), as well as hazard the guess that ZÍD.DA = *memal*.

The texts of Hittite thus point to a particular specialization of *hat-* as a technical term referring to "dried, parched meal," specifically "spelt,"<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The sign HĀD is normally read UD, *ut* in Hittite. If indeed it is to be read HĀD here, we may assume the Hittite scribe is making a folk-etymology with his native *had-*. The phrase ZÍD.DA HĀD.DU.A is found only in Boghazköy (Deimel, *Šum. Lex.* 536,209).

<sup>4</sup> The phrase *welku hātant-* "dried grass" will explain Tocharian A *āti*, B obl. *atīyai* "grass" just as "dried spelt meal" explains Latin *ador* "spelt." For the phonology cf. AB *āk-* "lead": Lat. *agō*.

<sup>5</sup> The Hittite reading of the Sumerogram ZÍZ "spelt" is unknown. It is an *r/n*-stem: with phonetic complement, nom. sg. ZÍZ-*tar* KUB XVII 10 I 14, KBo XV 10 II 58, gen. sg. ZÍZ-*na-aš* KUB XXXV 116, 10, dat./loc. sg. ZÍZ-*ni* KBo XV 33 I 15 (I owe the latter two references to H. Berman, *The*

co-occurring with the participle "ground (meal)," and destined for cultic use. It is not an ordinary foodstuff; the context is religious.

We have already noted that Latin *ador* is the ancient word for *far*: *far, quod ueteres adoreum appellauere* (Plin. Nat. 18, 81). Compare also Servius [auct.] Aen. 5.745 (*far*:) *frumenti certa species sicut adoreum*. But the crucial definition of *ador* is that given us by Festus (P.F. 3, 19) to explain his second etymology: *ador farris genus, edor quondam appellatum ab edendo, uel quod aduratur, ut fiat tostum, unde in sacrificio mola salsa efficitur*. Festus' first etymology, and unfortunately the only one cited by the etymological dictionaries, *edor ab edendo*, is only a "calembour" (Ernout-Meillet). It is his second etymology, *ador quod adur-atur*, which proceeds to give a definition identical in every particular with the Hittite semantic and cultural picture: *ador* is parched (*tostum*) and ground (*unde mola efficitur*) for a specific cultic purpose (*in sacrificio*).

The equivalence of *ador* and *far tostum* is clear in Festus. Compare further F. 124, 13 *mola etiam uocatur far tostum et sale sparsum, quod eo molito hostiae aspergantur*, and P.F. 97, 22 *immolare est mola, id est farre molito et sale, hostiam perspersam sacrare*. In the parallel *far tostum et sale sparsum* and *farre molito et sale* we may see the same co-occurrence as in Hittite *hātan mallan* "parched [and] ground."

The sacral character of *ador* and *far* is likewise evident from the passages quoted, and numerous others. Nonius 59.5 (82.5 Lindsay) cites an etymology of *nefarii* from Varro, *Vita Populi Romani*: "*a farre; quod adoreum est, id quo scelerati uti non debeant, non triticum sed far.*" Note especially Nonius' definition: 52, 14 (74, 14 L.) *ador frumenti genus quod epulis et immolationibus sacris pium putatur*. *Ador* is *pium*, as is *far*. Vergil, Aen. 5.745 *farre pio et supplex ueneratur acerra*. It is not a mere "Vergilian" *pious* but a genuine epithet of Latin religious language. Horace, Carm. 3.23.19-20 *molliuit auersos Penatis | farre pio et saliente mica* is describing the solemn aspersion of the *focus* with *mola salsa*. Compare also Arnobius 7.26 *ut pium far monstrat, quo peragi mos fuit sacrificiorum solemnum munia*. Vergil's unique use of *ador(eus)* is similarly in a religious, cultic context: Aen. 7.109-10 *instituuntque dapes et adorea liba per herbam | subiciunt epulis (sic Iuppiter ipse monebat)*.

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*stem formation of Hittite nouns and adjectives* (unpub. diss., University of Chicago, 1972). It is of course tempting to speculate that the Hittite form might be \**hatar*, like *ador*, but no evidence for this exists.

We thus have in Latin *ador* the ancient name of a kind of grain which is parched, and ground, to serve a cultic purpose in the sacrificial ritual. The set of cultural features, as elements of a structure, is identical with that of Hittite. The root of the word for "ground, milled" is common to both Latin (*moli-tus*) and Hittite (*mall-ant-*). I suggest that in the Hittite verb for "dry," *hat-*, we must see the root of Latin *ad-or*.

The semantic shift is identical with that in English *meal* (which in Southern American means specifically *cornmeal*, the unmarked meal), which with its Germanic congeners is a derivative of the verb "to grind, mill," Indo-Eur. \**melə-*.

Latin *immolare* "sacrifice" from *mola* (*salsa*) "meal (with which the victim, the altar, and the knife were sprinkled)" illustrates the sort of semantic shift and etymology that can be recovered only by paying attention to the whole cultural context which gave rise to the term. The etymology of Latin *ador* can be discovered only by these same means.

The implications of this etymology for the prehistoric agriculture of the Indo-Europeans, as well as for the history of Indo-European religion, remain a problem for the future.





## ETYMA ENNIANA

CALVERT WATKINS

(For Otto Skutsch on his sixty-fifth birthday)

*uegeō*

FESTUS (138,20 L) preserves one example from Ennius of this archaic verb, Ann. 487 Vahlen: *cum magno strepitu Volcanum uentus uegebat*. The lexicographer cites the verse as an illustration of metonymy, "a superiore re inferior." The basic meaning of the verb is "to arouse, quicken"; here specifically it denotes the action of the rushing wind fanning the Fire-God's forge.

Apart from this passage in Festus, virtually all our certain attestations of *uegeō* come from an article in Nonius (p. 183,4 M, 268,1 L): *ueget pro uegetat uel erigit, uel uegetum est. Pomponius Maiali* (78): *animos Venu' ueget uoluptatibus. Ennius Ambracia* (4) [= Scen. 367 V]: *et aequora salsa ueges ingenibu' uentis. Varro Manio* (278): *nec natus est nec morietur: uiget, ueget, utpote plurimum. idem "Ovos λύρας* (351): *quam mobilem diuum lyram sol harmoge / quadam gubernans motibus diis ueget*. Similar to the last passage, and indeed perhaps modelled on it, is Lucretius 5.532 *quae uegeat motum signis*.

In the second Ennian passage we may note the same association of the verb with the wind; this time it is the waters which are aroused. In Pomponius Venus arouses the passions, while in Varro's "*Ovos λύρας* it is the sun, in Lucretius an unnamed natural and divine force, which is the prime mover.

Dictionaries since Forcellini have on the strength of *uiget ueget* in the other Varronian passage assumed also for *uegeō* an intransitive, stative value "to be lively, active." It is the great merit of Ernout and Meillet, *Dict. étym. lat. s.v.*, to have shown that this is false: "l'existence même du couple *uiget ueget*, prouve que *uegēre* y est employé avec son sens transitif: il a la force (*uiget*), il donne la vie (*ueget*)."

Yet such is the force of error that etymological dictionaries both of Latin and of other Indo-European languages have continued to give this nonexistent stative value as the basic meaning of *uegeō*: "bin

munter" is the first meaning given in Walde-Hofmann *Lat. etym. Wb.*<sup>3</sup> 2.741; Pokorny, *Indogerm. etym. Wb.* 1117; Mayrhofer, *Kurzgef. etym. Wb. des Altindischen* 3.182; Feist, *Vgl. Wb. der gotischen Spr.* 548; de Vries, *Altnordisches etym. Wb.* 639; and perhaps others. The consequences for the etymology of *uegeō* have been grave.

Within Latin, *uegeō* clearly belongs with *uegetus* "lively" (whose suffix with its unreduced *-e-* in an internal open syllable is unexplained; cf. the ethnic name *Venetī* and the adjective *uenetus* derived from it). And as all etymologists have been agreed since the last century, *uegeō* cannot be separated from *uigeō* and the adjective *uigil* with its derivative *uigilāre*. All three are ancient in Latin; *uigeō* from Naevius, *uigil* and *uigilāre* from Plautus on.

The Indo-European root form for all of these Latin words is *\*ueg-*, as is proved by their recognized cognates (to be discussed below): Indo-Iranian *vāj-*, Germanic *wak-*, from apophonic *\*ueg-/uog-*. But each of the Latin forms presents certain problems.

For the adjective *uigil* we might expect in the first instance *\*uigul*, compare *simul:similis* and archaic (Festus, Lucilius) *facul:facilis*. The variant *-il*, recurring in *pugil*, *mūgil*, reflects the same variation in the timbre of the (here anaptyctic) vowel that we find in the superlative suffixes *-imus*, *-umus*, *-issimus*, *-issumus*. Cf. Meillet-Vendryes, *Traité de gramm. comp. des langues class.*<sup>2</sup> 113.

The prototype is an *i*-stem adjective *\*ueg-lis*. Lehmann's objection (*Lat. Gramm.* 239) because of the gen. plur *uigilum* is countered by Meillet-Vendryes, *Traité de gramm. comp. des langues class.*<sup>2</sup> 478; the syncope of the *-is* in the nominative provokes the transfer to the consonantal stem type. The raising of the first vowel to *i* in *uigil* is regularly attributed to assimilation to the *-i-* of the second syllable (Leumann 96, Meillet-Vendryes 121, Sommer, *Hdb. der lat. Laut- u. Formenlehre* 113). While such a vowel harmony rule will also explain such cases as *nihil* < *\*ne-hil(om)*, *simul* from older *semol*, *semul*, there are numerous other instances of the raising of *e* to *i* in the absence of a following *i*, particularly after labial or labiodental. Cases like *stircus* (Luceria) *Mircurios* (Praeneste) are clearly dialectal, but *firmus* is not, and *uitulus*, Umbrian *vitluf* beside *uetus*, *uillus* beside *uellus*, perhaps *fiber* beside *feber*, *pinna* beside *penna*, would appear to attest a widespread, if sporadic, raising of Italic *e* to *i* after labial.

The same phonetic explanation might account for Szemerényi's attractive etymology of Lat. *uilis* "cheap" as *\*ues-lis*, via *\*uislis*; this adjective offers an exact morphological parallel to *uigil* from *\*ueg-lis*. In *uilis* the following *-i-* was clearly a factor, contrast *uēnum* from

\*ues-no-, with the same root. See Szemerényi's discussion, *Arch. Ling.* 6.31-45 (1954), especially p. 36 (he favors an intermediary \*uēlis), and Hamp's comment, *Glotta* 46.276<sup>3</sup> (1968).

The verb *uigilāre* is a derivative of *uigil*. The great antiquity of this verb in Latin is clear from the old ritual and religious formula preserved by Servius ad Aen. 8.3: *is qui belli suscepit curam, sacrarium Martis ingressus primo ancilia commouebat, post hastam simulacri ipsius, dicens "Mars uigila."* That the stem-vowel *-i-* of the adjective does not appear in the verb is paralleled by forms like *tenuis: attenuāre*, older than the type *breuiāre*, and Hittite *dankuiš* "black, dark": *dankuwahh-* "blacken." It may indicate that the *i*-stem is in fact secondary, from the Indo-European point of view. The stative-intransitive character of the *ā*-verb *uigilāre* is noteworthy, and may reflect a very old layer of derivation of verbs in *-ā-* from adjectives; cf. my paper in the *Transactions of the Philological Society* 1971.

Essentially all authorities assume that the verb *uigeō* owes its *i* to *uigil*, and goes back to earlier *uegeō*. Meillet-Vendryes' statement (p. 121) is "*uigil* de \**uegil* (cf. *uegeō*, refait ensuite en *uigeō* d'après *uigil*"; Sommer (p. 58) has "*uigeō* neben *uegeō* . . . unter Einwirkung von *uigil*."

We have here a curious contradiction in Neogrammarian practice and the assumed regularity of sound change, which appears to have gone altogether unnoticed. The Latin verb *uegeō*, confined to archaic authors but in fact attested later than *uigeō*, is presumed both to have been remodeled to *uigeō* after *uigil* in prehistoric times, and to have continued unchanged in *uegeō*, with the two happily coexisting down to the time of Lucretius and Varro at least. Such an assumption strains our linguistic credulity.

The dilemma can however be resolved. We have evidence for an old stative-intransitive verb \**ueg-ē-*, with the meaning "be lively, thrive, be vigorous," which appears in Latin in the form *uig-ē-*, *uigeō*. From the stative \**ueg-ē-* in *uigeō* we find as well the regular inchoative *uigēscō*, from Lucretius on. On the antiquity of the Latin *-ē-sc-* formation, compare Hittite *-e-š-* with the same force, see *TPS* 1971.

Whether the raising of the root-vowel *e* to *i* in *uigeō* is due to the "influence" of *uigil*, from the same root \**ueg-*, or attributable to a more general sporadic or dialectal phonetic rule, is uncertain. The texts of Latin do not support a close association of *uigeō* and *uigil*, which are semantically rather distant; if any Latin word is associated with *uigeō* it is rather *uiuō*. Compare *quod uiuit quod uiget* Cic. Tusc. 1.27.66, *uiuant et uigent* Nat. Deor. 2.33.83, *id uiuere* ibid. 3.14.35,



*cuius facta uiua nunc uigent* Naev. ii, 109 Ribbeck<sup>3</sup>, p. 226 Marmorale, *in uiuido pectore uigebat* Livy 6.22.7, *uiuimus uigemusque*, id. 2.32.11, *uiuunt uigentque*, id. 25.38.8.

The flaw in the etymological dilemma has lain in the unquestioned assumption that the old stative-intransitive *\*ueg-ē-* is also the form underlying Latin *uegeō*. This assumption was made because of the erroneous view, as we have seen, that *uegeō* is basically a stative-intransitive, “bin munter,” which it is not. *Vegēre* is consistently and without exception a causative-transitive verb meaning “arouse, quicken, stir up (waters), fan (fire).” The Indo-European stative suffix *\*-ē-* is wholly out of place in such a formation, and it is no accident that there exists no corresponding inchoative *\*uegēscere*.

The implication for the etymology of *uegeō* is clear; we must seek a causative-transitive formant, in place of the stative *\*-ē-*. Such a formant is not hard to find. The Latin second conjugation sign *-ē-* reflects not only the Indo European stative *\*-ē-*, but also the Indo-European causative (transitive)-iterative *\*-eǵe-*, as in *monēre*, *docēre*. The formation implied the *o*-grade of the root, as in the latter two examples, and the Indo-European prototype should be reconstructed as *\*uog-eǵe-*. The radical *e* of *uegeō* must be due to the change of initial *uo-* to *ue-* in Latin, attested in *uorsus*, *uorrō*, *uortex*, *uotō*, *uoster* beside later *uersus*, *uerrō*, *uertex*, *uetō*, *ueter*.

Though this rule is normally stated only for the environment of following dental or apical cluster as in the above instances (Meillet-Vendryes 112, Sommer 67, Leumann 61), there are no counter-examples of *uo-* preserved before original velar, and no Latin words at all beginning *\*uog-*; the preservation of initial *uo-* in *uoueō* (*\*uog<sup>w</sup>h-eǵe-*), *uomō* (*\*uomə-*), *uocō* (*\*uok<sup>w</sup>-*) is doubtless attributable to the following labial or labio-velar.

This Indo-European prototype *\*uog-eǵe-*, internally reconstructed from Latin alone, can then be compared to, and exactly equated with, a derivationally isolated verb in another Indo-European tradition: Vedic Sanskrit *vājáyati*. The Indo-European form of this verb can be normally reconstructed as the identical *\*uog-eǵe-*, with root *\*ueg-* and the *o*-grade and Vedic accentuation proper to the causative-iterative formation. And in its semantics, and associated objects and subjects in the Vedic texts, it corresponds almost uncannily with Latin *uegeō*. The meaning of *vājáyati* is precisely “arouse, quicken, stir up (waters), fan (fire).” Compare the following passages.

RV 9.68.4 *sá mātārā vicáran vājáyann apáh | prá médhiraḥ svadháyā, pinvate padám* “coursing through his two mothers (Heaven and



Earth), *churning up the waters*, the wise one (Soma) of his own power makes his place (the soma vat) overflow." Cf. Ennius' *aequora salsa ueges*.

The older Vedic 1 pl. pres. is found in the clausula of an 8-syllable gāyatrī in RV 8.93.7 *tám indram vājayāmasi / mahé vṛtrāya hāntave* "that Indra *we urge on*, to slay great Vṛtra." The sense is "spur on, arouse the passions"; it is the martial counterpart of Pomponius' *animos Venu' ueget uoluptatibus*. With the singers as subject and the god as object, as frequently in the Rig-Veda, we have in Levi-Straussian terms the movement down to up; in the cosmographic passages of Lucretius and Varro with the god as subject we have the expected reciprocal movement up to down.

The same finite verb form recurs, in the same metrical slot, with the Fire God Agni as object in RV 8.43.25: *agnīm . . . māryaṃ ná . . . / śáptim ná vājayāmasi* "Agni . . . like a young warrior . . . like a chariot team *we spur on*." The close Vedic association of fire and water — Agni ("fire") is *apām nāpāt* ("grandson, descendent of the waters") — is explicit in the same hymn, line 9: *apsú agne sádīṣ ṭava* "thy seat, O Agni, is in the waters." In another Agni-hymn we find the verb associated with the wind as the Fire God's racehorse: RV 4.7.11 *vātasya melīm sacate nijūrvann / āśūṃ ná vājayate hinvé árvā* "all-consuming, he follows *the roaring of the wind*, *spurs (the wind) on* like a courser; the steed is impelled." Here, both the middle inflexion of the causative-transitive *vājayate* and the ending -e of *hinvé* are linguistic archaisms in the Rig-Veda, cf. my *Indogerm. Gramm.* III/1. 88ff, 132ff. As such, they argue for the antiquity of the alliterative verbal collocations, which strikingly recall the Ennian *cum magno strepitu Volcanum uentus uegebat, ueges ingentibus uentis*.

The genuinely erotic counterpart of Pomponius' *animos Venu' ueget uoluptatibus* is found in the Atharva-Veda, in the unique example of the verb *vājayati* in this text. Compare AV 6.101.2 *yéna kṛśāṃ vājayanti / yéna hinvánti āturam / téna asya brahmaṇaspate / dhánur iva ā tānayā pásah* "Wherewith they *invigorate* one who is lean, wherewith they incite one who is ill, — with that, O Brahmaṇaspati, make thou his member taut like a bow" (tr. Whitney). The collocation and conjunction of *vājayanti* and *hinvánti* should also be noted, and compared with the archaic *vājayate hinvé* of the Rig-Vedic passage 4.7.11 just cited.

Not only is the Fire God the object of the verb in Vedic, but fire itself; and this time both in Indic and Iranian. Avestan has the compound *atrə.vazana-* "apparatus for fanning the (sacred) fire (Av.

*ātar-*), bellows." The collocation with "fire" and the special sense of "fan" recur in later Vedic *upa-vājayati* (TS, TB, S) "(das Feuer) anfachen," and the substantive "fan" in *upa-vājana-* (KŚS), morphologically identical with Avestan *-vazana-*, as shown by Wackernagel, *Kleine Schr.* 277-8. No clearer counterpart to Ennius' *Volcanum uentus uegebat*, metonymically uniting fire and the Fire God, could be found.

In the Rig-Veda the causative *vājāya-* is also used frequently of spurring on horses. Compare X 68.2 *br̥haspate vājāya āśūñr̥ iva ājāu* "O Brhaspati, spur them on like swift horses in a race," and note the same object *āśū-* "swift horse" (Gk. *ὠκύς*) in IV 7.11 cited above. In view of the striking parallelism of semantic field of Vedic *vājāya-* and Latin *uegeō*, it is worth recalling Gifanius' conjecture *uegere* for MS *uigere* in Lucretius 5.1298: *et prius est armatum in equi conscendere costas / et moderarier hunc frenis dextraque uegere / quam biugo curru belli temptare pericla*. Though editors since Lambinus have kept *uigere*, the translation "do doughty deeds," "user de sa force," "rüstig zum Kampfe sein" is a bit forced, and *armatum . . . uegere* could refer to lashing the horses' flanks with the flat of a sword.

The common Indo-Iranian character of the verb and its nominal derivatives, the common causative-transitive force "quicken, arouse," and the semantic identity, based on phrasal collocations, with the Latin cognate *uegeō*, suffice entirely to refute the view of Whitney, *Roots* s.v. and Mayrhofer, *Etym. Wb.* 3.182 that Vedic *vājāyati* is a denominative to *vājāḥ* "strength; contest; prize" (from the same root) with shifted accent. The denominative is attested in the participle RV *vājāyánt-*, and its semantics ("strive for the prize") are clearly distinct. We may assume in RV *vājāyati* a genuine inherited causative-transitive, from a primary root *\*vaj-*. The root appears in Iranian as *vaz-*, in *-vazana-* and archaic nominal forms like Av. *vazārət* "sich mit Kraft aufmachend," *vāzišta* "most powerful," and the Old Persian (Median) *vazarka-* = *vazrka-* "great, mighty," from an old noun *\*vazar-* "strength, vigor."

The semantic identity of Vedic *vājāyati* (RV also mid. *vājāyate*) and Latin *uegeō*, each derivationally isolated in its own tradition, requires us to posit an Indo-European causative-transitive *\*uog-eje-* as the common antecedent lexical item underlying each. The middle inflexion attested in RV *vājāyate*, in transitive function with overt object, is a valuable index of the antiquity of the verb; as a thematic formation, the causative-iterative in *\*-eje-* would have had an original 3 sg. pres. middle ending *\*uogejo/e*, renewed first as *\*uogejet(i)*, and

ultimately as hypostasized active \**uogeietī*. Cf. *Indogerm. Gramm.* III/1 132 and passim.

Yet another Indo-European tradition attests the same form: Germanic. We have in Gothic *us-wakjan* “ἐξυπνίζειν, wake up (trans.),” Old Norse *vekja*, Old English *weccan*, Old Saxon *weccian*, Old High German *wecchen*, German *wecken* the reflexes of a Common Germanic causative \**wakjan*, in Indo-European shape \**uog-ejē*-. The morphological agreement with the derivationally isolated Latin *uegeō* and Vedic *vājáyati* allows us to assume a common Indo-European lexical prototype for all three traditions, Latin, Indo-Iranian, and Germanic; the latter has semantically specialized the verb in the sense “arouse (from sleep), wake up,” but the earlier, more general sense is preserved in the Germanic adjective \**wakra*- in Old Norse *vakr* “awake, vigorous,” Runic *wakraR*, Old English *wacor* “awake, attentive,” Old High German *wackar*, *wahhar* “awake, aroused; vigorous.” (The \*-*ro*-suffix of the latter is related to the -*r*- of Iranian \**vazar*- underlying Old Persian *vaz(a)rka* “mighty.”) The sense “(a)wake(n)” of the Germanic family is in any case an inheritance, not an innovation, since it recurs in Latin *uigil*, *uigilare*.

Beside inherited causative formations we frequently find statives in \*-*ē*- or an equivalent suffix (Germanic -*ai*- of the third weak class). Archaic Latin causative-transitive *lūcēre*, as in Ennius Ann. 156 *candida lumina lucent*, Plautus Curc. 9 *lucēs cereum*, Cas. 118 *lucēbis facem*, agrees with Vedic *rocáyati*, Av. *raočaiiēiti* “lights” and Hittite *lukkizzi* “lights, sets on fire,” all presupposing causative-transitive \**louk-ejē*-. Beside these we have stative \**leuk-ē*- in Latin intransitive *lūcēre*, *lūcēscere*, and Hittite *lukkeš-zi* “grows light.”

In precisely similar fashion we have beside the Germanic causative *wakjan* a stative verb with the meaning “be awake,” in Gothic *wakaiþ* “γρηγορεῖν,” Old Norse *vaka*, Old English *wacian* (Eng. *watch*), Old Saxon *wakōn*, and Old High German *wahhēn*. The Germanic stative verb stem \**wak-ai*- (for the origin of the suffix, see a forthcoming paper by J. Jasanoff) is itself doubtless a denominative from the Germanic adjective \**wak-ra*-, discussed above, with archaic truncation of the stem-suffix \*-*ro*- as in Latin *ruber* → *rubeō*, *macer* → *maceō*, *piger* → *piget*. On the latter process see *TPS* 1971.

The Latin stative *uigeō* from \**ueg-ē*- is structurally parallel to, but independent of, the Germanic stative \**wak-ai*- from the adjective \**wak-ra*-. But in Latin *uegeō*, Vedic *vājáyati*, and the family of Gothic *us-wakjan* we have the common conservation of a single inherited Indo-European form.



*ceu*

Latin knows from Ennius on an adverbial particle of comparison *ceu* "like, as," confined in ante-Augustan times to elevated poetic texts. Its earliest attestation is *Ann.* 352 *et simul erubuit ceu lacte et purpura mixta*, cited by Nonius for the old nominative of the word for "milk." As a poetic word, "apud poetas praeter scaenicos priscos" (TLL) and appearing in prose only from Seneca and Suetonius on, *ceu* is *prima facie* an archaism, and may reflect an ancient formation in the language, of prehistoric date.

The correct direction in which to seek the etymology of *ceu* was seen by Louis Havet in 1886, in the *Melanges Renier* 370ff. He compared the Latin deictic particle *ce*, preposed in *cēdō*, *cette*, *cēteri* < \**ke-etero-* (cf. Umbrian *etram-a* "ad alteram," Old Church Slavonic *eterŭ* "someone"), and the *-va* of the Sanskrit particle of comparison *iva* "like, as," built on the same pronominal stem *i-* as Latin *is*, *id*, and semantically identical with *ceu*. For the etymology of the *-do* of *cedo* cf. my *Indogerm. Gramm.* III/1.208.

Ernout-Meillet, *Dict. etym. lat.*<sup>3</sup> s.v., add that the \**-ue* here is "peut-être" the same as in Lat. *-ue* "or." It is assuredly so, as Havet himself had recognized, and we may compare Homeric ἢ(F)έ "than" with the comparative, and particularly Middle English *or* "than," archaic and dialectal British and American English *nor* "than." For the negation in the latter, note Vedic *na* "like," literally "not."

An implicit formal defect of Havet's etymology — he himself did not venture a reconstructed form — is that *ce* + *ue* ought in Latin to have yielded \**coue*, \**cou'*, as in *nouus* from \**neuos* (Greek νε[F]ος) and countless other examples. Walde-Hofmann, *Lat. etym. Wb.*<sup>3</sup> s.v., therefore proposed the preform \**keiue*, which correctly accounts for the reflex *ceu*, just as \**sei-ue* yields *siue*, *seu*, and \**nei-ue* yields OLat. *nīue*, *neu*. (Lat. *nēue* is formed from the negation *nē* < \**ne*, rather than from the negation \**nei* in *nī*, *nī-ue*, and Oscan *nei-p* "nec," and secondarily referred to *neu* and *nīue*.)

While this solution is phonologically satisfying, its morphology and semantics are less so. Walde-Hofmann assume the natural segmentation \**kei* + *ue*; they take \**kei* as a local adverb "here" of pronominal origin, with the locative ending *-ei* (Lat. *domī*, Oscan *lūvkei* "in luco"), and identify it with Greek ἐκεῖ "there" and in particular κεῖ in the same meaning.

Yet neither of these adverbs is found in Homer, who has only κεῖθι. Sappho shows both κῆ and κῆθι, the latter perhaps a concealed Homer-



ism. For an alternative explanation of *κεῖθι* see further below. The form *κεῖ* is very poorly attested; Herodian attributes an instance to Archilochus (314 Lasserre-Bonnard: *παρὰ τὸ ἐκεῖθι*., *κεῖθι καὶ κεῖ*., *παρὰ Ἀρχιλόχῳ*), but the fragments of Archilochus preserved show only one example of *κεῖθι* (221 L-B. *πόδες δὴ κεῖθι τιμιώτατοι*). Otherwise, *κεῖ* appears to be found only in Alexandrian poetry: Herodas 1.26 (cf. the commentary of Headlam-Knox 23) and Callimachus, *Hymn to Delos* 195 as a v.l. (P.Oxy.), in both of which it could be a pseudo-archaism. Furthermore *ἐκεῖ*, *κεῖ*, Aeol. *κῆ* have all been taken by Schwyzler, *Gr. Gr.* 1.613, following Brugmann, *Grdr.*<sup>2</sup> 2.2.323, as a back-formation from *ἐκεῖνος*, which would most easily explain why it means "there" and not the expected "here," as in Lat. *hic*, older *heic*, *hici-ne*, Faliscan *hei*, from *\*ghei(-ke)*, or for that matter English *here*. Isolated *κεῖ* could similarly be derived from *κεῖνος*, and the vocalism of Aeol. *κῆ* (transferred to *κῆθι* = *κεῖθι*?) must come from *κῆνος*, not *\*kei* which would yield Aeolic *\*κεῖ*. Frisk *Gr. etym. Wb.*, still prefers to take (*ἐ*)-*κεῖ* as a frozen locative. But if *κεῖ* (whence *ἐκεῖ*) in fact continues a form of Indo-European date, its distribution in historical Greek is most peculiar.

Ionic *κεῖνος*, Aeolic *κῆνος* have a "spurious diphthong" [ē] from contraction of preposed deictic particle plus pronominal stem: *\*ke + eno-*. Later *ἐ-κεῖνος* is formed on *κεῖνος* by a repetition of the same process, preposition of a deictic particle (*ἐ-*); typologically comparable are Italian *questo*, *quello* from *\*eccu(m) istum*, *\*eccu(m) illum*, or Oscan *e-tanto* "tanta," Russian *è-tot* "this" from *tot*. If Attic *ἐκεῖ* were extracted from *ἐκεῖνος* we might expect Old Attic inscriptions to show EKE *ἐκεῖ* like Aeolic *κῆ*; Schwyzler, *DGEP* Appendix 8 (= IG I 1, suppl. p. 3, ca. 460) has both *εκει* and *ειναι*, as well as *εν τεισι πολεσιν*, contrast his App. 10 (IG I Suppl. 27c, post V med.) with *εναι* and *εν δε τεισι αλλεσι πολεσι*.

I conclude that the evidence within Greek for an Indo-European locative *\*kei* "here" is very slim. A similar stem-form probably did exist in one dialect area, as exemplified by Old Irish (*in*) *bith cé* "this world (as opposed to the next)" (*\*kei*?), perhaps Ogham *COI* "here" (apophonic?). But the basic meaning of the pronominal stem *\*ki-* in Italic and Celtic was clearly and specifically "on this side (of)," Lat. *cis*, *citra*, with Italic and Celtic cognates. The reconstruction *\*kei* is also not necessary for Old Irish *cé*, which could also be the fossilized nominative of which the preposition *cen* "without" is an oblique case; cf. archaic *bé* "woman" (*\*g<sup>w</sup>en-s*) beside *ben* (*\*g<sup>w</sup>en-ā*) and acc. *bein* (*\*g<sup>w</sup>en-m*). Nothing indicates that a wholly hypothetical

Italic form *\*kei* either morphologically or semantically can be set up and combined as *\*kei-ye* to explain Latin *ceu*.

Yet as we have noted the phonological form *\*keiye* is necessary to account for Latin *ceu*. An alternative segmentation is therefore indicated; and a precise parallel can be documented in Italic texts, which dictates the correct solution of the Latin form.

The Paelignian (Northern Oscan) funerary inscription from Corfinum, number 213 in Vetter's *Handbuch der ital. Dial.* and dated to the first century B.C., is well-known for furnishing virtually certain non-Latin examples of the Saturnian verse-line, together with complex concatenating patterns of alliteration. In the second and third preserved line we find the name of the deceased, a priestess (*sacaracirix* "*\*sacatrix*") of Ceres, with a verb phrase intercalated for the sake of alliteration: *Prismu. Petiedu.ip.uidad / Vibdu*. Her name, in the order of the constituents in the inscription, was *Prima Petiedia Vibidia*, with the letter *ḍ* (Ð) noting an affricate [dʒ] or sibilant [ʒ] from earlier *-dĭ-*, *-di-*. In the remaining *.ip.uidad.*, each a fully stressed word as indicated by the interpuncts, Vetter recognized a verb-phrase introduced by the adverb "here": *i-p* is directly comparable in formation to Latin *i-bī*, Umbrian *ife*, and probably Oscan *ifei*, with the pronominal base *i-* and the same *-p* from *\*-k<sup>w</sup>(e)* as Oscan *nei-p* "nec." (The verb *.uidad.* is admittedly unclear; formally it looks like a 3 sg. *ā*-subjunctive with secondary endings like Oscan *fakūiad* "faciat," *putiad* "*\*poteat, possit*," and could be identical with Latin *uideat*, though the sense escapes us.)

Now beside the *ip* "here" of this Paelignian inscription we may set another form from the Northern Oscan region, this time from a curious fourth-century Latin inscription (and one of the very few from this period) from Marsian territory, Vetter 228a, which shows independently clear local dialectal influence (*pro.le[cio]nibus.Martses* "pro legionibus Marsis"). The form is *.ceip.*, again a phonological word set off by interpuncts, and in the context Vetter is surely correct in interpreting it as "here": *caso.cantouios.aprufclano.ceip.apurfinem.esalicom.* (lapis *esalico.m*) "Caso Cantouius Apruficulanus hic apud finem Esalic(or)um."

We know from Latin *cēterī* that the pattern of prefixation of deictic *\*ke* to pronominal stems, as in Greek *κεῖνος* < *\*ke* + *eno-*, existed in the Italic branch: *cēterī* < *\*ke* + *etero-* may be compared with uncompounded Umbrian *etram-a* "ad alteram," as noted above. This pattern of prefixation of the deictic element is found also in Germanic, where the Old Norse pronoun *hann*, *hānn* "he" is most easily derived from the same independently prefixed *\*ke-* which yielded Greek *κεῖνος*.

It is therefore reasonable to assume that an original Northern Oscan adverb for "here"

$*i-p(e)$  (Pael.  $ip$ )

was renewed by the prefixation of the deictic particle  $*ke$ , a simple semantic reinforcement, to

$*ke + i-p(e)$  (Marsian Lat.  $ceip$ )

in accord with the pattern observable in  $cēterī$ ,  $κεῖνος$ , and other wholly parallel developments. The same was already assumed by Vetter, *Hdb.* 162.

This permits us to return to Latin  $ceu$ , and in rigorously parallel fashion to segment its antecedent phonological form  $*keiye$  as deictic particle  $*ke$ , a semantic reinforcement, plus adverb "like, as"

$*ke + i-ye$  .

which presupposes the existence of a simple, unreinforced adverb "like, as," of the shape

$*i-ye$ .

Such a form is precisely what we have in Vedic and later Sanskrit  $iva$  "like, as," the form originally compared to  $ceu$  — for its semantics — by Havet.

We may thus replace the parallelism by an equation: Lat.  $ceu < *ke + i-ye =$  Skt  $iva < *i-ye$ . The syntactic difference in word-order between  $ceu$  which precedes and  $iva$  which follows the noun phrase compared is wholly comparable to the pre- and post-position of other adverbial elements of the Indo-European sentence in the various languages (e.g.  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron$  and  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron$ , etc.). It should be noted that linguistic equations between such adverbial particles are rare between Indo-European languages, and significant where they appear.

The foregoing analysis prompts another suggestion. The Latin adverb  $ibi$ , Umbrian  $ife$ , Oscan  $ifei$  supposes an apophonic variant  $*i-dhei$  beside the  $-dhi$  underlying Greek  $-θι$ . Another variant of the suffixed particle appears in Sanskrit  $i-ha$  "here," Prakrit  $i-dha$ , and Greek  $-θα$ . The combined evidence of the three traditions would suggest an Indo-European  $*i-dhi$ , to which might well have been formed in the same fashion as we have observed, with deictic prefix,  $*ke + i-dhi$ , which could explain the form  $κεῖθι$ , and mutatis mutandis  $κεῖθεν$ ,  $κεῖσεν$ , discussed above.

It is also tempting to suggest that the Germanic forms for "here," Common Germanic  $*hē^2r$ , go back to a prefixed form  $*ke-$ , Gmc  $*he-$ ,

plus an adverbial derivative in *-r* of the Indo-European pronominal stem *\*e/o-*, parallel to Gothic *hwar* "where" < *\*hwa-r*, IE *\*k<sup>w</sup>o-r*, *par* "there" < *\*pa-r*, IE *\*to-r*. We would have Gmc. *\*he* + *a-r* (> *\*hē<sup>2</sup>r*, Goth. etc. *hēr*), in Indo-European shape *\*ke* + *o-r*, though its creation would appear to be of Germanic date only.

Finally, an additional language may be adduced to show the prefixation of deictic *\*ke* to an adverbial particle. The Indo-European word for "now," reconstructible as *\*nū-*, shows in several traditions a final nasal: Greek *νῦν*, *νυν*, and Latin *etiam-num* "even now." In Latin *nunc*, *nuncine* from *num-ce(-ne)* we have the same suffixation of deictic *-ce* as in *hunc*, *tunc*, etc.

Now in Hittite the word for "now" is written *kinun* (*ki-nu-un*). Rather than assuming that the *ki-* directly reflects the demonstrative stem *\*ki-* (Lithuanian *šis* etc.), with Pedersen, *Hittitisch* § 46, we may assume that *ki* is as normally in Hittite the spelling of initial velar plus *e* (*kissar-* "hand" < *\*ghesr*:*χελρ*). This permits the analysis of *kinun* "now" as *\*ke* + *nun*, with exactly the same elements of Latin *nunc*, but in the reverse order; semantically, deictic *\*ke-nun* "now" is on a line with Marsian Latin *ce-ip*, Greek *κεῖθι*, and Germanic *\*he-ar* "here."

This evidence is sufficient to demonstrate the pattern of reinforcement of adverbial particles by the prefixation of deictic *\*ke* within Indo-European times. The isolated character of each example within its own tradition shows that none could have been created on the basis of synchronically existing rules of grammar in each tradition. At the same time the pattern of prefixation — otherwise unknown in Indo-European morphology save for negation and the dialectal augment — illustrates clearly the special character of particle formation in Indo-European, and its separate position in the derivational system.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY



## ENNIAN LAURENTIS TERRA

ALAN J. NUSSBAUM

FROM the historical point of view, there are only two ways to interpret the fact that Latin does not show a formal distinction between masculine and feminine<sup>1</sup> in the present participle in -ens, -entis.<sup>2</sup> On the one hand, it is possible that the distinction characterizing such pairs as Skt. bhāran/bhārantī and Greek φέρων/φέρουσα (both reflecting a putative \*bher-e/on(t)-/\*bher-e/ont-ia) was inherited into Latin but eliminated for one reason or another. On the other hand, it may be that Latin has preserved here a two-way distinction animate/inanimate,<sup>3</sup> which only later developed into the three-way distinction masculine/feminine/neuter which is reflected in other languages. Both interpretations have been offered.

Rudolf Thurneysen<sup>4</sup> held the first view:<sup>5</sup> "Das masc. ursp. \*legents, das fem. \*legentis (italische Umbildung von ursp. -entî) und das neutr. \*legent<sup>6</sup> mussten in Lateinischen in die eine Form zusammen-

I would like to thank Professor Otto Skutsch for reading the manuscript of this paper and making several valuable suggestions.

<sup>1</sup> The neuter, of course, is not itself distinguished from these either. But the question of how the identity of the neuter (i.e. inanimate) form on the one hand and the masculine and feminine (i.e. animate) form(s) on the other came about is of a different order, since there was certainly an IE distinction of animate/inanimate in the -nt- participle, as generally in the nominal (*bzw.* adjectival) category.

<sup>2</sup> *bzw.* -āns, -antis.


<sup>3</sup> Cf. (with Meillet *infra*) the Latin i-stem adjectives (*fortis*, -*lis* types) and the adjectives in -āk- (*audax* type), which seem never to have shown a distinction between masculine and feminine forms. This is particularly the case with i-stem adjectives, which, however, do not seem to have been an IE type.

<sup>4</sup> *Archiv für lat. Lexicographie und Grammatik* 5, 576.

<sup>5</sup> Cf., among others: Brugmann, *Grundriss* II<sup>2</sup> 2, 124; Buck, *Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin* 212; Leumann-Hoffman, *Lateinische Grammatik* 265, 329; C. Watkins, "Italo-Celtic Revisited," in Birnbaum and Puhvel, eds., *Ancient Indo-European Dialects* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1966) 40.

<sup>6</sup> The assumption, in the case of the neuter form, of a development \**legent* > *legens* is debatable. -*nt*# > -*ns*# is not easily paralleled in Latin (cf. Ehrlich, IF 11, 301), and even in Oscan where, as Thurneysen indicates, the secondary third person plural ending appears as -*ns*, the assumption of a direct development of -*nt* > -*ns* does not impose itself (cf. Leumann-Hoffmann, *Lat. Gramm.*,

fließen." As far as the feminine form is concerned, then, the assumed development is:



It may be added as a justification of this explanation that Latin *neptis*, also an inherited  $\bar{i}$ -stem (cf. Skt. *naptī-h*) underwent exactly the same treatment and, in a parallel manner, *\*socrū-* (< *\*swekrū-*, cf. Skt. *śvaśrū-h*) was remade to the feminine  $u$ -stem *socrus*,  $-ūs$ .

In an article entitled "Essai de chronologie des langues indo-européennes,"<sup>7</sup> in which Meillet argues for the relative lateness of the feminine gender as a whole in Indo-European, he points to certain facts about Latin, interpreting them as archaisms:

En Latin, on observe beaucoup d'adjectives où la distinction du masculin et du féminin n'est marquée . . . C'est . . . ce qui arrive dans le participes présents comme *ferens*, en face de forms qui, de l'indo-iranien au germanique et au grec, opposent nettement les deux genres . . . Comme, en Latin le féminin est en voie de croissance à l'époque historique . . . tous ces adjectives masculins-féminins doivent passer pour représenter un état de choses ancien dans la langue.

It is the purpose of this paper to settle this question in favor of the first view summarized above. This can be done by bringing to bear a piece of unambiguous evidence which, as far as one can tell, has never been mentioned in connection with this problem.

It should first be pointed out, however, that, even granted the *relative* posteriority of a three-gender system to a two-gender system, there is every reason to believe that the feminine in  $*-\bar{i}$  (and thus the participle in  $*-nt-\bar{i}$ ) is of IE date and that Latin (or at least Italic) inherited this formation, whatever its subsequent fate. For the "feminine" in  $*-\bar{i}$  (bzw.  $*-i\bar{a}$ ) is, of course, by no means limited to Indic and Greek, languages which do in fact share several characteristic features, but appears also in Germanic; and Celtic, the group most closely related to Italic, has, among its  $*-\bar{i}$  feminines, some isolated remnants of a feminine participle in  $*-nt-\bar{i}$  which, as Watkins points

265, and Buck, *Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian*, 80ff, who follows Ehrlich in rejecting  $-nt\# > -ns\#$  in O.-U., but adopts a very improbable explanation of his own.

<sup>7</sup> BSL 32 (1931), 1-28.

out, are very likely inherited survivals because of the fact that "the participle as a deverbative grammatical category was given up in the Celtic languages at a relatively early date."<sup>8</sup> Among these are Old Irish *canait* (< \*kan-ont-ī) beside masculine *cano* (< \*kan-ont-s, gen. *canat* < \*kan-ont-os) and the (originally divine) name Brigit, a virtual isogloss with Vedic *bṛhatī* (both from \*bhrgh-nt-ī).<sup>9</sup>

Laurentum is the name of one of the more ancient Italic settlements in Latium.<sup>10</sup> It lay in the *ager Laurens*, near the west coast of Italy between the Tiber and the Numicus, and is represented by Vergil as being the stronghold of King Latinus. Morphologically, Laurentum is transparently the thematicization of the -nt- stem Laurent-,<sup>11</sup> and it is this formation in -nt- which provides the critical evidence referred to above. *Laurens* (i.e. of course, < \*Laurent-s) serves as the local adjective to *Laurentum* and is thus virtually synonymous with *Laurentinus*, -a, -um, as in:

Ut belli signum Laurenti Turnus ab arce  
Extulit (Verg. *Aen.* 8.1)

As an -nt- stem, *Laurens* shows both i-stem and consonant stem inflection in abl. sg. and gen. pl.:

Hunc Fauno et Nympha genitum Laurente Marica  
Accipimus (Verg. *Aen.* 7.47)

but:

... Laurenti Turnus ab arce  
(Verg. *Aen.* 8.1)

Lyrnesi domus alto, solo Laurente sepulchrum  
(Verg. *Aen.* 5.47)

but:

Exspectate solo Laurenti arvisque Latinis  
(Verg. *Aen.* 8.38)

Laurentumque minis et duro mota tumultu  
(Verg. *Aen.* 8.371)

but:

legatos Laurentium (Livy 1.14.1)

<sup>8</sup> Watkins (above, n. 6) 40.

<sup>9</sup> See Thurneysen, *A Grammar of Old Irish*, §296, and (Watkins above, n. 6) 40, with references.

<sup>10</sup> B. Tilly, *Vergil's Latium*, esp. chap. V, "Vergil's Laurentum" (Oxford, 1947).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Tarentum (= *Tάρων*, -αντος).

What we have then in *Laurens*, *-entis* is an adjectival formation whose stem formant is identical to the participial suffix *\*(e/o)nt-*.

In view of this, what are we to say of the clearly synonymous form which appears in Ennius' *Laurentis terra* (*Ann.*, Vahlen<sup>2</sup> 34, to which cf. the parallel *Saturnia terra-Ann.* V<sup>2</sup> 25)? The Latin Dictionaries of Georges and of Lewis and Short list the adjective as *Laurentis*, *-idis*, even though *Laurentis* is a *hapax*, and there is absolutely no evidence of a stem *\*Laurentid-*. Rather, it is clear from *Laurente Marica*, for example, that the ablative of *Laurentis* is simply *Laurente*. Given (1) that *Laurentis* means the same thing as *Laurens*, as we know from Priscian's introductory comment to the Ennian line in which *Laurentis* occurs — "*'Laurentis'* etiam pro '*Laurens*,'" <sup>12</sup> and (2) that it is feminine, a more satisfactory solution suggests itself. *Laurentis* is the direct (though perhaps remodeled) continuation of a feminine in *\*-nt-ī* and represents, at the very least,<sup>13</sup> a transitional form between *\*-entī* and *-ens*. That is, *Laurentis* may be said to be exactly comparable to the hypothetical *\*legentis* assumed above. As such it is to be considered another example of an unsyncopated *i*-stem on the same level as

(1) *terra corpus est*, at *mentis ignis est* Priscian *ap. Gramm. Lat.* (ed. Keil) II, 341, 21)

(2) "*lentis*" pro "*lens*" (ibid. II, 341, 22)

(3) *vide ne quae illic insit alia sortis sub aqua* — √ —. (Pl. *Cas.* 280: specifically mentioned by Priscian *ap. Gramm. Lat.* (ed. Keil) II, 320, 7–8; cf. also Ter. *And.* *alt. ex.*, 4?)

In short, the feminine adjective *Laurentis* in the text of Ennius may in fact be the last surviving example of a characteristic Indo-European formation inherited into Latin but subsequently eliminated.

It is possible, however, to go still further in the analysis of this unique and important form. A closer examination of the actual Ennian line in which *Laurentis* appears shows that it may well be an older and more significant form than we have yet suggested.<sup>14</sup> The full hexameter runs:

Quos homines quondam Laurentis terra recepit

*Laurentis*, the form with which we have just been concerned from a

<sup>12</sup> Priscian *ap. Grammatici Latini* II, 337, 26 (ed. Keil).

<sup>13</sup> But see below.

<sup>14</sup> I am grateful to my teacher, Calvert Watkins, for bringing to my attention the metrical evidence upon which the remainder of the exposition so heavily depends.



morphological point of view, here attracts our attention from a metrical point of view:

Quos homi|nes quon|dām Lau|rentis| terrā re|cepit

Now the final -s of *Laurentis* here seems to make position in thesis (i.e. in the second half-foot of a spondee), a situation which, as is well known, is very rare in Ennius' hexameters. In fact, there is exactly one other (possibly) valid example in the 628 lines of the *Annals* of -s# making position in thesis.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, there are about one hundred cases in which -s# is "dropped" (i.e. fails to make position) in thesis.<sup>16</sup>

In an article entitled "L's latin caduc,"<sup>17</sup> Louis Havet argued that Ennius' usage in this regard is actually entirely consistent and that the small number of counter-examples that had been adduced were only apparent. It would be worthwhile to summarize Havet's section (VI, 315ff) on Ennius' dactylic versification with respect to -s#.

In a "strong half-foot" (i.e. in arsis), Havet begins, the final -s always *does* make position, as in:

... vol|avit a|vis simul... (*Ann.* V<sup>2</sup> 92)

But in a "weak half-foot" (i.e. in thesis) before a following initial consonant, Havet goes on to say, the -s# is dropped as a rule, both in words having a short penult (i.e. as the second short of a dactyl):

... ratu(s)| Romulu(s)| praedam (*Ann.* V<sup>2</sup> 75)

and after a long penult (i.e. as the first short of a dactyl):

scitu(s) se|cunda... (*Ann.* V<sup>2</sup> 246)

<sup>15</sup> See Otto Skutsch, *Studia Enniana* (London, 1968) 30-34. Skutsch, speaking of *two* counter-examples other than *Laurentis terra*, because he regards *Ann.* 141 as a real exception (which it does not seem to be — see below), suggests that the fact that all three cases of apparent preservation of -s# in thesis are proper names has something to do with the exceptional preservation.

*Ann.* 315 (*pulvis fulva volat*) is a case apart since, for whatever reason, *pulvis* has a long *i* as far as Ennius is concerned. Cf. *Ann.* 282: *Iamque fere pulvis ad caelum vasta videtur*. Cf. also Verg. *Aen.* 1.478: *... versa pulvis inscribitur hasta*, but *Aen.* 11, 877: *pulvis, et e speculis*. ... See, on this word, Otto Skutsch, "The prosody of *Pulvis*," *Glotta* 49, 142-143.

<sup>16</sup> Skutsch, *Studia* 45, n. 3.

<sup>17</sup> Havet, *Etudes romanes dédiées à Gaston Paris* (Paris, 1891) 303-329.

or

Quīntu(s) pā|ter... (Ann. V<sup>2</sup> 295)

or

Primū(s) sē|nē... (Ann. V<sup>2</sup> 423)

What Ennius does *not* do, the argument continues, is anything analogous to:

Primūs| sē... (Verg. Aen. 2.370)

where -s# is retained and makes position for the *second* long of a spondee. The examples can be multiplied. Ennian are:

...ho|mō vēs|tītū(s) tō|gā sup̄|ēscīt (Ann. V<sup>2</sup> 494)

(Havet gives the verse with his emendation of *Romanus* to *vestitus*) and

...vol|vendū(s) pēr| aethērā| vagit (Ann. V<sup>2</sup> 531)

But not:

...au|detīs| tollere| mōlēs (Verg. Aen. 1.134)

Havet then goes on to discuss briefly the handful of exceptional cases which may be adduced as examples of -s# making position in thesis. First, there is Ann. V<sup>2</sup> 222:

Qualīs| cōsili|is quān|tumque pō|tesset in| armīs

Havet rejects the reading *qualis*, which he contends is not certain in any case, on the grounds that it "ne peut se construire, et, en outre, ne conviendrait pas au sens,"<sup>18</sup> and suggests "*Qualia consilia* (avec allongement par la césure?)" or "*Qualibu(s) consiliis*." In fact, according to Otto Skutsch,<sup>19</sup> "*qualis consiliis* is now known to be based on a misreading of the manuscript, which has *quantis* (or *quantum is*) *consiliis*." So much for that counter-example.

Next is Ann. V<sup>2</sup> 216:

...nēc dīc|tī studi|ōsus| quīsqu(am) ērat| ant(e) hūnc

Havet's judgment is that "*Ante hunc*, d'après le contexte de Cicéron (*Br.* 71, cf. *Or.* 171) commençait une phrase à part." He rearranges the verse so that *studiosus* ends one line and *quisquam* begins the next.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. 316.

<sup>19</sup> Skutsch, *Studia* 32.

It is this passage with which Otto Skutsch is concerned in *Enniana* II.1,<sup>20</sup> where he discusses cases of "patching" on the part of Cicero, i.e. insertions into and deletions from quoted lines of Ennius with a view toward making them fit more smoothly into the Ciceronian context. Partly on independent grounds, then, Skutsch neatly disposes of the usual reading of *Ann.* V<sup>2</sup> 215-16:

Cum neque Musarum scopulos  
nec dicti studiosus quisquam erat ante hunc,

suggesting that all we have of what Ennius actually wrote is:

(nam?) neque Musarum scopulos . . .  
nec dicti studiosus . . . ante hunc

and adding that "with *quisquam erat* Cicero is patching."

A further seeming exception to the rule that in Ennius final -s is always dropped in thesis is *Ann.* V<sup>2</sup> 141.<sup>21</sup>

Isque di|es post|qu(am) Ancus| Marcīu(s)| regna re|cepit

This line is not treated by Havet, for it is not the reading of the manuscript, but is a conjecture of Ilberg's. Servius,<sup>22</sup> who preserves the fragment, has:

Isque di|es post| aut Mar|cus quam| regna re|cepit,

which, while difficult to construe, follows the rule of preserving -s# only in arsis. The difficulty with the manuscript reading is, of course, that it says *Marcus* rather than *Marcius*. However, Ilberg's emendation is not an improvement, since, in addition to violating the -s# rule, it does away with the tmesis of *post . . . quam*, which is the *lectio difficilior*. The best solution, therefore, is that of Vahlen,<sup>23</sup> who simply emends the *Marcus* of the manuscript to *Ancus* and reads:

Isque di|es post| aut An|cus quam| regna re|cepit  
<Aut obiit Tullus . . .>

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. 30-34.

<sup>21</sup> Ilberg's conjecture was incorporated in the text of Vahlen's first edition, but later rejected (see below). Skutsch refers to it as "probable" (*Studia* 33).

<sup>22</sup> "Servius Auctus" ad *Aen.* 3, 333.

<sup>23</sup> J. Vahlen, *Ennianae Poesis Reliquiae*<sup>2</sup> (Leipzig, 1928), ad loc. The conjecture of Mariotti (*Lexiconi su Ennio* 48), *post Antiocus quam* is less attractive, but at least does not violate the -s# dropping rule.

As a second Ennian reference to Ancus Marcius as simply Ancus, one may cite *Ann.* V<sup>2</sup> 149:

Postquam lumina sis oculis bonus Ancu(s) reliquit<sup>24</sup>

We now come to the single valid case (other than *Laurentis terra*) of -s# making position in thesis: *Ann.* V<sup>2</sup> 304:

303	Additur orator Cornelius suaviloquenti
304	Ōre Cē thēgus  Mārcu(s)   Tū dīta nō col lēga
305	Marci filius

Havet's suggestion concerning this line is that it be emended to:

Ōre Cē|thēgu(s) Tū|dīta|nō Mār|cus col|lēga

His grounds for doing so have to do with Ennius' versification practices. Specifically, Havet points out that when a line of dactylic hexameter has a so-called "feminine" caesura (i.e. when the caesura falls between the two shorts of a dactylic foot) in the third foot, the second foot *may* theoretically consist of a spondaic word, or a word whose last two syllables form a spondee. He illustrates the type with a Homeric example (*Φ* 196):

τῆς δὲ τετάρτης ἥρξε|| γερων . . .

Ennius, however, does not do this. When he has a feminine caesura, Havet continues, and the end of the second foot coincides with a word boundary, that second foot is always dactylic. So (with *spondaic* second foot coinciding with word boundary but *normal caesura*):

Bellipo|tentes| sunt|| magi(s)| quam sapi|entipo|tentes  
(*Ann.* V<sup>2</sup> 181)

But (with *dactylic* second foot coinciding with word boundary before a *feminine* caesura):

Celso| pectore| saepe|| iū|bam quas|sat simul| altam  
(*Ann.* V<sup>2</sup> 517)

The only example of a spondaic second foot coinciding with word boundary before a feminine caesura, as it happens, is *Ann.* V<sup>2</sup> 305. In and of itself this fact might invite little comment. But, as Havet puts

<sup>24</sup> Quoted by Lucretius (*de R.N.* 3, 1025), where Cyril Bailey observes that "this is the only case of suppressed *s* in a proper name in Lucretius."



the case, "Par un hasard peu vraisemblable, nous aurions, d'après les éditions d'Ennius, un exemple unique du spondée second ainsi placé, et ce serait justement un spondée exigeant la conservation de l's."<sup>25</sup> One is entitled, at this point, to harbor a certain amount of suspicion as to the authenticity of *Ann.* V<sup>2</sup> 305 as printed.<sup>26</sup>

If, granted all this, it would be overstating the case to say that each and every example of -s# in thesis making position has incontrovertibly been shown to be invalid, it has, it is hoped, been convincingly indicated that all the cases mentioned thus far are at least vulnerable in one way or another. Returning to the form *Laurentis* with this in mind, and noting that this is the only example of the retention of final -s in thesis which is, as far as anyone has been able to demonstrate, textually indisputable, we are in a position to deny a priori that the length of the last syllable of *Laurentis* has anything whatever to do with the presence of -s# before the initial t- of *terra*. Rather, the solution which all but imposes itself when all the facts are considered is that *Laurentis* has a long *i*, and is most properly analyzed, from the historical point of view, as *Laurentī* + s. In other words, what we have in this form is simply a sigmaticized feminine in -ī on an \*(e/o)nt- stem. This interpretation raises the existence of this form from the status of indirect evidence to that of direct proof that Latin did indeed inherit the feminine participle corresponding on the one hand to Skt. *bhārantī* and Greek *φέρουσα* (both reflecting \*bher-e/ont-iā) and on the other hand to Old Irish *birit*, "sow" (< \*bher-nt-iā), but then remade it to an i-stem in a manner exactly parallel to \*neptī- => *neptis*. At this point, of course, the assumed feminine participle in -entis followed the same development as *mentis* > *mens* and *lentis* > *lens*.

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<sup>25</sup> In Havet's treatment, a single line, *Ann.* V<sup>2</sup> 305, is thus indirectly shown to contain two unique metrical anomalies, for Havet has apparently satisfied himself by this point that *Laurentis terra* is not a serious obstacle, although he admits, "Je n'ai rien à invoquer contre ce texte, si ce n'est la défiance même que m'inspire la conservation de l's" (*Etudes romanes* 316).

<sup>26</sup> It must be admitted, on the other hand, that Havet's proposal, as Professor Skutsch points out (*per litteras*) is less than unimpeachable, both because of the relative scantiness of the extant material and because a line of the structure suggested by Havet would itself be unusual. Still, there is the fact that *Ann.* 304, as it stands, does contain two unique exceptions, and it is, of course, possible to reject it for that reason without necessarily accepting Havet's emendation either.



## THE CONCEPT OF PERIODICITY IN THE *AD HERENNIIUM*

H. C. GOTOFF

MODERN scholars and critics seem to have a clear and fairly consistent notion of what periodic style entails.<sup>1</sup> It is a complex sentence in which both sense and syntax are held in suspension until the end of the construction when they are simultaneously resolved. The idea that the period is complete in itself and at every point anticipates its own conclusion goes back to Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.9.3-4: λέγω δὲ περιόδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ μέγαθος εὐσύνοπτον . . . δεῖ δὲ τὴν περίοδον καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τετελειῶσθαι. He makes his case for this very strongly by his criticism of the articulation of the opening lines of Euripides' *Meleager*.<sup>2</sup> His point is that

<sup>1</sup> See J. E. Sandys, *M. Tulli Ciceronis ad M. Brutum Orator* (Cambridge 1885) 217, n. to 204, and G. M. Z. Grube, "Thrasymachus, Theophrastus, and Dionysius" *AJP* 73 (1952) 253f n. 4, among others for the articulation of the general view. The difficulties created by Aristotle are discussed by E. M. Cope, *Introduction to the Rhetoric of Aristotle* (London 1867) 306f; J. Zehetmeier, "Die Periodenlehre des Aristoteles," *Philologus* 85 (1930) 192-208, 255-284, 414-436; W. Schmid, "Ueber die Klassische Theorie und Praxis des Antiken Prosarhythmus," *Hermes (Einzelschrift 12)* 1959, 112-130; and L. P. Wilkinson, *Golden Latin Artistry* (Cambridge 1963) 167-170, among others. No one study has been definitive; various scholars have made suggestive contributions, such as Zehetmeier's relating periodicity to prose-rhythm under Aristotle's aesthetic heading of "limit," or Schmid's understanding, however imperfect (see Wilkinson, *ibid.*, 169n), of the racetrack metaphor. E. Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa* (Leipzig; 5th ed., Darmstadt 1958) I 42, and n., dealing particularly with the ancient concept, maintained that periodicity is indivisible from prose-rhythm. In this he is followed by W. Schmid (*ibid.*), among others, and opposed by Grube (*ibid.*) 254 and n. There is need for a study of how and when the concept of periodicity developed from the more restricted ancient technique to what scholars from the Renaissance on picture it to be.

I wish to thank Professor G. Kennedy for his reference to H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* (Munich 1962) vol. I, where *Ad Herennium* 4.27 is discussed in sections 943 and 945. It seems to me that in returning "periodos" to a purely bipartite, Aristotelian sense, Lausberg, in section 924f, ignores another meaning of the word and another kind of rhetorical sentence structure.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle quotes the first line only and attributes it to Sophocles. The scholiast to Ar. *Frogs* 1269, assigns it to the opening of the *Meleager* of Euripides. The

there is enough grammatical material in the first trimeter to be rendered as a complete unit, although the meaning would be distorted because the thought in fact continues grammatically into the next line. This is not the only somewhat surprising limitation of Aristotle's idea of a period. In his further remarks, he makes it quite clear, although scholars have not always acknowledged it, that by *periodos* he conceived of a unit of sentence structure far more restricted than the modern notion envisions. The definition he proposes can never have included the sophisticated architectonics of his contemporary Demosthenes, much less the writer whose name is most closely associated with the periodic style, Cicero.

G. Kennedy maintained that, in considering *periodos*, Aristotle had in mind first and foremost the balanced, antithetical, essentially bipartite sentences that mark the style of Gorgias and later of Isocrates.<sup>3</sup> Aristotle is not consistent even in insisting that a period be bipartite, for he allows for a simple period — presumably, a sentence without subordination in which sense and simple grammar are not resolved until the last word.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, there can be little doubt, *pace* Grube,<sup>5</sup> that when talking about complex periods, Aristotle understood the structure to be bipartite, i.e. composed of two *cola* (*Rhet.* 3.9.5): κῶλον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἕτερον μῶριον ταύτης. This is not the place to try to reach a definition of *colon* that would satisfy every use of it by Greek and Latin writers; for, like many of the words we are pleased to think of

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second verse is found in several sources, among them Dem. *De Eloc.* 58. Aristotle's objection is too severe; the standard applied here would render much of classical composition open to the charge of poor and confusing construction. Demetrius cites the lines to show actors' interjections can miscast the emphasis of a statement. The lines as they appear in Demetrius, with the added, artificial pause created by the expletives, argue Aristotle's point rather better than the single line he himself cites:

καλυδῶν μὲν ἦδε γαῖα Πελοποιᾶς χθονός  
 φεῦ  
 ἐν ἀντιπόρθμοις πεδὸ' ἔεουσ' εὐδαίμονα  
 αἶ, αἶ.

<sup>3</sup> George Kennedy, "Aristotle on the Period," *HSCP* 63 (1958) 283ff.

<sup>4</sup> Presumably any sentence without subordination that suspends the verb until the end would come under the heading of ἀφελὴς περίοδος. Attempts to reconcile the simple period with the statement that the period consists of two *cola* have not, unsurprisingly, been successful.

<sup>5</sup> Grube, *A Greek Critic: Demetrius* (Toronto 1961) 35 n. 41, suggests the possibility that ταύτης does not refer back to περίοδος, but rather to the trimeter quoted from the *Meleager*. Demetrius 34 did not so understand Aristotle, nor would this rendering make sense.



31:

or the several examples of antithesis quoted by Aristotle himself at 3.9,7, from Isoc., *Panegy.* 35f come under his definition of a period. On the other hand, sentences like Thuc. 2.102, cited by Dem. 45: ὁ γὰρ Ἀχελῷος ποταμὸς ῥέων ἐκ Πίνδου ὄρους διὰ Δολοπίας καὶ Ἀγριανῶν καὶ Ἀμφιλόχων, ἄνωθεν παρὰ Στράτον πόλιν ἐς θάλασσαν διεξιεῖς παρ' Οἰνιάδας, καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῖς περὶ λιμνάζων ἄποραν ποιεῖ τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν χειμῶνι στρατεῦεσθαι; or even Demosth. *Lept. init.* (Dem. 10): μάλιστα μὲν εἵνεκα τοῦ νομίζειν συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει λέλυσθαι τὸν νόμον εἶτα καὶ τοῦ παιδὸς εἵνεκα τοῦ Χαβρίου ὠμολόγησα τούτοις, ὥς ἂν οἷός τε ὦ, συνερεῖν are not. The fact is that in Aristotle's mind the period is closely related to the enthymeme, and the enthymeme is constructed as a two-

<sup>6</sup> I have not seen A. DuMesnil, *Begriff der drei Kunstformen des Rede: Komma, Kolon, Periode, nach der Lehre der Alten* in *Zum zweihundertjährigen Jubiläum des königl. Friedrichs-Gymnas* (Frankfort 1894) 32-121, cited by Caplan, *Ad Herennium Libri IV de Ratione Dicendi* (Harvard University Press 1954) 294 n. b. I am not, however, hopeful that order can have been created from a situation in which a prepositional phrase can be called a *colon* (Demetr. 10 on Dem. *Lept. init.*) or an independent predicate be called a *comma* (ibid. 9 γνῶθι σεαυτόν, et al.). Similarly, the opening sentence of Herodotus can be cited as an example of unperiodicity by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.9.2) and of periodicity by Demetrius (17).

part parallelism or antithesis.<sup>7</sup> Thus, each of the two basic units of the period is a *colon*, as Aristotle insists; within this framework the structure may be strictly antithetical or otherwise divided.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, while agreeing basically with Kennedy, I find that Aristotle's analysis can accommodate a larger number of periods in our sense than Kennedy suggests. Not, unfortunately, that complete consistency can be derived from Aristotle's account; the notion of the simple period cannot be incorporated into this system. But, leaving that aside, the present explanation is supported by the ease with which Aristotle moves to his discussion of the Gorgianic figures at *Rhet.* 3.9.9. Gorgias is identified with antithesis and other figures that arise from and support two-part balance. In this treatment, Aristotle seems to be following Theodectes, who, we are told, listed, in the context of *antithesis*, *parison*, and *homoeoteleuton* most of the beginnings of periods.<sup>9</sup> He was thus considering in close conjunction periodicity and the Gorgianic figures.

It cannot be said that later writers on the subject of prose composition were prevented entirely by the Aristotelian view from proceeding to a more complex definition of the period — a definition that could embrace the constructions of Demosthenes and Cicero. Nevertheless, the limitation was a pervasive one. Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses the word *periodos* without definition, sometimes to mean little more than we do by "sentence."<sup>10</sup> When he speaks of periodic style, moreover, he gives no indication of whether he has in mind the bipartite constructions predicated on Gorgianic parallelism and antithesis, or the freer-flowing, more complex periods of Demosthenes or Cicero. In

<sup>7</sup> Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.9.8, cf. 2.9. In the first cited passage Aristotle states his preference for antithetical periods of the Isocratean sort.

<sup>8</sup> Arist., *Rhet.* 3.9.7. Although Aristotle favors the *λέξεις ἀντικειμένη*, there is nothing about the *λέξεις διηρημένη* intrinsically incompatible with a bipartite framework as defined in our discussion.

<sup>9</sup> In 3.9.9, Aristotle moves from the antithetical period to a discussion of *pariosis*, *isocolon*, and *paromoiosis* (*homoeoteleuton*). At the end of the section he says αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιόδων σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις ἐξηριθμῶνται. If my interpretation of Aristotle's meaning is correct, this list may have included elements both syntactic (relative pronouns, conjunctions, etc.) and rhetorical (i.e. μέν, οὐ μόνον) that anticipate a second unit to resolve them. ἀρεταὶ for ἀρχαὶ is, therefore, an unnecessary change.

<sup>10</sup> For example, Dionysius usually introduces a sentence with the word *λέξις*: τὴν δὲ δὴ Πλατωνικὴν λέξιν ταυτηνὶ τίνι ποτὲ ἄλλῳ κοσμηθεῖσαν οὕτως ἀξιωματικὴν φαίη τις ἂν . . . (*De Comp.* xviii), but in ix he uses *περίοδος* purely for the sake of variety: καὶ ἔτι τὴν Πλατωνικὴν ἐκείνην περίοδον, ἣν ἐν τῷ ἐπιταθίῳ ὁ ἄνηρ ψράφει, τίς οὐκ ἂν φαίη παραπληρώματι λέξεως οὐκ ἀναγκαίῳ προσηράνισθαι . . .

*Lys.* 8, he appears to judge periodicity to be a highly artificial technique that militates against verisimilitude, perhaps suggesting the very formal and artificial Gorgianic figures.

Demetrius, on the other hand, is quite specific both in acknowledging his debt to Aristotle's discussion in *Rhet.* 3.9, and in his determination to expand the compass of the period to include suitable constructions of three or four members.<sup>11</sup> His first example of a period, that from Demosth. *Lept. init.*, cited above, is of a type not included by Aristotle, since it cannot be reduced to two units. Further, his subdivision into rhetorical, narrative, and conversational periods reveals an inclusiveness that practically makes the word *periodos* useless as a critical term.<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, in 22f, he singles out for special notice the kind of period that is constructed from antithetical and parallel members. There follows a discussion of *antithesis*, *isocolon*, and *homoeoteleuton*, the Gorgianic figures. After this nod to Aristotle, it cannot be coincidental that he next distinguishes between the enthymeme and syllogism (32). He may be correcting Aristotle, but he is certainly at that point involved in the Aristotelian conception of the period as a basically bipartite structure.

The relationship of the concept of periodicity to the Gorgianic figures in the rhetorical works of Cicero deserves full treatment elsewhere. It may suffice here to say that nowhere in his discussion of composition does Cicero reveal an awareness of that complex periodicity that distinguishes his style and that of Demosthenes from the bipartite, often antithetical, and frequently redundant structure associated with Gorgias and Isocrates.<sup>13</sup>

What may, I think, be established fairly succinctly is the strong Aristotelian flavor of the discussion of periodicity in the *ad Herennium*. In 4.27, we are told: *continuatio est densa et continens frequentatio verborum cum absolutione sententiarum*, translated by H. Caplan as, "A Period is a close-packed and uninterrupted group of words embracing a complete thought."<sup>14</sup> This definition is compatible with the modern

<sup>11</sup> Demetr. *De Eloc.* 16. It is indicative of the problems involved with treating the ancient critical treatises as technical works that, after setting two to four *cola* as the limits of a period, Demetrius introduces the *monocolon* in the next paragraph.

<sup>12</sup> Demetrius all but acknowledges this in *De Eloc.* 21.

<sup>13</sup> See, for example, the discussions in *Orator* 38-38 and 219-220. Quint, 9.3.74, credits Cicero's restraint in the use of Isocratean periods. See, also, n. 18 below.

<sup>14</sup> H. Caplan, *Ad Herennium* . . . 297. The textual problem in the first line is of no consequence to this discussion.



notion of periodicity, while also echoing Aristotle's least exclusive characterization of the period: δεῖ δὲ τὴν περίοδον καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τετελειῶσθαι. When he goes on to suggest the kinds of sentence to which *continuatio* is appropriate, however, we see underlying the conception the same limitation imposed by Aristotle. The examples he gives of Maxim, Contrast, and Conclusion are all basically bipartite:

- sententia*: ei non multum potest obesse fortuna,  
qui sibi firmius in virtute quam in casu praesidium  
conlocavit.
- contrarium*: nam si qui spei non multum conlocarit in casu,  
quid est quod ei magnopere casus obesse potest?
- conclusio*: quodsi in eos plurimum fortuna potest,  
qui suas rationes omnes in casum contulerunt,  
non sunt omnia committenda fortunae  
ne magnam nimis in nos habeat dominationem.

All three examples, I maintain, are basically of bipartite construction. If *colon* or *membrum* is to be defined in the modern sense, the first example has two members, the second has three, and the last has four. In fact, Caplan (above, n. 14) comments on the example of *conclusio* that it conforms to the upper limit of Demetrius' definition, i.e. a four-membered period. But the first example is composed simply of a main clause containing the antecedent that anticipates the following relative clause. The second and third examples are in the form of conditions, protasis-apodosis, and are therefore naturally bipartite. In the last example, *eos* in the *quodsi*-clause anticipates the relative clause syntactically, while, rhetorically, *non omnia* paves the way for the *ne*-clause that follows. This is all substructure; the sentence can be analyzed as composed of two units. Like Demosth. *Aristocr.* 99, quoted above, this is a highly complex sentence in a bipartite framework, and therefore conforms to Aristotle's definition of a period. The Aristotelian overtones of this passage in the *Ad Herennium* are further confirmed by the fact that the author then goes on to discuss the Gorgianic figures of *isocolon*, *homoeoptoton*, *homoeoteleuton*, and *paronomasia*.<sup>15</sup> It would not, indeed, be out of place to compare *ad Her.* 4.27 with Demetr. *De Eloc.* 30, where the latter, in distinguishing between enthymeme and syllogism, says that the enthymeme is a thought (*sententia*?), expressed either controversially (ἐκ μάχης λεγομένη =

<sup>15</sup> Antithesis (*contentio*) is discussed in *Ad. Her.* 4.21, but the stress is no more on structural than on verbal antithesis



*contrarium*?) or in the form of a consequence (ἐν ἀκολουθίας σχήματι = *conclusio*?).<sup>16</sup>

It would seem, then, that the author of the *Ad Herennium* was following in his discussion of *continuatio* a view of periodicity as old as Theodectes and one enunciated by Aristotle — a view that pervaded the works or influenced the attitudes of rhetorical writers down to Cicero and Quintilian on the Latin side. Cicero may have accepted this view uncritically from tradition, or he may have limited himself intentionally by tradition to make a point about his style that was only partially literary.<sup>17</sup> The fact is that, following the account that is found in Aristotle, Cicero, in treating periodicity, describes a structure that is more readily found in Isocrates than in Demosthenes or himself. This is part of the explanation of why posterity has identified him with Isocrates far more closely than an analysis of their styles would justify.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> I am not suggesting that these are equivalent technical terms in the *Ad. Her.*, or elsewhere. In fact, see Quint. 5.10.2, where enthymeme is defined as a conclusion from antithesis (or *contrarium*). The similarity of the discussion in Demetrius and the *Ad Her.* is patent in general terms.

<sup>17</sup> This requires full discussion. I plan to deal elsewhere, at greater length, with the contradiction between theory and practice in Cicero's rhetorical treatises. It may be suggested briefly here that in his treatment of periodicity, no less than of rhythm — two areas in which his contribution to prose style was most original — Cicero is at great pains to insist upon and identify himself with a tradition, even when he does not — as with that of the Gorgianic figures — in the main follow that tradition.

<sup>18</sup> E. Laughton, "Cicero and the Greek Orators," *AJP* 82 (1961) 27-49, shows masterfully that the periodic constructions of Isocrates and Demosthenes are very different and that Cicero has a fondness for the latter type. The article may suggest that Cicero eschewed two-part constructions and Isocratean parallelism. This is not the case by any means; but the formal balance, thrice repeated, of the first sentence of the *pro Archia*, often cited as an example of Ciceronian periodity, is hard to parallel elsewhere in the corpus.



## EMENDAVI AD TIRONEM:

SOME NOTES ON SCHOLARSHIP IN THE SECOND CENTURY A.D.

J. E. G. ZETZEL

OTTO JAHN read his masterly paper on the subscriptions in the manuscripts of the Latin Classics over 120 years ago, on November 14, 1851; it remains, despite its age, a model of clarity and good sense, and it has not been replaced.<sup>1</sup> Since 1851, however, our knowledge of many of the texts which he collected has improved, in respect to both their historical background and their significance for the transmission of the texts to which they are attached. Some of the deficiencies now apparent in his edition were Jahn's fault, but not all. He did not look at some of the manuscripts involved, and there are some errors in the texts; but in at least one case the Vatican authorities did not permit him to examine an important manuscript.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, as was the custom in his day, the descriptions of manuscripts are often not accurate enough for the purposes of textual criticism, and he often did not identify them precisely. Finally, his exploration of the historical backgrounds, while exemplary for its time, is simply out of date. In sum, it is high time that the subscriptions were re-edited. The present paper, dealing with the first subscription in Jahn's collection, is intended to be the first step toward the preparation of a new edition.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> O. Jahn, "Über die Subscriptionen in den Handschriften römischer Classiker" *Ber. d. sächs. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Leipzig*, Phil.-Hist. Klasse 3 (1851) 327-372 [= Jahn]. A number of my friends and teachers have criticized earlier drafts of this paper. I am particularly indebted to E. Badian and Z. Stewart for their advice. I am grateful also to the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana for permission to publish photographs of *Vat. Lat.* 11458.

<sup>2</sup> The Vaticanus (B) of Persius; cf. Jahn, *A. Persii Flacci Satirarum Liber* (Leipzig 1843) CLXXV.

<sup>3</sup> The extraordinary excellence of Jahn's collection in its day is often unrecognized because its background is not known. One need only compare Jahn with L. Lersch, "Römische Diorthosen" *Museum des rheinische-westphälischen Schulmänner-Vereins* 3 (1845) 229-274, one of Jahn's major sources, to see the immense improvement in the latter. (Lersch's paper is extremely rare; I was not able to locate a copy in the United States, but found it in the British Museum.)



The subscription of Statilius Maximus is found in a number of humanistic manuscripts (all descended from a copy made by Poggio), at the beginning of Cicero's second speech against the agrarian law of Rullus. Jahn himself had not seen any of these manuscripts, but relied on a copy made by Mai, as follows:<sup>4</sup>

*in exemplari vetustissimo hoc erat in margine:*

Emendavi ad Tyronem et Laetanium. Acta ipso Cicerone et Antonio cos Oratio XXIII.

*in exemplari sic fuit:*

Statilius Maximus rursus emendavi ad Tyronem et Laetanium et Dom̄. et alios veteres. III oratio eximia.

Mai's text was not from the best manuscript of the speeches, and some fifty years after Jahn's publication a better text was found in a manuscript of the Laurentian Library in Florence (*Conv. Soppr.* 13). This manuscript, known by the siglum M, is a fifteenth-century copy of Poggio's copy of eight Ciceronian speeches which he had found in Germany in 1417.<sup>5</sup> The improved text of the subscription was printed by A. C. Clark in a full collation of M published in 1909.<sup>6</sup> More recently, however, the best possible text has been discovered, Poggio's own autograph, found in the Vatican by A. Campana (*Vat. Lat.* 11458).<sup>7</sup> As may be seen from the photographs, the *De Lege Agraria* I ends at the foot of fol. 56<sup>r</sup> of the manuscript, and the title is given there. The second speech begins at the top of fol. 56<sup>v</sup>, and the subscription was added, by Poggio himself, in the top margin. The text is as follows:<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Jahn 329 refers to the publications of Mai and Bandini. Other publications before 1851 were Lersch, "Römische Diorthosen" 238, and Gräfenhan, *Geschichte der klassischen Philologie* IV (1850) 383. It should be noted that the subscription is at the beginning and not, as Jahn said, the end of the speech.

<sup>5</sup> On Poggio's discovery see R. Sabbadini, *Le Scoperte dei codici latini e greci ne' secoli XIV e XV* (Florence 1903-1914) I 81f, II 191f. On M cf. A. C. Clark, *Inventa Itolorum: Anecdota Oxoniensia*, Classical Series XI (1909).

<sup>6</sup> Clark, *Inventa Itolorum* 50, and *M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes* IV (Oxford 1909) viiif.

<sup>7</sup> The only description of this manuscript (with bibliography) is in J. Ruysschaert, *Codices Vaticani Latini: Codices 11414-11709* (Vatican 1959) 93-96. The only reference to it since that time, other than in reviews, that I have seen, is in L. D. Reynolds and N. G. Wilson, *Scribes and Scholars* (Oxford 1968) 114f.

<sup>8</sup> See Plate II. Line divisions of the manuscript are marked, and abbreviations that are not otherwise important have been expanded in parentheses.



In exemplari uetustissimo hoc erat in margine.  
 Emendavi ad tyrone(m) et laecanianu(m) / acta  
 ipso cicerone et antonio coss. oratio XXIII.  
 In exemplo sic fuit. Statili(us) / maximus rur-  
 sum em(en)davi ad tyrone(m) et laecanianu(m) 5  
 et dom̄ & alios ueteres. III. / oratio exi / mia.

A certain amount of clarification is necessary in order to discover what the ancient original probably said. In the first place, the subscription as we have it was written by Poggio, not by Statilius Maximus, and therefore the introductory comments of lines 1 and 4 were composed by the former.<sup>9</sup> The first comment is quite clear: the first subscription was written in the margin of Poggio's exemplar. It follows that the second one was written in the main body of the text. The implied distinction between *exemplar* and *exemplum*, although quite rare, can be documented from late Latin: *exemplar* refers to the physical form of a book, *exemplum* to the text written in it.<sup>10</sup> A similar arrangement of two subscriptions is found in the Montepessulanus 212 (A) of Persius, in which one subscription is found in the margin near the beginning of the First Satire, and the other is in the body of the text after the Prologue, which has been displaced.<sup>11</sup> As in the case of the subscriptions in Persius, then, we may guess that the copyist of an ancestor of Poggio's copy of the *De Lege Agraria* omitted the first subscription, which was added in the margin by his corrector.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Similarly, on fol. 53 of the Vatican manuscript there is a marginal note recording the absence of two leaves in an exemplar (Ruysschaert, *Codices* 94).

<sup>10</sup> This appears from a quotation of one Rollandinus in *Summa de Notaria* cited by Du Cange s.v. Exemplar: "... Exemplum vero ... est scriptura exemplata, generata, vel sumpta ex priori sive originali scriptura, unde versus

Exemplar genus est, Exemplum quod trahis inde ..."

The letters of Poggio (Poggius Bracciolini, *Opera Omnia III: Epistolae*, ed. Thomas de Tonellis [Turin 1964 = Florence 1832-1861]) provide numerous examples of the physical nature of *exemplar*, e.g. II 38 (vol. I p. 175f): "Alias a te postulavi opera Senecae, cura obsecro ut habeam exemplar" (cf. also vol. I p. 149, 340; II 209, 218, 279; III 85, 91, 94, 130, 148, 165), but only one example of *exemplum* which shows that it referred to the words, not the form, III 7 (vol. I p. 199): "Scripsi ad Leonardum, itemque Nicolaum paucis verbis: exemplum subscribi feci, non ut eloquenter, sed ut amice me videas scripsisse." The difference between *exemplum subscribere* and the usual *exemplar mittere* is significant.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. W. Clausen, *A. Persi Flacci Saturarum Liber* (Oxford 1956) viiif, and "Sabinus' MS of Persius" *Hermes* 91 (1963) 252-256.

<sup>12</sup> A third example of addition of a subscription in the margin by a corrector is provided by the Leidensis 82 of Juvenal; cf. A. E. Housman, *M. Annaei Lucani Belli Civilis Libri Decem* (Oxford 1926) xvi.

Once Poggio's additions have been explained, the subscriptions of Statilius himself raise a number of questions. First, of course, is the identity of the subscriber. Other evidence about Statilius exists, in the form of some twenty citations bearing his name given by the grammarian Julius Romanus, as cited by Charisius. Two of these tell us that the work in question was a treatise on *singularia* in Cato and Cicero; that is to say, it was a collection of rare words and odd forms found in the works of those two authors.<sup>13</sup> The citations of Statilius in Romanus are also the only evidence for his date. Since Romanus quotes, among others, Acro, Porphyryon, Gellius, and Apuleius, he must have written no earlier than the beginning of the third century. Statilius, therefore, lived no later than that time. Moreover, although evidence from silence is obviously not decisive, the fact that Statilius is not named either in Gellius or in Suetonius' *De Grammaticis* suggests that he flourished in the latter half of the second century. His interest in rare words also suggests that he was a contemporary of Fronto and Gellius.<sup>14</sup>

As for the other names in the subscription, one, Tiro, is quite clear, although *tyronem* must be corrected to *tironem*. *Laecanianum*, on the other hand, is unknown. It is probable, on the basis of other evidence, that the correct form of the name was Laecanianus.<sup>15</sup> The final name, present only in the enigmatic abbreviation *dom̄*, has sometimes been interpreted as a form of *dominus*. In fact, the correct expansion is *Domitium*, as is shown by a passage of Fronto which refers to a Domitius Balbus in connection with the copying of Cicero's works.<sup>16</sup>

The curious phrase *oratio XXIII* provides the only really insoluble problem of the text. It was explained by A. Zumpt in 1860 as referring to a chronological edition of Cicero's speeches, of which, by his count,

<sup>13</sup> On Statilius' *singularia* cf. O. Froehde, "De C. Iulio Romano Charisii Auctore" *Jahrb. f. Philol.* Supp. 18 (1892) 545-547. I intend to deal in detail with Statilius' grammatical work in a separate article.

<sup>14</sup> The collection of *singularia* was prescribed as a suitable exercise for Marcus by his teacher Fronto, *De Eloquentia* 4.7. All information about Romanus was collected by Froehde in the work cited above, n. 13.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. P. Hildebrandt, *De Scholiis Ciceronis Bobiensibus* (Diss. Berlin 1894) 15 n. 4. Jahn 330n and A. Zumpt, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes Tres de Lege Agraria* (Berlin 1860) xxi, were wrong to suggest that the man's name was actually Laecanius, explaining *Laecanianum* on the model of the Ἀττικιανὰ; the parallel of *ad Tironem* shows that. Cf. also PIR<sup>2</sup> L 27.

<sup>16</sup> Fronto *Ad M. Caesarem* 1.7.4; see below. Lersch (above, n. 3) 239, had already recognized the proper expansion before the passage of Fronto was legible. Cf. also E. Hauler, "Fronto über klassische Ausgaben lateinischer Schriftsteller" *Mélanges Chatelain* (Paris 1910) 626f.

desistat. Atque valeat me ipsum sibi domino: qui equis  
 etiam hunc consulem videt, que iure sua fructuque iuris bono  
 ad hominem dignitatemque perducant. Quod si nos non minus studi-  
 o ad communem dignitatem defendendam profectum per ha-  
 bitum ad quod maxime res publica desiderat, ut cuius ordinis  
 iustitiam que apud maiores nostros fuit, eadem nunc iugo  
 intervallo non perstituta esse videatur.

AI TULLII CICERONIS DE AGRARIA LEGE CONTRA RULLI  
 LIBER PRIMVS EXPLICIT. INCIPIT SECVNDVS.

IN SENATV. KL. IANVARIS.

PLATE I

In hoc placito testimo hoc erat in margine. Emendare ad errorem de latini-  
 tate ipsi errore et antonio rullus oratio xxiii. In exemplo sic fuit. ita h-  
 maxime qd n rullus condant ad errorem de latini- et dem de alio uerunt. iii.

[ ST. HOC. in more positum. quir. instituti qz maiora ut ei qui  
 beneficio vno imagines familie sue constituta sunt - tam pri-  
 mam habeant orationem - qua gratiam beneficii sui cum suor-  
 lum coniungunt. Qui in ratione nonnulli aliqui digni  
 maiora laude reputantur. plerique autem hoc perficiunt - ut  
 tantum in moribus eorum debuit esse videtur - unde etiam quod  
 postremo solueretur redundaret. Melius quidem apud nos de mori-  
 bus laudandi facultas non datur: non quo non tales  
 fuerint, quales nos illorum sanguine creati. Disaplorum qz insti-  
 tutos videtur. sed qd laude populari usqz honoris sui huc  
 canerunt. De his autem illis uerborum arrangementis sit apud

PLATE II





the *De Lege Agraria* II was the twenty-fourth.<sup>17</sup> In 1883, however, Kiessling suggested that the subscription referred to the first speech against Rullus' proposal, not the second, and managed to make that speech the twenty-fourth in chronological order.<sup>18</sup> In fact, the present position of the subscription makes it very hard to tell which speech is involved. If it originally stood where it is now, after the *incipit* of the second speech, it might refer to that work. If, on the other hand, the order of the *explicit* and *incipit* and their connection with the subscription has been disturbed, as seems likely,<sup>19</sup> then the subscription refers either to the first speech alone or to the whole series of speeches *De Lege Agraria*.<sup>20</sup> As for the number twenty-four, that is in any case impossible for a complete edition of Cicero's speeches: there are sixteen extant earlier speeches of Cicero, and fragments exist of eleven more, not to mention titles of others. The *De Lege Agraria* II was thus twenty-eighth. Either the chronological edition was incomplete or the figure *XXIII* is corrupt; no decision between these two explanations is possible.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>17</sup> A. Zumpt (above, n. 15) xxiii.

<sup>18</sup> A. Kiessling, *Coniectaneorum Spicilegium* (Ind. Schol. Greifswald 1883) 6f; cf. also Hildebrandt (above, n. 15) 15f.

<sup>19</sup> The evidence for disturbance is the anomalous phrase *acta ipso Cicerone et Antonio coss.*, which ought not to be in the nominative if it belongs in the subscription. It is much more at home in the *explicit* at the foot of the preceding page, which reads (as may be seen from Plate I):

M.TVLLII.CICERONIS.DE.AGRARIA.LEGE.CONTRA.RVLLV(M).  
LIBER.PRIMVS.EXPLICIT. INCIPIT.SECVNDVS.

The same hand has added, with a reference sign in the space after CICERONIS, the phrase

IN.SENATV.KL.IANVARIS.

Clearly, the phrase that Poggio added supplies the day, but not the year; that is given by the phrase now found in Statilius' subscription.

<sup>20</sup> In two other authors there are subscriptions which follow an introduction only, and an *incipit* might be considered enough of an introduction to qualify. Sabinus' subscription to Persius originally followed the choliambic Prologue, and the fullest version of Torquatus Gennadius' subscription to Martial appears between the three introductory epigrams and the main text of Book XIII; cf. W. M. Lindsay, *Ancient Editions of Martial* (Oxford 1903) 2f, and Clausen, *Hermes* 91 (1963) 253. There are also parallels for subscriptions after one unit of a work referring to the whole thing: the subscription to Macrobius' Commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis* follows Book I (Jahn 347f), the subscription of Turcius Rufius Apronianus in the Medicean Virgil follows the Eclogues (Jahn 348), and the subscription of Niceus follows the first book of Juvenal's Satires (Jahn 360).

<sup>21</sup> Kiessling got his figure by omitting the speeches *Cum Quaestor Lilybaeo Decederet* and *De Rege Alexandrino* and by counting the two speeches for

One final difficulty remains. It is surprising that none of the numerous scholars who have had occasion to refer to this subscription has found anything wrong with the closing phrase, *oratio eximia*. It is quite out of place in a factual subscription like this; indeed, there is no parallel in any of the subscriptions collected by Jahn.<sup>22</sup> The necessary emendation is clear: *eximia* is nothing but a mistaken expansion of *XXIII*, or whatever other number was originally written in the first part of the subscription. The repetition between the two related subscriptions is not unique, and should not surprise us.<sup>23</sup> Collecting the expansions and corrections made here, we may offer a partial reconstruction of the two subscriptions of Statilius Maximus:<sup>24</sup>

- a) Emendaui ad Tironem et Laecanianum. acta ipso  
Cicerone et Antonio consulibus. oratio *XXIII*.
- b) Statilius Maximus rursum emendaui ad Tironem et  
Laecanianum et Domitium et alios ueteres *III*.  
oratio *XXIII*.

Aside from textual matters, the most intriguing problem posed by the subscription is the reference to Tiro. Tiro's name is connected with the text of Cicero's speeches in two other sources. One of them is the passage of Fronto which also contains the name of Domitius Balbus, to which we shall return later.<sup>25</sup> The other, more important source is the *Noctes Atticae* of Aulus Gellius, in two passages where manuscripts corrected, or descended from a copy corrected, by Tiro are mentioned.

On the first occasion on which Gellius refers to a Tironian manuscript

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Oppius as one. The composition of the various collections of Cicero's speeches in antiquity is a problem that has not been adequately studied.

<sup>22</sup> The only possible parallel is the subscription to Priscian (Jahn 355f), "... scripsi artem Prisciani eloquentissimi grammatici doctoris mei," but that is not really apposite.

<sup>23</sup> Compare the subscriptions to Persius: cf. Clausen (above, n. 11).

<sup>24</sup> I have not ventured to restore parallel phrases from one part to the other or to emend the number *XXIII*. A further attractive improvement has been proposed to me by E. Badian which is too tentative to restore to the text. According to him, *et alios* is a mistaken expansion of *Bal.*, for *Balbus* (see above, n. 16 and text), and *ueteres III* is a gloss on the original three names. This is persuasive for several reasons. In the first place, the only other reference to this man uses both names; in the second, it is unlikely that Statilius would fail to name half of his sources and use the vague *ueteres III*; finally, it may be significant that Poggio uses *et* for *et* only here in the subscription: that sign would more easily be confused with *B*.

<sup>25</sup> See above, n. 16, and below, p. 241.

(I.7.1), he cites a chapter of the Fifth Verrine with the introduction:

In oratione Ciceronis quinta in Verrem in libro spectatae fidei Tironiana cura atque disciplina facto scriptum fuit. . . .

The significant part of the passage of Cicero quoted was the final phrase (II Verr. 5.167):

hanc sibi rem praesidio sperant futurum.

Gellius reports that he and his friends were all ready to emend the last word to *futuram*, when a friend who was steeped in antiquarian lore reported that undeclined future infinitives like *futurum* were to be found in other Republican authors; he gave a large number of examples from Gracchus and others to support his contention.

The other appearance of the Tironian copy is in a discussion of euphony (13.21.15):

Sicuti Marco etiam Ciceroni mollius teretiusque uisum in quinta in Verrem 'fretu' scribere quam 'freto': 'perangusto' inquit 'fretu diuisa' (5.169). Erat enim crassius uetustiusque 'perangusto fretu' dicere. Itidem in secunda simili usus modulamine 'manifesto peccatu' (2.191) inquit, non 'peccato'; hoc enim scriptum in uno atque in altero antiquissimae fidei libro Tironiano repperi . . .

It is fairly evident that in both places Gellius is referring to one and the same manuscript (or set of rolls) of the Verrine orations, a copy which claimed to be descended from, or to have been corrected against, or in fact to be, a manuscript written by Tiro. That the manuscript existed is quite probable, not only because the other reports, particularly the subscription, show that such a copy existed at that time, but also because all of Gellius' citations come from the end of a book, which suggests that he was unrolling the volumes himself, not merely using someone else's collection of grammatical oddities.<sup>26</sup>

The quality of Tiro's readings, however, is the most interesting feature of Gellius' reports. No modern editor has had any difficulty at all in rejecting *futurum* at 5.167. It is extremely archaic, and would be singularly out of place in Cicero.<sup>27</sup> And yet it is in a Tironian copy.

<sup>26</sup> I do not wish to deal here with the problem of Gellius' reliability, which is generally good in such matters. It should be noted here that only variants that are explicitly cited from manuscripts by the ancient sources are examined in this paper.

<sup>27</sup> On this passage see C. Zumpt's excellent note in his edition of the Verrines (Berlin 1831) 983; on the indeclinable future infinitive, cf. A. Ernout, *Morphologie historique du latin*<sup>3</sup> (Paris 1953) 229f.



As for the other readings, they have had more success. Peterson in the Oxford Text prints *fretu*, presumably because Charisius, citing Romanus, in turn citing the elder Pliny's *Dubii Sermonis Libri*, quoted the phrase *a Gaditano fretu* from an unknown work of Cicero (Char. 164.7B). This is by no means compelling evidence; even if Cicero once used *fretu*, that does not mean that he used it regularly. Moreover, all of the manuscripts here read *freto*.<sup>28</sup> As for *peccatu*, Peterson rejects it, although it was accepted by Zumpt on the grounds of its presence in one of his manuscripts (not reported by Peterson, and perhaps wrong), and by analogy with *fretu*. It is surely to be rejected.

Of the three readings attributed to the Tironian copy, then (and printed by Funaioli as genuine fragments of Tiro),<sup>29</sup> one is clearly wrong and two are at best dubious; we must wonder if the whole manuscript was of the same caliber. Several explanations are possible. One, that the readings are in fact correct, we have already rejected; another is that the manuscript that Gellius saw was a bad copy of a genuine Tironian text; another that the readings in question were deliberate alterations on Tiro's part of the text of Cicero. A fourth, which we will defend here, is that the manuscript that Gellius considered Tironian was no such thing, but was either a deliberately eccentric text or merely a bad copy to which Tiro's name was falsely attached; in other words, a forgery. Of these explanations we have already disproved the first; the third, that Tiro deliberately altered the text, is equally untenable. Nothing in the character of Tiro would lead us to believe it, and there is also no proven instance of the deliberate alteration of a manuscript by emendation in that period; certainly none of the more eminent critics of the first century did it.<sup>30</sup> The possibility that the manuscript Gellius knew was merely a bad copy of a genuine original must remain for the present a distinct possibility, but we may remark in advance that, aside from the evidence of Gellius, Fronto, and the subscription, there is no reason to believe that Tiro ever "edited" Cicero's speeches.<sup>31</sup> It is at least suspicious that while Quintilian knew

<sup>28</sup> Cicero used the form *freto* elsewhere in the Verrines, e.g. II Verr. 5.5. *Fretu* is not common, and may be poetic; see the examples collected in TLL s.v.

<sup>29</sup> H. Funaioli, ed., *Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta* (Leipzig 1907) 393f, F 1-3.

<sup>30</sup> It should, however, be recognized that Hyginus was not above inventing manuscripts; see below, p. 237. I have treated this topic more fully in my dissertation (Harvard 1972) *Latin Textual Criticism in Antiquity*.

<sup>31</sup> I occasionally use the words "edit" and "edition" for want of better terms. An ancient edition should not be compared to a modern one; cf. B. A.



that Tiro had made public Cicero's *commentarii* to his speeches (10.7.31), he never refers to any edition by Tiro of the speeches themselves.<sup>31a</sup>

One should not, of course, rashly suggest that a relatively well-attested book like Tiro's Cicero was a forgery. But some support for that suggestion will appear from the fact that it was by no means the only such creation. Therefore, what follows will show that several copies of famous books that cannot have been genuine were in circulation in the first century and later, that in fact, particularly in the second century, there was an active business involving them.

It is to be expected that the most flagrant examples of forgeries of this type involve Virgil.<sup>32</sup> In the DS commentary on the *Georgics*, on the phrase "tiliae atque uberrima tinus" (4.141), we find the inane note:

ipsius autem manu duplex fuit scriptura, 'pinus' et 'tinus.'

This is obviously false: Virgil wrote *tinus*, which has been corrected out of existence in all of our ancient manuscripts. In the Medicean Virgil, moreover, we are lucky enough to be able to see this process still taking place: that codex alone preserves *tinus* in the original hand, altered to *pinus* by the corrector.<sup>33</sup>

DS preserves a number of examples, mostly involving the *Georgics*, of alternate readings ascribed to the poet himself, none of which is

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van Groningen, "ΕΚΛΟΞΙΣ" *Mnemosyne* 16 (1963) 1-17. Funaioli prints two other fragments of Tiro's "edition"; F 4 is from Asconius p. 1C, where Kiessling-Schoell inserted Tiro's name in a lacuna. This supplement was rightly rejected by Clark. F 5 (Gellius 15.6.1) does not refer to an edition, but to Tiro's assistance of Cicero in research and writing.

<sup>31a</sup> I regret that only when this article was in proof did I see W. C. McDermott's paper "M. Cicero and M. Tiro". *Historia* 21 (1972) 259-286. He deals with the usual evidence for Tiro's edition and on p. 280 reaches the cautious, if incorrect, conclusion "All that can be stated for certain is that Tiro edited all or part of the orations against Verres".

<sup>32</sup> The most active variety of forgery was the creation of spurious works, of which some of the poems of the *Appendix Vergiliana* are the best example. Cf. E. Fraenkel, "The Culex" *Kleine Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie* II (Rome 1964) 192-197.

<sup>33</sup> Mynors *ad loc.* well remarks "somniatur DServ." M and M<sup>2</sup> also disagree in the same way at G 4.112, but here P has also *tinus*, and DS contents himself with a simple *legitur et tinus*. O. Ribbeck, *Prolegomena Critica* (Leipzig 1886) 24, accepted even this variant as genuine. (Not too much weight should be given to this example, which is found only in the untrustworthy manuscript V, our sole source for DS at the end of the *Georgics*; cf. G. Thilo, *Servii Grammatici . . . Commentarii* III 1 [Leipzig 1887] xiff.)

readily acceptable. One passage, in fact, is provided with two such comments. The lines in question are *Georgics* 1.65ff:

. . . glaebasque iacentis  
puluerulentā coquat maturis solibus aestas;  
at si non fuerit tellus fecunda, sub ipsum  
Arcturum tenui sat erit suspendere sulco:  
illic officiant laetis ne frugibus herbae,  
hic, sterilem exiguus ne deserat umor harenam.

Concerning verse 66, DS reports:

ipsius manu adiectum 'maturis solibus,'

and concerning 69-70:

ipsius manu adiecti sunt deletis duobus, quorum alter totus legi potuit, 'ipsis officiant segetes ne frugibus illic'; ex altero hoc tantum, 'ne deserat umor harenam.'

It is immediately obvious that these alterations cannot possibly be Virgil's own; to say that he *added* "maturis solibus" in his own hand does not make any sense: are we to suppose that the original scribe, possibly taking dictation from Virgil, had simply left the middle of the verse blank?<sup>34</sup> In the same way, it is hard to imagine what was replaced by the correct version of verse 70. As for the purported alternative to verse 69, it is an understatement to call it weak; and if Virgil's rough drafts may have contained lines like this, it is most unlikely that they got far enough to have been written in a good copy, and only then corrected.<sup>35</sup> In fact, both of these notes, as well as that involving *pinus* and *tinus*, point to only one possible solution: there was in fact a manuscript (or more than one) with these corrections in it, and it was passed off to a gullible grammarian as being Virgil's own. It is not possible to suggest that such a copy never existed: the ancient scholiasts rarely had the imagination to cite fictional manuscripts. Nor is it possible to believe that the manuscript was actually written under Virgil's guidance; the readings are simply too bad.

Some of the other Virgilian readings reported by DS support the idea that the source who gave the commentator this information was

<sup>34</sup> Ribbeck (above, n. 33) 30, believed that *maturis solibus* was the replacement for an earlier *maturis frugibus*, now found in R. That reading, however, is due only to confusion with verse 69, nor does DS record that there was an erasure here, merely an addition.

<sup>35</sup> Even Ribbeck, *ibid.*, could not accept the alternative form of verse 69: "Potuerunt enim illi [sc. commentatores] quoque corrupta exemplaris sui scriptura falli . . ."

relying on an actual manuscript. In two cases, it is not made clear by the note what sort of manuscript is being discussed, but the fact that the origin is not specified (as opposed to the frequent designation of manuscripts as *libri* or *codices*) strongly suggests that a putative Virgilian manuscript is involved.<sup>36</sup> Both of these cases occur in a space of 25 lines in the third book of the *Aeneid*. The first occurs at 3.204; here DS explains the origin of three verses which are not transmitted by our manuscripts, and which are generally recognized as being spurious:

hinc Pelopis gentes Maleaeque sonantia saxa  
circumstant, pariterque undae terraeque minantur:  
pulsamur saeuis et circumsistimur undis.

hi uersus circumducti inuenti dicuntur et extra paginam in mundo:

Similarly, at 3.226, which reads correctly:

Harpyiae et magnis quatiunt clangoribus alas,

DS noted:

... sed sane hic uersus qui circumductus est talis auditur, 'resonant magnis stridoribus alae.'

Again it is clear what has happened: in both cases a manuscript was seen by DS's source which had the three verses and the phrase in the margin, circled and presumably with lines directing them to the proper place in the text. Although DS does not specifically use Virgil's name, we must assume that the manuscript which had the verses had some kind of Virgilian authentication; otherwise it is unlikely that DS would have quoted them.<sup>37</sup>

Two other variant readings at the beginning of the *Georgics* deserve to be recorded here, although their origin is not so clear as the five examples so far adduced. On G 1.6 DS records:

LVMINA numina fuit, sed emendauit ipse, quia postea (10) ait 'et uos agrestum praesentia numina fauni.'

Likewise, on G 1.13, he notes:

... in Corn. 'equum,' in authentico 'aquam,' ipsius manu 'equum.'

<sup>36</sup> Ribbeck, *ibid.*, 189f, classed both notes discussed here as normal manuscripts rather than autographs; that is possible, but not likely.

<sup>37</sup> The four verses which DS cited at A 6.289 probably came from a similar source, but were not cited by DS from a manuscript.

The second of these passages seems to belong to the same class of manuscript as the other five, namely, a manuscript not written or corrected by Virgil but passed off as his; *equum* is the correct reading. The phrase *in authentico*, however, is problematic; I believe that it means the first hand of the manuscript, as opposed to a correction in Virgil's own hand. It might also refer to the commentator's base text, or to any standard copy, such as the semi-mythical text of Tucca and Varius.<sup>38</sup> The note seems, however, to belong to the same class as the first set. As for the *lumina:numina*, it is quite easy to visualize it as a manuscript error, caused precisely because of the line cited in the scholium. It is equally plausible, however, as one of that category of "biographical" variants which includes the "improvements" of Tucca and Varius, as well as such alterations as the changes of *Nola* to *ora* and *Bella* that are attributed to Virgil by Gellius and Servius.<sup>39</sup> None of the variants of this class is any more to be believed than are the manuscript variants, but they do not belong in a discussion of forged manuscripts; they involved a purely scholiastic and biographical transmission, and have only been imported into the text of Virgil by modern editors.

The presence of these Virgilian variants in the DS commentary on Virgil provides no sure evidence for their original date. That commentary, however, is largely based on the commentary of Donatus, written in the middle of the fourth century A.D.<sup>40</sup> That date is therefore a *terminus ante quem* for the existence of such manuscripts. Moreover, because DS was not an original scholar, but rather a compiler and excerptor of commentaries that were often much earlier than he was, we will not be too far afield in suggesting that these "autographs" of Virgil were current at a time not very distant from that of Gellius and Statilius Maximus, namely, the end of the second century or the beginning of the third.<sup>41</sup> DS, moreover, is not the only reporter of

<sup>38</sup> This appears to be the interpretation of Ribbeck (above, n. 33) 29. The word *authenticum* generally refers to the original of a document: cf. *Dig.* 22.4.2. *HA Tyr. Trig.* 10.9.

<sup>39</sup> *Nola* to *ora*, Gell. 6.20.1, DS G 2.224; *Nola* to *Bella*, Serv. A 7.740. Ribbeck (above, n. 33) 23f, accepted the former but not the latter; the first is false as well, as Haupt (*Ind. Lect.* (Berlin 1857) 4 [= *Opuscula* II (Leipzig 1876) 122f] had already seen. On Tucca and Varius, see now G. P. Goold, "Servius and the Helen Episode" *HSCP* 74 (1970) 123ff.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Goold, *ibid.*, 104f, and references given there. There should be no need for further argument about this.

<sup>41</sup> This is particularly evident because DS admits that he reported at least the verses after A 3.204 from an earlier commentary (*dicuntur*).



the readings of such manuscripts: Gellius himself provides important confirmation of their existence in the second century, in citing such copies both from his own knowledge and from the reports of Hyginus and Probus. We may examine these in chronological order.

It is reassuring that the manuscript of Virgil seen by Hyginus is so obviously incorrect, because his date, and the fact that he knew Virgil himself, would otherwise be strong reasons to believe his report. But Hyginus is not at all to be trusted in his reports of the text, and the reading he claimed to have drawn from a valuable manuscript is no exception. The correct text of *Georgics* 2.246f is:<sup>42</sup>

at sapor indicium faciet manifestus et ora  
tristia temptantum sensu torquebit amaro.

Gellius' report of Hyginus' reading is slightly different (1.21.2):

Hyginus . . . confirmat et perseuerat non hoc a Vergilio relictum, sed quod ipse inuenerit in libro, qui fuerit ex domo atque familia Vergilii:

et ora  
tristia temptantum sensus torquebit amaror.

Hyginus seems to have offered two arguments in favor of his reading,<sup>43</sup> neither of which is compelling. In the first place, the word *amaror* was used by Lucretius (4.224), and therefore had a suitable precedent. It is, however, worth noting that the word was not used by Lucretius in a phrase so clumsy as *sensus amaror*: in the earlier poet the word is not qualified in the same way:

cum tuimur misceri absinthia, tangit amaror.

The Lucretian precedent is not a very strong argument.<sup>44</sup> The same is true of the other argument against *sensu amaro*; according to Hyginus, to say *sapor sensu torquebit* is more or less the same as to say *sensus sensu torquebit*, because *sapor* is a sense. He found the tautology unac-

<sup>42</sup> Printed by Mynors, after having been rejected in most major editions for more than a century (Ribbeck, Hirzel, Sabbadini). I have discussed Hyginus' Virgilian criticism in more detail in my dissertation (above, n. 30).

<sup>43</sup> Gellius, as often, splits his source up into a dialogue. The parallel note of Servius on these lines, however, which must derive ultimately from Hyginus, contains arguments from both parts of Gellius' conversation. On Gellius' methods here, cf. Mercklin, "Die Citiermethode und Quellenbenutzung des A. Gellius in den Noctes Atticae" *Jahrb. f. Philol.* Supp. 3 (1860) 635-708 and Kretschmer, *De Auctoribus A. Gellii Grammaticis*<sup>2</sup> (Berlin 1866) 21ff.

<sup>44</sup> It is worth noticing that Macrobius (*Sat.* 6.1.47) quoted the line with *amaro* and thought that it was borrowed from Lucretius 2.401, "foedo pertorquent ora sapore."

ceptable. However, few modern critics would find the phrase redundant or un-Virgilian; since all of the ancient manuscripts preserve it, moreover, there is no reason to reject it.<sup>45</sup>

But if Hyginus' reading is wrong, what are we to say about the manuscript in which he found it? Two possibilities occur; either Hyginus had seen such a manuscript, which was not what it purported to be, or he simply invented the manuscript himself. Since Hyginus was not in the habit of respecting the text of Virgil as the poet left it, but offered a number of suggestions of what Virgil would have changed if he had lived, and was otherwise high-handed, the second possibility is attractive.<sup>46</sup> Whether or not this is true, however, we may note that the forger exerted a certain wise caution in his attribution of the manuscript. Since contemporaries would be aware of the common use of dictation, Hyginus, or his forger, claimed only that the copy was from Virgil's household. The later age, it appears, was not so well informed.<sup>47</sup> In any case, we are safe in assuming that Hyginus' Virgilian text was not genuine, even if it existed.

In contrast to the manuscript which Hyginus claimed to have used, the Virgilian copy cited by Probus, writing in the second half of the first century, cannot be proved to have been a forgery. Gellius quoted Probus directly (13.21.4):

'nam in primo georgicon, quem ego' inquit 'librum manu ipsius correctum legi, "urbis" per i litteram scripsit. uerba e uersibus eius haec sunt (G 1.25):

urbisne inuisere, Caesar,  
terrarumque uelis curam . . .'

There is no reason why Virgil should not have written *urbis*, and it is therefore quite possible that the manuscript was genuine.<sup>48</sup> The major argument against its authenticity is the number of instances of citations in DS of forged autographs of the *Georgics*, particularly of Book I;

<sup>45</sup> The only manuscripts with Hyginus' reading are Carolingian, and probably got it from Servius. On the passage as a whole, cf. Goold (above, n. 39) 161f.

<sup>46</sup> Hyginus' only other obvious emendation, *limo* for *lino* at A 12.120, is preserved only by Servius, whose abridgement uses the word *reliquisse* in the citation of Hyginus. This may be a sign that he was drawing on another "manuscript" there. *Limo*, printed by Mynors as by editors since Heyne, is as wrong as *amaror*.

<sup>47</sup> Genuine autographs of Virgil probably did exist in the first century; cf. Pliny, NH 13.26.83.

<sup>48</sup> The reading is found in two of the three ancient manuscripts and in most of Mynors' Carolingian copies. A more skeptical view of this manuscript is given by Goold (above, n. 39) 162.

it was clearly a popular text to forge.<sup>49</sup> Gellius, in fact, provides one other example of a dubious text of the same book (9.14.7):

... factum hercle est ut facile his credam, qui scripserunt idiographum librum Vergilii se inspexisse, in quo ita scriptum est (G 1.208):

libra dies somnique pares ubi fecerit horas . . .

The reading found in most of the ancient manuscripts and in citations from Servius and other grammarians (and printed by Mynors) is *die*.<sup>50</sup> It is therefore possible that this too was a forgery. It might be added that, although it is reasonable to ask whether all of the citations from spurious Virgilian manuscripts might not have come from one source, that is most unlikely. Probus, who used his copy for a grammatical treatise, was clearly not the source for the others, and the number of other forged books of Virgil makes it likely that several of them were available.

The most important question to be asked about the Virgilian forgeries in particular and all of them in general is that of motive. Why would someone attempt to pass a manuscript off as being written in Virgil's own hand, or, for that matter, as a genuine Tironian copy of Cicero? Several reasons for forgeries are known. In the first place, in the case of a critic like Hyginus, the obvious reason for fabrication is to justify his own improvements. This reason, however, is not applicable to most of the readings that we have discussed, and is generally rare in textual criticism. Why would Probus want to substitute *urbis* for its alternative form? Why would DS's source want to claim credit for erasing and writing in the words *maturis solibus* or *pinus*? Such an explanation does not deserve serious credit. Equally inapplicable is the well-known practice of attaching a great poet's name to lesser works, such as appear in the *Appendix Vergiliana*; this is only applicable to the three verses given by DS in *Aeneid* III, and they were not worth the effort. Likewise, it is impossible to see these creations as insidious justifications for any religious, literary, or social policy, as some forgeries have been; the forgery of a manuscript rather than a work of literature has far more limited aims. One remaining possibility is a malicious sense

<sup>49</sup> It seems probable to me that the large number of forgeries of the *Georgics* is due to the mysterious revision of them that Virgil made to eliminate the *laudes Galli* (Serv. E 10.1, G 4.1). That revision, of course, is highly overrated by Servius and many scholars since, including Ribbeck. The story, however, will have lent plausibility to manuscripts with revisions.

<sup>50</sup> It is quoted, for example, by Priscian II 366, 367, III 189K. Little weight can be placed on the variation *die: dies* which in this context is palaeographically very easy.

of humor, forging for the sheer joy of fooling the fumbling pedants of antiquity, in the manner in which Syme suggests that the author of the *Historia Augusta* worked.<sup>51</sup> Doubtless it would be amusing to watch a Statilius Maximus or other earnest grammarian poring over a manuscript which was actually of less than no value, but it would seem that the effort of creating such a copy would not be repaid by the humor; and if the jester merely attributed great value to an ordinary copy, that is not nearly so funny. The only field in which that motive for forgery seems suitable is that of biographical inventions like the stories of Tucca and Varius. The actual motive for misattributed manuscripts, I believe, is much more mundane: money.

Gellius supplies some strong support for the profit motive in the last of the examples of a Virgilian manuscript which we shall cite (2.3.5f):

Venit nobis in memoriam Fidum Optatum, multi nominis Romae grammaticum, ostendisse mihi librum Aeneidos secundum mirandae uetustatis emptum in sigillariis uiginti aureis, quem ipsius Vergili fuisse credebatur. In quo duo isti uersus cum ita scripti forent (A 2.469f):

uestibulum ante ipsum primoque in limine Pyrrus  
exultat telis et luce coruscus aena,

additam supra uidimus h litteram et 'ahena' factum.

There is no reason to distrust the story; we are quite safe in assuming that what Gellius wrote must have sounded plausible to his readers, and we must therefore assume that twenty pieces of gold, although a high price, was not incredible for a rare book in the second century. Twenty *aurei* was a huge sum for a book; if the rare-book trade commanded such prices, then there was a considerable incentive to create rare books to meet the demand.<sup>51a</sup>

One more suspicious book appears in Gellius, again expensive. In discussing the text of Ennius, *Annals* 232f (in Vahlen<sup>2</sup>),

denique ui magna quadrupes eques atque elephant  
proiciunt sese,

Gellius cites an old and rare copy (18.5.11):

<sup>51</sup> See, in particular, *Emperors and Biography* (Oxford 1971) 248ff; 271ff on invention of authorities by the author of the HA is quite relevant.

<sup>51a</sup> One might compare the huge prices paid for books by Arethas of Caesarea in the ninth century; cf. Reynolds and Wilson (above, n. 7) 56.



...librum summae atque reuerendae uetustatis, quem fere constabat Lampadionis manu emendatum, studio pretioque multo unius uersus inspiciendi gratia conduxi et 'eques' non 'equus' scriptum in eo uersu inueni.

The operative phrase here is *pretio multo*; Lampadio's Ennius was a rare and valuable book. The reader, by now, may suspect just how rare Lampadio's Ennius actually was: aside from one possible reference in Fronto, which we shall discuss shortly, Lampadio is not known to have edited Ennius. In fact, in the passage of Suetonius (*Gram.* 2) which mentions him, he is said to have divided Naevius' epic into seven books, but there Vargunteius is the only name mentioned in connection with Ennius. In the context of rare and valuable editions mentioned by Gellius, the obvious conclusion is that Lampadio's Ennius, like Tiro's Cicero, was the creation of an industrious and inventive forger in the second century. Both works were invented in the Antonine period.

It is high time to turn to the passage of Fronto that provides the only confirmation for the critical labors of Lampadio, Tiro, and others. The context in which this confirmation occurs is a letter in which Fronto thanked Marcus Aurelius profusely for copying in his own hand one of his (Fronto's) speeches (*Ad M. Caes.* 1.7.4):<sup>52</sup>

Quid tale M. Porcio aut Quinto Ennio, C. Graccho aut Titio poetae, quid Scipioni aut Numidico, quid M. Tullio tale usu uenit? Quorum libri pretiosiores habentur et summam gloriam retinent, si sunt Lampadionis aut Staberii, Plautii aut D. Aurelii, Autriconis aut Aelii manu scripta e<xem>pla aut a Tirone emendata aut a Domitio Balbo descripta aut ab Attico aut Nepote. Mea oratio extabit M. Caesaris manu scripta. Qui orationem spreuerit, litteras concupiscet; qui scripta contempserit, scriptorem reuerebitur.

This passage is perhaps one of the most grossly misinterpreted pieces of evidence about ancient texts. Funaioli and others have taken it to be a list of early critical editions; the reference to Nepos has been used to draw unwarranted conclusions about the publication of Cicero's letters.<sup>53</sup>

What Fronto's valuable list purports to be, in fact, is a list of famous men who wrote manuscripts of famous authors. And that fact should

<sup>52</sup> The text given here is that of van den Hout.

<sup>53</sup> Funaioli (above, n. 29) 107, described this passage as *de libris ad criticam rationem emendatis*. Cf. also L. R. Taylor, "Cornelius Nepos and Cicero's Letters to Atticus" *Mélanges J. Bayet* (Brussels 1964) 678-681.

be immediately suspicious: Atticus, for one, never copied one of Cicero's works in his own hand: he had well-trained scribes for that. Another red flag is the word *pretiosiores*: again, with Fronto, we are in the region of rare and valuable books in the second century which, as the selections from Gellius have shown, is treacherous. Moreover, there are suspicious names. Tiro is the most dubious of these; the manuscript of the Verrines which claimed to be his at this time was undoubtedly a forgery, as we have seen. Lampadio, too, is suspicious. Even though the order of names in his pair is reversed, there can be little doubt that it was a copy of his Ennius to which Fronto referred, another masterpiece of the forger's art. Not all of the names in the list are otherwise known. Staberius and probably Plautius are, and if the latter is to be identified with L. Plotius Gallus, an early Latin rhetor, his association with any of the earlier orators is appropriate;<sup>54</sup> D. Aurelius is presumably the grammarian Aurelius Opillus. Aelius Stilo is of course well known, but we may suspect that it was his fame as a speechwriter rather than as a grammarian that placed him in this company: it would be quite a coup to sell the copy of a speech of Metellus Numidicus written in the very hand of his speechwriter.<sup>55</sup> Nepos is not otherwise known to have had anything to do with the transmission of Cicero's works, not to mention copying them in his own hand. Domitius Balbus we have already met; the other names are not known.

A startling suggestion of some significance follows on what we have said. Fronto's list is not what he thought it was. Far from being rare and valuable copies of early authors, these books were rare and expensive forgeries. To the best of our knowledge, not one of the scribes mentioned by Fronto had ever copied a manuscript, and some had nothing at all to do with the authors to whom they are attached. The learned Fronto and the studious Gellius would be mortified to learn of their errors of judgement. The booksellers who fooled them probably lived quite comfortably.

We may return briefly to Statilius and his copy of Cicero. Of all

<sup>54</sup> Staberius was the tutor of Brutus and Cassius: Suetonius *Gram.* 13; Plotius Gallus, *Rhet.* 26.

<sup>55</sup> Aelius Stilo did not in fact write speeches for Numidicus, but probably for Metellus Nepos. The passage of the *Brutus* (206) which recorded this is corrupt: the filiation is missing and may have disappeared before the second century. Speeches of other Metelli went under Numidicus' name as well in that period: Gellius (I.6) cites a speech of Macedonicus under Numidicus' name. Stilo's Numidicus is thus in the same category as Lampadio's Ennius: the writer is attached to the wrong author. I owe this point to E. Badian.

of the subscriptions collected by Jahn, only three refer to collation against another manuscript. Statilius is the only one to refer to more than one copy, and the only one to refer to a book otherwise known.<sup>56</sup> But of the six copies, if he really used that many in preparing his text, and after all of his labor in producing it — for, as any textual critic knows, the comparison of six manuscripts is no small task — the result was at best harmless, at worst counterproductive. At least two, and probably more of the six were fakes, and of little value; they were created to pander to the archaist taste of the time, and probably gave readings, like *futurum*, intended to please their customers. It is to be hoped that their influence on extant manuscripts was not large.<sup>57</sup>

After the foundation of the libraries of Alexandria and Pergamum, Galen tells us, the demand for books, and the prices paid for them, led to the creation of forgeries (15.105K). The same thing appears to have taken place in second-century Rome. On the one hand, eager students of grammar and rhetoric were in great need of early books and editions in order to pursue their antiquarian studies more accurately. On the other hand, there was a distinct shortage of such books. The resulting forgeries, created to meet the demand, were inevitable. What is most surprising about these books, however, is the way in which they appear to have been accepted. From an examination of the evidence it is clear that many, if not all, of these books purported to be copies of texts that never existed, but their purchasers did not realize that. The irony is, that with all of their antiquarian zeal, these scholars did not know enough to penetrate the fraud.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> The other two references are in the subscriptions to Livy (Jahn 335), "Nicomachus Dexter u.c. emendaui ad exemplum parentis mei Clementiani," and Boethius (Jahn 354), where there is a reference to correction *contra codicem Renati*. Note also the subscription to Ps.-Quintilian (not in Jahn) cf. G. Lehnert, "Zur Textgeschichte der grösseren Pseudo-Quintilianischen Declamationen" *Rh. Mus.* 60 (1905) 154.

<sup>57</sup> Clark (*Inventa Itolorum* 16) singled out minor orthographic archaisms (e.g. *maxumus*) as characteristic of M, but that could be mediaeval rather than ancient; cf. Goold, "Amatoria Critica" *HSCP* 69 (1965) 9.

<sup>58</sup> Only after submitting this article did I see the survey of W. Speyer, *Die literarische Fälschung im heidnischen und christlichen Altertum* (Munich 1971), who deals with forged manuscripts briefly (pp. 84, 111f.) and does not mention any of those discussed here.





## SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D. (1972)

VICTOR BERS — *Enallage: A Problem in Greek Style*

**E**NALLAGE is the transfer to the governing substantive of an adjective which by logic, or at least convention, belongs with an expressed dependent genitive e.g. *νεῖκος ἀνδρῶν ξύναιμον* (Soph. *Ant.* 793f). In the vast majority of examples one can make some sense by taking the adjective with the noun it modifies; thus we have ambiguity, but of a narrow type since there are only two possible meanings. Expressions like *ῥμαιμος φόνος* (Aesch. *Eum.* 212) are semantically similar to enallage but poetically distinct: in an enallage the prosaic expression, made obvious by the presence of the genitive, is juxtaposed with the figurative one, whereas the prosaic meaning of *ῥμαιμος φόνος* is implicit.

Many scholars have proposed syntactical theories to show that the figure does not exist; they argue, for instance, that the adjective is assimilated to the case of the governing substantive or that the two nouns have coalesced into a compound. These attempts cannot be decisively refuted, but they fail to account for the limited distribution of enallage, both in various genres and in contexts, and the difference in nuance between alternate forms of expression. Further, enallage provides by far the most economical explanation of the phenomenon.

Homeric Greek and Boeotian and Aeolic inscriptions display the coexistence in the early stages of the language of two morphological realizations of the genitive function — possessive adjective and the genitive case. I argue that enallage is a preservation of this feature of archaic syntax. A likely locus of diffusion is the adjacent use of the possessive pronominal and the genitive, as in *ἐμὰ κήδεα θυμοῦ* (*Od.* 14.197), the only widely accepted enallage in Homer. Whether or not this specific conjecture is correct, there are grounds for regarding enallage as an archaism of some type. An examination of the contexts in which enallage is found shows that it appears with great frequency in the same semantic fields in which the morphological archaism of simplex o-stem adjectives in two terminations is heavily concentrated.

A synchronic study of enallage in Pindar and the tragedians (including examples not previously recognized) shows that the figure is associated with formal or ornate diction and only rarely, if ever, is meant to show emotion overpowering logic. Pindar, who generally excludes enallage from his myths, uses it to make an utterance deliberately equivocal or oblique and to throw stress on an abstract word. The tragedians show a strong tendency to employ enallage in iambic sections only in linguistically conservative contexts. Aeschylus, unlike Sophocles and Euripides, uses enallage to produce impressionistic effects. Sophocles' specialty is enallage in deliberately inappropriate diction. Euripides uses both traditional and highly imaginative enallages.

In brief appendixes I discuss enallage in Greek prose and in Latin.

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Degree in Classical Philology 1972

FREDERICK C. CHRISTIE — *Longus and the Development of the Pastoral Tradition*

In this study of Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*, an examination of the theme of divine intervention in the other Greek love romances and in Longus leads to the conclusion that Longus' treatment of this theme is strikingly different from that of the other romancers. This becomes particularly evident in Longus' establishment of Eros as the chief efficient cause and prime motivator in his narrative as opposed to the multiplicity of divine causes in the other romances where Eros is, at best, only *par inter pares*.

A thorough analysis of *Daphnis and Chloe*, moreover, reveals even more striking differences. First there is Longus' treatment of love. He does not use the motif of love-at-first sight which is *de rigueur* in the others. Instead, he posits the total erotic innocence of his protagonists and dedicates his whole story to their education in love. Secondly, he rejects the usual theme of their separation, of their attempts to maintain chastity, and of their consequent traveling, with its attendant panoply of purple passages and lengthy digressions, and thus severely limits their adventures to those which would promote their education. Thirdly, he lays great stress on the theme of the harmonious synthesis of *φύσις* and *τέχνη* as an ideal. Fourthly, and most importantly, he sets

his story in the pastoral landscape, thereby totally eschewing the romancers' usual fascination with travel and faraway places.

Since these differences represent such a departure from the tradition of the Greek love romance, an investigation is then made into the pastoral tradition in Greek poetry to see if there are grounds for maintaining that Longus' chief inspiration for composing *Daphnis and Chloe* is to be found in the Theocritean and post-Theocritean tradition; to see, in short, if it can be established that Longus was not writing a prose love romance at all, but was rather creating a new genre, the prose pastoral.

The results of this inquiry prove significant. It becomes clear that the Theocritean tradition on love is that perfectly mutual love is impossible, and, in fact, that a central creative tension of the Theocritean aesthetic is that love and poetry are in a constant conflict in which poetry must take priority of importance. Intimately related to this is the other tension between *φύσις* and *τέχνη* in which *τέχνη* (i.e. the arts in general) has pride of place. In such an aesthetic framework the god Eros remains essentially the villain he was in earlier Greek love poetry, whereas the pastoral landscape is exclusively the domain of the shepherd-poet who is unlucky in love.

In the post-Theocritean tradition, on the other hand, one can see traces of an attempt to resolve these Theocritean tensions together with a concerted effort to "pastoralize" Eros. Once the tension between Eros and poetry has been resolved, a perfectly mutual love need no longer be an impossible ideal for a shepherd-poet, and there are some late poems in the Theocritean corpus which reveal a move toward incorporating mutual love and stable marriage into the pastoral aesthetic.

Given these facts, it becomes obvious that Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe* is in a direct line of development with the previous pastoral tradition, and an analysis of his use of reminiscences from Theocritus and later poets merely underscores Longus' very conscious attempt to refashion the pastoral from within by synthesizing the creative tensions of the Theocritean aesthetic into a higher unity whose source and symbol is his characterization of Eros as Cosmic Shepherd and Cosmic Artificer.

Viewed in this light, Longus' so-called "innovations" have nothing at all to do with the romance genre. Far from concerning himself with the vagaries of that form or with an attempt to improve it, Longus simply availed himself of its prose-medium and its acceptance of the fact of mutual love to fashion his new genre, the prose pastoral. Both his assumption of erotic innocence on the part of his hero and heroine



and his related theme of their education in love served as the catalyst by which he reworked the Theocritean pastoral into a new landscape which is ruled by a benign, shepherding Eros.

Longus' inclusion of Sapphic and religious coloring, moreover, is important, if not necessary, in that it also lends credibility to this new formulation of pastoral love and of Eros and bridges the gap between the somewhat pessimistic view of love in pastoral poetry and the older tradition of the Aeolic poets of Lesbos.

Clearly, such an interpretation contradicts all other criticism in the field, in that all previous readings of this work began with the premise that *Daphnis and Chloe* was a Greek love romance. There are, however, advantages to avoiding such a designation for Longus. In the first place, one does not have to explain away its many differences from this genre, a task which inevitably entails unprovable facts and *a priori* assumptions. Secondly, a more accurate and explicit description of the Greek love romance genre can be obtained which applies to them all if Longus' work is excluded.

Thirdly, and most significantly, Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe* will take its place among the other representatives of the pastoral — a place which Longus was seemingly at pains to win for it — and will be considered as a necessary constituent of any future history of the pastoral genre. Though by no means of the stature of the Theocritean *Idylls* or of the Vergilian *Eclogues*, *Daphnis and Chloe* in its continued influence precisely as pastoral upon later writers and artists alike maintains its right to such a position.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Degree in Classical Philology 1972

ELIZABETH ANN FISHER — *The Greek Version of Ovid's  
Metamorphoses*

In the thirteenth century the Byzantine monk Maximus Planudes translated Ovid's *Metamorphoses* into Greek prose; scholars have examined his translation rather inconclusively for its relevance to the textual tradition of the Latin original, but its peculiar quality and purpose as a work of Greek literature have been virtually ignored. This study attempts to treat the Greek *Metamorphoses* of Planudes both in terms of its relationship to the Latin original and as an independent work of Byzantine literature; conclusions regarding the appeal and relevance of Ovid to thirteenth-century Byzantine culture result.



The Greek *Metamorphoses* appeared after a cultural estrangement of some six hundred years between the Greek East and Latin West; the first chapter of this study outlines the process of that estrangement, beginning with the attitude of Greek authors of the Roman period toward the cultural aspects of Roman civilization. Although a positive attitude toward Latin literature and culture appears in the enduringly popular writings of Plutarch, the largely unfavorable observations regarding Roman culture offered by many Greek authors of the Roman period provided a *de facto* negative introduction to any product of Latin culture presented to the conservative and learned circles of thirteenth-century Constantinople; the unfavorable impression of Roman culture conveyed by the writings of Polybius, Diodorus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Appian, Strabo, Josephus, Lucian, Dio Chrysostom, Pausanias, Aelius Aristides, Theodoret, and Libanius is surveyed in brief. Moreover, the subsequent history of deteriorating cultural relations between medieval East and West served to reinforce an attitude of indifference toward Latin literature and culture on the part of generations of Byzantine intellectuals. It was only as an aspect of the thirteenth-century Palaeologan Renaissance that a new receptivity to Latin culture was possible in Byzantium; Planudes' *Metamorphoses* translation is both product and hallmark of that renaissance spirit.

An examination of the life of Planudes and his role in the remarkable intellectual climate of his time follows; his varied scholarly work typified the Palaeologan renaissance spirit, and he himself assumed a major intellectual role at the very highest levels of contemporary society.

Next, the literary context of Planudes' *Metamorphoses* is established by collecting and analyzing contemporary works from several genres; examined are the introduction to an oration of Theodore Metochites, a letter of Nicephorus Chumnus, a section of Pachymeres' history, a chapter from Constantine Acropolites' *Life of St. Theodosia*, part of a poem of Manuel Philes, and a segment of Andronicus Palaeologus' verse romance, *Callimachus and Chrysorrhoe*.

A brief discussion of the manuscripts of the Greek *Metamorphoses* prefaces a careful examination of the translation of *Metamorphoses* I. 163-208. The syntax, sentence structure, word choice, and rhetorical features of the translation are analyzed in terms of their relationship both to the Latin original and to contemporary Byzantine aesthetic criteria. The translator's peculiar interpretation of the passage and the influence of his positive attitude toward the original Latin work become evident in the course of this analysis.

Planudes' grasp of Latin vocabulary is assessed in a brief chapter comparing the range and flexibility of his Latin vocabulary to the definitions included in a "good" Byzantine Latin-Greek dictionary, that of pseudo-Philoxenus.

In conclusion, the high literary quality of Planudes' *Metamorphoses* translation suggests that it was not intended simply as a pedagogical aid to reading the Latin text but rather as an independent literary work, to be read and enjoyed for recreation by a learned and rhetorically sophisticated Byzantine audience. In style it is related to "good" contemporary Byzantine literature; in subject matter and appeal, it reflects the interest in light of somewhat racy stories also satisfied by the emerging genre of the medieval verse romance.

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#### BARRY JAMES HENNESSEY — *The Early Insular Script*

The work of E. A. Lowe on the insular script, in particular his introduction to volume II of the *Codes Latini Antiquiores*, and the plates of insular MSS. scattered throughout the twelve volumes of that work, has had a formative influence on recent palaeographical literature. His use of the terminology "insular majuscule" and "insular minuscule" and his criteria for classification of the MSS. have been widely adopted. This thesis addresses itself largely to Lowe's methodology; a detailed study of his criteria is presented, and his concept of category criticized. A more specific analysis of individual MSS., on a regional and chronological basis, forms the second half of the work.

Lowe speaks of individual letter forms as majuscule or minuscule, but this terminology, which has been traditional since the eighteenth-century *Nouveau Traité de diplomatique*, is derived from typography, and is anachronistic in dealing with pre-Caroline scripts. The implied dichotomy, used for scripts from the third-century uncial on, is largely invalid.

Papyrus finds from the Fayoum in Egypt, dated *saec.* III–VII, have yielded examples of "mixed" scripts which undermine the clear uncial/half-uncial (i.e. majuscule/minuscule) classifications based originally on later Italian models of *saec.* V–VII. Mallon's work on the papyri has shown that provincial scribes adhered to no double standard, but variously employed the whole range of new letter forms. There is

little correspondence evident between proportions of the script and the style of alphabet employed.

What is true of the earlier uncial hands is true of the insular as well. "Majuscules" are often written with elongated proportions on small cramped pages usually considered typical of the minuscule productions, and "minuscules" are found in the *de luxe* style associated with the majuscule. Size and formality are apparently independent of the letter forms employed.

Lowe selects the form of the *a* as the single feature by which to distinguish the two hands: the majuscule *a*, shaped like a conjoint *oc*; the minuscule, pinched at the top, with a very narrow bow. The manner of tracing the *a*, however, is not consistent, and as many as six different forms can be isolated. A number of insular hands combine several varieties as well, necessitating a continual modification of the majuscule/minuscule system.

Use of the uncial forms of the *d*, *n*, *r*, and *s* is considered characteristic of the majuscule also, but there is a continuum in usage from the *de luxe* majuscules, which admit all four forms, to certain informal majuscule and minuscule types which admit none at all. Most insular products, be they majuscule or minuscule, employ just one or two. None of Lowe's criteria, general or specific, do in fact offer a valid basis for classifying the various insular hands.

A description of insular MSS. follows here, organized on a regional basis. A distinct style is established for the Columban houses of northern Ireland in the late seventh century (the Cathach of Columba, considered *saec.* VII<sup>2</sup>), a style quite similar to that of Bobbio at the time. Southern Ireland at this period is represented by the diminutive Book of Mulling. Northumbria gave rise to a highly regimented and formal script, modeled on Italian uncials at Jarrow/Wearmouth (the Lindisfarne Gospels). A second, less formal and more compressed hand also appears (St. Omer, Bib. Mun. 257). Later Irish productions in the south culminated in the style of the Stowe Missal, in a tradition consistent with earlier samples and sharply distinct from that of the northern centers. A less carefully executed type, modeled on the Northumbrian style, dominates the late northern Irish. The predominant style of later Northumbria is exemplified by the Durham Cassiodorus, descended from the St. Omer Gospels. A second, related hand is seen in the Leningrad Bede. Both admit of a more cursive treatment.

Anglo-Saxon products written in Mercia show close imitation of Northumbrian models, particularly the type of the Cassiodorus. A few West Saxon products indicate a similar dependence on Northumbrian



practice, but on the type of the Bede. Kentish hands are defined by charters of A.D. 715 and 759; a variant style is seen in the Dusseldorf MS., Landes- und Stadtbibl. B.210, associated with the eastern sector, near Canterbury. The existence of a Canterbury school of illumination is questioned, and certain products of the school (Cotton Tiberius C.II) are considered instead to be Mercian. Renewed continental influence is evident in later Anglo-Saxon products.

Classification in this manner, by regional style, is considered to be truer to the actual historical circumstances in which the writing was done, and less misleading than the traditional majuscule/minuscule standards, which do not seem to have been codified until the Carolingian reform of the ninth century.

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Degree in Classical Philology 1972

PATRICIA FRANCES GETZ PREZIOSI — *Traditional Canon and Individual Hand in Early Cycladic Sculpture*

We opened our subject in Chapter I with a general description and a typological classification of EC figurines, which, with certain modifications, follows that of Renfrew (*AJA* 73 [1969] 1-32). We were here primarily concerned with such factors as posture, arm position, and the treatment of forms and details. It was seen that EC sculpture lends itself to classification according to essentially distinct categories, and that considerable variety is observable within the strict limits of each type. The relative chronology of the different types and varieties of figurines was also discussed, and a pattern of development was discerned. Finally, we considered the problems of ascertaining the find-spots and places of manufacture of the statuettes of each type. From a survey of the distribution of the figurines Paros, Naxos, and Amorgos appeared to constitute the center of sculptural activity in all phases of production. The importance of Keros in the ECII phase was also emphasized.

In Chapter II the figurines belonging to the more common naturalistic types (i.e. Plastiras, Developed folded-arm figurine and Angular folded-arm figurine) were studied with a view to discovering the principles which determined their design and execution. It was found that for each of the main types a system of proportions was adhered to stringently. The same sets of proportions were used for large and small works alike, and bore little resemblance to natural human ones. It



seemed necessary, therefore, to postulate that nearly every figurine was more or less carefully planned, with the aid of compass and/or ruler, according to a predetermined design or canon. It was then demonstrated that a tripartite plan was employed in the design of Plastiras-type figurines and a quadripartite plan for Developed folded-arm figurines and most Angular folded-arm figurines.

It was shown, further, that complementary angles, obtained from a rectangle based on a ratio of five to eight (and until now known to have been significant in Bronze-Age architectural contexts only), were used with striking consistency in EC figurines of all types both for aspects of the outline and for incised internal details. The possible configuration of the angular device used in this process was suggested.

In view of the remarkable similarity of design observed within each type of figurine, a similarity which could only be explained as resulting from the use of consciously applied formulae, it was suggested that the sculptors must have belonged to a highly specialized craft. Moreover, the archaeological record tends to support the conclusion that relatively few artisans were producing figurines at any one time during the EC period. It was considered advisable, therefore, to try to identify the works of individuals rather than of workshops or island schools.

In Chapters III–V our primary concerns were to isolate the works of individual masters, to assess the similarities and differences, to determine in what ways individual pieces were typical and in what ways idiosyncratic expressions, and, where the works were sufficient in number, to describe the development of a particular master's style. This method proved useful for examining a substantial number of figurines in detail, so as to amplify the general typological description of Chapter I, as well as to analyze further and demonstrate more cogently the principles of design set forth in Chapter II.

In Chapter III we identified the hands of five Plastiras masters (perhaps four, if Masters IV and V were one), two or more of whose works could be recognized. In Chapter IV, eight (or possibly seven) masters of Developed folded-arm figurines were studied; in Chapter V, seven masters of Angular folded-arm figurines. It was shown that these sculptors were responsible for 30 percent of the figurines of the three types illustrated in the Catalogue.

In Chapter VI the rarer postural and occupational types of figurine were described and studied both with regard to their typological characteristics (particularly in the aspect of planning) and with a view to isolating the works of individual masters. It was found that the vertical double groups, the seated male figures, and the standing male

musicians (all of which were executed in the Developed style and most likely by sculptors who normally carved folded-arm figurines) were designed according to modifications or elaborations of the quadripartite canon used for the Developed folded-arm figurines. It was possible to identify more than one work of two harper masters and two woodwind masters.

The single most compelling conclusions which can be drawn from the present study is that EC figurines were designed according to geometric formulae by sculptors carefully trained in a traditional aesthetic. A surprisingly sophisticated method is demonstrable, and in the opinion of the writer this method accounts for the unique character of Cycladic sculpture in the Early Bronze Age.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Degree in Classical Archaeology 1972

CATHARINE PRINCE ROTH — “*Mixed Aorists*” in *Homeric Greek*

The so-called “mixed aorists” in Homer — forms both sigmatic and thematic, occurring in the imperative and secondary tenses of the indicative — have been discussed since the time of Aristarchus. The ancient Homeric scholars came up with the two possible explanations: either the forms were some kind of aorist, combining features of first and second aorists, or else they were related to the future. These remain the only alternatives. The problem is to explain how the attested forms of each verb could have developed from one or the other starting point (aorist or future). In recent years we have advanced in understanding both of analogical development in language generally and the of special character of the Greek epic language. The rules which analogical processes follow are summarized by Kuryłowicz in his article “La Nature des procès dits ‘analogiques,’” which may be found in his *Esquisses linguistiques* (Wrocław 1960) pp. 66–86. Milman Parry demonstrated that the basic units of the epic language are not so much single words as formulaic phrases (see his collected papers, *The Making of Homeric Verse*, ed. Adam Parry, Oxford 1971). Subsequent study has shown more and more that the epic language does not create forms arbitrarily *metri gratia*, but that it follows the same rules of analogy as natural languages do, subject of course to the constraint of the meter. In the epic language, however, many old formulae have been preserved by the meter, as archaisms lacking synchronic motivation. When such a

formula becomes the basis for an analogical adaptation, it belongs to no grammatical system which might limit the development. Hence innovations can occur in the epic language which never took place in the natural Greek language, making the epic language a curious mixture of old and new. Although Homeric grammar cannot be described as a synchronic system, its development can be traced diachronically. The relations between formulae often make it possible to establish a chronological order. Thus innovations can be distinguished from archaisms, and the path of analogical development can be elucidated. In this way, we not only explain particular Homeric forms but also contribute to comparative Indo-European study, both in revealing types of development which may occur similarly in other languages and in removing from the realm of Indo-European inheritance those forms which are actually Greek innovations. Certainly neither a thematic sigmatic aorist nor a secondary future can be posited for a common Indo-European verbal system.

To summarize the particular results briefly, we are concerned with four types of "mixed aorist." First, *οἴσετε, ἄξετε, ὄψεσθε*, etc.: these come from the future, via the future participle (see *Glotta* 48 [1970] 155-163). The forms *δύσето, βήσето*, etc., are imperfects from the future stem, created perhaps when the future was not yet an inflexional category but still a derived desiderative formation. The imperatives *ὄρσεο* and *λέξεο* are thematizations of the athematic aorist imperatives *ὄρσο* and *λέξο*, which were synchronically unmotivated. The aorist *ἴξε ἴξον* is a sigmatization of the undifferentiated aorist or imperfect *ἴκε \*ἴκον*, like the Sanskrit seventh aorist as explained by Kuryłowicz (*Esquisses linguistiques* 126-130). By such diverse processes with various starting-points similar results were produced.

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Degree in Classical Philology 1972

CONSTANCE HELEN RICHARD STREETER — *Aristotle's References  
to Foreigners*

The thesis challenges the theory that Aristotle believed that the Greek race was superior to all other races. Tarn, Baldry, and Ehrenberg, for example, have based their evaluation of Aristotle's feeling regarding foreigners mainly upon his advice to Alexander and several observations he makes about foreigners in Book 1 of the *Politics*. They have used



Aristotle as a foil in order to emphasize the originality of Alexander's ideas of and his efforts toward bringing about the unity of mankind.

In the first chapter the following ideas are introduced: Aristotle's admiration for the Carthaginian constitution as expressed in Book 2 of the *Politics* is certainly inconsistent with any notion of the superiority of the Greek race to all others. Had Aristotle felt that all non-Greeks were inferior, he could have omitted any discussion whatever of a non-Greek constitution. His discussion of this non-Greek constitution in itself demonstrates that when he said that man is by nature a political animal (*Politics* 1.1253a1-3), he was referring to man in the universal sense. It is noted that Aristotle's critics have not taken into consideration all the evidence available on the subject of foreigners in Aristotle's works.

In the same chapter there is a discussion of Aristotle's methodological principles and it is decided to apply Aristotle's own method of arriving at truth, namely, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γιγνόμενα τοῖς λόγοις ("The evidence bears witness to the theories" *Politics* 8.1334a5,6), to all his references to "foreigners" (*barbaroi*, *ethne*, *xenoi*, *metoikoi*, and non-Greeks mentioned by ethnic name), as they must be the most compelling evidence to support any theory that Aristotle claimed superiority for the Greek race.

In the second chapter all his references to *barbaroi* have been categorized and analyzed. It has been asked what he meant by the word, and his references have been compared with those of other authors. His attitude throughout the *Politics* is inconsistent, just as his attitude to them in the *Ethics* and other works is often inconsistent with that expressed in the *Politics*. It has been argued that his advice to Alexander as reported by Plutarch in *De Alexandri Fortuna* should not be taken as seriously as most scholars have taken it, partly because of the purpose of Plutarch's work, but particularly because Aristotle's own writings contain many references which tend to refute it. It has been found that Aristotle used the word *barbaros* most often for the dual purpose of denoting the racial non-Greek and of describing men who were both non-Greek and mainly servile, mainly brutish, or culturally backward.

In the third chapter Aristotle's concept of the *ethnos* has been discussed. The conclusion drawn is that he takes the traditional meaning of the word, "a large group of people," and gives it an additional meaning. When he thinks in terms of the *polis*, the *ethnos* is any large group, Greek or non-Greek, that he could not, for one reason or another, call a *polis*. In the area of the traditional antithesis between Hellenes



and barbarians, Aristotle does not follow the trend observed by Juethner and Bengtson. His concept of the Hellenes narrows, but so does his concept of the barbarians. Between these two groups stand the *ethne*, who on the one hand approach his concept of the Hellenes, and on the other, his concept of the barbarians.

In the fourth chapter Aristotle's references to *xenoi* and *metoikoi* have been discussed. First, the historical and philological evidence about them outside the works of Aristotle has been examined, and then what can be learned about them from Aristotle's works. Aristotle's special meanings for the word *xenikos* have been discussed, and the idea that Aristotle preferred to identify himself as a *xenos* rather than as a *metoikos* has been proposed. *Xenikos*, when used in a rhetorical context, has the connotations of "lofty," and "dignified." Should a philosopher choose to withdraw from political life, he, though actually a citizen, could contribute to the life of the *polis* as a voluntary *xenos*. To Aristotle a special kind of "foreignness" in the life of the *polis* was praiseworthy and even desirable, and could be a positive influence on the state.

In the fifth chapter Aristotle's references to non-Greeks and non-Greek countries mentioned by name have been discussed. No evidence of national or racial prejudice was found in them, so instead of testing each for explicit prejudice, it has been asked whether Aristotle has, by his rigorous selection of evidence from the historical tradition, presented a picture of a given people which can be considered as evidence for implicit prejudice. Aristotle's sources have been questioned in order to bring his position about given peoples into relation with those of his predecessors. His references to geography, climate, animals, and people of given foreign countries have been examined in order that it might be seen whether he had theories based on an idea of geographical determinism. Problems which arise with respect to the particular references have also been considered, e.g. textual questions and conflicting statements of fact regarding particular countries.

The appendices at the end of the dissertation constitute the evidence on which the discussion is based. They contain all of Aristotle's references to *barbaroi*, *ethne*, *xenoi*, *metoikoi*, and non-Greeks mentioned by name in that order, designated as A, B, C, D, and E, respectively. Appendix E is arranged country by country in alphabetical order. The reason for including the appendices is twofold: (1) those interested in Aristotle's references to foreigners will be able to find them all in one place, and (2) the collection and categorization of the references reveal a consistent pattern of Aristotle's thought on the subject of foreigners.

The dissertation itself represents a collection of all of the available evidence regarding Aristotle's feeling about the "foreigners" of his world, and an analysis of that evidence. From it I have concluded that his writings do not support the claim to Greek superiority which his critics have attributed to him. They indicate instead that Aristotle's orientation was toward ideas rather than specific peoples. He believed that polity, intellectual achievement, and even tyranny, are not the property of given races and nationalities, but are universal things which the *gignomena* show have been attained by men, irrespective of nationality. In Aristotle's picture of mankind nationality is an "incidental circumstance."

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Degree in Classical Philology 1972

PETER WHITE — *Aspects of Nonimperial Patronage in the Works of Martial and Statius*

Testimony concerning literary patronage is available in quantity from two periods in the history of classical Latin literature: the Augustan Age and the turn of the first century after Christ. The workings of patronage in the time of Martial and Statius have been little discussed in comparison with Augustan conditions. Yet the relationship between poet and patron in the late first century was markedly different from what it had been one hundred years earlier, and therefore requires a separate investigation. The primary data consist of a long roll of individuals (for the most part little-known) who are named in the *Silvae* and in the *Epigrams*, and of the poems which were written for them. The five studies of this dissertation are organized first around a group of poems, and then around certain groups taken from among the patrons.

Evidence gathered in the first chapter shows that most of the *Epigrams* and the *Silvae* had already reached their honorands before they were published in books. They were first presented as impromptu productions, at public or private recitations, or in *libelli*, a *libellus* being defined as an unpublished draft manuscript of modest length. The subsequent appearance of the poems in published books, however, undoubtedly enhanced their appeal to patrons, who craved publicity. A second part of Chapter One deals with a series of introductory pieces (poems or letters), and argues that presentation of a book is to be distinguished

from the idea of dedication. Martial, who calculated on a popular readership, tended to avoid language which would imply a dedication. Statius by contrast, addressing a more limited audience, regularly dedicated his books.

A prosopographical survey of senators and highly placed *equites* who can be identified among the friends of Martial fills Chapter Two. Twenty-five men are included: Fronto, Celer, Stertinius Avitus, the younger Pliny, Munatius Gallus, Venuleius, two persons surnamed Macer, Julius Proculus, Nerva, Antonius Primus, Licinius Sura, the brothers Domitii (Tullus and Lucanus), Instantius Rufus, Domitius Apollinaris, Silius Italicus, Aquilius Regulus, Arruntius Stella, Flaccus, the *Ignotus* of *Epigrams* 7.79, Claudius Livianus, Norbanus, and Vibius Maximus (who is distinguished from the homonymous friend of Statius). Something is said also of four individuals who prove not to qualify for full discussion: Antistius Rusticus, Cornelius Palma, Julius Frontinus, and Crispinus the Egyptian. Chapter three surveys the corresponding category among Statius' friends, which includes six men: Manilius Vopiscus, Rutilius Gallicus, Maecius Celer, Vitorius Marcellus, Plotius Grypus, and Vettius Crispinus. Although both chapters focus on individuals, they also touch on recurrent characteristics which help to define the nature of literary patronage. It is a tie which poets formed and maintained with particular persons, not a form of *clientela* which involved families. These connections often owed their origin as much to the desire of rich men to cultivate celebrities as to the initiatives of Martial and Statius. They develop chiefly in the milieu of the literary salon, where the poets and prospective patrons have had the chance to meet; it is less common for the poets to approach persons to whom they do not naturally have access.

The most important conclusion from the prosopographical survey is reserved for chapter four. Neither Martial's friends nor Statius' friends were courted for the sake of their political influence. Indeed, almost none of Statius' friends had influence: of the senatorial friends, only one or two were consular; and among the rest, only the imperial secretary Abascantus counted as a man of power. About half of Statius' friends were politically inactive. More persons of consequence can be identified in the poems of Martial, who names at least four times as many patrons as does Statius. But Martial did not begin to cultivate his friends as they first emerged into political prominence; and those he names most often are, like Statius' closest friends, the least prominent in politics. A corollary observation can be made about the way in which the poets deal with their patrons' public careers. Martial generally



eschews mention of public offices. Statius, though he does not ignore a patron's career, never makes attainment of office the subject of a poem. In principle, the poets do not compose occasional verse to congratulate their friends on public office, or to publicize their activities in the army or in government.

The last chapter argues that patrons of the late first century did not constitute a closely knit group of literary-minded men, comparable to the patrons of the Augustan era. Far from forming a nucleus, the six people who figure both in the *Epigrams* and in the *Silvae* (Arruntius Stella, Atedius Melior, Claudius Etruscus, Argentaria Polla, Novius Vindex, and Earinus) had very divergent relationships with Martial and Statius, and no relations with one another. They rather corroborate than weaken the impression that the poets wrote for different audiences. Moreover, another group of contemporaries, the friends of Pliny, overlap but little with the people mentioned in the *Epigrams*, and do not overlap at all with the people of the *Silvae*. This holds true even for Pliny's specifically "literary" friends. If, then, the *Silvae*, the *Epigrams*, and the *Letters* do fairly represent the milieu in which the literature of the late first century was written, that literature did not owe spirit or shape to the exertions of one particular circle of writers, poets, and patrons. Not only, however, are these groups more or less discrete. If Martial's friends (or Statius' friends) are taken by themselves, the individuals who comprise the group stand largely isolated from one another. The *Epigrams* often name one friend in connection with another, but most of the people who can be interlinked in this way cluster in isolated duos and trios. One extensive cluster of mutual friends can be discerned, centering on Arruntius Stella. But otherwise the concept of a "literary circle" does not apply to the collection of people named in the *Epigrams*. In the *Silvae* there is even less evidence of interrelationship among the various patrons.

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